In the Interest of: C.L.P., a Minor ( 2015 )

J-A25023-15
2015 PA Super 210IN THE INTEREST OF: C.L.P., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: F.M.P. AND P.T.A.,
MATERNAL GRANDPARENTS
No. 42 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered November 21, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0002355-2013
CP-51-FN-004529-2013
IN THE INTEREST OF: G.L.P., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: F.M.P. AND P.T.A.,
MATERNAL GRANDPARENTS
No. 43 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered November 21, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0002361-2013
CP-51-FN-004529-2013
BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., MUNDY, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
OPINION BY MUNDY, J.: FILED OCTOBER 02, 2015
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A25023-15
Appellants, F.M.P. (Maternal Grandfather) and P.T.A. (Maternal
Grandmother), (collectively, Grandparents) appeal from the November 21,
2014 order denying, inter alia, their motion to schedule a custody trial
pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1915.4, with respect to
their grandsons, G.L.P. and C.L.P., who are adjudicated dependent pursuant
to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302. After careful review, we reverse and remand for
further proceedings.
The factual background of this case, as gleaned from the certified
record, is as follows. In November 2013, G.L.P., who was then five-months-
old, and C.L.P., who was then three-years-old, were removed from their
biological parents, G.P.T. (Mother) and C.L.R. (Father), and placed in the
custody of the Philadelphia Department of Human Services, Children and
Youth Division (DHS), following a non-accidental trauma suffered by G.L.P.
See Trial Court Opinion, 5/18/15, at 1-2. A physician at the Children’s
Hospital of Philadelphia, where G.L.P. was treated, certified his injury as a
near-fatality. Id. at 2.
On March 24, 2014, the trial court adjudicated G.L.P. and C.L.P.
dependent. In addition, the trial court issued an aggravating circumstances
order with respect to G.L.P. and C.L.P. stating that “[t]he Child or another
child of the parent has been the victim of physical abuse resulting in serious
bodily injury[,] sexual violence[,] or aggravated neglect by the parent;
proven as to Mother and Father.” Trial Court Order, 3/24/14, at 1.
-2-
J-A25023-15
Nevertheless, the trial court directed DHS to provide reunification services
for the family. Id. Since their placement, G.L.P. and C.L.P. have been in
foster care through Catholic Social Services.
On June 19, 2014, Grandparents filed a complaint for custody against
Mother, Father, and DHS, wherein they asserted they had standing to seek
custody of G.L.P. and C.L.P. pursuant to Section 5324(3) of the Custody Act,
23 Pa.C.S. §§ 5321-5340. On the same date, Grandparents filed a motion
to intervene, wherein they requested that the trial court schedule a custody
hearing or, alternatively, “grant[] them permission to participate in the
dependency proceedings naming them as the care alternative which is the
least restrictive for the boys.” Motion to Intervene, 6/19/14, at ¶ 19.
Thereafter, the certified record reveals that, by a July 30, 2014
permanency review order, the trial court directed DHS to explore
Grandparents as possible resources, and to schedule supervised visitation
between Grandparents, G.L.P., and C.L.P., upon receipt of criminal
clearances for Grandparents.1 By permanency review order dated August
21, 2014, the trial court directed Grandparents to submit a brief within 30
days concerning whether the trial court has jurisdiction to hear the custody
____________________________________________
1
By a permanency review order dated October 31, 2014, the trial court
directed the parties to arrange supervised weekly visits between
Grandparents and their grandsons.
-3-
J-A25023-15
matter. On October 28, 2014, Grandparents filed a motion to schedule a
custody trial pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1915.4.
An oral argument on Grandparents’ motions occurred on November
21, 2014, during which counsel for DHS, Mother, Father, and Grandparents
participated, along with the Child Advocate. Counsel for Grandparents
explained to the trial court that the motion to intervene, filed concurrently
with the custody complaint on June 19, 2014, “was nothing more than a
vehicle to request a trial date under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure
1915.4. It [was] never intended to be a motion to intervene in
dependency.” N.T., 11/21/14, at 11. As such, counsel for Grandparents
acknowledged to the trial court that Grandparents do not have standing in
the dependency action. Id. at 62.
