Com. v. Adewumi, D. ( 2015 )


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  • J-S41028-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    DAVID A. ADEWUMI
    Appellant                No. 1902 MDA 2014
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 23, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0001348-2013
    BEFORE: ALLEN, J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                          FILED AUGUST 07, 2015
    David A. Adewumi appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed by
    the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County following his conviction of two
    counts each of stalking1 and harassment.2       Adewumi challenges the trial
    court’s denial of his request to withdraw his nolo contendere plea in relation
    to the aforementioned crimes. In the alternative, Adewumi challenges both
    the legality and discretionary aspects of his sentence. After careful review,
    we affirm in part, vacate in part and remand for resentencing.
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    42 Pa.C.S. § 2709.1(a).
    2
    42 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a).
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    The trial court summarized the facts and procedural history of the
    matter as follows:
    [Appellant], David A. Adewumi[,] was charged with two counts
    of [s]talking and two counts of [h]arassment.
    By way of background, [Adewumi] requested that his bail be
    lowered so he could seek mental health treatment.               On
    September 10, 2013, an Order was entered by the Honorable
    Judge Kistler reducing bail from $50,000 to $1,000 and, if
    released on bail, [Adewumi] was directed to attend the
    Meadow[s] Psychiatric Clinic for a mental health evaluation and
    to follow the recommendations of the evaluator. He was to
    report to the Meadows Psychiatric Clinic within four hours of
    release from the Centre County Correctional Facility. He was
    also ordered to have no contact with [T.L.], the stalking victim in
    this case. On February 10, 2014, a bench warrant was issued
    for failure to appear. [Adewumi] did not go to the Meadows but
    instead fled to California. He was returned to Pennsylvania
    through the extradition process. Bail was rescinded and was set
    on April 16, 2014[,] at $50,000 straight.
    On September 16, 2014, [Adewumi] entered a [nolo contendere
    plea] and signed a written [nolo contendere] colloquy.
    [Adewumi] filed a pro se document on October 6, 2014, despite
    having counsel appointed to represent him at that time, raising
    several convoluted issues including an apparent challenge of his
    plea and seeking to defend himself[,] which seemed to relate
    more to his other cases. Subsequent to the charges being filed
    in the herein stalking case, [Adewumi] was charged with
    institutional vandalism at docket number CP-14-CR-1367-2013.
    While he was incarcerated in connection with the stalking case,
    he caused damage by tampering with a sprinkler system at
    Centre County Correctional Facility.      [Adewumi] was also
    charged with making false reports at docket number CP-14-CR-
    1694-2013. He made false complaints that corrections officers
    at Centre County Correctional Facility had grabbed his genitals.
    These two cases were consolidated and are [also] currently on
    appeal with the Honorable Superior Court.
    [Adewumi] was scheduled for sentencing on October 15, 201[4].
    On that date, he made a [motion to withdraw his nolo
    contendere plea]. The scheduled sentencing date was continued
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    to allow the Commonwealth adequate time to respond to his
    motion. On October 23, 2013, this [c]ourt heard [Adewumi’s
    motion] which was denied and [Adewumi] was sentenced.
    A pre-sentence investigation was prepared which this [c]ourt
    considered. For Count 1, Stalking, [Adewumi] was sentenced to
    undergo imprisonment for a period of not less than one (1) year
    nor more than (5) years in a state correctional institution. Credit
    was given of fifty-five days served. For Count 2, Stalking, he
    was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of not less
    than one (1) year nor more than (5) years in a state correctional
    institution.  For Count 3, Harassment, he was placed on
    probation for a period of twelve months to run consecutive to the
    sentence imposed at Count 2. For Count 4, Harassment, he was
    ordered to pay a fine of $50.00. These sentences are to run
    consecutive to those imposed on [Adewumi’s] other docket
    numbers[.] [Adewumi] did not file [p]ost-[s]entence [m]otions.
    Trial Court Opinion, 1/9/15, at 1-2.
