Shaffer, K. v. Visaggio's, Inc. ( 2015 )


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  • J-A12039-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
    KEITH A. SHAFFER,                          : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :      PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee               :
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    VISAGGIO’S, INC.,                          :
    :
    Appellant              : No. 1959 MDA 2014
    Appeal from the Order entered October 20, 2014,
    Court of Common Pleas, Cumberland County,
    Civil Division at No. 2009-02122
    BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE and ALLEN, JJ.
    DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.:                  FILED JULY 29, 2015
    Based upon my review of the certified record on appeal, I must
    respectfully dissent.      In this case, William A. Duncan (“Duncan”), a
    statutorily-appointed appraiser, received evidence and issued a report to the
    trial court analyzing the fair value of the stock owned by dissenting
    shareholder and appellee, Keith A. Shaffer (“Shaffer”), in appellant,
    Visaggio’s, Inc. (“Visaggio’s). In my view, the trial court erred in adopting
    Duncan’s report, as it is unsupported by any evidence in the certified record.
    During the evidentiary proceedings before Duncan, Shaffer and
    Visaggio’s each called real estate and business valuation experts to present
    reports and offer supporting testimony.1      To understand the reports and
    1
    The parties also called separate expert witnesses regarding the proper
    valuation of Visaggio’s real property. Because on appeal neither party has
    J-A12039-15
    testimony of the business valuation experts, it is important to review the
    applicable law relevant to the determination of the fair value of a dissenting
    shareholder’s stock.   In In re Glosser Bros., Inc., 
    555 A.2d 129
    (Pa.
    Super. 1989), this Court distilled and explained at length the basic valuation
    principles described in O’Connor Appeal, 
    304 A.2d 694
    (Pa. 1973).          In
    O’Connor, our Supreme Court instructed that “fair value” for a dissenting
    shareholder’s stock refers to going concern value (i.e., the value of the
    business as a continuing enterprise, without regard to the effects of the
    impending merger), rather than liquidation value (i.e, the amount that could
    be obtained by selling the corporation’s remaining assets upon a cessation of
    business operations). 
    Id. at 698.
    In Glosser Bros., this Court described
    the proper methodology to determine the going concern value of a
    dissenting shareholder’s stock as follows:
    The “going concern” concept of fair value in a
    dissenting shareholders' appraisal proceeding and
    the many individual factors comprising it were aptly
    described by the Delaware Supreme Court in Tri–
    Continental Corp. v. Battye, 
    74 A.2d 71
    , 76 (Del.
    1950):
    The basic concept of value under the
    appraisal is that the stockholder is
    entitled to be paid for that which has
    been    taken    from    him,    viz.,  his
    proportionate interest in a going concern.
    By     value    of    the     stockholder’s
    proportionate interest in the corporate
    disputed the trial court’s adoption of Duncan’s real estate valuation, I will
    not address any such issues herein.
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    enterprise is meant the true or intrinsic
    value of his stock which has been taken
    by the merger. In determining what
    figure represents this true or intrinsic
    value, the appraiser and the courts must
    take into consideration all factors and
    elements which might reasonably enter
    into the fixing of value. Thus, market
    value, asset value, dividends, earning
    prospects, the nature of the enterprise
    and any other facts which were known or
    which could be ascertained as of the date
    of the merger and which throw any light
    on future prospects of the merged
    corporation are not only pertinent to any
    inquiry as to the value of the dissenting
    stockholders' interest, but must be
    considered by the agency fixing the
    value.
    
    Id. at 72.
    The O'Connor [C]ourt noted that courts had
    properly distilled all of these factors into three
    principal valuation methods, i.e. (1) net asset value;
    (2) actual market value; and (3) investment value.
    The court defined these valuation methods as
    follows:
    Net Asset Value is the share which the
    stock represents in the value of the net
    assets of the corporation. Such assets
    include every kind of property and value,
    whether realty or personalty, tangible
    and intangible, including good will and
    the corporation’s value as a going
    concern.
    Investment Value is an estimate of
    present worth in light of past, present
    and prospective financial records of the
    company and is obtained by capitalizing
    earnings. There are two basic steps in
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    the capitalization process: calculation of
    a representative annual earnings figure,
    and choice of a capitalization ratio which
    reflects the stability and predictability of
    earnings of the particular corporation.
    Market Value refers to the price at
    which the stock was selling on the
    market prior to the action which is
    objected to, disregarding any change in
    price due to the action.
