Com. v. Mazzocco, D. ( 2015 )

J-A19016-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
DAVID MATTHEW MAZZOCCO
Appellant No. 466 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 18, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0004913-2013
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., JENKINS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED AUGUST 12, 2015
Appellant David Mazzocco appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas following his jury
trial conviction for first-degree murder,1 attempted murder,2 aggravated
assault,3 and recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”).4 We affirm.
The trial court summarized the underlying facts of this matter as
follows:
. . . [O]n Sunday, March 10, 2013, [Appellant] and his girlfriend,
Samantha Snatchko, had dinner at a friend’s house. During
____________________________________________
1
18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a).
2
18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a).
3
18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a).
4
18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.
J-A19016-15
dinner [Appellant] had between 4 and 6 beers. He also bought
40 Xanax pills from a friend earlier that day and had taken 15 of
them throughout the day. After dinner, [Appellant] displayed
three (3) handguns and an AR-15 rifle to other guests at the
party, who were gun enthusiasts. At the conclusion of the meal,
[Appellant] took Snatchko home because she was uncomfortable
with his drinking and drug use and also with the display of guns.
He then went to the Fort Pitt Inn, a bar located on Steubenville
Pike in North Fayette. While in the bar, he had 2 beers and 2
shots of Crown Royal, at which point the bartender refused to
serve him any more alcohol. Throughout the evening,
[Appellant] was telephoning and texting Snatchko on his cell
phone and repeatedly left the bar and then came back inside. It
was subsequently revealed that Snatchko was attempting to end
the relationship and [Appellant] was alternately upset and
begging to come see her and jealous because he thought she
had another man at her house. During one of the trips outside,
[Appellant] returned with a smashed cell phone and then asked
to use the bar phone. Later in the evening, [Appellant] went
outside and returned with a bloody hand from breaking a window
in his truck and told his friends Dave and Ryan Thomas, with
whom he had been sitting, to leave the bar. He then reached
into his pocket, pulled a handgun and fired two shots, hitting
patrons James Adams and James Quirk in the head.[5] At that
point, two other patrons, Gerald Maroni and Juan Rodriguez,
rushed [Appellant] and attempted to subdue him. Another shot
was fired, this time hitting Maroni in the arm. Eventually Maroni
and Rodriguez managed to wrestle the gun away from
[Appellant], and Maroni beat [Appellant] in the head several
times with the gun in order to subdue him. Maroni and
Rodriguez held [Appellant] down until the police arrived and
handcuffed him. [Appellant] was taken to Mercy Hospital, where
he was treated and released. He was then transported to the
Homicide Division, where he was permitted to sleep and offered
food. He told police that he had not been provoked, but rather
began shooting for no reason and intended to keep shooting
until the police arrived.
____________________________________________
5
The shot to the head killed James Adams. James Quirk survived, but with
grievous and permanent injuries.
-2-
J-A19016-15
1925(a) Opinion, pp. 2-3.
Following a trial conducted November 7-21, 2013, a jury convicted
Appellant of first-degree murder, two counts of attempted murder, two
counts of aggravated assault, and one count of REAP. 6 On February 18,
2014, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment without parole
on the first-degree murder conviction and consecutive sentences of 10 to 20
years of imprisonment for each of the attempted murder convictions. The
trial court imposed no further penalties for the remaining convictions.
Appellant filed post-sentence motions7 on February 25, 2014, which
the trial court denied by order filed on March 4, 2014. Appellant filed a
notice of appeal on March 24, 2014. Both Appellant and the trial court
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises the following four claims for review:
I. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err when it denied [Appellant’s] post-
trial motion to vacate the verdict of guilty and enter judgment of
acquittal as to first-degree murder, third-degree murder,
attempted homicide, aggravated assault and recklessly
endangering another person on grounds that the evidence was
insufficient to support verdicts of guilty, in particular the
[Commonwealth] failed to disprove the defenses of self-defense
and imperfect self-defense?
____________________________________________
6
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case, the trial court granted
Appellant’s motion for acquittal on four other counts of REAP.
7
Appellant’s post-sentence motions included a weight of the evidence claim.
-3-
J-A19016-15
[II.] Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err when it denied [Appellant’s] post-
trial motion to vacate the verdict of guilty and order a new trial
as to first-degree murder, third-degree murder, attempted
homicide, aggravated assault and recklessly endangering
another person on grounds that [the] verdict was against the
weight of the evidence, in particular the [Commonwealth] failed
to disprove the defenses of self-defense and imperfect self-
defense?
