In the Interest of: K.B. a/k/a K.J.W., a Minor ( 2017 )

J-S84001-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: K.B. A/K/A IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
K.J.W., A MINOR PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: C.L.B., MOTHER
No. 1590 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered April 22, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): 51-FN-386995-2009
CP-51-AP-0000299-2016
CP-51-DP-0000155-2014
BEFORE: OLSON, SOLANO and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JANUARY 23, 2017
Appellant, C.L.B. (Mother), appeals from the order entered on April 22,
2016, which terminated her parental rights to K.B., a minor born in January
2014. We affirm.
We quote the trial court’s summary of the relevant factual and
procedural history in this case.
The child, K.B. was born [i]n January [], 2014.
On January 7, 2014, [the Department of Human Services of the
City of Philadelphia (DHS)] received a General Protective
Services [report (GPS report)] alleging [Mother] tested positive
for cocaine, benzodiazepines and phencyclidine at [K.B.’s]
birth[.] [K.B.] tested positive for cocaine at birth. The report
was substantiated.
On January 10, 2014, DHS visited [Mother’s] home and
determined that the condition of the home was inappropriate to
care for the child. The home had missing walls and holes in the
ceiling. Furthermore, a [portion] of the staircase was missing.
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S84001-16
On January 17, 2014, the day [K.B.] was to be released from the
hospital, DHS obtained an Order of Protective Custody (OPC) for
K.B. [Thereafter], [t]he child was placed in foster care.
A shelter care hearing was held on December 27, 2013 before [a
hearing master]. [The master] lifted the OPC and ordered the
temporary commitment of K.B. to the care and custody of DHS.
On January 28, 2014, an adjudicatory hearing was held before
the [trial court]. [The court] adjudicated K.B. dependent and
committed him to the care and custody of DHS.
The matter was listed on a regular basis before [various judges]
pursuant to [the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351], and
evaluated for the purpose of determining or reviewing the
permanency plan [for K.B.]. [Between January 2014 and April
2016, the court conducted periodic review hearings in this
matter.]
[On March 31, 2016, DHS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s
parental rights to K.B.] On April 22, 2016, a [hearing to
terminate Mother’s parental rights was held.] The [c]ourt found
by clear and convincing evidence that [M]other’s parental rights
[with respect to] K.B. should be terminated pursuant to [the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8),
and (b).] Furthermore, the [c]ourt held it was in the best
interest of the child that the goal be changed to adoption.
[On May 23, 2016, Mother filed a timely notice of appeal
together with a concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2). Mother’s timely concise
statement challenged the sufficiency of the evidence establishing
grounds for involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights,
as well as the court’s decision to change K.B.’s permanency goal
from reunification to adoption. The trial court issued its opinion
on June 23, 2016.]
Trial Court Opinion, 6/23/16, at 1-2.
On appeal, Mother asks us to review the following issues:
Whether the trial court’s ruling to involuntarily terminate
[Mother’s] parental rights to her son, K.B., was not supported by
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clear and convincing evidence establishing grounds for
involuntary termination?
Whether the trial court’s decision to change K.B.’s permanency
goal from reunification to adoption was not supported by clear
and convincing evidence that such decision would best protect
the child’s needs and welfare?
Mother’s Brief at 5.
In her first issue, Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the trial court’s termination of her parental rights.
In a proceeding to terminate parental rights involuntarily, the
burden of proof is on the party seeking termination to establish
by clear and convincing evidence the existence of grounds for
doing so. The standard of clear and convincing evidence is
defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty[,] and
convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in
issue. It is well established that a court must examine the
individual circumstances of each and every case and consider all
explanations offered by the parent to determine if the evidence
in light of the totality of the circumstances clearly warrants
termination.
We review a trial court’s decision to involuntarily terminate
parental rights for an abuse of discretion or error of law. Our
scope of review is limited to determining whether the trial court’s
order is supported by competent evidence.
In re Adoption of G.L.L., 124 A.3d 344, 346 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 2511(a)(1),(a)(2),(a)(5) and (a)(8), and (b). This Court may affirm the
trial court’s decision regarding the termination of parental rights with regard
to any one subsection of section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380,
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384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004).
We focus our attention on section 2511(a)(2) along with section 2511(b).
Those statutory provisions provide that:
(a) General rule.-The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
***
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential
parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical
or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
***
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of
a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical[,] and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The
rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing[,] and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.
The focus in terminating parental rights under section 2511(a) is on
the parent, but, under section 2511(b), the focus is on the child. In re
Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc). As
this Court explained:
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1)
repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect[,] or refusal;
(2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect[,] or refusal has caused the
child to be without essential parental care, control[,] or
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subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and
(3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect[,] or refusal
cannot or will not be remedied. The grounds for termination due
to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied are not limited to
affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those grounds may
include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental
duties.
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
Mother argues that she completed many of her case plan objectives
and that she regularly maintained loving and nurturing parental contacts
with K.B. Specifically, Mother points out that she: 1) made two-thirds of
her scheduled visits with K.B.; 2) offered legitimate reasons for failing to
attend scheduled visits that she missed; 3) obtained appropriate housing
throughout the proceedings before the trial court; 4) attended random drug
screens and tested negative; 5) sustained herself throughout the duration of
this case without financial assistance from DHS. Mother’s Brief at 17.