    
    [O'Connor, 304 A.2d at 698
    n.7]
    Glosser 
    Bros., 555 A.2d at 133-34
    .
    Expanding upon the valuation methods described in O’Connor, in
    Glosser Bros. we offered the following additional discussion of appropriate
    valuation methodology in this context:
    [W]e do not read the O'Connor opinion as limiting a
    trial court to a consideration of only these three
    valuation methods. 
    Id. at []
    697–98. Financial
    analysis has become increasingly complex with the
    passage of time.          New methods of valuing
    investments have been developed and are generally
    accepted in the financial community as being
    reliable.     In recognition of this fact, other
    jurisdictions that previously restricted a trial court to
    the foregoing three valuation methods have now
    expanded the types of valuation information that
    may be considered in a stock valuation proceeding.
    For example, in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 
    457 A.2d 701
    (Del. 1983), the Supreme Court of
    Delaware, known for its expertise in these matters,
    directed that Delaware courts would no longer be
    bound to use only the traditional “Delaware block” or
    weighted average approach to valuation. By this
    method, which is still generally in use in
    Pennsylvania and which was applied by the trial
    court in the instant case, the court considers only the
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    three traditional methods of valuation, assigns each
    a percentage weight and adds the resulting amounts
    to come to a total value. The Weinberger court
    found this approach too restrictive and directed that
    courts henceforth use a “more liberal approach
    [which] must include proof of value by any
    techniques or methods which are generally
    considered acceptable in the financial community
    and otherwise admissible in court....” 
    Id. at 712–13.
    Glosser 
    Bros., 555 A.2d at 134
    .
    To summarize, pursuant to Glosser Bros., going concern value is
    determined by using the “Delaware Block” method, whereby the trial court
    employs a “weighted average approach to valuation,” assigning a percentage
    of weight to the net asset value, investment value, and market value of the
    company to arrive at the fair value of the company.2     
    Id. at 133-34.
      In
    accordance with Weinberger, however, where the Delaware Block method
    would be too restrictive under the specific circumstances presented, a trial
    court in appropriate cases may instead utilize “any techniques or methods
    which are generally considered acceptable in the financial community and
    otherwise admissible in court.” 
    Id. 2 Glosser
    Bros. presented an unusual situation in which 50-60% of the
    corporation’s stock was closely held by management and family while the
    remaining stock was publicly traded. 
    Id. at 131.
    The trial court applied the
    Delaware Block approach, but decided not to include the market approach
    and instead weighted the net asset value at 65% and the investment value
    at 35%. 
    Id. at 136.
    This Court reversed, concluding that the trial court
    erred in excluding market value from its calculation, since although public
    trading was thin, there was no evidence of market manipulation or control to
    justify ignoring market value entirely. 
    Id. at 135-36.
    In reversing, we
    remanded the case with instructions to assign a weight to the market value
    and include it in the valuation analysis. 
    Id. at 136.
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    J-A12039-15
    With these valuation principles in mind, in this case two business
    valuation experts offered reports and testimony on the going concern value
    of Visaggio’s’ stock at the evidentiary proceedings before Duncan. William
    Boles (“Boles”), a business valuation expert retained by Visaggio’s, testified
    regarding the findings set forth in his report. Boles described his valuation
    methodology to determine the going concern value of Visaggio’s’ stock as
    follows:
    In our valuation of Visaggio’s, Inc., we considered all
    three approaches to value.         Under the income
    approach, we utilized the capitalized earnings
    method. Under the market approach, we utilized the
    market value of invested capital to sales method.
    Under the asset approach, we used the formula
    method (also known as the excess earnings
    method), which computes a goodwill factor.
    Visaggio’s, Inc. Valuation of Common Stock, 12/31/2007, at 42 (Exhibit 11).
    For the income value, using the capitalized earnings approach, Boles utilized
    a weighted average of annual net income from 2004-2007 ($22,180) and
    applied a capitalization rate of 21.80% to arrive at a “[t]otal indicated value
    before contingent liability” of $101,743. 
    Id. at Exhibit
    11, Schedule 2. For
    the market value, using the invested capital to sales method, Boles
    computed a weighted average of annual sales for the years 2004-2007
    ($1,434,542) and applied an industry multiple (.34) to arrive at an
    “[i]ndicated value of operating assets plus goodwill” of $487,714.      