[III.] Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err when it denied [Appellant’s]
motion to suppress the statement he allegedly made to the
Allegheny County Police because it was not a knowing and
voluntary statement?
[IV.] Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err when it imposed a sentence of
“life without the possibility of parole” because it is an unlawful
sentence in that a sentencing court’s authority is limited to
imposing a sentence of life imprisonment?
Appellant’s Brief, p. 6.8
A. The Sufficiency of the Evidence Claim
Appellant first claims that the Commonwealth adduced insufficient
evidence to convict him of his various crimes. See Appellant’s Brief, p. 16.
Specifically, Appellant claims the Commonwealth failed to adequately
disprove the defenses of self-defense and imperfect self-defense. See id. at
19-24. He is incorrect.
When examining a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, this Court’s
standard of review is as follows:
____________________________________________
8
The argument section of Appellant’s brief combines his sufficiency of the
evidence and weight of the evidence claims into a single claim. See
Appellant’s Brief, pp. 6, 16-24. For the sake of clarity, we regard and
discuss these claims as separate claims herein.
-4-
J-A19016-15
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test,
we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for
the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and
circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in
applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and
all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
[trier] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and
the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part
or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 790 (Pa.Super.2014).
Pennsylvania’s Crimes Code governs self-defense, and provides, in
relevant part, as follows:
§ 505. Use of force in self-protection
(a) Use of force justifiable for protection of the person.--
The use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable
when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary
for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful
force by such other person on the present occasion.
(b) Limitations on justifying necessity for use of force.--
...
(2) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section
unless the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect
himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual
intercourse compelled by force or threat; nor is it justifiable if:
-5-
J-A19016-15
(i) the actor, with the intent of causing death or serious
bodily injury, provoked the use of force against himself in
the same encounter; or
(ii) the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of
using such force with complete safety by retreating, except
the actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling or
place of work, unless he was the initial aggressor or is
assailed in his place of work by another person whose
place of work the actor knows it to be.
...
(2.3) An actor who is not engaged in a criminal activity, who is
not in illegal possession of a firearm and who is attacked in any
place where the actor would have a duty to retreat under
paragraph (2)(ii) has no duty to retreat and has the right to
stand his ground and use force, including deadly force, if:
(i) the actor has a right to be in the place where he was
attacked;
(ii) the actor believes it is immediately necessary to do so
to protect himself against death, serious bodily injury,
kidnapping or sexual intercourse by force or threat; and
(iii) the person against whom the force is used displays or
otherwise uses:
(A) a firearm or replica of a firearm as defined in 42
Pa.C.S. § 9712 (relating to sentences for offenses
committed with firearms); or
(B) any other weapon readily or apparently capable of
lethal use.
18 Pa.C.S. § 505.
This Court recently explained justified use of deadly force in self-
defense in detail as follows:
According to our Supreme Court, the justified use of deadly force
requires:
-6-
J-A19016-15
a) the actor was free from fault in provoking or continuing
the difficulty which resulted in the use of deadly force; b)
the actor must have reasonably believed that he was in
imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, and that
there was a necessity to use such force in order to save
himself or others therefrom; and c) the actor did not
violate any duty to retreat or to avoid the danger.
Commonwealth v. Harris, 542 Pa. 134, 137, 665 A.2d 1172,
1174 (1995). The defendant has no “burden to prove” his self-
defense claim. Commonwealth v. Torres, 564 Pa. 219, 224,
766 A.2d 342, 345 (2001). The Supreme Court explained the
evidentiary burdens as follows:
While there is no burden on a defendant to prove the [self-
defense] claim, before that defense is properly at issue at
trial, there must be some evidence, from whatever source
to justify a finding of self-defense. If there is any evidence
that will support the claim, then the issue is properly
before the fact finder.
Smith, 97 A.3d at 787. The Commonwealth sustains this burden if it
establishes at least one of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:
1) the accused did not reasonably believe that he was in
danger of death or serious bodily injury; or 2) the accused
provoked or continued the use of force; or 3) the accused
had a duty to retreat and the retreat was possible with
complete safety.
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Hammond, 953 A.2d 544, 559
(Pa.Super.2008), appeal denied, 600 Pa. 743, 964 A.2d 894 (2009).
