Pillar, K. v. Pillar, D. ( 2017 )

J. A19006/16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
KATHLEEN M. PILLAR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
DAVID M. PILLAR, : No. 3300 EDA 2015
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Decree, October 14, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County
Civil Division at No. No. 1-2015-DR
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OTT AND FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JANUARY 13, 2017
David M. Pillar (“Husband”) appeals from the October 14, 2015 order
entering a decree in divorce from Kathleen M. Pillar (“Wife”) and
incorporating the master’s April 30, 2015 report and recommendation
therein. After careful review, we affirm.
The relevant “findings of fact” were summarized in the master’s
April 30, 2015 report and recommendation and need not be reiterated here.
(See master’s report and recommendation, 4/30/15 at 2-6, ¶¶ 1-69.) The
parties were married on September 15, 2000, and separated on
November 26, 2013. On January 2, 2014, Wife filed a divorce complaint
raising claims relating to, inter alia, equitable distribution of the parties’
marital estate and alimony. On January 16, 2015, Pamela S. Wilson, Esq.
(“Master Wilson”), was appointed to address the parties’ claims, and a
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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hearing was ultimately conducted on March 12, 2015. Following the
hearing, Master Wilson filed a report and recommendation on April 30, 2015.
On May 18, 2015, Husband filed exceptions to Master Wilson’s report and
recommendation, and argument was scheduled before the Honorable
Raymond L. Hamill on June 29, 2015. On July 8, 2015, the trial court
entered an order denying Husband’s exceptions and adopting the equitable
distribution scheme set forth in Master Wilson’s report and recommendation.
Specifically, Master Wilson made the following recommendations in her
report:
1. Wife’s request for divorce should be granted on
Wife’s complaint to divorce under
[23 Pa.C.S.A.] § 3301(c)[1] of the
Pennsylvania Divorce Code. The parties agree
that the marriage is irretrievably broken.
2. Wife’s request for a divorce based upon
Pa.C.S.[A.] 23 § 3301(d) and [23 Pa.C.S.A.]
§ 3301(a)(6) of the Pennsylvania Divorce Code
is denied.
3. Wife shall receive $349.28 from Husband for
the late fees she incurred due to his failure to
make timely mortgage payments while he was
living in the home. Husband shall pay this
amount within thirty days of the divorce decree
being entered.
4. The marital debt in the amount of $24,480.43
shall be disbursed from the escrow account to
the noted credit card companies. Wife shall
1
We note that 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301 was amended, effective December 5,
2016, but that the version of the statute applicable in the case sub judice
was prior to this amendment. (See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301, enacted
legislation 1990, Dec. 19, P.L. 1240, No. 206, § 2.)
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receive $20,920.18, which represents the
remaining balance from the sale of the marital
residence.
5. The parties will keep any personal property
currently in their possession, except that Wife
shall receive the two plants and set of dishes
with blue flowers.
6. Wife’s request for alimony under
[23 Pa.C.S.A.] § 3701 of the Pennsylvania
Divorce Code is granted. Wife shall receive
$280.00 a month until she reaches the age of
65.
7. Wife’s request for alimony pendente lite is
denied.
8. Wife’s request for payment of counsel fees
under [23 Pa.C.S.A.] § 3702 of the
Pennsylvania Divorce Code is denied.
8. Each party is to assume any and all debt
and/or other liabilities which are in their
respective names not addressed in this
recommendation.
9. Husband shall receive the Wells Fargo checking
account.
10. Husband is entitled to keep Pillar Masonry,
including the equipment.
11. Each party will cooperate in the transferring of
any titles, deeds, or legal documentation so a
transfer can be successfully effectuated. Any
transfer fees to effectuate any transaction will
be equally shared by the parties.
12. Each party is awarded the vehicle which is
currently in their possession.
13. Husband is responsible for his own counsel
fees.
