Com. v. Bradley, A. ( 2015 )

J-S18034-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
AARON BRADLEY
Appellant No. 2064 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 26, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0010497-2012
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., ALLEN, J., and MUNDY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED AUGUST 12, 2015
Appellant, Aaron Bradley, appeals from the February 26, 2014
judgment of sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole,
imposed following a conviction by a jury of first-degree murder, carrying a
firearm in public in Philadelphia, and possessing instruments of a crime
(PIC).1 After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court has set forth the relevant factual history in extensive
detail in its opinion filed pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 1925(a); as such, we need not reiterate it in full herein. See Trial
Court Opinion, 10/31/14, at 2-24. For purposes of this appeal, we briefly
summarize the relevant facts as follows.
____________________________________________
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 6108, and 907(a), respectively.
J-S18034-15
In the early morning hours of March 27, 2010, police responded to a
call of shots fired and discovered Bruce Fox shot several times and hanging
out of his vehicle. N.T., 2/19/14, at 79. Upon determining that Fox was
unresponsive but breathing, the officers removed Fox from his vehicle and
transported him in their police cruiser to a local trauma center. Id. Fox was
pronounced dead at 2:34 a.m. Id. at 80.
At trial, the Commonwealth called Tanaya Nelson to testify. Nelson
testified that she and Appellant were previously involved in a romantic
relationship. Id. at 88. Nelson testified to suffering physical abuse at the
hands of Appellant throughout their relationship. Id. at 90-97. Nelson also
testified that an incident occurred that led to Appellant choking her, followed
by her attacking him, and resulting in criminal charges against Nelson. Id.
at 100-101.
In October 2009, Nelson began attending All State Career Trade
School, where she met the victim, Bruce Fox. Id. at 106. The relationship
between Nelson and Fox was friendly, but Nelson testified it was never
romantic. Id. at 107. In January 2010, Fox took Nelson shopping and
bought her some clothes. Id. at 109. When Appellant found out about Fox
taking Nelson shopping, he became enraged and tore up the clothes Fox had
purchased. Id. at 110.
On the Friday leading up to the incident, Nelson and Appellant went
shopping at Wal-Mart. Id. at 128. Appellant purchased a dresser for Nelson
-2-
J-S18034-15
while at Wal-Mart, and then dropped Nelson off at her cousin’s house, where
Nelson lived. Id. 129-130. About an hour after arriving at her cousin’s
house, Nelson realized she had approximately ten missed calls from
Appellant. Id. at 130. Nelson called Appellant back, and he began to
question where she was and who she was with. Id. Appellant then went to
the house and took Nelson’s phone and started to go through it, wherein he
saw a text from Fox which made him angry. Id. at 132. Appellant then left
and took Nelson’s cell phone with him. Id. Nelson repeatedly called
Appellant from her cousin’s phone and her cousin’s boyfriend’s phone. Id.
Appellant returned Nelson’s phone the following morning on March 27, 2010
by leaving it in Appellant’s cousin’s mailbox. Id. at 135.
Upon recovering her phone, Nelson received a phone call from
Philadelphia detectives asking to come and speak with her. Id. at 139.
Nelson realized that her call and text message logs had been deleted, and
she had not deleted them prior to Appellant taking her phone. Id. at 141.
The trial court accurately summarized the testimony regarding
Nelson’s phone log as follows.
Nelson testified that [Appellant] had two phone
numbers which she used to contact him. Nelson
then read from a call log the calls [Appellant] made
to her phone on the night of March 26, 2010. Nelson
testified that, according to the call log, [Appellant]
called her ten times between 11:51 p.m. and 12:06
a.m.[] Nelson then read from the log that she called
[Appellant] at 12:07 a.m. and they talked for 497
seconds. Nelson testified that she believed this was
the conversation when [Appellant] accused her of
-3-
J-S18034-15
being with another man because she did not pick up
her phone. Nelson then read the next call from
[Appellant] to her phone was at 12:23 a.m. but she
did not answer. Nelson further read the next phone
call made by her phone was at 12:52 a.m. to Fox.
Nelson stated that the call log then showed three
phone calls between 12:53 a.m. to 12:55 a.m. from
her cousin’s phone to her cell phone. Nelson
testified that these were the calls she had made to
[Appellant] shortly after he had left with her phone.
Nelson then read from the call log that there were
phone calls made at 6:46 a.m., 8:21 a.m., 10:05
a.m., and 10:36 a.m. from her cousin’s boyfriend’s
phone to [Appellant]’s phone, which Nelson testified
was when she called [Appellant] the next morning to
have him return her phone. Nelson testified that she
retrieved her phone from the mailbox shortly after
the last call.