At the conclusion of the oral argument, the trial court, on the record,
denied Grandparents’ motion to intervene, and further stated that the court
will not entertain the custody complaint or the motion to schedule a custody
trial because Grandparents do not have legal standing. Id. at 69-70, 75.
The trial court explained on the record that Section 5324 confers legal
standing upon grandparents of dependent children “when the parents[’]
rights either [have] been terminated or the parent is deceased, or the parent
is in no position to become a parent, which is different from this case,
because … the parents right now … I believe they’re fully compliant [with
their Family Service Plan objectives.]” Id. at 29. By order dated November
-4-
J-A25023-15
21, 2014, the trial court denied Grandparents’ motion to intervene. In
addition, the order stated that Grandparents “were ruled out as possible
kinship parents.”2 Trial Court Order, 11/21/14, at 1.
On December 18, 2014, Grandparents filed notices of appeal and
concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i), which this Court consolidated by stipulation of the parties.
The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion on May 18, 2015.3
On appeal, Grandparents present three issues for our review.
A. Whether it was an error of law for the trial court
to refuse to schedule a trial on the Grandparents’
Complaint for Custody where the subject
grandchildren had been adjudicated dependent by
the trial court, such adjudication triggering the
Grandparents’ standing to file a complaint for
custody pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324, and such
filing requiring the scheduling of a trial pursuant to
[Pa.R.C.P.] 1915.4[?]
____________________________________________
2
During the oral argument on November 21, 2014, counsel for DHS advised
the trial court that Grandparents have been ruled out as a kinship resource
for G.L.P. and C.L.P. because of an allegation that one or both of them may
have been caring for G.L.P. at the time of his injury. See N.T., 11/21/14, at
17, 20-21.
3
The Child Advocate argues in its appellee brief that we should dismiss this
appeal because the subject order did not dismiss or deny the custody
complaint. We reject this argument because the motion to intervene, which
the court denied, included a request to schedule a child custody hearing. In
addition, the trial court ruled on the record that it will not act on the motion
to schedule a custody trial because Grandparents do not have legal standing.
N.T., 11/21/14, at 69-70, 75. We deem this to be, in effect, a dismissal of
their custody complaint. Therefore, we conclude that this appeal is properly
before us, and we will review it on its merits.
-5-
J-A25023-15
B. Whether it was an error of law and abuse of
discretion for the trial court to find that the
Grandparents’ Complaint for Custody could not be
heard while reunification with the parents was being
considered via the Juvenile Act[,] 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 6301 et seq., which it determined to supersede the
statutory mandate of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324, when the
plain language of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324 imposes no
such requirement, nor does case[]law interpreting
it[?]
C. Whether it was an error of law for the trial court
to conclude that any grant of custody to
Grandparents via the Custody Act, including
temporary custody which is an option within the
Juvenile Act[,] 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(a), and the
Custody Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5323(b), would be
impermissible, contrary to the parents’ prima facie
rights and frustrate the goal of family unity within
the Juvenile Act while reunification with the parents
is being explored[?]
Grandparents’ brief at 3-4.
The crux of Grandparents’ arguments on appeal is that they have
standing to seek custody of their dependent grandsons pursuant to Section
5324(3) of the Custody Act, notwithstanding the permanency goals of
reunification under the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6301–6375. Section
5324 provides as follows.
§ 5324. Standing for any form of physical
custody or legal custody.
The following individuals may file an action under
this chapter for any form of physical custody or legal
custody:
…
-6-
J-A25023-15
(3) A grandparent of the child who is not in
loco parentis to the child:
(i) whose relationship with the child
began either with the consent of a parent
of the child or under a court order;
(ii) who assumes or is willing to assume
responsibility for the child; and
(iii) when one of the following conditions
is met:
(A) the child has been determined
to be a dependent child under 42
Pa.C.S. Ch. 63 (relating to juvenile
matters);
(B) the child is substantially at risk
due to parental abuse, neglect,
drug or alcohol abuse or
incapacity; or
(C) The child has for a period of at
least 12 consecutive months,
resided with the grandparent,
excluding brief temporary absences
of the child from the home, and is
removed from the home by the
parents, in which case the action
must be filed within six months
after the removal of the child from
the home.
