PNC Bank v. Willis, D. and P. ( 2014 )


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  • J.S45043/14 & J.S45044/14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,   :               IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO NATIONAL :                    PENNSYLVANIA
    CITY BANK,                        :
    :
    v.                :
    :
    DONALD J. WILLIS AND              :
    PATRICIA A. WILLIS,               :
    :
    Appellants    :               No. 235 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the Order Entered November 19, 2013
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Civil Division No(s).: 3251 June Term, 2013
    PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,   :               IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO NATIONAL :                    PENNSYLVANIA
    CITY BANK,                        :
    :
    v.                 :
    :
    WHISPERING MEADOWS, LLC,          :
    :
    Appellant     :               No. 282 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the Order Entered November 19, 2013
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Civil Division No(s).: 3250 June Term, 2013
    BEFORE: BOWES, WECHT, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.:                     FILED DECEMBER 30, 2014
    We dispose of these two appeals together, as they lie from identical
    orders issued in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas denying
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J.S45043/14 & J.S45044/14
    petitions to strike or open confessed judgments obtained by the same
    Appellee, PNC Bank, National Association, Successor in Interest to National
    City Bank. The appellants at No. 235 EDA 2014 are Donald J. and Patricia A.
    Willis. The appellant at No. 282 EDA 2014 is Whispering Meadows, LLC, a
    limited liability company of which the Willises are members. We will use the
    appellation “Appellants” to refer to all three appellants. 1   Appellants have
    filed identical briefs and argue the trial court erred in: (1) holding they did
    not raise meritorious defenses to the confessed judgment; and (2) awarding
    the attorneys’ fees to Appellee. We deny relief on the first issue but grant
    relief on the second. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for the calculation
    of attorneys’ fees.
    “On April 30, 2007, Donald and Patricia Willis, as the borrowers,
    executed a promissory note with National City Bank, as the lender, in the
    principal amount of $1,280,000[.]” Trial Ct. Op., 2/26/14, at 2. The Willises
    defaulted on the note. Am. & Restated Forbearance Agreement, 7/1/12, at
    1, Ex. C to Appellee’s Compl. in Confession of Judgment, 6/25/13.
    On July 1, 2012, [the Willises and Appellee] executed an
    “Amended and Restated Forbearance Agreement” that
    amended the payment terms of the promissory note and
    caused Whispering Meadows, LLC . . . to execute a
    1
    Appellants were represented in the trial court proceedings and in the
    instant appeal by the same law office. Furthermore, the appellate briefs,
    trial court opinions, and filings in both cases are identical, and for ease of
    disposition we refer to them in the singular.
    -2-
    J.S45043/14 & J.S45044/14
    guaranty and suretyship agreement whereby it became a
    guarantor and surety for the Willis[es’] obligations.
    Trial Ct. Op. at 2 (citations to record omitted). The documents attached to
    the   forbearance   agreement    set    forth   the   outstanding   balance   as
    $613,233.23.2 The new maturity date for the loan was one year later, June
    30, 2013. Am. & Restated Forbearance Agreement, Exh. A at 1.
    Appellants did not make any payments under the new agreement. On
    June 25, 2013, Appellee, as a successor in interest to National City Bank
    filed complaints in confession of judgment against both the Willises and
    Whispering Meadows, LLC for the alleged failure to make payments Appellee
    asserted it was owed $710,411.96, which included $63,715.94 in “attorneys’
    fees of 10%.”3
    [The parties] agreed to extend the time to file petitions
    to strike off or open the judgment so that the parties could
    attempt to negotiate a settlement of their issues. Those
    discussions were unsuccessful, and [on September 26,
    2013, Appellants] separately filed nearly identical motions
    to “Open and Strike Confessed Judgment.”[4]
    2
    This figure included: (1) a principal balance of $546,012.57; (2) interest
    due of $61,950.33; and (3) a late fee of $5,270.33. The interest rate was
    5%.
    3
    The total damages of $710,411.96 also included: (1) $546,012.57 of
    principal balance; (2) $91,146.89 of interest through the date of the filing of
    the complaint; (3) $9,536.56 late charges. Appellee’s Compl. in Confession
    of Judgment, 6/25/13, at ¶ 7.