The requirement of reasonable belief encompasses two
aspects, one subjective and one objective. First, the
defendant must have acted out of an honest, bona fide
belief that he was in imminent danger, which involves
consideration of the defendant’s subjective state of mind.
Second, the defendant’s belief that he needed to defend
himself with deadly force, if it existed, must be reasonable
in light of the facts as they appeared to the defendant, a
consideration that involves an objective analysis.
-7-
J-A19016-15
Smith, 97 A.3d at 787 (quoting Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 617 Pa. 527,
551, 53 A.3d 738, 752 (2012)).
To claim self-defense, the defendant must be free from fault in
provoking or escalating the altercation that led to the offense,
before the defendant can be excused from using deadly force.
Smith, 97 A.3d at 787 (quoting Mouzon, 53 A.3d at 751).
If the defendant’s own testimony is the only evidence of self-defense,
the Commonwealth must still disprove the asserted justification
and cannot simply rely on the jury’s disbelief of the defendant’s
testimony:
The disbelief of a denial does not, taken alone, afford
affirmative proof that the denied fact existed so as to
satisfy a proponent’s burden of proving that fact. The trial
court’s statement that it did not believe Appellant’s
testimony is no substitute for the proof the Commonwealth
was required to provide to disprove the self-defense claim.
If there are other witnesses, however, who provide accounts of
the material facts, it is up to the fact finder to reject or accept
all, part or none of the testimony of any witness. The
complainant can serve as a witness to the incident to refute a
self-defense claim.
Smith, 97 A.3d at 788 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Further,
[a]lthough the Commonwealth is required to disprove a claim of
self-defense arising from any source beyond a reasonable doubt,
a [fact-finder] is not required to believe the testimony of the
defendant who raises the claim.
A number of factors, including whether complainant was armed,
any actual physical contact, size and strength disparities
between the parties, prior dealings between the parties,
threatening or menacing actions on the part of complainant, and
general circumstances surrounding the incident, are all relevant
when determining the reasonableness of a defendant’s belief
-8-
J-A19016-15
that the use of deadly force was necessary to protect against
death or serious bodily injuries. Furthermore, a physically larger
person who grabs a smaller person does not automatically invite
the smaller person to use deadly force in response.
Smith, 97 A.3d at 788 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
In addition to self-defense, which, if successful, results in acquittal, a
first-degree murder defendant may also claim that he committed an
“unreasonable belief killing.” This defense, otherwise known as “imperfect
self-defense,” if employed successfully, does not result in acquittal, but
instead results in a conviction for voluntary manslaughter in lieu of first-
degree murder. The Crimes Code defines imperfect self-defense as follows:
Unreasonable belief killing justifiable.--A person who
intentionally or knowingly kills an individual commits voluntary
manslaughter if at the time of the killing he believes the
circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify the
killing under Chapter 5 of this title (relating to general principles
of justification), but his belief is unreasonable.
18 Pa.C.S. § 2503(b). “The derivative and lesser defense of imperfect belief
self-defense is imperfect in only one respect—an unreasonable rather than a
reasonable belief that deadly force was required to save the actor’s life. All
other principles of justification under 18 Pa.C.S. § 505 must [be satisfied to
prove] unreasonable belief voluntary manslaughter.” Commonwealth v.
Sepulveda, 55 A.3d 1108, 1124 (Pa.2012) (internal citations and
quotations omitted). As with self-defense, a defendant must be free from
fault to successfully employ the defense of imperfect self-defense.
Sepulveda, 55 A.3d at 1124-25.
-9-
J-A19016-15
Here, Appellant presented a justification defense of self-defense at
trial. Appellant testified that Adams had earlier threatened to kill him
because Appellant had taken Adams’ job. Appellant further testified that he
saw Adams reach into his pocket and pull out a gun. He claims, fearing for
his life, he shot Adams in the face and then accidentally shot Quirk. He also
testified someone else fired the shot that hit Maroni in the arm. Appellant’s
own testimony was the only self-defense evidence.
The physical evidence and the testimony of other witnesses, however,
refute Appellant’s testimony. This evidence established that all three shots
fired in the altercation came from the same weapon – Appellant’s gun – and
that Adams did not have a gun at all. Further, the bartender and the other
bar patrons all testified that they had not witnessed any interaction
whatsoever between the two men prior to Appellant shooting Adams.
