Com. v. Williams, R. ( 2015 )

J-A21027-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
RONMEL WILLIAMS
Appellant No. 3342 EDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order November 10, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0003755-2009
BEFORE: ALLEN, J., MUNDY, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED AUGUST 12, 2015
Appellant, Ronmel Williams, appeals pro se from the November 10,
2014 order dismissing his pro se “Motion to Correct Patent/Obvious Error
Nunc Pro Tunc”, which the PCRA court treated as a second and untimely
petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 9541-9546. After careful consideration, we affirm.
The procedural history of this case was summarized by a panel of this
Court in a prior appeal, as follows.
On June 15, 2010, [Appellant] pled guilty to
two counts of criminal attempt (homicide). [18
Pa.C.S.A. § 901.] The trial court sentenced
[Appellant], on August 17, 2010, to two concurrent
prison terms of 15 to 30 years. [Appellant] filed a
post-sentence Motion, which the trial court denied.
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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[Appellant] timely filed a direct appeal challenging
the discretionary aspects of his sentence. On May
11, 2011, this Court denied [Appellant’s] allowance
of appeal from the discretionary aspects of his
sentence, concluding that the appeal was frivolous.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 30 A.3d 535 (Pa.
Super. 2011) (unpublished memorandum).
On May 27, 2011, [Appellant] filed a Petition
for review, which the trial court denied. On appeal,
this Court entered a Judgment Order vacating the
trial court’s Order and remanding the matter. On
remand, this Court directed that [Appellant’s]
Petition be considered his first Petition for relief
under the PCRA and that counsel be appointed to
represent [Appellant]. Commonwealth v.
Williams, 47 A.3d 1236 (Pa. Super. 2012)
[(unpublished judgment order)].
On remand, the PCRA court appointed Charles
Banta, Esquire (“Attorney Banta”), to represent
[Appellant]. Attorney Banta subsequently filed a
Petition to withdraw as counsel and a no-merit letter
in accordance with Commonwealth v. Turner, 544
A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth v.
Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
After a hearing, the PCRA court granted Attorney
Banta’s Petition to withdraw, and denied
[Appellant’s] PCRA Petition [on May 11, 2012].
Thereafter, [Appellant] filed [a] timely appeal [on
June 8, 2012].
Commonwealth v. Williams, 81 A.3d 992 (Pa. Super. 2013) (unpublished
memorandum, at 1-2).1 In that appeal, Appellant challenged the legality of
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1
During the pendency of the appeal, Appellant filed a pro se “Motion to
Modify Sentence” on August 23, 2012, as an amendment “to the timely-filed
petition which is already under review.” Appellant’s Motion to Modify
Sentence, 8/23/12, at 1. The PCRA court denied the motion on September
28, 2012. Appellant filed a notice of appeal from that order on October 25,
2012. By per curiam order filed February 20, 2013, this Court quashed the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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his sentence and certain discretionary aspects of his sentence. Relative to
his illegality of sentence claim, in an unpublished memorandum filed May 8,
2013, we held the following.
Our review of the record discloses that [Appellant’s]
sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum
sentence for criminal attempt, as set forth at 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(c).5 [Appellant’s] concurrent
sentences of 15 to 30 years are within the statutory
maximum and are, in fact, within the standard range
of the sentencing guidelines….
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5
Section 1102(c) provides that “a person who has
been convicted of attempt … where serious bodily
injury results may be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment which shall be fixed by the court at
not more than 40 years.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(c)
(emphasis added).
Id. at 3. We also denied Appellant’s remaining claims for relief and affirmed
the PCRA court’s dismissal of Appellant’s PCRA petition. Id. at 4.
On September 16, 2014, Appellant filed the instant “Motion to Correct
Patent/Obvious Error Nunc Pro Tunc”. The PCRA court considered the
motion as a second PCRA petition, and on October 8, 2014, issued a notice,
pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907, of its intent to
dismiss the petition as, inter alia, being untimely filed. Appellant filed a
response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice on October 31, 2014. On
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
appeal as untimely, noting the appeal was properly from the August 17,
2010 judgment of sentence, and the post-sentence motion, being untimely,
did not toll the time to file an appeal. Superior Court Order, 3098 EDA
2012, 2/20/13, at 1.
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November 21, 2014, the PCRA court dismissed Appellants petition without a
hearing. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on November 21, 2014.2
Appellant raises the following questions for our review.
1. Did [the] trial court err in not holding
Appellant’s claims in the fashion of an illegal
sentence claim as opposed to a PCRA claim?
2. Did [the] sentencing court err in sentencing
Appellant to a 15 to 30 years sentence for an
attempted homicide where serious bodily injury []
was never found clearly violated [sic] Title 18
Pa.C.S. [§] 1102(c)?
