Com. v. Brown, T. ( 2016 )


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  • J-S68027-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    v.
    TROY JOHNSON BROWN
    Appellant                 No. 109 WDA 2016
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Dated December 11, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-61-CR-0000565-2006
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., SOLANO, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY SOLANO, J.:                       FILED NOVEMBER 07, 2016
    Appellant Troy Johnson Brown files this counseled appeal from the
    December 11, 2015, order dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post
    Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, for lack of
    jurisdiction. We affirm.
    The PCRA court summarized the pertinent procedural history of this
    case as follows:
    Mr. Brown was sentenced on November 20, 2007 on two counts
    of Possession with Intent to Manufacture or Deliver a Controlled
    Substance[,35 Pa. C.S.A. § 780-113(a)(30),] and one count [of]
    Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Possession with Intent to Deliver
    a Controlled Substance[,18 Pa. C.S.A. § 903(a)(1)-(2)], to an
    aggregate sentence of thirteen (13) to thirty (30) years.
    Specifically, he was sentenced to [] five (5) to (10) years at
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S68027-16
    Count 2, a consecutive five (5) to (10) years at Count 3, and a
    consecutive three (3) to (10) years at Count 1. In giving this
    sentence, this Court invoked the mandatory minimums
    proscribed [sic] by 18 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 7508(a)(7)(ii) and (a)(3)(ii)
    at Counts 2 and 3, respectively. Mr. Brown filed a direct appeal,
    which was denied by the Superior Court’s Non-Precedential
    Decision of July 8, 2009. The instant PCRA was initiated by Mr.
    Brown’s filing dated February 25, 2015. Attorney Kirtland filed
    an Amended PCRA petition on Mr. Brown’s behalf on March 27,
    2015.
    PCRA Court Opinion, 12/11/15, at 1-2.
    In his amended petition, Appellant claimed that his sentence was
    illegal under Alleyne v. United States, 
    133 S.Ct. 2151
     (2013), in which the
    U.S. Supreme Court held that any fact that by law increases a mandatory
    minimum sentence must be treated as an element of the offense and found
    by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.1 The PCRA court held a hearing on
    Appellant’s petition on April 24, 2015, and denied the petition on
    December 11, 2015.          The PCRA court held that Appellant’s petition was
    untimely and did not satisfy the newly-recognized constitutional right
    exception to the PCRA’s time bar set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii).
    Specifically, the court stated, “the rule announced in Alleyne does not allow
    ____________________________________________
    1
    As the PCRA court noted, “the Amended PCRA purports to be ‘in addition
    to the claims set forth’ in [Appellant’s] initial filing . . . .” PCRA Court
    Opinion, 12/11/15, at 2 n.3. The PCRA court stated, “[t]o the extent the
    initial filing contains issues distinct from [the Alleyne issue], we construe
    such arguments as underdeveloped and therefore waived.” Id. In this
    appeal, Appellant raises only the Alleyne claim; thus, we conclude that
    Appellant has abandoned any additional claims that may have been in the
    original, pro se, PCRA petition.
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    [Appellant] to invoke the new constitutional right exception to the time bar”
    because “Alleyne has not been held by the United States Supreme Court to
    invalidate [mandatory minimum] sentencing schemes retroactively.” PCRA
    Court Opinion, 12/11/15, at 2, 3.
    In this appeal, Appellant raises the following issue, as stated:
    Whether the PCRA court abused its discretion or
    erred as a matter of law in denying the petitioner’s
    PCRA petition seeking to find his sentence
    unconstitutional since he was sentenced to a
    mandatory minimum sentence and the statutes
    concerning [his] conviction have been found
    unconstitutional but not retroactive.
    Appellant’s Brief at 5.
    This Court’s standard of review regarding an order dismissing a
    petition under the PCRA is “to determine whether the determination of the
    PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error.
    The PCRA court's findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for
    the findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Barndt, 
    74 A.3d 185
    , 191-92 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations and internal quotation marks
    omitted).
    The   timeliness    of   a   post-conviction   petition   is   jurisdictional.
    Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 
    79 A.3d 649
    , 651 (Pa. Super. 2013).
    Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or
    subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment
    is final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves one of the three
    -3-
    J-S68027-16
    exceptions to the time limitations for filing the petition set forth in Section
    9545(b) of the statute. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b).2
    Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on August 7,
    2009, when the thirty-day time period for filing an allocatur petition with the
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania expired. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). As
    Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition more than five years after his
    judgment of sentence became final, it is patently untimely unless Appellant
    has satisfied his burden of pleading and proving that one of the three
    enumerated exceptions applies.
    Appellant’s petition and amended petition did not plead or prove
    application of any of the enumerated exceptions, but in his brief to this
    Court, Appellant attempts to invoke the newly-recognized constitutional right
    ____________________________________________
    2
    The three exceptions to the timeliness requirement are:
    (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
    interference of government officials with the presentation of the
    claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
    Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States.
    (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
    to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
    exercise of due diligence; or
    (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
    recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
    this section and has been held by that court to apply
    retroactively.
    42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).
    -4-
    J-S68027-16
    exception set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). See Appellant’s Brief at
    10-11.    However, the PCRA court anticipated this argument and explained
    that this exception applies only when the court that recognized the new right
    has held that the right applies retroactively.             See PCRA Court Opinion,
    12/11/15, at 2; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii).                The PCRA court further
    explained that because the U.S. Supreme Court has not held that Alleyne
    applies retroactively to cases on collateral review, Appellant could not satisfy
    the   newly-recognized        constitutional      right   exception   to   the   PCRA’s
    jurisdictional time bar.       PCRA Court Opinion, 12/11/15, at 3.           The PCRA
    court was correct.      Further, after the PCRA court issued its opinion in this
    case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania expressly held that Alleyne does
    not   apply    retroactively     in   the      PCRA   context.   Commonwealth        v.
    Washington, 
    142 A.3d 810
    , 820 (Pa. 2016) (“We hold that Alleyne does
    not apply retroactively to cases pending on collateral review . . . .”). There
    is thus no authority for application of the newly-recognized constitutional
    right exception to Appellant’s PCRA petition. As Appellant does not argue for
    application of any other exception, his petition is untimely.3
    ____________________________________________
    3
    The PCRA court’s analysis of Appellant’s untimeliness adequately disposes
    of this matter, but we note that Appellant failed to meet the PCRA’s
    requirements for two additional reasons. First, his PCRA petition failed to
    allege application of any of the exceptions in Section 9545(b)(1), and he
    made no argument for application of the newly-recognized constitutional
    right exception until he filed his brief to this Court, which is contrary to what
    the statute requires. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1); Commonwealth v.
    Burton, 
    936 A.2d 521
    , 525 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“exceptions to the time bar
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    -5-
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    Based on the foregoing, the PCRA court correctly concluded that it
    lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s untimely PCRA petition.       We
    therefore affirm the PCRA court’s order denying Appellant post-conviction
    relief.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 11/7/2016
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    must be pled in the PCRA petition, and may not be raised for the first time
    on appeal”), appeal denied, 
    959 A.2d 927
     (Pa. 2008) (table). Second, he
    failed to file his petition within the 60-day deadline set forth in Section
    9545(b)(2) of the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2); Commonwealth v.
    Leggett, 
    16 A.3d 1144
    , 1146-47 (Pa. Super. 2011) (petition must be filed
    within 60 days of decision recognizing new constitutional right, not within 60
    days of when petitioner learned of newly-recognized right).
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 109 WDA 2016

Filed Date: 11/7/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024