Com. v. Ibrahim, J. ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
JIHAD IBRAHIM
Appellee No. 3467 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order of August 11, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No.: C-51-CR-0010044-2013
BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., SHOGAN, J., and WECHT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 29, 2015
The Commonwealth appeals the trial court’s August 11, 2014 order.
In that order, the trial court granted Jihad Ibrahim’s motion to suppress
evidence. For the reasons contained herein, we reverse the order, and we
remand for further proceedings.
On July 19, 2013, Philadelphia Police Officer Joseph Marrero and his
partner observed Ibrahim riding a bicycle in the wrong direction on a one-
way street in Philadelphia. When the officers attempted to stop him,
Ibrahim sped off on the bike. While fleeing, Ibrahim dropped a firearm.
Ibrahim was apprehended, and charged with persons not to possess a
firearm, possessing a firearm with altered manufacturer’s number, carrying
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a concealed firearm without a license, carrying a firearm in Philadelphia, and
possession of an instrument of crime.1
On August 11, 2014, Ibrahim presented an oral motion to the trial
court to suppress the firearm. The trial court immediately proceeded to a
hearing, at which the following testimony was elicited, as summarized by the
trial court:
[Officer Marrero] testified that[,] on July 19, 2013[,] at
approximately 10:20 a.m.[,] he was in an unmarked police
vehicle in plain clothes proceeding eastbound in the 1800 block
of Dickenson Street in South Philadelphia[,] which runs one-way
in that direction. He observed [Ibrahim] riding on a bicycle in
the 1700 block of Dickenson travelling westbound towards him
approximately a half a block away. He attempted to stop
[Ibrahim] for a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code for riding his
bicycle the wrong way by yelling at him [to] “Stop, stop the
bike,” at which time he claimed [that Ibrahim] refused to stop,
continued to pedal faster, and turned southbound onto Bouvier
Street[,] which is one-way southbound. He followed [Ibrahim]
without initiating his lights or siren and at the end of Bouvier
Street, [Ibrahim] made a right-hand turn onto Tasker Street
heading westbound, and at the corner of 18th and Tasker, about
a quarter of a block further, [Ibrahim] jumped off of the bicycle,
removed a firearm from his waistband and discarded it on the
street. At that point, the officer exited his vehicle, announced
that he was the police, ordered him to stop[,] and chased and
apprehended him.
Q. Did you announce yourself—at any point, did you
announce yourself as police?
A. Yes. Once I saw [Ibrahim] jump off of the bicycle and
remove the object from his waistband, I announced
police and to stop.
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1
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6105, 6110.2, 6106, 6108, and 907, respectively.
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He then testified that he did not issue a traffic citation because
he is not permitted to issue traffic tickets when in plain clothes
and he did not have a citation book with him. He recovered the
weapon from where he saw [Ibrahim] discard it.
On cross-examination, the officer confirmed that he first saw
[Ibrahim] when he was approximately a half a block ahead of
him, that he only observed him going the wrong way “for a
matter of feet,” [that he] first yelled for him to stop through his
car window when he caught up with him on Bouvier Street, at
which point [Ibrahim] was travelling in the correct direction,
without announcing that he was a police officer, and that,
therefore, there was no way for [Ibrahim] to know that he was a
police officer; in addition, he did not intend to issue a traffic
citation to [Ibrahim] but only to warn him. [Ibrahim] did not
testify or present any other evidence.
Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 1/15/2015, at 1-2 (references to the notes of
testimony omitted).
After hearing the testimony and the argument from both parties, the
trial court determined that the stop was pretextual, and that Ibrahim’s
abandonment of the firearm was forced. See Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”),
8/11/2014, at 22. Accordingly, the trial court granted Ibrahim’s suppression
motion. Id.
On September 10, 2014, the Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal,
in which the Commonwealth certified that the trial court’s suppression order
would either terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). On the same date, the Commonwealth filed a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b),
even though the trial court had not yet ordered such a statement. On
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January 15, 2015, the trial court issued the above-quoted opinion pursuant
to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
The Commonwealth raises the following issue for our consideration:
Where [Ibrahim] drove the wrong way on a one-way street on a
bicycle and, when ordered to stop, sped away and discarded a
gun, did the lower court err in suppressing the gun on the
ground that the stop was pretextual because the police wanted
to stop [Ibrahim] for reasons unrelated to the traffic violation?
Brief for the Commonwealth at 1.
Our standard of review is well-settled.
We begin by noting that where a motion to suppress has been
filed, the burden is on the Commonwealth to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the challenged evidence is
admissible. In reviewing the ruling of a suppression court, our
task is to determine whether the factual findings are supported
by the record. If so, we are bound by those findings. Where, as
here, it is the Commonwealth who is appealing the decision of
the suppression court, we must consider only the evidence of the
defendant’s witnesses and so much of the evidence for the
prosecution as read in the context of the record as a whole
remains uncontradicted.