3. Was Appellant illegally sentenced outside of
the authority of the statute?
Appellant’s Brief at 8.
In his first issue, Appellant argues the PCRA court erred by addressing
his motion as a PCRA petition and not as a motion invoking inherent power
to correct a sentence. Appellant’s brief at 14-15. “The issue in the case,
whether the trial judge had the authority to correct an alleged sentencing
error, poses a pure question of law. Accordingly, our scope of review is
plenary and our standard of review is de novo.” Commonwealth v.
Borrin, 12 A.3d 466, 476 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc), affirmed, 80 A.3d
1219 (Pa. 2013). Specifically, Appellant claims he was sentenced for
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2
The PCRA court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure
1925(b). The PCRA court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on December 17,
2014, referencing its October 8, 2014 Rule 907 notice as containing its
reasons for dismissing Appellant’s petition.
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attempted murder, resulting in serious bodily injury, when the record
reflects no resulting serious bodily injury had been shown.3 Appellant’s brief
at 14-15. Consequently, Appellant claims his sentence of 15 to 30 years’
incarceration is illegal as exceeding the statutory maximum for the crime of
attempted murder where serious bodily injury did not result. 4 Id. at 12-13.
Accordingly Appellant, citing Commonwealth v. Holmes, 933 A.2d 57 (Pa.
2007), avers his motion was properly addressed to the trial court’s inherent
jurisdiction to correct patently erroneous sentences and is not subject to the
PCRA’s timeliness constraints. Id. at 14-15.
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3
Section 1102(c) provides as follows.
(c) Attempt, solicitation and conspiracy.--
Notwithstanding section 1103(1) (relating to
sentence of imprisonment for felony), a person who
has been convicted of attempt[] to commit murder,
[] where serious bodily injury results may be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment which shall be
fixed by the court at not more than 40 years. Where
serious bodily injury does not result, the person may
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which shall
be fixed by the court at not more than 20 years.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102
4
Appellant’s argument relative to the grading of his charge and the legality
of his sentence is specious. As noted, this Court affirmed the legality of the
judgement of sentence for attempted murder resulting in serious bodily
harm. Jackson, supra. Further, the record clearly evidences that
Appellant pled guilty to the charge as so stated and admitted to the fact that
he shot two victims multiple times with a revolver. N.T., 6/16/10, at 6-7,
12-15.
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In Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516 (Pa. Super. 2011),
appeal denied, 47 A.3d 845 (Pa. 2012), this Court addressed an identical
claim. Therein Jackson argued his motion to the trial court to correct a
patent sentencing error was addressed to the trial court’s inherent authority
to correct its orders and was, therefore, not subject to the PCRA’s time
limitations. Id. at 518. Distinguishing Holmes, we held as follows.
[T]he PCRA court did not have inherent
authority to consider Jackson’s petition absent
statutory jurisdiction under section 9545. Jackson
contends that in recognizing the “inherent”
jurisdiction of a trial court to correct obvious errors
in its sentences, our Supreme Court established an
open-ended right that could be invoked by any trial
court, including a PCRA court, at any time. However,
the cases Jackson cites upholding inherent
jurisdiction only consider this right in the context of
jurisdiction to amend orders pursuant to section
5505. Jurisdiction under section 9545 was not at
issue because the sentences were corrected within
one year of the judgment of sentence becoming
final.
Unlike [the companion cases addressed in
Holmes] Jackson filed his petition years after the
PCRA filing deadline had expired. Thus, a PCRA
court would have to overcome two jurisdictional
hurdles to correct his sentence: section 5505 and
section 9545. We have not found any decision in
which our appellate courts have upheld, or in which a
PCRA court has invoked, inherent jurisdiction absent
statutory authority under 9545. Nor do we believe
that a PCRA court could invoke its inherent
jurisdiction after this deadline.
Inherent jurisdiction has been upheld as an
exception to section 5505 because section 5505 was
never intended to create a strict jurisdictional
deadline for correcting orders where there is an
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obvious illegality in the sentence. This intent is
evident from the plain language of the statute.
Section 5505 confers on the trial court an affirmative
right to modify orders within 30 days after its entry if
there is no appeal, and does not expressly limit this
authority after the 30–day period has expired.
Because section 5505 does not directly prohibit a
court from correcting an order after the deadline, our
courts have recognized a limited equitable exception
to the statute that permits a trial court to correct
obvious illegalities in its sentences that are not
discovered within the 30–day statutory period.
Section 9545 of the PCRA is not amenable to
such equitable exceptions. Section 9545 expressly
states that a PCRA petition “shall be filed within one
year of the date the judgment becomes final” unless
one of the statutory exceptions is pled and proven.