    4
    Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2959 governs petitions strike or open
    confessed judgment. Pa.R.C.P. 2959. “Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 2959(a)(3), a
    petition to strike or open a confessed judgment must be filed within thirty
    days of the date the judgment creditor filed written notice of its
    -3-
    J.S45043/14 & J.S45044/14
    Trial Ct. Op. at 2 (citations to record omitted).
    Appellants’ motions raised three defenses. First, they argued:
    [Appellee] has failed to properly calculate the amount
    outstanding on the Promissory Note and has failed to
    give    [Appellants]    proper   credit   for    payments[.]
    Specifically, [Appellants] made two payments of $2,500 on
    March 30, 2011 and April 12, 2011.[5 Appellee’s] failure to
    credit these payments affects the principal balance,
    interest, and late charges in an amount that cannot be
    determined at this time because [Appellee] has thus far
    been unwilling to provide an accounting on how those
    amounts were calculated. Thus, it is indisputable that the
    confessed judgment is in an amount in excess to which
    [Appellee] could be entitled as a matter of law.
    Appellants’ Mot. to Open & Strike Confessed Judgment, 9/26/13, at ¶ 3
    (emphasis added). Appellants’ second defense was that Appellee
    acted in bad faith with the intent and effect of frustrating
    [Appellee’s] ability to make payments on the Promissory
    Note. Specifically, [Appellee] lost two executed copies of
    the Forbearance Agreement; (2) . . . never provided
    [them] with a countersigned copy of the Forbearance
    Agreement; (3) . . .       never provided [them] with a
    payment schedule; (4) . . . never provided [them] with a
    monthly payment amount; and (5) . . . never provided
    [them] with a location or address to which payments could
    be directed. [Appellants] requested the foregoing items on
    numerous occasions, but [Appellee] failed to address these
    requests. . . . As a result of [Appellee’s] failure to provide
    the foregoing items, [Appellants] were effectively unable
    to make regular payments on the Promissory Note. The
    two payments [above] were made by [Appellant] Donald J.
    execution.” ESB Bank v. McDade, 
    2 A.3d 1236
    , 1240 (Pa. Super. 2010)
    (emphasis added). Here, Appellee did not seek to execute the confessed
    judgments, and thus Rule 2959(a)(3) is not triggered. See 
    id.
    5
    As we discuss infra, the March and April 2011 payments predated the July
    2012 execution of the amended forbearance agreement.
    -4-
    J.S45043/14 & J.S45044/14
    Willis literally appearing at a local [branch of Appellee
    bank] and giving the checks to a local teller. It was clear
    to [Appellants] from these circumstances that their
    payments were not being properly credited, and the
    Complaint in Confession of Judgment . . . has confirmed
    that belief. Thus, as a result of [Appellee’s] bad faith, it
    was objectively unreasonable for [Appellants] to
    continue to make payments that they knew would
    not be properly credited to the Promissory Note.
    Id. at ¶ 2 (emphases added).         Appellants’ final defense was that the
    attorneys’ fees of $63,715.96 “act[ed] as an unlawful penalty rather than a
    lawful liquidated damages provisions [sic]” and was “clearly unrelated to and
    disproportionate to the work actually performed,” that of “filing . . . a three
    page Complaint in Confession of Judgment.” Id. at ¶ 3.
    On October 2, 2013, Appellee filed answers, asserting Appellants
    “failed to present the requisite evidence of a meritorious defense necessary
    to open a confessed judgment.” See Trial Ct. Op. at 4. Appellee attached a
    transaction history for the account, which showed the March and April, 2011
    payments were credited. Appellee further argued that Appellants offered no
    factual support for their allegation that it “frustrated [their] ability to make
    payments on the promissory note.” Id.
    [Appellee] further argued “the other allegations
    asserted by [Appellants] are immaterial, as none of them
    [affected Appellants’] ability to make payments to
    [Appellee] when due.” Finally, regarding the requested
    attorney’s fees of 10%, [Appellee] asserted that they are
    consistent with Pennsylvania law, and this court did not
    need to specifically access their reasonableness as they
    were specifically authorized by the warrant of attorney [in
    the parties’ forbearance agreement].