Mother also notes that DHS’ witness conceded that Mother loved her son
very much. See id. Under these circumstances, Mother asserts that her
desire to comply with DHS case objectives, her wish to maintain a parental
relationship with her son, and her efforts to seek reunification should
overcome the trial court’s assessment that clear and convincing evidence
demonstrated Mother’s continued neglect of her parental responsibilities.
We disagree.
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A parent is required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably
prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities. In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d
326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). A parent’s vow to cooperate, after a period of
uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of services, may
properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous. Id. at 340. Moreover, a
parent’s limited success with services designed to remedy barriers to
effective parenting may support termination under § 2511(a)(2). See In re
B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 385 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 863 A.2d
1141 (Pa. 2004). Termination of parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(2)
may be predicated upon either incapacity or refusal to perform parental
duties. In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002).
Contrary to Mother’s factual contentions, the trial court made the
following findings of fact:
In the instant case, [Mother] did not complete her Family
Service Plan (FSP) objectives. The Community Umbrella Agency
(CUA) social worker testified that [Mother’s] FSP goals were: 1)
to go to the Clinical Evaluation Unit of the [c]ourt for random
drug screens; 2) to complete drug and alcohol treatment; 3) to
complete mental health treatment; 4) to maintain visits with the
child; and, 5) to obtain suitable housing. N.T., 4/22/16, at 41.
[Mother] did not comply with the random drug screens. N.T.,
4/22/16, at 22. Furthermore, [Mother] did not complete drug
and alcohol treatment. N.T., 4/22/16, at 19-21. Moreover,
[Mother] did not complete mental health treatment. N.T.,
4/22/16, at 23. Lastly, [Mother] was not consistent with her
visits with the child. She attended [14] out of [21] visits. N.T.,
4/22/16, at 24.
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Trial Court Opinion, 6/23/16, at 3. Since the assessments of the trial court
find support in the record, we discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s
conclusion that termination was appropriate under § 2511(a)(2).
Having determined that the agency established § 2511(a)(2) by clear
and convincing evidence, we next turn to whether section 2511(b) was
satisfied by clear and convincing evidence.
If the grounds for termination under [section 2511(a)] are met,
a court shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The
emotional needs and welfare of the child have been properly
interpreted to include intangibles such as love, comfort, security,
and stability. [Our Supreme Court has] held that the
determination of the child’s needs and welfare requires
consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and
child. The utmost attention should be paid to discerning the
effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
Mother argues that the trial court failed “to give primary consideration
to the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child
as required by the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b), to support
termination[.]” Mother’s Brief at 23. Again, we disagree.
We are guided by the following principles in assessing the termination
of parental rights under § 2511(b).
Before granting a petition to terminate parental rights, it is
imperative that a trial court carefully consider the intangible
dimension of the needs and welfare of a child—the love, comfort,
security, and closeness—entailed in a parent-child relationship,
as well as the tangible dimension. In re Matsock, 611 A.2d
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737, 747 (Pa. super. 1992). “Continuity of relationships is also
important to a child, for whom severance of close parental ties is
usually extremely painful.” In re William L., 383 A.2d 1228,
1241 (Pa. 1978). The trial court, “in considering what situation
would best serve the [child's] needs and welfare, must examine
the status of the natural parental bond to consider whether
terminating the natural [parent’s] rights would destroy
something in existence that is necessary and beneficial.” In re
P.A.B., 570 A.2d 522, 525–26 (Pa. Super. 1990), appeal
dismissed, 607 A.2d 1074 (Pa. 1992).
In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1202 (Pa. Super. 2000).
There was ample evidence in this case to support the trial court’s
conclusion that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best
interest of K.B. under § 2511(b). The trial court’s bonding analysis was as
follows:
In the instant matter, the DHS social worker testified that the
child is bonded with his foster mother. The child is very
comfortable in the foster home. The interaction between the
foster mother and the child is very “maternal and loving.” N.T.,
4/22/16, at 28. The foster mother takes care of all of the child’s
daily needs. N.T., 4/22/16, at 28. The CUA social worker also
testified that the child is bonded with the foster mother. He
further testified that the child does not share the same
parent-child bond with [Mother]. N.T., 4/22/16, at 45. The
testimony indicated that the child would not suffer long-term
harm if [Mother’s] rights were terminated. N.T., 4/22/16, at 16.
Furthermore, it would be in the best interest of the child if
[Mother’s] parental rights were terminated and the child is freed
for adoption. N.T., 4/22/16, at 29 and 45.
Lastly, the [trial c]ourt found that [Mother’s] testimony was not
credible. N.T., 4/22/16, at 64.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/23/16, at 5.
Our review of the certified record confirms support for the trial court’s
determination that clear and convincing evidence supported the agency
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petition for involuntary termination under § 2511(a)(2) and (b).1
Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/23/2017
____________________________________________
1
Our disposition of Appellant’s first claim moots the second issue raised in
this appeal.
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