    Adewumi raises the following issues on appeal:
    1. Did the trial court err in not permitting Adewumi to withdraw
    his plea?
    2. Did the trial court impose a manifestly excessive sentence
    and abuse its discretion?
    3. Where stalking is not qualified [as] a crime of violence, did
    the lower court err in finding [Adewumi to be Recidivism Risk
    Reduction Incentive] ineligible?
    Appellant’s Brief, at 5-6.
    “A trial court’s decision regarding whether to permit a guilty plea to be
    withdrawn    should   not    be   upset   absent   an   abuse   of   discretion.”
    Commonwealth v. Pardo, 
    35 A.3d 1222
    , 1227 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation
    omitted).   An attempt to withdraw a nolo contendere plea is considered
    based upon the same standard as an attempt to withdraw a guilty plea. See
    Commonwealth v. Boatwright, 
    590 A.2d 15
    , 19 (Pa. Super. 1991).                 A
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    defendant must show a “fair and just” reason for withdrawing a plea that
    does not cause “substantial prejudice” to the Commonwealth.        
    Id.
       “The
    proper inquiry . . . is whether the accused has made some colorable
    demonstration, under the circumstances, such that permitting withdrawal of
    the plea would promote fairness and justice.”           Commonwealth v.
    Carrasquillo, ___ A.3d ___, 
    2015 WL 3684430
    , at *8 (Pa. 2015).
    However, “a bare assertion of innocence is not, in and of itself, a sufficient
    reason to require a court to grant such a request.” Id. at *1.
    As noted by our Supreme Court in Carrasquillo, prior decisions of the
    Court had lent the impression that a claim of innocence in connection with a
    request to withdraw a guilty or nolo contendere plea prior to sentencing was
    a per se fair and just reason for the withdrawal of the plea. See id. at *7.
    In clarifying the Court’s stance, Carrasquillo provides that trial courts have
    discretion to deny the withdrawal of a plea involving a mere assertion of
    innocence, particularly where such an assertion lacks plausibility. Id. at *8.
    The circumstances present in Carrasquillo that led to a lack of plausibility
    involved the strength of the Commonwealth’s case, Carrasquillo’s insincerity
    and manipulation of the system, and the farfetched explanation Carrasquillo
    provided of his innocence. See id. at *3, 8.
    Here, Adewumi did not proclaim his innocence when he first made the
    request to withdraw his nolo contendere plea on October 15, 2014, the day
    he had been scheduled for sentencing.       Instead, Adewumi indicated his
    unhappiness with counsel and the outcome of the case. Subsequently, the
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    court heard argument on Adewumi’s motion to withdraw the plea on October
    23, 2015. During these proceedings, Adewumi asserted his innocence, but
    only after the Commonwealth pointed out that he had not done so. Later in
    the proceedings, when the court questioned him directly, Adewumi again
    asserted his innocence.
    The record reveals, however, that Adewumi consistently manipulated
    the criminal justice system throughout the pendency of this matter.
    Adewumi was represented by a series of different attorneys; one was unable
    to continue representing Adewumi because Adewumi failed to maintain
    contact with the attorney, while Adewumi asserted the ineffectiveness of
    another. Adewumi repeatedly alternated between proceeding with counsel
    and proceeding pro se, apparently doing so when he considered it to be
    convenient to his case. While incarcerated for the instant harassment and
    stalking charges, Adewumi convinced the trial court to reduce his bail so that
    he could be released and check himself into a mental health facility for
    treatment.   Instead of entering the treatment facility as agreed, however,
    Adewumi fled to California and had to be extradited to Pennsylvania at
    significant cost to the Commonwealth.