    -5-
    J.S45043/14 & J.S45044/14
    Id. at 4-5 (citations to record omitted).
    On November 14, 2013, the trial court held oral argument. Appellee
    produced a transaction history of Appellants’ account. Appellants conceded
    the two $2,500 payments were credited to their account. Appellee further
    argued that “throughout 2011, the Willis[es] continued to make payments
    on a monthly basis” and on December 13, 2011, “made a principal reduction
    payment of $732,625.23.” Id. at 5 (quoting N.T., 11/14/13, at 7).
    On November 18, 2013, the trial court entered two orders, denying
    each of Appellants’ motions to strike or open the confessed judgments. This
    timely appeal followed.6
    In their first issue, Appellants argue the trial court abused its
    discretion by failing to recognize their meritorious defense that Appellee
    acted in bad faith. Their sole argument is:
    The trial court was presented with uncontested evidence
    that [Appellee]: (1)      two executed copies of the
    Forbearance Agreement [sic]; (2) provided [Appellants]
    with a countersigned copy of the Forbearance Agreement
    [sic]; (3) provided [Appellants] with a payment schedule
    [sic]; (4) never provided [Appellants] with a monthly
    payment amount; and, (5) provided [Appellants] with a
    location or address to which payments could be directed.
    6
    Although the text of the orders state the date is November 18, 2013, the
    orders bear “filed” time-stamps of November 19th. The trial docket also
    indicated that notice of the orders was given on November 19th.
    Accordingly, Appellants’ notices of appeal filed on December 19, 2013, were
    timely. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); Pa.R.C.P. 236(a)(2). The trial court did not
    order Appellants to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement; however the court
    issued an opinion.
    -6-
    J.S45043/14 & J.S45044/14
    [Appellants’ Reproduced Record at] 47a-48a and 140a-
    141a.    Appellants] requested the foregoing items on
    numerous occasions, but [Appellee] failed to address these
    requests. Id. Specifically, [Appellant] Donald J. Willis
    made numerous phone calls to Ms. Jean Mascia,
    [Appellee’s] agent who negotiated the transaction, to have
    these issues addressed, but none of his calls were
    returned. Id.
    The court below reasoned that [Appellants] should have
    continued to make payments—of an indeterminate amount
    and at an indeterminate location—on the blind faith that
    their payments were being properly credited.           This
    effectively alleviates [Appellee] of its duty of good faith
    and fair dealing by allowing [Appellee] to interfere with
    and fail to cooperate with [Appellants’] attempts to
    perform under the contract by making payments.
    Appellants’ Brief at 8-9. We hold no relief is due.
    This Court has stated:
    “A petition to strike a judgment is a common law
    proceeding which operates as a demurrer to the record.[“]
    *    *    *
    [T]he petition to strike a confessed judgment must focus
    on any defects or irregularities appearing on the face of
    the record, as filed by the party in whose favor the warrant
    was given, which affect the validity of the judgment and
    entitle the petitioner to relief as a matter of law. . . .
    In contrast, “if the truth of the factual averments
    contained in [the complaint in confession of judgment and
    attached exhibits] are disputed, then the remedy is by
    proceeding to open the judgment,” not to strike it. A
    petition to strike a confessed judgment and a petition to
    open a confessed judgment are distinct remedies; they are
    not interchangeable.     A petition to open a confessed
    judgment is an appeal to the equitable powers of the
    court. Factual disputes by definition cannot be raised
    or addressed in a petition to strike off a confession
    of judgment, because factual disputes force the court to
    -7-
    J.S45043/14 & J.S45044/14
    rely on matters outside the relevant record to decide the
    merits of the petition.
    Midwest Fin. Acceptance Corp. v. Lopez, 
    78 A.3d 614
    , 622-23 (Pa.
    Super. 2013) (citations omitted) (emphases added).
    In the instant matter, Appellants’ motion to strike the confessed
    judgment did not aver any defects or irregularities appearing on the record.
    Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that Appellants’ motions “were
    only petitioning to open the confessed judgments.” See Trial Ct. Op. at 6.