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14. Any fees beyond the initial Master’s $500.00
fee shall be divided 60% ($282.00) to Husband
and 40% ($188.00) to Wife.
Master’s report and recommendation, 4/30/15 at 10-11 (citation formatting
corrected).
Thereafter, on October 14, 2015, the trial court entered a decree in
divorce and incorporated Master Wilson’s report and recommendation. On
November 3, 2015, Husband filed a timely notice of appeal. The following
day, the trial court directed Husband to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal, in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Husband
filed his timely Rule 1925(b) statement on November 23, 2015. On
January 7, 2016, the trial court filed a comprehensive, nine-page
Rule 1925(a) opinion.
Husband raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in
denying the exception alleging that the Master
erred in not considering, in her
Recommendation, that there be any division of
Husband’s marital debts despite stating in her
Findings of Fact that “Husband claims marital
debts in the amount of $22,775.00[]”?
2. Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in
denying the exception alleging that the Master
erred in calculating the parties’ marital debt as
$24,480.83 given Husband’s testimony
regarding his marital debt?
3. Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in
denying the exception alleging that the Master
erred in determining that Wife shall receive
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$20,920.18 from the remaining balance of the
sale of the marital residence, but would also
have the marital debt in her name paid from
the proceeds of the house, with no
recommendation as to the division of the
marital debt in Husband’s name?
4. Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in
denying the exception alleging that the Master
erred in finding that Wife has a pension from
Wayne Memorial Hospital and receives $115.25
a month, but did not subject said pension to
equitable distribution?
5. Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in
denying the exception alleging that the Master
erred in granting alimony as Wife works
part-time as a bartender at Blooming Grove
Tavern?
6. Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in
denying the exception alleging that the Master
erred in granting Wife alimony until the age of
65, when Wife would be entitled to social
security at age 62?
7. Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in
denying the exception alleging that the Master
erred in granting Wife alimony when she
receives $1,300.00 monthly from social
security disability?
8. Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in
denying the exception alleging that the Master
erred in granting Wife alimony, yet found that
the Wife is not an injured or innocent spouse?
9. Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in
denying the exception alleging that the Master
erred in granting alimony in light of the
equitable distribution award, as well as her
employment, disability payments, and
pension?
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10. Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in
denying the exception alleging that the Master
erred in granting Wife’s request for alimony for
$280.00 until she reaches the age of 65?
Husband’s brief at 4-5.2
We begin by addressing Husband’s challenges to the equitable
distribution scheme. Specifically, Husband argues that Master Wilson erred
in finding that the parties’ marital debt was $24,480.43, despite Husband
testifying that the marital debt was $22,775.00; that Wife was entitled to
receive $20,920.18 from the remaining balance of the sale of the marital
residence; and that Wife’s $115.25 monthly pension from Wayne Memorial
Hospital was not subject to equitable distribution. (Husband’s brief at
11-17; issues 1-4.)
Our standard of review of awards of equitable distribution is well
settled:
A trial court has broad discretion when
fashioning an award of equitable distribution. Our
standard of review when assessing the propriety of
an order effectuating the equitable distribution of
marital property is whether the trial court abused its
discretion by a misapplication of the law or failure to
follow proper legal procedure. We do not lightly find
an abuse of discretion, which requires a showing of
clear and convincing evidence. This Court will not
find an abuse of discretion unless the law has been
overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised
was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
2
Husband’s arguments can be separated into two categories; his first four
issues challenge the equitable distribution scheme, and his remaining six
issues concern the award of alimony. For the ease of discussion, we have
addressed each of these matters accordingly.
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partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the
evidence in the certified record. In determining the
propriety of an equitable distribution award, courts
must consider the distribution scheme as a whole.
We measure the circumstances of the case against
the objective of effectuating economic justice
between the parties and achieving a just
determination of their property rights.
Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1134 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 62
A.3d 380 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted).