    During the motion to withdraw and sentencing proceedings, Adewumi
    continued to demonstrate deceitful and manipulative tendencies. Adewumi
    claimed that his attorney was ineffective, yet switched from representing
    himself to proceeding with the very same “ineffective” attorney representing
    him for the sentencing itself.    The Commonwealth presented testimony
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    during the proceedings on the motion to withdraw indicating that earlier on
    that day, while the victim’s mother was testifying to the impact of
    Adewumi’s actions, Adewumi “broke into a wide grin and [] made an
    exaggerated wink with his left eye as [the victim’s mother] was describing
    how hard this was on her daughter.”         N.T. Motion to Withdraw Guilty
    Plea/Sentencing, 10/23/14, at 85.      For these reasons, though Adewumi
    eventually asserted his innocence, we agree with the trial court that “the
    motion to withdraw the plea was meant to further harass and intimidate the
    victim and her family.” Trial Court Opinion, 1/9/15, at 5. Furthermore, the
    Commonwealth’s evidence implicating Adewumi indicates that his assertions
    of innocence are implausible. Carrasquillo, supra, at *8.
    Moreover, we agree with the trial court that the Commonwealth would
    be prejudiced by the withdrawal of Adewumi’s plea.           To demonstrate
    prejudice in connection with the withdrawal of a plea requires “a showing
    that due to events occurring after the plea was entered, the Commonwealth
    is placed in a worse position than it would have been had trial taken place as
    scheduled.” Commonwealth v. Kirsch, 
    930 A.2d 1282
    , 1286 (Pa. Super.
    2007). In Kirsch, we determined that the reluctance of a witness to testify
    did not result in prejudice to the Commonwealth sufficient to deny the
    withdrawal of a guilty plea.   We also noted that it “[was] not a situation
    where in the interim a witness ha[d] died or left the jurisdiction, or where
    key evidence ha[d] been inadvertently lost or destroyed.” 
    Id. at 1287
    .
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    Conversely, here, two significant witnesses who would have testified
    for the Commonwealth were located outside the jurisdiction at the time the
    trial was scheduled to occur.           The Commonwealth had purchased non-
    refundable plane tickets, and the witnesses were prepared to fly to
    Pennsylvania from Arizona and California to testify. However, in reliance on
    Adewumi’s plea, the Commonwealth informed the individuals that they were
    not needed for trial and the flights were not used.                 As such, the
    Commonwealth would be prejudiced because it would bear the burden of
    again locating these individuals outside the Commonwealth and arranging
    for their transportation to Pennsylvania for trial if Adewumi’s plea were
    withdrawn.
    Since Adewumi’s nolo contendere plea stands, we turn to the issues
    Adewumi raises regarding his sentence.3            An illegal sentence presents a
    question     of   law,    and    we    have    a   plenary   standard   of   review.
    Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    997 A.2d 1205
    , 1208 (Pa. Super. 2010).
    Adewumi first asserts that his sentence is illegal because he is eligible
    for a Recidivism Risk Reduction Incentive (RRRI) sentence. The trial court
    did not consider an RRRI sentence for Adewumi, finding that Adewumi is
    precluded from this type of sentence because of the violent nature of his
    ____________________________________________
    3
    Because we conclude that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence, we
    will not address the discretionary sentencing issue Adewumi raises regarding
    the length of his sentence.
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    offenses.4    Adewumi contends that stalking is not a “crime of violence,”
    citing to the list of crimes in 42 Pa. C.S. § 9714(g). 5 However, the stalking
    statute itself provides that violation of a protection from abuse (PFA) order is
    a   “crime    of   violence.”      See     18    Pa.C.S.   §   2709.1(c);   see   also
    Commonwealth v. Bortz, 
    909 A.2d 1221
    , 1223 (Pa. 2006) (“‘crime of
    violence’ occurs when there is a violation of an extant PFA order issued
    under 23 Pa.C.S. § 6108.               This language is explicit and free from
    ambiguity.”)       The stalking charges for which Adewumi was instantly
    sentenced involved actions in direct violation of a PFA order the victim had
    obtained against Adewumi.6 Thus, we find that Adewumi is not entitled to
    an RRRI sentence.