Nelson then read from text messages that had
been sent between her phone and Fox’s phone
between 1:07 a.m. to 2:42 a.m. on March 27, 2010.
Nelson stated that the first message was sent from
her phone to Fox at 1:07. It read, “Can you come
get me?” Nelson testified that the next message was
sent at 1:29 from her phone to Fox, and read “I
want to see you tonight.” Nelson testified Fox then
responded at 1:29, “Where you at? F.O.E.[]” Nelson
stated the next message was sent from her phone to
Fox at 1:32 and read, “70th and Dicks.” Nelson
testified Fox responded at 1:34, “You know who you
talking to?” Nelson testified that the next message
was sent at 1:35 from her phone to Fox and it read,
“Yeah. Why you say that?” Nelson stated Fox
responded at 1:41, “I’m about to slide through
there. F.O.E.[]” Nelson testified that the next
message was sent from her phone to Fox at 1:45
and read, “Call when you get there.” Fox then
replied at 1:53, “On my way.” Nelson testified that
Fox then called her phone at 2:21 a.m.[] Nelson
further testified the next text message was sent at
2:21 from her phone to Fox and read “You here?”
Fox then responded at 2:21, “Yeah. F.O.E.[]” Nelson
stated the next message was sent from her phone to
-4-
J-S18034-15
Fox at 2:24 and read “Here I come.” Nelson testified
the next message was sent at 2:26 from her phone
to Fox and read “What kind of car you in?” Fox
responded at 2:27, “I’m on the corner of 70th
Street. F.O.E.[]” Nelson stated the next message
was then sent at 2:31 from Fox and read, “Come on
now.” A response was then sent from her phone at
2:34 and read, “Okay.” Nelson testified the next
message was sent from Fox to her phone at 2:36
and read, “Where you at?” A response was then
sent from her phone at 2:36 and read “Where you
at?” Nelson testified that Fox responded at 2:37,
“On the corner.” Nelson stated the next message
was sent from her phone to Fox at 2:39 and read
“Where?” Fox then responded at 2:39, “70th and
Dicks.” Nelson testified the next message was sent
from her phone to Fox at 2:41 and read, “Oh, I see
you.” Fox then responded at 2:42, “Come on.”
Nelson testified that she did not send or receive any
of these texts. Nelson further testified that when her
phone was returned to her, all these texts had been
deleted from her phone. Nelson stated she had no
animosity towards Fox and he was “a sweet guy.”
Trial Court Opinion, 10/31/14, at 9-10 (internal citations omitted).
The trial court set forth the procedural history of this case as follows.
On July 9, 2012, [Appellant] was arrested and
charged with first-degree murder, PIC, and carrying
a firearm in public. From February 19 to February
25, 2014, a trial was held in the presence of a jury.
On February 26, 2014, [Appellant] was found guilty
of all charges and [the trial c]ourt sentenced him to
the mandatory sentence of life without parole on the
first-degree murder charge and 2 ½ to 5 years on
each gun charge, to run concurrently with the life
sentence.
On February 26, 2014, [Appellant] filed a
motion to vacate his sentence through counsel,
which was denied by operation of law on June 26,
2014.
-5-
J-S18034-15
Id. at 2. On July 16, 2014, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.2
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review.
A. Did the trial court err by permitting the
Commonwealth to introduce evidence indicating that
Appellant optained [sic] a Florida gun license two
months after the crimes herein occurred because
such evidence was irrelevant and highly prejudicial?
B. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion
by overruling an objection to a comment made by
the prosecutor during her opening speech wherein
she attempted to invoke the sympathy of the jury by
arguing that the victim’s child was left fatherless?
C. Did the trial court err by denying a motion for a
mistrial proffered after a life-in-being witness gave
testimony that was irrelevant, emotional, and highly
prejudicial?
D. Did the trial court commit an error of law by
overruling objections to comments made by the
prosecutor that advised the jury that defense
counsel was attempting to distract the jury and had
done something wrong or underhanded by calling
Appellant’s daughter as a witness?
Appellant’s Brief at 3.3
In his first issue, Appellant argues the trial court “committed an abuse
of discretion by permitting the Commonwealth to introduce evidence that
[A]ppellant obtained a gun license in Florida almost two months after the
____________________________________________
2
Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1925.
3
For purposes of our review, we elect to address Appellant’s issues in a
slightly different order.
-6-
J-S18034-15
crime herein was committed and that when he was arrested … he had the
identification card in his possession[.]” Id. at 14. Appellant argues the
evidence was prejudicial because “it permitted the jury to infer that
[A]ppellant may have also possessed a weapon prior to obtaining the
license.” Id. at 16. Further, Appellant argues that “prejudice occurred
because the license was obtained almost two months after the killing and no
evidence was introduced that in any way connected the issuance of the
license to the murder.” Id.