The trial court correctly assessed the evidence presented in relation to
Appellant’s self-defense and imperfect self-defense claims:
Here, the Commonwealth presented evidence that was
more than sufficient to disprove [Appellant’s] trial claim of self-
defense (and his appellate claim of imperfect self-defense). The
Commonwealth was able to establish, through the testimony of
the bartender and every patron who was at the bar at the time
of the shooting, that there had been no confrontation between
[Appellant] and Adams, and, in fact, there had been no contact
or conversation at all between them. The Commonwealth was
able to prove through physical evidence that Adams did not have
a gun, and so could not have been pulling out a gun as
[Appellant] claimed. Although [Appellant] claimed that someone
else was shooting (presumably at him), the Commonwealth was
able to prove through ballistics evidence that all three shots
were fired by [Appellant], from his weapon. Moreover, the
- 10 -
J-A19016-15
Commonwealth was able to prove that once [Appellant] shot
Adams – who [Appellant] claimed was the only threat or source
of confrontation – he continued to shoot, hitting James Quirk in
the head and Gerald Maroni in the arm.
Ultimately, the evidence very clearly demonstrated that
there was no threat or confrontation that would have required
[Appellant] to protect or defend himself. Rather, the evidence
demonstrated that [Appellant], who had been drinking and
taking prescription drugs was angered and upset over the break-
up with his girlfriend, left the bar and went to his truck where he
deliberately armed himself with three handguns. When he
returned to the bar he told his friends to leave, then pulled out a
gun and, without warning or provocation, began shooting.
These facts provide absolutely no basis for a claim of self-
defense or imperfect self-defense. The Commonwealth clearly
established that [Appellant] was the aggressor, and so met its
burden of disproving the claim of self-defense (as well as the
[appellate] claim of imperfect self-defense). This claim must
fail.
1925(a) Opinion, pp. 5-6.
Accordingly, Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim based on the
Commonwealth’s alleged failure to disprove self-defense and/or imperfect
self-defense fails.
B. The Weight of the Evidence Claim
Appellant next claims that the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence. See Appellant’s Brief, p. 16. Appellant bases this claim on his
argument that the Commonwealth failed to adequately disprove the
defenses of self-defense and imperfect self-defense. See id. at 19-24. He
is again incorrect.
The denial of a new trial based on a lower court’s determination that
the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence is one of the least
- 11 -
J-A19016-15
assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial. See
Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa.2013). This Court
reviews weight of the evidence claims pursuant to the following standard:
A motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary
to the weight of the evidence, concedes that there is sufficient
evidence to sustain the verdict. Thus, the trial court is under no
obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict winner. An allegation that the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial
court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere
conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts
would have arrived at a different conclusion. A trial judge must
do more than reassess the credibility of the witnesses and allege
that he would not have assented to the verdict if he were a
juror. Trial judges, in reviewing a claim that the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence do not sit as the thirteenth
juror. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine that
notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of
greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight
with all the facts is to deny justice.
Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751-52 (Pa.2000) (internal
citations, quotations, and footnote omitted).
Stated differently, a court may award a new trial because the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence only when the verdict is so contrary to
the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice,9 “such that right must be
____________________________________________
9
This Court has explained the notion of “shocking to one’s sense of justice”
as follows:
When the figure of Justice totters on her pedestal, or when the
jury’s verdict, at the time of its rendition, causes the trial judge
to lose his breath, temporarily, and causes him to almost fall
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
- 12 -
J-A19016-15
given another opportunity to prevail.” Commonwealth v. Goodwine, 692
A.2d 233, 236 (Pa.Super.1997). Moreover, appellate review of a weight
claim consists of a review of the trial court’s exercise of discretion, not a
review of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence. Widmer, 744 A.2d at 753. When reviewing the
trial court’s determination, this Court gives the gravest deference to the
findings of the court below. We review the court’s actions for an abuse of
discretion. Id.
Simply stated, the jury’s verdict in this matter illustrates that the jury
found credible the testimony of the Commonwealth’s witnesses that
Appellant was the aggressor and fired his weapon unprovoked, and
incredible Appellant’s testimony to the contrary. This evidence, as discussed
supra, clearly disproved Appellant’s defenses of self-defense and imperfect
self-defense. The trial court agreed with the jury’s assessment in denying
Appellant’s post-sentence motion for a new trial based on the weight of the
evidence. See 1925(a) Opinion, p. 8. Nothing about the verdict or the trial
court’s reasoning shocks the conscience. Thus, Appellant’s weight of the
evidence claim warrants no relief.
