Com. v. Freeland, J. ( 2014 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JASON EUGENE FREELAND
Appellant No. 1331 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 30, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0002141-2013
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., PANELLA and OLSON, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED DECEMBER 22, 2014
Appellant, Jason Eugene Freeland, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered on July 30, 2014, as made final by the denial of his post-
sentence motion on August 6, 2014. We affirm.
The factual background of this case is as follows. On November 2,
2011, 13-year-old A.M. was sent home from school. When she got home
from school, Appellant pushed her down on the bed and raped her. The
procedural background of this case is as follows. On December 18, 2013,
Appellant was charged via criminal information with rape,1 sexual assault,2
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(a)(1).
2
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3124.1.
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and corruption of a minor.3 On April 3, 2014, Appellant pled guilty to all
three charges. The trial court ordered an evaluation of Appellant by the
Pennsylvania Sexual Offenders Assessment Board because of his conviction
for the sexual offenses. After this evaluation, Appellant’s sentencing hearing
was held on July 30, 2014. At that hearing, Appellant was found not to be a
sexually violent predator (“SVP”), was sentenced to four to eight years’
imprisonment, and ordered to register as a sex offender for the remainder of
his life. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion on August 4, 2014. That
motion was denied on August 6, 2014. This timely appeal followed.4
Appellant raises two issues for our review:
1. Is it unconstitutional to require an Appellant to register for a
lifetime when said registration requirement exceeds the
statutory maximum penalty for Appellant’s offense?
2. Is [Pennsylvania’s version of the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (“SORNA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A §§ 9799.10–9799.41]
unconstitutional in requiring [] Appellant to register for [his]
lifetime?
Appellant’s Brief at 7 (complete capitalization removed).
Appellant first contends that his sentence is illegal as the requirement
to register as a sex offender for the remainder of his life exceeds the
statutory maximum penalty for rape, i.e., 20 years. “Issues relating to the
3
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(ii).
4
On August 13, 2014, Appellant filed a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal (“concise statement”). See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On
August 19, 2014, the trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion. Both issues
raised on appeal were included in Appellant’s concise statement.
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legality of a sentence are questions of law. . . . Our standard of review over
such questions is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.”
Commonwealth v. Akbar, 91 A.3d 227, 238 (Pa. Super. 2014). As this
Court has explained:
On December 20, 2011, the legislature replaced Megan’s Law
with SORNA, effective December 20, 2012, to strengthen
registration requirements for sex offenders and to bring
Pennsylvania into compliance with the Adam Walsh Child
Protection and Safety Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 16901 et seq. Section
9799.14 of SORNA establishes a three-tier system of specifically
enumerated offenses requiring registration for differing lengths
of time.
Commonwealth v. Sampolski, 89 A.3d 1287, 1288 (Pa. Super. 2014).
Rape is a Tier III offense and requires lifetime registration. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14(d)(2).
As to Appellant’s contention that the lifetime registration requirement
is illegal because it exceeds the statutory maximum sentence for rape, this
Court recently rejected a similar challenge, stating:
[Appellant] relies upon Commonwealth v. Williams, 832 A.2d
962 (Pa. 2003), to support his argument that requiring an
individual to register for many years longer than the maximum
penalty of the crime itself is excessive and the registration
provisions should be struck down as unconstitutional punishment
under the state and federal constitutions. In Williams, our
Supreme Court was asked to decide whether certain provisions
of Megan’s Law II were constitutional as it applied to [SVPs]. The
Williams Court specifically held that the [application of the]
registration, notification, and counseling provisions of Megan’s
Law II, to offenders deemed to be SVPs, were non-punitive,
regulatory measures supporting a legitimate governmental
purpose. Id. at 986. However, [our Supreme] Court did find
that the prescribed penalties that attach to SVP’s for failure to
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register and verify their residence were unconstitutionally
punitive and, therefore, invalidated those provisions. Id. . . .