Our courts have strictly interpreted this requirement
as creating a jurisdictional deadline. Further, our
courts have interpreted jurisdiction under section
9545 differently than section 5505. Unlike section
5505, section 9545 does not merely grant a court
authority to consider a PCRA petition for a limited
period of time; it acts to divest a court of jurisdiction
once the filing period has passed. Therefore, when
the one-year filing deadline of section 9545 has
expired, and no statutory exception has been pled or
proven, a PCRA court cannot invoke inherent
jurisdiction to correct orders, judgments and
decrees, even if the error is patent and obvious.
Id. at 522-523 (citations and footnotes omitted).
Instantly, in accordance with the precedent set in Jackson, we
conclude the PCRA court did not err in treating Appellant’s “Motion to Correct
Patent/Obvious Error Nunc Pro Tunc” as a second PCRA petition. We
proceed to review the PCRA court’s dismissal of Appellant’s PCRA petition.
Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA
petition is limited to examining whether the court’s
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rulings are supported by the evidence of record and
free of legal error. This Court treats the findings of
the PCRA court with deference if the record supports
those findings. It is an appellant’s burden to
persuade this Court that the PCRA court erred and
that relief is due.
Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 69 A.3d 1270, 1274-1275 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(citation omitted).
As alluded to in the previous discussion, the PCRA court determined
that Appellant’s petition was untimely and dismissed it for want of
jurisdiction to review its merits. “[I]t is well-settled that … a question of
timeliness implicates the jurisdiction of our Court.” Commonwealth v.
Gandy, 38 A.3d 899, 902 (Pa. Super. 2012) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted), appeal denied, 49 A.3d 442 (Pa. 2012). “Because these
timeliness requirements are mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, no court
may properly disregard or alter them in order to reach the merits of the
claims raised in a PCRA petition that is filed in an untimely manner.”
Commonwealth v. Lopez, 51 A.3d 195, 196 (Pa. 2012) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). The PCRA “confers no authority upon this
Court to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA time-bar[.]”
Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 983 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted).
This is to “accord finality to the collateral review process.” Id. “It is well
settled that [a]ny and all PCRA petitions must be filed [in a timely manner]
unless one of three statutory exceptions applies.” Commonwealth v.
Garcia, 23 A.3d 1059, 1061-1062 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal quotation
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marks and citations omitted), appeal denied, 38 A.3d 823 (Pa. 2012). “We
have repeatedly stated it is the appellant’s burden to allege and prove that
one of the timeliness exceptions applies. Whether Appellant has carried his
burden is a threshold inquiry prior to considering the merits of any claim.”
Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 346 (Pa. 2013) (citation
omitted), cert. denied, Edmiston v. Pennsylvania, 134 S. Ct. 639 (2013).
The Act provides for the following possible exceptions to the timeliness
requirement.
§ 9545. Jurisdiction and proceedings
…
(b) Time for filing petition.—
(1) Any petition under this subchapter,
including a second or subsequent petition, shall be
[timely] filed … unless the petition alleges and the
petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim
previously was the result of interference by
government officials with the presentation of
the claim in violation of the Constitution or
laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution
or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is
predicated were unknown to the petitioner and
could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional
right that was recognized by the Supreme
Court of the United States or the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
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provided in this section and has been held by
that court to apply retroactively.
(2) Any petition invoking an exception
provided in paragraph (1) shall be filed within 60
days of the date the claim could have been
presented.
…
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b).
Appellant’s second PCRA is untimely on its face. His sentence became
final on June 10, 2011, 30 days after this Court affirmed the judgment of
sentence and in the absence of Appellant filing a petition for allowance of
appeal with our Supreme Court. See Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a) (stating, “a petition
for allowance of appeal shall be filed with the Prothonotary of the Supreme
Court within 30 days after the entry of the order of the Superior Court …
sought to be reviewed[]”). Therefore, Appellant had until June 11, 2012,
one year from that date, to file a first or any subsequent PCRA petition. 5
See generally 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). As noted, it is obligatory for
Appellant to plead and prove one of the statutory exceptions to the PCRA’s
timeliness strictures to invoke the PCRA or this Court’s jurisdiction to
consider his petition. See Edmiston, supra. Appellant has not endeavored
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5
June 10, 2012 fell on a Sunday. Consequently, the final due date for any
PCRA petition in this case became June 11, 2012. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908
(providing, “[if] the last day of any such period shall fall on Saturday or
Sunday … such day shall be omitted from the computation”).
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to do so. We therefore conclude the PCRA court correctly determined that it
lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of Appellant’s petition. See id.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the PCRA court properly
dismissed Appellant’s second PCRA petition as untimely filed. Accordingly,
the PCRA court’s November 10, 2014 order is affirmed.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/12/2015
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