    Thus, we affirm the denial of the requests to strike the confessed judgment.
    See 
    id.
        We thus consider whether the trial court erred in denying the
    motion to open the confessed judgment.
    We note the relevant standard for a ruling on a petition to open a
    confessed judgment: “A petition to open judgment is an appeal to the
    equitable powers of the court.       As such it is committed to the sound
    discretion of the hearing court and will not be disturbed absent a manifest
    abuse of discretion.”   PNC Bank v. Kerr, 
    802 A.2d 634
    , 638 (Pa. Super.
    2002) (citation omitted).
    “[A] court acting in equity should open a confessed judgment only
    when the petitioner ‘acts promptly, alleges a meritorious defense and
    presents sufficient evidence of that defense to require submission of the
    issues to the jury.’” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    Pa.R.Civ.P. 2959(e) sets forth the standard by which a
    court determines whether a moving party has properly
    averred a meritorious defense. “If evidence is produced
    -8-
    J.S45043/14 & J.S45044/14
    which in a jury trial would require the issues to be
    submitted to the jury the court shall open the judgment.”
    Furthermore, the court must view the evidence presented
    in the light most favorable to the moving party, while
    rejecting contrary evidence of the nonmoving party. The
    petitioner need not produce evidence proving that if the
    judgment is opened, the petitioner will prevail. Moreover,
    we must accept as true the petitioner’s evidence and all
    reasonable and proper inferences flowing therefrom.
    Liazis v. Kosta, Inc., 
    618 A.2d 450
    , 453 (Pa. Super. 1992) (citations
    omitted and emphasis added).       “Fundamentally, every contract imposes
    upon the parties a duty of good faith and fair dealing in the performance and
    enforcement of the contract.” 
    Id. at 454
    .
    In the case sub judice, the trial court opined that Appellants failed to
    present sufficient evidence of a meritorious defense.    We agree, and note
    Appellants did not produce any evidence, either by attachment to their
    motion7 to open confessed judgment or by presentation at oral argument
    before the trial court.
    With respect to Appellants’ claim that Appellee lost and failed to
    provide executed copies of the forbearance agreement, we agree with the
    trial court that these two facts, even if true, “had nothing to do with
    [Appellants’] ability to make payments.” See Trial Ct. Op. at 7.
    With respect to Appellants’ defense that Appellee failed to provide a
    7
    The only exhibits attached to Appellants’ motions to open confessed
    judgment were: (1) emails between the parties concerning their agreement
    to extend the time for Appellants to petition to open the judgment; (2)
    copies of two checks payable to Appellee, of $2,500 each, and bearing
    “deposited” stamps.
    -9-
    J.S45043/14 & J.S45044/14
    payment schedule, monthly payment amount, and payment address, we
    note the following. Appellants’ motion to open confessed judgment averred
    that Donald Willis called Ms. Mascia, Appellee’s representative, for the
    payment schedule, monthly amount, and payment address, “none of his
    calls were returned,” and consequently, [the Willises] “were effectively
    unable to make regular payments on the Promissory Note.”                     Appellants’
    Mot. to Open & Strike Confessed Judgment at ¶ 4 (emphasis added).
    Appellants concluded, “Thus, as a result of [Appellee’s] bad faith, [including
    its alleged failure to credit the March and April 2011 payments,] it was
    objectively unreasonable . . . to continue to make payments that they knew
    would not be properly credited to the Promissory Note.”                
    Id.
     (emphasis
    added).
    A careful review of this argument reveals Appellants’ argument was
    that   because    two    payments   were    not    properly    credited   under      the
    promissory       note    and   Appellants   were      unable   to   obtain     payment
    information, it was unreasonable for them make payments under the
    subsequently executed forbearance agreement.               Appellants provided no
    evidence, nor even an assertion, that despite the lack of a payment
    schedule,   monthly      payment    amount,     and    payment      address    for   the
    promissory note, and the fact that they ultimately defaulted under the
    promissory note,        they subsequently      attempted to      obtain the      above
    information after they executed the forbearance agreement.                     The trial
    - 10 -
    J.S45043/14 & J.S45044/14
    court noted:
    Given the undisputed fact that [Appellants] successfully
    made payments to [Appellee] on the account in the past
    (and even when they asserted the payments were not
    being credited), we agreed it was absurd for [Appellants]
    to now claim [Appellee’s] conduct somehow prevented
    them from doing so after the forbearance agreement was
    executed . . . . No doubt that is why [Appellants] carefully
    alleged only the hollow accusation that they were
    “effectively” unable to make regular payments on the
    promissory note, not that they were actually precluded
    from doing so.[ ]
    Trial Ct. Op. at 7 (emphasis added).