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
from the bench, then it is truly shocking to the judicial
conscience.
Commonwealth v. Davidson, 860 A.2d 575, 581 (Pa.Super.2004)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
- 13 -
J-A19016-15
C. The Suppression Claim
Next, Appellant claims that the trial court erred by not suppressing his
post-arrest statement to police. See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 24-30.
Specifically, he claims the statement was not knowingly and voluntarily
made because he was still suffering from the combined effects of a head
injury, medication received at the hospital, and his drug and alcohol use
from the previous day. See id. He is incorrect.
This Court’s well-settled standard of review of a denial of a motion to
suppress evidence is as follows:
[An appellate court’s] standard of review in addressing a
challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to
determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are
supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions
drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth
prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only
the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence
for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the
context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s
factual findings are supported by the record, [the appellate court
is] bound by [those] findings and may reverse only if the court’s
legal conclusions are erroneous. Where . . . the appeal of the
determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of
legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are not
binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if
the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.
Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to []
plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa.2010) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).
When a court is called upon to determine whether a confession is
voluntary and, hence, admissible at trial, it examines the totality
- 14 -
J-A19016-15
of the circumstances surrounding the confession to ascertain
whether it is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained
choice by its maker. In making this inquiry, a court is not
concerned with the issue of whether the substance of the
confession is true. Rather, a court is constrained to examine
only whether an individual’s confession was the product of
coercion, duress, or the use of other measures by interrogators
deliberately calculated to overcome his or her free will.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 85 A.3d 530, 537-38 (Pa.Super.2014). “By the
same token, the law does not require the coddling of those accused of crime.
[The accused] need not be protected against his own innate desire to
unburden himself.” Commonwealth v. Templin, 795 A.2d 959, 966
(Pa.2002) (quoting Commonwealth v. Graham, 182 A.2d 727, 730–31
(Pa.1962)).
When assessing voluntariness pursuant to the totality of the
circumstances, a court should look at the following factors: the
duration and means of the interrogation; the physical and
psychological state of the accused; the conditions attendant to
the detention; the attitude of the interrogator; and any and all
other factors that could drain a person’s ability to withstand
suggestion and coercion.
Commonwealth v. Harrell, 65 A.3d 420, 434 (Pa.Super.2013), appeal
denied, 101 A.3d 785 (Pa.2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Nester, 709
A.2d 879, 882 (Pa.1998)).
“The Commonwealth has the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant confessed voluntarily.” Harrell, 65 A.3d at
434. “The determination of whether a confession is voluntary is a conclusion
of law and, as such, is subject to plenary review.” Commonwealth v.
Roberts, 969 A.2d 594, 599 (Pa.Super.2009).
- 15 -
J-A19016-15
The testimony at the suppression hearing revealed the following.
Appellant had a blood alcohol level of 1.57% at 2:22 a.m. He was
combative and needed to be restrained at 3:00 a.m. Additionally, he was
given Haldol and Ativan to calm him so the medical personnel could
administer a CT scan. Although Appellant was diagnosed with a concussion,
the CT scan was negative for head injury. After receiving stitches for a head
laceration, Appellant was discharged in an alert and stable condition, with a
zero pain score, and with no evidence learning considerations or barriers
prevented him from understanding discharge instructions.
Upon his transport to the police station, police placed Appellant in a
12-foot-by-12-foot interrogation room and shackled one of his legs to a bolt
on the floor. Appellant declined food and drink. The police allowed him to
sleep until 11:00 a.m.
At 11:00 a.m., two detectives entered the interrogation room and
spoke with Appellant. Appellant requested and received a cigarette. The
police explained that this would be Appellant’s opportunity to tell his version
of the events, and advised him of his Miranda10 rights by reading Allegheny
County Police’s “Rights Warning Waiver” form. Appellant had no questions
about the form, which he initialed and signed in the appropriate places. In
addition to executing the waiver form, Appellant indicated verbally that he
____________________________________________
10
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
- 16 -
J-A19016-15
wished to speak with police about the incident. Although he seemed tired
during the conversation regarding his waiver of rights, Appellant asked
appropriate questions. During the interview, Appellant gave responsive and
appropriate answers to the questions posed. He did not appear intoxicated;
his speech was not slurred, and he was not swaying in his seat. The
interview concluded at 11:45 a.m.