The Divorce Code does not specify a particular method of valuing
assets. The divorce master and trial court must exercise discretion and rely
on the estimates, inventories, records of purchase prices, and appraisals
submitted by both parties. Smith v. Smith, 653 A.2d 1259, 1265
(Pa.Super. 1995), appeal denied, 663 A.2d 693 (Pa. 1995).
In determining the value of marital property,
the court is free to accept all, part or none of the
evidence as to the true and correct value of the
property. Where the evidence offered by one party
is uncontradicted, the court may adopt this value
even though the resulting valuation would have been
different if more accurate and complete evidence had
been presented. A trial court does not abuse its
discretion in adopting the only valuation submitted
by the parties. Absent a specific guideline in the
divorce code, the trial courts are given discretion to
choose the date of valuation of marital property[,]
which best provides for “economic justice” between
parties.
Baker v. Baker, 861 A.2d 298, 302 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 918
A.2d 741 (Pa. 2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Husband’s claims hinge in large part on his disagreement with a
number of Master Wilson’s findings. The record reflects that Master Wilson
relied on the plethora of exhibits submitted by the parties, as well as the
testimony of each party at the March 12, 2015 hearing, in determining the
value of the parties’ marital property. (Master’s report and
recommendation, 4/30/15 at 6-8; see also Wife’s “Pre-Trial Statement,”
2/27/15, exhibits 1-18; Husband’s “Pre-Trial Statement,” 3/9/15,
exhibits A-R; certified record at nos. 23, 27.) The trial court found that
Master Wilson disagreed with Husband’s valuation of the parties’ marital
debt and that her proposed recommendations were supported by the record.
(Trial court opinion, 1/7/16 at 2-3.) We similarly decline to upset the
determinations of the fact-finder. We have consistently explained that “a
master’s report and recommendation, although only advisory, is to be given
the fullest consideration[,]” as the master is in the best position to observe
the testimony and demeanor of the parties. Moran v. Moran, 839 A.2d
1091, 1095 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
This court has repeatedly explained that, “[i]n determining the
propriety of an equitable distribution award [], we must consider the
distribution scheme as a whole.” Schenk v. Schenk, 880 A.2d 633, 643
(Pa.Super. 2005). “[W]hen a court divides the marital property, it must do
so only after considering ‘all relevant factors,’ including eleven specific
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factors listed in the Divorce Code.” Teodorski v. Teodorski, 857 A.2d 194,
199-200 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a), when
fashioning equitable distribution awards, the trial
court must consider: the length of the marriage;
any prior marriages; age, health, skills, and
employability of the parties; sources of income and
needs of the parties; contributions of one party to
the increased earning power of the other party;
opportunity of each party for future acquisitions of
assets or income; contribution or dissipation of each
party to the acquisition, depreciation or appreciation
of marital property, value of each party’s separate
property, standard of living established during the
marriage; economic circumstances of each party and
whether the party will be serving as custodian of any
dependent children.
Mercatell v. Mercatell, 854 A.2d 609, 611 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation
omitted). “The weight to be given to these statutory factors depends on the
facts of each case and is within the [fact-finder’s] discretion.” Schenk, 880
A.2d at 643 (citations omitted).
Instantly, we find that Master Wilson expressly considered all of the
relevant factors in making her recommendations as to how the parties’
marital property should be distributed. (See master’s report and
recommendation, 4/30/15 at 10-11.) Those factors included Husband’s
higher earning capacity, the fact that Wife is in poor physical health and has
been deemed disabled, and that “Wife is incapable of self-support through
full[-]time employment” and that her needs “greatly outweigh” those of
Husband due to her physical condition. (Id. at 9.) The master also
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considered the duration of the marriage; the parties’ respective ages, the
fact that they did not have children, their “minimal” standard of living during
the marriage; and their $24,480.43 in credit card debit. (Id.) Additionally,
the master took note of the fact that Wife put a $5,000 down payment on
the marital home at the time of its purchase and that Wife contributed
financially to Husband’s business. (Id.)