    Furthermore, the trial court reasoned:
    [T]here is a level of disingenuousness in [Appellants’]
    claiming bad faith on [Appellee’s] part for allegedly not
    providing . . . a monthly payment amount after they
    entered into the forbearance agreement when thereafter
    [Appellants] had an equal obligation [sic] to make
    payment, but failed to make any payment on the account.
    In addition to explicitly stating payments were due “on the
    last day of each consecutive calendar month” until the
    June 30, 2013 maturity date (which is essentially a
    payment schedule, something [Appellants] also averred
    they were never provided with in bad faith), Exhibit A to
    the forbearance agreement includes the interest rate and
    payment terms for the loan going forward. This court is
    hard pressed to believe that if [Appellants] really were not
    being told [the monthly payment amount], they could not
    have attempted to calculate the expected payment (that
    appears to be approximately $6,900 a month) or at least
    make some kind of payment on the account, which in all
    certainty would have been properly credited to the account
    like all the other payments they made. Of course, there
    is no evidence [Appellants] attempted to make a
    payment of any kind after the forbearance
    agreement was entered into, but were refused. . . .
    
    Id.
     at 7-8 n.1 (emphases added).
    - 11 -
    J.S45043/14 & J.S45044/14
    On appeal, Appellants ignore the above analyses. They likewise ignore
    the trial court’s observation that at oral argument: (1) they conceded that
    the March and April 2011 payments were credited to their account; and (2)
    Appellee averred the Willises continued to make monthly payments
    “throughout    2011”    and   “made       a      principal   reduction   payment   of
    $732,625.23” on December 13, 2011. See Trial Ct. Op. at 5; N.T. at 4, 6-7.
    At oral argument, Appellee contended such payments indicated Appellants’
    knowledge of where to make payments, as well as the fact that they had,
    prior to executing the forbearance agreement, previously made payments.
    N.T. at 7.    In response, Appellants: (1) reiterated the five instances of
    alleged bad faith on the part of Appellee; and (2) then reasoned that the
    transaction history corroborated their claims: the lack of “a concession of
    monthly payment[s]” and the different amounts paid “tend to show
    [Appellants] didn’t even know what [they were] supposed to be paying
    because of the bank’s actions.” Id. at 9-10.
    In light of all the foregoing, including their argument before the trial
    court, Appellants have not persuaded this Court that the trial court abused
    its discretion in finding they did not allege meritorious defenses. See PNC
    Bank, 
    802 A.2d at 638
    . Accordingly, we deny relief on their first issue.
    Appellants’ second claim on appeal is that the court abused its
    discretion in rejecting their defense as to the attorneys’ fees.           As stated
    above,   Appellee’s    complaint   in   confessed       judgment    demanded   10%
    - 12 -
    J.S45043/14 & J.S45044/14
    attorneys’ fees in the amount of $63,715.94.            Appellants present two
    arguments, which we address seriatim.              First, they assert that the
    “attorneys’ fee awards . . . had no relationship to the work actually
    performed by [Appellee’s] attorney, and therefore, violated the express
    terms of the Forbearance Agreement, which specifically provides that ‘the
    amount of attorneys’ fees that [Appellee] may recover . . . shall not exceed
    the actual attorneys’ fees incurred.’” Appellants’ Brief at 9-10. They assert
    that the trial court improperly overlooked this provision of the forbearance
    agreement. Appellants further aver, without any citation to the record, that
    Appellee “admitted that those fees bore no relationship whatsoever to the
    work actually performed by [its] counsel.” See id. at 10. They reason that
    the attorneys’ fees thus “acted as an unlawful penalty rather than a lawful
    liquidated damages provision.” Id. We find no relief is due.