Moreover, if the evidence supports the factual findings of the
suppression court, this Court will reverse only if there is an error
in the legal conclusions drawn from those findings.
Commonwealth v. Powell, 994 A.2d 1096, 1101 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(internal citations to cases and rules omitted). With regard to the trial
court’s legal conclusions, our standard of review is de novo.
Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 291, 320-21 (Pa. 2011) (citations
omitted).
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We first note that the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code apply with
full force in this case, even though Ibrahim was riding a bicycle instead of a
vehicle at the time that the police observed him driving in the wrong
direction down a one-way street. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3501(a) (“Every person
riding a pedalcycle upon a roadway shall be granted all of the rights and
shall be subject to all of the duties applicable to the driver of a vehicle by
this title, except as to special provisions in this subchapter and except as to
those provisions of this title which by their nature can have no application.”).
We now turn to the principles that govern interactions between a police
officer and a person operating a vehicle on this Commonwealth’s roadways.
The general rule regarding the level of suspicion that a police officer
must possess before stopping a vehicle is codified at 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b),
which provides as follows:
Whenever a police officer is engaged in a systematic program of
checking vehicles or drivers or has reasonable suspicion that a
violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may stop a
vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of checking the
vehicle’s registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle
identification number or engine number or the driver’s license, or
to secure such other information as the officer may reasonably
believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.
Id. Although subsection 6308(b) delineates the general rule, it does not
apply in all instances because, as we have held, not all vehicle offenses
require further investigation to determine whether a motorist has committed
that offense. Indeed, despite subsection 6308(b)’s reasonable suspicion
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standard, some offenses, by their very nature, require a police officer to
possess probable cause before he or she may conduct a traffic stop.
In Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en
banc), an en banc panel of this Court explained the requisite levels of
suspicion that a police officer must have before effectuating a stop, as
follows:
In light of our Supreme Court’s interpretation of the current
language of Section 6308(b), we are compelled to conclude that
the standards concerning the quantum of cause necessary for an
officer to stop a vehicle in this Commonwealth are settled;
notwithstanding any prior diversity on the issue among panels of
this Court. Traffic stops based on a reasonable suspicion: either
of criminal activity or a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code under
the authority of Section 6308(b) must serve a stated
investigatory purpose. In effect, the language of Section
6308(b)—“to secure such other information as the officer may
reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of
this title”—is conceptually equivalent with the underlying
purpose of a Terry[2] stop.
Mere reasonable suspicion will not justify a vehicle stop when the
driver’s detention cannot serve an investigatory purpose relevant
to the suspected violation. In such an instance, “it is encumbent
[sic] upon the officer to articulate specific facts possessed by
him, at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide
probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in
violation of some provision of the Code.” Commonwealth v.
Gleason, 785 A.2d 983, 989 (Pa. 2001) (superseded by
subsection 6308(b); emphasis in Gleason).
Id. at 1290-91 (citation modified; some citations omitted).
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2
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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We further elaborated upon the distinction between Motor Vehicle
Code offenses that require probable cause and those that require only
reasonable suspicion most recently in Commonwealth v. Salter, ___ A.3d
___, 2015 Pa.Super. 166 (Pa. Super. 2015). Therein, we stated the
following:
[W]hen considering whether reasonable suspicion or probable
cause is required constitutionally to make a vehicle stop, the
nature of the violation has to be considered. If it is not
necessary to stop the vehicle to establish that a violation of the
Vehicle Code has occurred, an officer must possess probable
cause to stop the vehicle. Where a violation is suspected, but a
stop is necessary to further investigate whether a violation has
occurred, an officer need only possess reasonable suspicion to
make the stop. Illustrative of these two standards are stops for
speeding and DUI. If a vehicle is stopped for speeding, the
officer must possess probable cause to stop the vehicle. This is
so because when a vehicle is stopped, nothing more can be
determined as to the speed of the vehicle when it was observed
while travelling upon a highway. On the other hand, if an officer
possesses sufficient knowledge based upon behavior suggestive
of DUI, the officer may stop the vehicle upon reasonable
suspicion of a Vehicle Code violation, since a stop would provide
the officer the needed opportunity to investigate further if the
driver was operating under the influence of alcohol or a
controlled substance.
Id. at *3.
In light of these principles, our first task is to determine whether
Officer Marrero needed probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop, or in
this case attempt to stop, Ibrahim. To make this determination, we must
consider the language and nature of the offense that triggered Officer
Marrero’s actions. Ibrahim was travelling the wrong way down a one-way
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street, an illegal action that is governed by 75 Pa.C.S. § 3308. That section
state that “[u]pon a roadway designated for one-way traffic, a vehicle shall
be driven only in the direction designated at all or such times as shall be
indicated by official traffic-control devices.” Id. We have no difficulty
concluding that a police officer must possess probable cause before stopping
an individual who is violating this provision. Like the speeding offense
described in the example from Salter, the investigation into the offense of
driving in the wrong direction on a one-way street is completed when the
officer observes a motorist doing exactly that. No further investigation is
required, and nothing of evidentiary or investigatory value with regard to
that particular offense can be ascertained once the stop is effectuated.