    Id. at Exhibit
    11, Schedule 3. For the net asset approach, Boles used the formula
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    method to calculate the value of the company’s goodwill ($6,586).           
    Id. at Exhibit
    11, Schedule 5.        He then added the shareholders’ equity from the
    financial statements (-$148,268) with the net value of the real estate
    ($333,237) and goodwill, to arrive at a “[t]otal indicated value before
    contingent liability” of $191,555. 
    Id. at Exhibit
    11, Schedule 4. Because all
    three of these valuations were dwarfed by contingent liabilities for unpaid
    wages and unfunded pension obligations of $1.3 million,3 however, Boles
    concluded that the value of Visaggio’s’ stock was $0. 
    Id. at 6,
    Exhibit 11,
    Schedules 2-4.
    Shaffer offered the testimony of business valuation expert James
    Smelzer (“Smelzer”).          Smelzer testified that in general he found Boles’
    approach to be “reasonable.” N.T., 1/13/2010, at 97. As a result, Smelzer
    did not perform his own independent valuations, and instead used Boles’
    numbers as the baseline for his going concern valuations. Smelzer modified
    Boles’ net asset, investment, and market valuations by making four material
    modifications: (1) he used the real estate valuation from Shaffer’s expert;
    (2) he adjusted the shareholders’ equity (book value) from (-$148,268)
    to     (-$119,465);     (3)    he   added   $111,747   in   non-operating   assets
    (marketable securities) that Boles excluded; and (4) he disagreed with any
    deductions      for   unpaid    wages   and/or   unfunded    pension   obligations.
    Comparison of Expert Appraiser’s Reports, 12/11/2009, Exhibit D.            Of the
    3
    I agree with the Majority’s thoughtful analysis on this issue.
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    three methods utilized by Boles, Smelzer found the invested capital to
    annual sales method to be “the most appropriate approach” for Visaggio’s,
    N.T., 1/13/2010, at 131, and using Boles’ baseline number of $487,714 and
    applying the four modifications, he valued Visaggio’s’ stock at $799,461,
    with Shaffer’s 25% interest thus equaling to $199,865.
    After receiving testimony on January 13-14, 2010 and June 4, 2010,
    Duncan conducted a view of Visaggio’s’ property and operations on July 27,
    2010, at which time he requested that Visaggio’s produce its insurance
    policies. Thereafter, on November 1, 2010, Duncan filed his report with the
    trial   court,   in   which    he   offered   the     following   straightforward
    recommendation:
    VII. APPRAISER’S FINDINGS
    1. Valuation of Real Estate - $1,800,000.00
    The hotel rooms and liquor license should be considered but not to the
    extent promoted by Shaffer’s appraiser for the reasons presented by
    the Lamadues.
    2. Business Equipment - $325,000
    The insurance coverages were considered together with the
    Appraiser’s view of the premises. The equipment is used, readily
    available, not unique and in some cases, very dated.
    Report of Appraiser, 11/1/2010, at 13.
    By order and opinion dated October 20, 2014, the trial court adopted
    Duncan’s valuation without modification, concluding that it “bear[s] a
    reasonable relationship to the values established by the parties’ experts and
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    is clearly supported by substantial evidence.” Trial Court Order and Opinion,
    10/20/2014, at 7. After subtracting the $1.6 million debt on the real estate,
    the trial court concluded, based solely on Duncan’s report, that the value of
    Visaggio’s’ real estate was $200,000, the value of its business equipment
    was $325,000, and Shaffer’s 25% share of the total value of $525,000 was
    thus $131,250. 
    Id. On appeal,
    Visaggio’s contends that the trial court erred in adopting
    Duncan’s valuation of $325,000 for its business equipment.      According to
    Visaggio’s, during the evidentiary proceedings, neither party submitted any
    evidence on the value of the business equipment and the business valuation
    experts did not assign any value to the equipment. Visaggio’s’ Brief at 15.
    As a result, Visaggio’s contends that the $325,000 valuation is not supported
    by any evidence of record.4 
    Id. I agree
    with Visaggio’s that the trial court’s finding that the value of
    Visaggio’s business equipment at the time of the merger was $325,000 is
    unsupported by any competent and substantial evidence of record. The trial
    court appointed Duncan pursuant to section 1579(c) of the Business
    4
    Visaggio’s also argues that Duncan’s viewing on July 27, 2010 and the
    insurance policies he subsequently received were both de hors the
    evidentiary record because the evidentiary record closed on June 4, 2010
    (the final day of testimony). Visaggio’s Brief at 15-17. On this issue, I
    agree with the Majority that there is no basis in the certified record on
    appeal to conclude that the evidentiary record before Duncan was closed at
    the time of the viewing and the receipt of the insurance policies. Maj.