Husband’s contentions on appeal merely challenge the weight to be
accorded the various factors, and as discussed, this matter was within the
province of Master Wilson, and not within the appellate court. See Schenk,
880 A.2d at 643; Moran, 839 A.2d at 1095. Herein, Master Wilson and the
trial court gave due consideration to all of the factors set forth in
Section 3502(a) in arriving at an equitable distribution scheme which, as a
whole, achieved a just determination of the parties’ marital property.
Accordingly, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in denying
Husband’s exceptions to the equitable distribution scheme set forth in
Master Wilson’s report and recommendation.
We now turn to Husband’s remaining claims challenging the award of
alimony to Wife. Specifically, Husband argues that Master Wilson erred in
granting Wife alimony because she is employed part-time; she is entitled to
social security at age 62; she receives a monthly social security disability
payment; she was not found to be “an injured or innocent spouse”; and she
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received a windfall from the equitable distribution award. (Husband’s brief
at 18-24; issues 6-10.) We disagree.
The role of an appellate court in reviewing
alimony orders is limited; we review only to
determine whether there has been an error of law or
abuse of discretion by the trial court. Absent an
abuse of discretion or insufficient evidence to
sustain the support order, this Court will not
interfere with the broad discretion afforded the
trial court.
Smith v. Smith, 904 A.2d 15, 20 (Pa.Super. 2006) (citation omitted;
emphasis added).
In determining the nature, amount, duration, and manner of payment
of alimony, the following 17 factors set forth in Section 3701(b) must be
considered:
(1) The relative earnings and earning capacities of
the parties.
(2) The ages and the physical, mental and
emotional conditions of the parties.
(3) The sources of income of both parties,
including, but not limited to, medical,
retirement, insurance or other benefits.
(4) The expectancies and inheritances of the
parties.
(5) The duration of the marriage.
(6) The contribution by one party to the education,
training or increased earning power of the
other party.
(7) The extent to which the earning power,
expenses or financial obligations of a party will
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be affected by reason of serving as the
custodian of a minor child.
(8) The standard of living of the parties
established during the marriage.
(9) The relative education of the parties and the
time necessary to acquire sufficient education
or training to enable the party seeking alimony
to find appropriate employment.
(10) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties.
(11) The property brought to the marriage by either
party.
(12) The contribution of a spouse as homemaker.
(13) The relative needs of the parties.
(14) The marital misconduct of either of the parties
during the marriage. The marital misconduct
of either of the parties from the date of final
separation shall not be considered by the court
in its determinations relative to alimony,
except that the court shall consider the abuse
of one party by the other party. As used in
this paragraph, “abuse” shall have the
meaning given to it under section 6102
(relating to definitions).
(15) The Federal, State and local tax ramifications
of the alimony award.
(16) Whether the party seeking alimony lacks
sufficient property, including, but not limited
to, property distributed under Chapter 35
(relating to property rights), to provide for the
party's reasonable needs.
(17) Whether the party seeking alimony is incapable
of self-support through appropriate
employment.
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23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(b); see also Isralsky v. Isralsky, 824 A.2d 1178,
1188 (Pa.Super. 2003).
In the instant matter, Master Wilson determined that an alimony
award of $280 per month until Wife reaches the age of 65 was appropriate,
given the “great disparity in [the parties’ respective] earning capacities and
income” and the fact that “Wife is incapable of self-support through
full[-]time employment.” (Master’s report and recommendation, 4/30/15 at
9-10.) Following our careful review, we conclude that Master Wilson
adequately examined the specific facts of this case and properly analyzed
the appropriate statutory factors in Section 3701(b) in determining Wife’s
reasonable needs and Husband’s earning capacity. The record supports
Master Wilson’s findings, and therefore, we conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in adopting her alimony recommendation.
Order entering decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
JosephD.Seletyn,Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/13/2017
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