Thus, section 3308, like speeding, is an offense that requires probable
cause, not reasonable suspicion, before an officer may stop the vehicle.
Without question, Officer Marrero possessed probable cause in this
case. To determine whether probable cause exists, we must consider
“whether the facts and circumstances which are within the knowledge of the
officer at the time of the arrest, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy
information, are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime.”
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 585 A.2d 988, 990 (Pa. 1991). From a
clear vantage point, Officer Marrero observed Ibrahim driving his bicycle
westbound on a road that requires all traffic to proceed in the eastbound
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direction. No further investigation was required. The moment that Officer
Marrero observed the violation, he had probable cause to stop Ibrahim.
The trial court held that the violation that Officer Marrero observed
was de minimis, and that further observation was necessary before he could
attempt to stop Ibrahim. This simply is not true. The statutory language of
the offense does not include a provision setting forth how long a person
must travel in the wrong direction before a violation occurs. To the
contrary, the offense occurs at the moment the motorist actually travels in
the wrong direction. Hence, it is of no moment whether an officer observes
a person travelling for one yard, ten yards, or one hundred yards. Upon
observing the violation, a police officer has probable cause to stop the
offending motorist.
The trial court relies upon Gleason for the proposition that an officer
must observe a person committing an offense for a sustained period of time
before making a vehicle stop. This reliance is entirely misplaced. First,
Gleason involved a DUI. Our Supreme Court held that a police officer had
to observe a motorist for a sustained period of time to determine whether
probable cause existed to stop the driver to investigate a DUI. However, as
noted above, Gleason was superseded by subsection 6308(b). Thus, the
probable cause analysis set forth in Gleason has no bearing on this case.
Second, and more importantly, DUI is one of the crimes that requires
reasonable suspicion, not probable cause. In other words, a suspected DUI
often necessitates further investigation, whereas driving the wrong way on a
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one-way street does not. The two crimes require different levels of
suspicion, and nothing about the offense committed by Ibrahim required any
additional investigation or any sustained observation by the police officer.
Gleason simply has no application here, nor is there any justification for
granting Ibrahim’s motion based upon the trial court’s characterization of the
violation of the Motor Vehicle Code as de minimis.
The trial court also concluded that the traffic stop was pretextual.
That is, the trial court believed that Officer Marrero used the alleged de
minimis traffic stop as an unjustified basis for stopping Ibrahim to
investigate some other crime. We observe nothing in the record to support
this conclusion. At no point during the suppression hearing did Ibrahim
suggest any other crime or set forth any other reason why Officer Marrero
wanted to investigate him. To the contrary, the record demonstrates only
that Officer Marrero observed Ibrahim clearly violate a provision of the Motor
Vehicle Code, and that Officer Marrero attempted to stop Ibrahim based only
upon that violation. The record does not support any contention that Officer
Marrero stopped Ibrahim for any other reason.
Finally, the trial court held that, because the stop was illegal, Ibrahim’s
abandonment of the firearm was forced. As a general rule, when a person
abandons property, the police may recover that property and use it as
evidence against a defendant. However, the abandonment cannot be the
result of illegal police conduct. Commonwealth v. Byrd, 987 A.2d 786,
791 (Pa. Super. 2009). In other words, if an individual abandons property
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during the course of an unconstitutional vehicle stop, we will consider the
abandonment to be forced, and the evidence recovered therefrom must be
suppressed. In this case, however, Officer Marrero had probable cause to
stop Ibrahim. The stop was not unconstitutional. Consequently, Ibrahim
was not forced to abandon the gun, and it cannot be suppressed.
Our standard of review require us to review the legal conclusions
drawn by the trial court de novo. Having done so, it is apparent that the
trial court erroneously held that Officer Marrero’s actions were
unconstitutional. To the contrary, Officer Marrero had probable cause to
stop Ibrahim. We vacate the trial court’s order, and we remand this case for
proceedings consistent with our holding.
Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.3
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3
The Commonwealth has filed a motion requesting this Court to
consider its untimely filed reply brief to be timely. The Commonwealth’s
reply brief was due on June 11, 2015. The Commonwealth did not file its
reply brief and the motion until June 18, 2015. In the motion, the
Commonwealth asserts boilerplate averments of essentially being too busy
to comply timely with this Court’s filing deadlines. The Commonwealth adds
no specific information regarding the due dates or names of any of the other
cases that have prevented the timely filing of its reply brief. Moreover, the
Commonwealth does not explain why it did not file its motion at an earlier
date. The Commonwealth having set forth what appear to be merely
boilerplate allegations, we deny the motion. We have not considered the
Commonwealth’s untimely reply brief in any way in deciding this case.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/29/2015
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