[E]ven assuming that [Appellant’s lifetime] registration
requirement is excessive in comparison to his actual sentence of
[four to eight] years’ imprisonment, we cannot ignore our
Supreme Court’s pronouncement that:
Because [it] do[es] not view the registration requirements
as punitive but, rather, remedial, [it] does not perceive
mandating compliance by offenders who have served their
maximum term to be improper. Furthermore, the fact that
an offender may be held until such information is furnished
is no different from confining someone in a civil contempt
proceeding. While any imprisonment, of course, has
punitive and deterrent effects, it must be viewed as
remedial if release is conditioned upon one’s willingness to
comply with a particular mandate.
Commonwealth v. Gaffney, 733 A.2d 616, 622 (Pa. 1999).
***
While [the cases relied upon] were decided prior to the effective
date of SORNA, the same principles behind the registration
requirements for sexual offenders under Megan’s Law apply to
those subject to SORNA. Namely, to effectuate, through
remedial legislation, the non-punitive goal of public safety.
Commonwealth v. McDonough, 96 A.3d 1067, 1070–1071 (Pa. Super.
2014) (emphasis removed); see Commonwealth v. Benner, 853 A.2d
1068, 1070 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal quotation marks, alteration, and
citations omitted) (“The registration provisions of Megan’s Law do not
constitute criminal punishment. . . . [T]he registration requirement is
properly characterized as a collateral consequence of the defendant’s plea,
as it cannot be considered to have a definite, immediate and largely
automatic effect on a defendant’s punishment.”).
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Thus, under McDonough a registration requirement that exceeds the
statutory maximum sentence is not illegal. Although McDonough dealt with
a 15-year registration requirement, its rationale is equally as applicable to a
lifetime registration requirement. Therefore, Appellant’s lifetime registration
requirement was not an illegal sentence.
In his second issue, Appellant contends that SORNA is
unconstitutional. Specifically, he alleges that SORNA violates the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment found in the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution (as incorporated against the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment) and article I, section 13 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution. The constitutionality of a statute is a pure question of law,
therefore our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is
plenary. Robinson Tp., Wash. Cnty. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901,
943 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted).
“[T]he Pennsylvania prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
is coextensive with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, and [] the Pennsylvania Constitution affords no broader
protection against excessive sentences than that provided by the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Commonwealth v. Elia, 83
A.3d 254, 267 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 94 A.3d 1007 (Pa. 2014)
(internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted). It is well-settled
that when a statute imposes a disability on a defendant for a reason other
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than to punish, it is considered non-penal and outside the confines of the
Eighth Amendment. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958). As noted
above, in McDonough this Court recently held that SORNA’s goal is “to
effectuate, through remedial legislation, the non-punitive goal of public
safety.” McDonough, 96 A.3d at 1071; see Benner, 853 A.2d at 1070.
We note that our decision in McDonough is congruent with the
decisions of a long list of courts. At least three United States Courts of
Appeals have held that registration requirements under the federal version
of SORNA do not violate the Eighth Amendment. United States v. Under
Seal, 709 F.3d 257, 265 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Crews, 496 F.
App’x 896, 901 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Davis, 352 F. App’x
270, 272 (10th Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court of Nevada has likewise held
that Nevada’s version of SORNA does not violate the Eighth Amendment.
Nevada v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (Logan D.), 306 P.3d 369, 388 n.13
(Nev. 2013). Furthermore, at least five United States Courts of Appeals
have held that the federal version of SORNA is a civil regulatory scheme,
foreclosing the possibility that it violates the Eighth Amendment. United
States v. Roberson, 752 F.3d 517, 524 (1st Cir. 2014); United States v.
Shannon, 511 F. App’x 487, 492 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Leach,
639 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir.2011); United States v. Young, 585 F.3d 199,
204–205 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 920 (8th
Cir. 2008). Courts of last resort in at least two other jurisdictions have
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likewise held that their respective versions of SORNA are civil regulatory
schemes. Doe v. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 62 A.3d 123, 155–
156 (Md. 2013); Doe I v. Williams, 61 A.3d 718, 730 (Me. 2013) (citation
omitted);
As SORNA is a non-punitive, remedial scheme, it is not punishment for
the purposes of the Eighth Amendment or article 1, section 13 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. Therefore, SORNA’s lifetime registration
requirement does not violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment found in the federal and state constitutions.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/22/2014
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