    In Dollar Bank v. Northwood Cheese Co., 
    637 A.2d 309
     (Pa. Super.
    1994), the trial court refused to open a confessed judgment to determine
    the reasonableness of counsel fees. 
    Id. at 314
    . On appeal, the borrower
    “assert[ed] that counsel fees awarded in accordance with the fifteen percent
    attorney’s   commission   specified    in   the   warrant   of   attorney   [were]
    excessive.” 
    Id.
     This Court set forth relevant Pennsylvania authority:
    If a confessed judgment includes an item not authorized
    by the warrant, the judgment is void in its entirety and
    must be stricken. However, if the judgment as entered is
    for items clearly within the judgment note, but excessive
    in amount, the court will modify the judgment and cause a
    proper judgment to be entered. If the judgment was
    - 13 -
    J.S45043/14 & J.S45044/14
    entered for an amount which was grossly excessive, the
    judgment must be stricken in its entirety.
    
    Id.
     (citations omitted). We then reasoned:
    Here, it is clear that attorney’s fees in the amount of
    fifteen percent were specifically authorized by the warrant
    of attorney. [The borrowers] claim that the amount of
    attorneys’ fees is excessive, but they provide no citation to
    any evidence of record to this effect, and similarly do not
    make any argument as to why the fees are claimed to be
    excessive. We note that a voluminous record accompanies
    the instant case. In light of the fact that the warrant of
    attorney permits the fee to which [the borrowers] object,
    and in the absence of any specific argument concerning
    the alleged excessiveness of the fee, we find this argument
    meritless.
    
    Id.
    Rait P’ship, L.P. v. E Pointe Props. I, 
    957 A.2d 1275
     (Pa. Super.
    2008), relied on Dollar Bank.      
    Id. at 1279
    .    In that case, the borrowers
    argued “that the trial court erred in refusing to strike off or open that part of
    the   judgment that included ‘an attorney’s collection          commission’    of
    $450,000.” 
    Id.
     This Court disagreed:
    [T]his Court has previously approved the inclusion of
    similar collection commission provisions in contracts. See:
    Dollar Bank[,
    637 A.2d at 314
    ] (attorney’s fee provision of
    fifteen percent enforceable where it was “specifically
    authorized by the warrant of attorney”). Here, there is no
    dispute that the Forbearance Agreement specifically
    provided for [the lender] to include as part of the
    confessed judgment “an attorney’s collection commission
    of fifteen percent (15%) of the aggregate amount of the
    foregoing sums.” . . .
    
    Id.
     Furthermore, in a footnote, this Court stated:
    - 14 -
    J.S45043/14 & J.S45044/14
    We are not persuaded by [the borrower’s] argument that
    the decision of this Court in PNC Bank v. Bolus, [
    655 A.2d 997
     (Pa.Super. 1995)], compels a different result. In
    that case, this Court approved a trial court's finding that
    the inclusion of an attorney's commission of $70,647.77 on
    a confessed judgment was "unreasonable." However, the
    provision at issue in that case specifically called for the
    imposition of a "reasonable" fee, thus justifying the trial
    court's inquiry into the reasonableness of the fee. Here,
    however, there is no similar provision, merely the
    automatic imposition of a "commission" of fifteen percent
    taxable as a cost attributable to [the borrower’s] default.
    ...
    
    Id.
     at 1279 n.3.
    In the instant case, the forbearance agreement included the following
    clause pertaining to attorneys’ fees:
    The Borrower hereby reaffirms and empowers any
    attorney of any court of record, after he occurrence of any
    Event of Default hereunder, to appear for the Borrower
    and, without complaint filed, confess judgment . . . against
    the Borrower in favor of the Bank . . . for the entire
    principal balance of the Note, all accrued interest and all
    other amounts due hereunder, together with costs of suit
    and an attorney’s commission of the greater of 10%
    of such principal and interest or $1,000 added as
    reasonable attorneys’ fee, and for doing so, the Note or
    a copy verified by affidavit shall be a sufficient
    warrant. . . . Notwithstanding the attorney’s commission
    provided for in this paragraph (which is included in the
    warrant for purposes of establishing a sum certain), the
    amount of attorneys’ fees that the Bank may recover
    from the Borrower shall not exceed the actual
    attorneys’ fees incurred by the Bank.
