Com. v. Carchidi, T. ( 2015 )

J-S11042-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
THERESA MARY CARCHIDI, :
:
Appellee : No. 1163 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered on June 19, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of York County,
Criminal Division, No. CP-67-CR-0002376-2014
BEFORE: PANELLA, OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 29, 2015
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the judgment of
sentence of six months’ intermediate punishment, following the guilty plea of
Theresa Mary Carchidi (“Carchidi”) to driving under the influence of alcohol
(second offense) (“DUI”), with refusal to submit to chemical testing. 1 The
Commonwealth disputes the trial court’s reliance upon this Court’s decision
in Commonwealth v. Musau, 69 A.3d 754 (Pa. Super. 2013), which
interpreted 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3803 as providing a statutory maximum sentence
of six months for a second DUI offense with refusal to submit to chemical
testing. See Musau, 69 A.3d at 758. We affirm.
The Commonwealth claims that the trial court improperly relied upon
Musau, arguing that this Court’s most recent interpretation of section 3803
1
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1), (b)(4).
J-S11042-15
provides for a five-year statutory maximum sentence. Brief for the
Commonwealth at 9 (citing Commonwealth v. Barr, 79 A.3d 668, 674 (Pa.
Super. 2013)).2 The Commonwealth asserts that the grading of the offense
is governed by 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3803, “and constitutes a Misdemeanor 1
graded offense with a sentencing mandatory minimum of 90 days, and a
statutory maximum sentence of five years.” Brief for the Commonwealth at
9.
The Commonwealth’s argument implicates the legality of Carchidi’s
sentence and, thus, is appealable as of right. Commonwealth v. Grow,
2015 PA Super 186, 2015 Pa. Super. LEXIS 510, at *3 (en banc). As such,
our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Id.Our review of the record discloses that the trial court sentenced
Carchidi pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3803(a)(1), as in effect at the time of
2
In Barr, a panel of this Court held that an appellant’s refusal to submit to
chemical testing
increased the grade of Appellant’s second DUI conviction from an
ungraded misdemeanor to a misdemeanor of the first degree.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3803(b)(4). The jury’s “refusal” determination
also increased Appellant’s statutory maximum penalty from six
months’ imprisonment to five years’ imprisonment and increased
Appellant’s mandatory minimum penalty from 30 days in jail to
90 days in jail. 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3803(b)(1) and 3804(c)(2); 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 1104(1) (prescribing the statutory maximum for
misdemeanors).
Barr, 79 A.3d at 674.
-2-
J-S11042-15
Carchidi’s sentencing. At that time, section 3803 provided, in relevant part,
as follows:
§ 3803. Grading
(a) Basic offenses. –
Notwithstanding the provisions of section (b):
(1) An individual who violates section 3802(a) (relating to
driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance)
and has no more than one prior offense commits a
misdemeanor for which the individual may be sentenced to
a term of imprisonment of not more than six months and
pay a fine under section 3804 (relating to penalties).
***
(b) Other offenses.
***
(4) An individual who violates section 3802(a)(1) where the
individual refused testing of blood or breath, or who violates
section 3802(c) or (d) and who has one or more prior offenses
commits a misdemeanor of the first degree.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3803 (effective until October 27, 2014) (emphasis added). 3
On September 4, 2015, the Pennsylvania Superior Court, sitting en
banc, filed its decision in Grow to determine whether Barr or Musau
controls in sentencing a defendant who has one prior DUI and who has
refused chemical testing upon the second DUI. In Grow, the en banc Court,
3
On October 27, 2014, the legislature amended section 3803(a) to replace
the phrase “Notwithstanding the provisions of section (b)” with “Except as
provided in subsection (b).” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3803(a). As Carchidi was
convicted and sentenced prior to the amendment, the amended version is
not applicable in this appeal.
-3-
J-S11042-15
agreeing with this Court’s interpretation of section 3803 in Musau, held that
“the plain language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meanings,
indicates [that] regardless of the … grading of the offense as a first-degree
misdemeanor, the maximum sentence for a first or second DUI conviction is
six months’ imprisonment.” Grow, slip opinion at 5-6 (quoting Musau, 69
A.3d at 758). Thus, the en banc panel concluded,
because the meaning of the statute in question is clear and free
from ambiguity, the Statutory Construction Act provides that
“the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of
pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 1921(b). Moreover, we are
constrained to consider solely the plain meaning of section 3803,
since “only when the words of a statute are ambiguous should a
court seek to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly
through consideration of statutory construction factors found in
Section 1921(c).” Commonwealth v. Brown, 603 Pa. 31, 981
A.2d 893, 898 (Pa. 2009) []….
Grow, slip opinion at 6-7 (footnotes omitted).4 As this Court’s en banc
decision in Grow is binding precedent, we cannot grant the Commonwealth
relief on its challenge to the legality of Carchidi’s sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
4
Nevertheless, the en banc Court in Grow considered and rejected the
Commonwealth’s arguments that this Court’s decision in Barr controls, see
Grow, slip opinion at 7-10 (concluding that the language in Barr, relied
upon by the Commonwealth, is dictum and not controlling); 8-9 (stating that
“grading and sentencing of the offense for a defendant in Grow’s position is
hardly absurd; the result merely diverges from the typical scheme.”); 12
(stating that although section 1921(c) of the Statutory Construction Act, 1
Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(c), permits legislative and administrative interpretations to
be considered when the wording of the statute is ambiguous, the language
of section 3803 is clear and free from ambiguity).
-4-
J-S11042-15
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/29/2015
-5-