-7-
J-A25023-15
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324(3). Specifically, Grandparents assert that they have
standing to seek custody of G.L.P. and C.L.P. pursuant to Section
5324(3)(iii)(A).4
We begin by observing that “the interpretation and application of a
statute is a question of law that compels plenary review to determine
whether the court committed an error of law. As with all questions of law,
the appellate standard of review is de novo and the appellate scope of
review is plenary.” B.K.M. v. J.A.M., 50 A.3d 168, 172 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
“The object of all interpretation and construction of
statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention
of the General Assembly. Every statute shall be
construed, if possible, to give effect to all its
____________________________________________
4
Neither DHS, Mother, nor Father filed an appellee brief in this appeal. The
Child Advocate asserts in its brief that the trial court did not commit an error
of law. The Child Advocate asserts that Grandparents do not have standing
to intervene in the dependency matter pursuant to the Juvenile Act. We
deem this argument irrelevant because the issue in this case is whether
Grandparents may file a child custody action concurrent to the dependency
actions pending with respect to their grandsons. Indeed, Grandparents
expressly stated that they are not seeking to intervene in the dependency
matters, as they agree they do not have standing to intervene under the
Juvenile Act. See N.T., 11/21/14, at 11, 62. Next, the Child Advocate
asserts that Section 5324 “appears to give the grandparents the right to file
a petition for custody when their grandchildren have been adjudicated
dependent, [but] it does not indicate how and when that petition should be
heard in light of Juvenile Act’s hierarchy of permanency goals.” Child
Advocate Brief at 24. The Child Advocate then asserts that the trial court
found it premature to list the custody complaint for trial because the
permanency goals for the family remained reunification, and, in so doing,
the court gave effect to both the Custody Act and the Juvenile Act. We
reject this argument for reasons explained fully below.
-8-
J-A25023-15
provisions.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). The plain
language of the statute is generally the best
indicator of legislative intent, Commonwealth v.
McCoy, 962 A.2d 1160, 1166 (Pa. 2009), and the
words of a statute “shall be construed according to
rules of grammar and according to their common
and approved usage ….” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a). We
generally look beyond the plain language of the
statute only where the words are unclear or
ambiguous, or the plain meaning would lead to “a
result that is absurd, impossible of execution or
unreasonable.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922; see also
Commonwealth v. Diodoro, 970 A.2d 1100, 1106
(Pa. 2009).
Commonwealth v. Garzone, 34 A.3d 67, 75 (Pa. 2012) (parallel citations
omitted).
Instantly, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court reasoned as
follows.
[O]nly in exceptional cases has Pennsylvania case
law recognized grandparents’ standing in custody
actions in the Domestic Relations Court when
grandchildren have been adjudicated dependent by a
court in a dependency action. Specifically only in
cases, [sic] family’s unity preservation is not viable.
Namely, when the permanency goal has been
changed to adoption or parental rights have been
terminated. In In re Ado[p]tion of Hess, 608 A.2d
[12] (Pa. 1992), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
recognized standing to grandparents that filed a
custody complaint at the adoption proceeding after
the parents voluntarily relinquished their parental
rights. [ ] In R.M. v. Baxter, 777 A.2d 446 (Pa.
1999), the paternal grandmother had standing to file
a custody action after the child was adjudicated
dependent and the permanency goal was changed to
adoption. ….
[In this case,] [t]he FSP [Family Service Plan] goal
for both parents is still reunification, and parents
have been fully compliant with their FSP goals …,
-9-
J-A25023-15
and despite the trial court finding of aggravated
circumstances, DHS was ordered to continue with
reasonable efforts for [G.L.P.’s and C.L.P.’s]
reunification with their parents…. The Grandparents’
rights under the Custody Act cannot trump the
status of [G.L.P.’s and C.L.P.’s] biological parents,
who have a prima facie right to custody. Parents’
rights have not been terminated and are fully
compliant. The Grandparents also admitted that
they do not have standing to participate in the
dependency action; therefore, their Motion to
Intervene had to be denied. Consequently, the trial
court did not have to hear the custody petition filed
by Grandparents.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/18/15, at 8-9. We conclude the trial court erred for
the following reasons.