    Am. & Restated Forbearance Agreement at ¶ 10 (emphases added).
    The trial court found Appellants’ claim failed as a matter of law. Citing
    Rait P’ship, L.P., the trial court noted the Superior Court “has previously
    - 15 -
    J.S45043/14 & J.S45044/14
    approved of the inclusion of similar collection commission provisions in
    contracts.”    Trial Ct. Op. at 8.     The trial court also held that it “need not
    assess the reasonableness of such a commission where the” contract
    explicitly provides for the commission and does not specifically call for a
    “reasonable’ fee.” 
    Id.
     The court reasoned: “Here, the requested attorney’s
    commission of 10% appeared in four separate places in the contracts
    between the parties and did not call on the court to inquire into the
    reasonableness of the commission.” 
    Id.
    We agree with the court’s reasoning.            The forbearance agreement
    provided for “an attorney’s commission of the greater of 10% of such
    principal and interest or $1,000 added as a reasonable attorney’s fee.” Am.
    & Restated Forbearance Agreement at ¶ 10 (emphasis added). Although the
    term “reasonable” appears, it modifies the $1,000 alternative. However, the
    agreement provided for either 10% of principal and interest or $1,000,
    whichever was greater. In this case, the 10% figure was greater and thus
    controlled.      That   clause   did   not   invoke   a   court   inquiry   into   the
    reasonableness of attorney’s fees.
    Appellants’ second argument is that that the forbearance agreement
    limited an award of attorney’s fees to “actual attorneys’ fees” incurred by
    Appellee.     We agree with this interpretation of the contract.        See Am. &
    Restated Forbearance Agreement at ¶ 10.               The trial court included the
    following footnote in its opinion:
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    J.S45043/14 & J.S45044/14
    While the [forbearance agreement] provisions . . . allowed
    [Appellee] to establish a sum certain and confess
    judgment in the amount of $63,715.94 for attorney’s fees,
    the court would note the guarantee and forbearance
    agreements will only allow [Appellee] to . . . recover . . .
    the actual attorney’s fees it incurs, which may end up
    being less than $63,000 in the absence of further
    litigation.
    Trial Ct. Op. at 8 n.2 (citing Am. & Restated Forbearance Agreement at ¶
    10) (emphasis added).
    On appeal, Appellants respond:
    The problem with [the trial court’s] analysis is that the
    confessed judgments act as final [judgments. Appellee]
    can collect $63,715.94 in attorney’s fees with impunity
    [sic], and if [Appellants] attempt to argue [Appellee]
    actually expended less, then surely [Appellee] will fall back
    on the doctrine of res judicata. In other words, the only
    way for the trial court have given [sic] “actual attorney’s
    fees” provision any hope of being enforced was to open the
    confessed judgment and require [Appellee] to establish its
    actual attorney’s fees. Having failed to do so was an
    abuse of discretion which should be overturned.
    Appellants’ Brief at 11-12. We determine this argument has merit.
    The trial court’s footnote indicates that the final sum of Appellee’s
    attorney’s fees was not yet calculated or determined, and could be less than
    the amount demanded in its complaint.        Trial Ct. Op. at 8 n.2.    None of
    Appellee’s filings, including its complaint, includes documentation showing
    incurrence of $63,715.94 of attorneys’ fees.       Our review of the record
    likewise reveals no explanation for the court’s reference to a $63,000 figure.
    As Appellants point out, the confessed judgments will act as final judgments
    against them.    Because the trial court has indicated the final sum of
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    J.S45043/14 & J.S45044/14
    attorney’s fees requested may not be calculated, and may be less than what
    was demanded, we agree with Appellants that the confessed judgments
    should be opened to determine this discrete issue. Accordingly, we vacate
    the court’s orders denying Appellants’ motions to open the confessed
    judgments and remand for the court to determine only the appropriate
    award of attorneys’ fees.
    Orders vacated. Case remanded for proceedings consistent with this
    memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/30/2014
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