Based on this evidence, the trial court assessed Appellant’s
suppression claim as follows:
. . . Gerald Maroni beat [Appellant] about the head in an attempt
to subdue him after the shooting. However, [Appellant] was
conscious, albeit belligerent and verbally abusive to the police at
the scene. He remained so at the hospital and was sedated to
permit medical treatment. However, upon his release from
Mercy Hospital, [Appellant] was cleared for incarceration. He
was permitted to, and in fact[] did, sleep for several hours and
was offered food and beverages before questioning began.
When the questioning began, [Appellant] gave responsive
answers and did not appear to be impaired.
[Appellant’s] averment that he does not remember the
interrogation remains suspect. It appears that he is attempting
to claim that the memory loss was the product of the beating by
Maroni, however, careful examination of the record reveals that
[Appellant] has also claimed selective memory loss from before
the shooting, particularly where he denied knowing how his
phone got smashed. It seems clear to this [c]ourt that
[Appellant] is attempting to use the “memory loss” to his benefit
for “forgetting” any particularly damaging behavior or anything
that he might otherwise not be able to explain.
Nevertheless, [Appellant’s] claim that he does not
remember making a statement is not sufficient to defeat its
admissibility. At the time of questioning, [Appellant] was
coherent and gave appropriately responsive answers; the fact
that the substance of the answers he gave was damaging to his
case does not mean that the statement was involuntary or
- 17 -
J-A19016-15
inadmissible. Ultimately, that is the sum and substance of
[Appellant’s] argument: the statement is damaging therefore it
should not have been admitted. All credible evidence
demonstrates that [Appellant] knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently waived his Miranda rights, and, as a result, the
statement was admissible. This [c]ourt was well within its
discretion in denying [Appellant’s] suppression and post-trial
motions in this regard.
1925(a) Opinion, pp. 9-10 (record citations omitted).
The suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record
and its legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Therefore,
Appellant’s suppression claim fails.
D. The Sentencing Claim
Finally, Appellant claims the trial court illegally sentenced him to serve
a life sentence without parole. See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 30-35. He is
incorrect.
This Court’s scope and standard of review for illegal sentence claims is
as follows:
The scope and standard of review applied to determine the
legality of a sentence are well established. If no statutory
authorization exists for a particular sentence, that sentence is
illegal and subject to correction. An illegal sentence must be
vacated. In evaluating a trial court’s application of a statute, our
standard of review is plenary and is limited to determining
whether the trial court committed an error of law.
Commonwealth v. Leverette, 911 A.2d 998, 1001-1002 (Pa.Super.2006)
(internal citations omitted).
- 18 -
J-A19016-15
Pennsylvania’s Crimes Code provides, in pertinent part:
§ 1102. Sentence for murder, murder of unborn child and
murder of law enforcement officer
(a) First degree.--
(1) Except as provided under section 1102.1 (relating to
sentence of persons under the age of 18 for murder,
murder of an unborn child and murder of a law
enforcement officer), a person who has been convicted of
a murder of the first degree or of murder of a law
enforcement officer of the first degree shall be sentenced
to death or to a term of life imprisonment in accordance
with 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 (relating to sentencing procedure
for murder of the first degree).
18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(a)(1). Additionally, Pennsylvania’s Prisons and Parole
Code provides:
§ 6137. Parole power
(a) General criteria for parole.--
(1) The board may parole subject to consideration of guidelines
established under 42 Pa.C.S. § 2154.5 (relating to adoption of
guidelines for parole) and may release on parole any inmate to
whom the power to parole is granted to the board by this
chapter, except an inmate condemned to death or serving
life imprisonment, whenever . . .
61 Pa.C.S. § 6137 (emphasis provided). Further, our case law
“unequivocally bars all parole for first degree murderers whether the
sentence is life or death.” Commonwealth v. Yount, 615 A.2d 1316, 1320
(Pa.Super.1992).
Clearly, the trial court had the authority to impose the sentence it did.
Based on the above law, Appellant’s claim that the trial court lacked the
- 19 -
J-A19016-15
authority to sentence Appellant to life imprisonment without parole is
without merit and borders on frivolous.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/12/2015
- 20 -