    Memorandum 9-10.
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    Corporations Law, which provides in relevant part that “[t]he court may
    appoint an appraiser to receive evidence and recommend a decision on the
    fair value.” 15 Pa.C.S.A. § 1579(c).5 Although apparently never addressed
    by our appellate courts, pursuant to this provision a trial court could
    presumably appoint an expert in business valuation, who would then receive
    evidence necessary and relevant to perform a Glosser Bros.-type going
    concern analysis (e.g., financial statements), and prepare a fair value
    recommendation to the trial court based upon this evidence. In the present
    case, however, Duncan is an attorney and the certified record contains no
    indication that he has any expertise or qualifications as a business valuation
    expert.6   As such, Duncan’s proper role here was more akin to that of a
    special master,7 namely to receive evidence in the form of conflicting expert
    5
    Section 1579(c) further provides that the appointee “shall have such
    power and authority as may be specified in the order of appointment or in
    any amendment thereof.” 
    Id. In its
    order appointing Duncan, the trial court
    did not confer any special power or authority on him, instead merely
    directing that he “make a recommendation to the court as to the value of
    the stock.” Trial Court Order, 6/1/2009, at 1.
    6
    In its order and opinion adopting Duncan’s report, the trial court cites to
    our Supreme Court’s admonition that valuation issues in dissenting
    shareholder litigation are “rather economic than legal in character” and thus
    can “better be derived by consulting the business man, the banker, and the
    industrial engineer, than the jurist, legal scholar, or lawyer.” Trial Court
    Opinion, 10/20/2014, at 3-4 (quoting Watt & Shand, 
    283 A.2d 279
    , 280-81
    Pa. 1971)).
    7
    For example, in divorce or annulment proceedings, Rule 1920.51 of the
    Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the trial court may
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    testimony   on   the   going   concern   value   of    the   stock   and    make    a
    recommendation to the trial court based upon that evidence.
    Duncan clearly failed to fulfill his proper role.       While he did receive
    evidence from business valuation experts (Boles and Smelzer), in his report
    to the trial court he ignored entirely their reports and testimony.                In
    significant contrast to the efforts of Boles and Smelzer to conduct valuations
    generally in accordance with the Delaware Block methodology prescribed by
    Glosser Bros., Duncan explains in his report that he arrived at his $325,000
    valuation for the business equipment merely by reviewing the insurance
    coverages “together with the Appraiser’s view of the premises.” Report of
    Appraiser, 11/1/2010, at 13.      In other words, Duncan valued Visaggio’s’
    business equipment by starting with the value provided by the company’s
    casualty insurance provider ($642,000),8 and then adjusted this number
    downward based upon his own observation of the equipment (which he
    appoint a master to hear the evidence                 and    issue   a   report   and
    recommendation. Pa.R.C.P. 1920.51(a)(1).
    8
    Perhaps because Visaggio’s’ insurance policies were not produced until
    after all the witness testimony had been received, the certified record
    contains no information regarding what specific equipment was insured (or
    excluded from coverage), or how the figure of $642,000 was derived.
    Moreover, neither Shaffer nor the trial court has cited to any authority
    suggesting that insurance values have any relevance in a determination of a
    business’ going concern value. The expert reports of Boles and Smelzer do
    not indicate that either of them requested or reviewed Visaggio’s’ insurance
    policies when they performed their going concern valuations, or otherwise
    suggest that such information would have assisted them in any way.
    - 11 -
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    described as “used, readily available, not unique and in some cases, very
    dated”).
    As such, unlike Boles and Smelzer, who each valued Visaggio’s as a
    going concern as per Glosser Bros., Duncan chose to employ an entirely
    different methodology, one that bore no relation to, and did not rely in any
    respect upon, the work performed by the two business valuation experts.