    ____________________________________________
    4
    The relevant portion of the RRRI statute includes that an “eligible offender”
    is a defendant who meets certain eligibility requirements including that the
    individual “[d]oes not demonstrate a history of present or past violent
    behavior.” 61 Pa.C.S. § 4503.
    5
    Section 9714 deals generally with sentences for second and subsequent
    offenses and lists crimes that are considered to be crimes of violence “[a]s
    used in this section.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(g). Thus, the listed crimes have no
    bearing on whether a crime of violence was committed instantly, particularly
    where the stalking statute provides that violation of a PFA order constitutes
    a crime of violence. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709.1(c).
    6
    The victim obtained a PFA order on April 19, 2013, prohibiting Adewumi
    from contacting or following her. The PFA order was amended on April 23,
    2013, and May 14, 2013, ultimately extending the expiration of the order to
    October 13, 2014.
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    Adewumi next asserts that his sentence is illegal because the crime of
    harassment merges with the crime of stalking for sentencing purposes. 7 “A
    claim that crimes should have merged for sentencing purposes raises a
    challenge to the legality of the sentence.” Commonwealth v. Quintua, 
    56 A.3d 399
    , 400 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citing Commonwealth v. Allen, 
    24 A.3d 1058
    , 1062 (Pa. Super. 2011)). Pursuant to our Judicial Code,
    [n]o crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the
    crimes arise from a single criminal act and all of the statutory
    elements of one offense are included in the statutory elements of
    the other offense. Where crimes merge for sentencing purposes,
    the court may sentence the defendant only on the higher graded
    offense.
    42 Pa.C.S. § 9765.          In the instance of the crimes of harassment and
    stalking, this Court has determined that “one can harass without stalking,
    but one cannot stalk without also harassing. Stalking is simply a more
    serious form of harassment. Consequently, we find that harassment is a
    constituent offense of stalking.” Commonwealth v. Reese, 
    725 A.2d 190
    ,
    192 (Pa. Super. 1999).
    Here, Adewumi’s sentence includes incarceration for two stalking
    charges, probation for one harassment charge, and a fine for a second
    harassment charge. One stalking charge alleges that “[b]etween 03/31/13 –
    ____________________________________________
    7
    This argument was not raised prior to its inclusion in Adewumi’s appellate
    reply brief. However, we may sua sponte “address an illegal sentence and
    remand the matter to the trial court even in the absence of the preservation
    of the claim as the issue is non-waivable.” Commonwealth v. Mitchell,
    
    986 A.2d 1241
    , 1244 (Pa. Super. 2009).
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    05/15/13, . . . [Adewumi] repeatedly appeared at locations where he knew
    the victim would be present, to include her high school, her bus stop outside
    the high school, and her place of employment.” Criminal Complaint, at 2.
    One of the harassment charges is directly related, as it is based upon the
    identical language and same course of conduct.         Likewise, the second
    stalking charge and second harassment charge are predicated on identical
    language and the same course of conduct, including that “[b]etween
    03/31/13 – 05/15/13, . . . [Adewumi] repeatedly communicated to the
    victim through text messages and emails.”         Id. at 2-3.     Thus, each
    harassment charge is based upon the same criminal act as one of the
    stalking charges and therefore merges into the correlated stalking charge.
    Reese, 
    supra.
    Because the trial court erroneously sentenced Adewumi regarding the
    harassment charges in addition to the stalking charges, we remand so that
    the trial court can resentence Adewumi based upon the stalking charges
    only. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9765; see also Commonwealth v. Wilson, 
    934 A.2d 1191
     (Pa. 2007) (where appellate court’s disposition upsets trial court’s
    original sentencing scheme, remanding for resentencing is appropriate
    disposition).
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    Judgment of sentence affirmed with respect to the trial court’s refusal
    to permit the withdrawal of Adewumi’s plea and vacated with respect to
    separate sentencing for stalking and harassment charges. Case remanded
    for resentencing. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/7/2015
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