The case authority cited by the trial court is inapposite to this matter.
First, in Hess, our Supreme Court interpreted the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.
§§ 2101 et seq., to permit grandparents to intervene in their grandchildren’s
adoption proceedings after the parental rights of the children’s mother and
father were terminated. In this case, Grandparents are not seeking to
intervene in adoption proceedings. Indeed, the certified record indicates
that there are no pending adoption proceedings as the parental rights of
Mother and Father have not been terminated. Rather, Grandparents seek a
hearing on their concurrent custody action under the Custody Act with
respect to their dependent grandsons. As such, the Custody Act, and not
the Adoption Act, is applicable in this case. Therefore, we conclude that
Hess is not controlling in this matter.
- 10 -
J-A25023-15
Second, in R.M., our Supreme Court held that 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5313(b),
the predecessor to Section 5324(3)(iii), conferred automatic standing upon a
grandparent to seek physical and legal custody of a grandchild after the child
has been adjudicated dependent. However, Section 5313(b) was
superseded by Section 5324(3)(iii) on January 24, 2011. This provision
provides that, to have standing to seek physical and legal custody, a
grandparent who is not in loco parentis to the child5 must establish one of
the three circumstances set forth in Section 5324(3)(iii)(A)-(C). See D.G.
v. D.B., 91 A.3d 706, 712 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating, “[u]nder
§ 5324(3)(iii), a grandparent must establish one of the three circumstances
set forth in subsections (A) through (C) in order to have standing to seek
custody”) (emphasis omitted). Therefore, unlike the former Section
5313(b), Section 5324(3)(iii) does not confer automatic standing upon a
grandparent to seek physical and legal custody of a grandchild.
Section 5324(3)(iii)(A) confers standing upon grandparents in cases
where “the child has been determined to be a dependent child under 42
Pa.C.S. Ch. 63 (relating to juvenile matters),” when the requirements of
____________________________________________
5
“The phrase ‘in loco parentis’ refers to a person who puts oneself in the
situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident to the
parental relationship without going through the formality of a legal
adoption.” T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 916 (Pa. 2001).
- 11 -
J-A25023-15
Section 5324(3)(i) and (ii) are also met.6 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324(3)(iii)(A). The
words of this provision are clear and unambiguous, and they do not impose
the limitation construed by the trial court. Thus, we reject the trial court’s
conclusion that “the Custody Act cannot trump the status of [G.L.P.’s and
C.L.P.’s] biological parents, who have a prima facie right to custody.” Trial
Court Opinion, 5/18/15, at 9. Such an interpretation, that a grandparent
does not have standing to seek custody of a grandchild determined to be a
dependent and having a goal of reunification with his biological parents
under the Juvenile Act, is contrary to the plain language of Section
5324(3)(iii)(A), by which we are to ascertain our General Assembly’s intent.7
See Garzone, supra.
Therefore, the Custody Act grants standing to grandparents to file for
any form of physical or legal custody when their grandchild has been
adjudicated dependent notwithstanding a permanency goal of reunification.
As such, we conclude that the trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to
list Grandparents’ custody action for a hearing pursuant to Grandparents’
____________________________________________
6
In this case, it is undisputed that Grandparents’ relationship with G.L.P.
and C.L.P. began with the consent of the parents, and that Grandparents are
willing to assume responsibility for their dependent grandsons. See 23
Pa.C.S. § 5324(3)(i)-(ii).
7
Any implications concerning the children’s reunification goals could pertain
to the merits of the instant custody complaint, upon which we express no
opinion. However, they do not negate the Grandparents’ standing, which, as
we have explained, is controlled by the plain text of Section 5324(3)(iii)(A)
in this case.
- 12 -
J-A25023-15
request based on its conclusion that Grandparents did not have standing.
Accordingly, the trial court’s November 21, 2014 order is reversed and the
case is remanded for the trial court to promptly list Grandparents’ custody
action for a hearing on the merits.
Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/2/2015
- 13 -