    While neither Boles nor Smelzer assigned any specific value to Visaggio’s’
    business equipment, assigning a value to the business equipment was
    Duncan’s principal (sole) focus. In this regard, it is important to note that
    Duncan’s $325,000 valuation does not constitute a going concern value for
    the business equipment, but rather his own estimate of the equipment’s
    liquidation value, i.e., his estimate of what the equipment might fetch in a
    sale to a willing buyer in its present condition (“used, readily available, not
    unique and in some cases, very dated”).        This was itself improper. 9   See
    9
    Even a cursory review of Duncan’s analysis reflects that it falls far short of
    the methodology described in Glosser Bros. Duncan did not apply a
    “Delaware Block” weighted average of net asset value, investment value,
    and market value to arrive at the fair value of Visaggio’s’ stock. Glosser
    
    Bros., 555 A.2d at 133-34
    . Moreover, neither Duncan nor the trial court
    offered any basis for employing a deviation from the Delaware Block method
    (per Weinberger), and nothing in the certified record indicates that
    Duncan’s approach constituted an alternative methodology “generally
    considered acceptable in the financial community.” 
    Id. This appeal
    cannot, however, be decided on this basis. In the proceedings
    before the trial court, Visaggio’s raised this issue of Duncan’s failure to follow
    the Glosser Bros. methodology to determine going concern value.
    Exceptions to the Report of Appraiser, 11/30/2010, ¶¶ 19-20 (“Mr. Duncan
    - 12 -
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    Glosser 
    Bros., 555 A.2d at 133
    (“fair value is to be construed as going
    concern value, as contrasted with liquidation value”).
    For these reasons, I cannot agree with the Majority that Duncan’s
    $325,000 valuation is supported by competent and substantial evidence.
    The Majority cites to testimony from Boles suggesting that the “value of the
    furniture, fixtures, and equipment and inventory” was $191,555.        Maj.
    Memorandum at 17.        A review of Boles’ report, however, shows that
    $191,555 did not constitute a valuation of Visaggio’s’ business equipment,
    since he arrived at this number by adding the shareholders’ equity from the
    financial statement (-$148,268) with the net value of the real estate
    ($333,237) and goodwill ($6,586).     Visaggio’s, Inc. Valuation of Common
    Stock, 12/31/2007, at 42 (Exhibit 11, Schedule 4). As such, while the book
    value10 of the business equipment may have been included as one
    did not consider any of the factors laid out by the Glosser court.”).
    Visaggio’s did not raise this issue on appeal, however, and therefore it is
    waived.
    10
    In O’Connor, our Supreme Court observed that book value “does not
    accurately represent the fair value of the corporate assets,” and that the
    “suggestion that the book value of the shares is any measure of their value
    is clearly fallacious.” 
    O’Connor, 304 A.2d at 700
    .
    The Majority correctly notes that book values for Visaggio’s’ business
    equipment were listed in its annual financial statements. Maj. Memorandum
    at 15-16. Even to the extent that (per O’Connor) these values provided
    any indication of the going concern value of the business equipment,
    however, Duncan’s report makes clear that he did not rely upon them in
    reaching his $325,000 valuation, as he instead relied solely upon the
    insurance policies and his own view of the equipment. Accordingly, the book
    - 13 -
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    component of the shareholder’s equity portion of this calculation, the
    $191,555 figure also includes other items, including real estate and goodwill,
    and thus does not represent the value of the business equipment.
    The Majority also cites to testimony from Smelzer suggesting that the
    value of the equipment was $487,714.         Maj. Memorandum at 17.        As
    discussed hereinabove, however, Boles’ valuation report (from which
    Smelzer obtained this number) shows that Boles arrived at $487,714 by
    multiplying a weighted average of annual sales for the years 2004-2007 with
    an industry multiple. 
    Id. at Exhibit
    11, Schedule 3. Accordingly, $487,714
    represents a capitalization of Visaggio’s’ annual sales, not the value of its
    business equipment.
    In sum, Duncan’s valuation of Visaggio’s’ stock is not supported by any
    competent or substantial evidence of record, and does not even reflect a
    going concern valuation as is required by law in this context.        To the
    contrary, because Duncan has no expertise in the valuation of business
    equipment (belonging to hotels, restaurants, or otherwise), his report
    constitutes, at best, his speculation regarding the liquidation value of the
    business equipment. As a result, the trial court erred as a matter of law in
    adopting Duncan’s $525,000 valuation of Visaggio’s.     Accordingly, I would
    values of the equipment in the financial statements provide no support for
    Duncan’s $325,000 valuation.
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    reverse the trial court’s decision and remand this case to the trial court for
    further proceedings consistent herewith.
    - 15 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1959 MDA 2014

Filed Date: 7/29/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024