We begin by noting our well-settled standard of review regarding the
admissibility of evidence in a criminal trial.
The admissibility of evidence is at the discretion of
the trial court and only a showing of an abuse of that
discretion, and resulting prejudice, constitutes
reversible error. An abuse of discretion is not merely
an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or
misapplication of the law, or the exercise of
judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the
result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as
shown by the evidence of record. Furthermore, if in
reaching a conclusion the trial court over-rides or
misapplies the law, discretion is then abused and it is
the duty of the appellate court to correct the error.
Commonwealth v. Fischere, 70 A.3d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en
banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), appeal denied, 83
A.3d 167 (Pa. 2013).
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant
evidence as “evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.”
-7-
J-S18034-15
Pa.R.E. 401. Building upon this definition, Rule 402
provides, in full, as follows: “All relevant evidence is
admissible, except as otherwise provided by law.
Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible.”
Pa.R.E. 402. Thus, while the general rule of the
admissibility of relevant evidence is subject to
various exceptions, the rule that irrelevant evidence
is not admissible is categorical. Accordingly, [t]he
threshold inquiry with admission of evidence is
whether the evidence is relevant.
Commonwealth v. Cook, 952 A.2d 594, 612 (Pa. 2008) (some internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
At trial, the Commonwealth moved to enter, as Exhibit C-38,
Appellant’s Florida gun license to carry a concealed weapon, which he
obtained after the murder that is the subject of this appeal. N.T., 2/21/14,
at 133-134. Defense counsel objected to the admission of the exhibit, and
requested a sidebar. Id. at 134. Specifically, defense counsel objected as
follows.
My objection, first, your Honor, with respect to C-38
being the concealed weapon or concealed weapon or
firearm license, state of Florida, the relevance of that
is somewhat tenuous since the date of issue is after
the homicide and the time my client is picked up is
almost – well, about 20 months after or 21 months
after the homicide. So there’s a large gap in time
from a temporal perspective.
There’s also the issue that this document we
know definitely was not in existence on the date of
the murder so I don’t know how it’s relevant. So I
don’t think that comes in at all with all due respect if
we know it wasn’t in existence at the time of the
murder and he possessed it 21 or 22 months after
the murder.
-8-
J-S18034-15
Id. at 136. The trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection and the
Florida gun license was admitted into evidence. Appellant correctly notes
that although he applied for the permit prior to the murder, that evidence
was not admitted at trial. Appellant’s Brief at 16. Appellant further argues
the evidence was prejudicial “because it permitted the jury to infer that
[A]ppellant may have also possessed a weapon prior to obtaining the
license.” Id.
Assuming, arguendo, that the admission of Appellant’s Florida gun
license was error, we nevertheless conclude that said error was harmless.
An error “can be harmless only if the appellate court
is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error is harmless.” Commonwealth v. Story, 383
A.2d 155, 162 (Pa. 1978). “When the record reveals
that an error did not prejudice the defendant, or that
the prejudice was so minimal that, beyond a
reasonable doubt, it did not influence the jury, [the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has] held the error
harmless.” Id. at 164–165 (footnotes omitted).
“Under this approach, a reviewing court first
determines whether the untainted evidence,
considered independently of the tainted evidence,
overwhelmingly establishes the defendant’s guilt.”
Id. at 166.
Commonwealth v. Barnett, --- A.3d ---, 2015 WL 4550107, *4 (Pa.
Super. 2015).
Accordingly, the question for review is whether the evidence of the
Florida gun license overwhelmingly established Appellant’s guilt. We agree
with the trial court that said evidence did not influence the verdict.
-9-
J-S18034-15
[T]here was overwhelming evidence presented at
trial from forensic experts Stark, Tankelewicz, and
Shute that [Appellant] was present at the crime
scene when Fox was murdered and lured Fox to the
crime scene by using Nelson’s phone. Moreover,
according to Nelson’s testimony, it was January,
2010, that she and [Appellant] had a confrontation
after [Appellant] saw another man driving her home
from work. Nelson stated that when [Appellant]
realized another man had driven her home, he
became enraged and tried to stuff the cigarette she
was smoking into her mouth. Nelson testified that
[Appellant] was carrying a gun on his hip during this
incident. Nelson further testified that this was not
the first time she had seen [Appellant] carrying a
gun. Furthermore, Nelson stated that [Appellant]
previously had held the gun to her head and
threatened to kill her. Nelson testified that the gun
was a semiautomatic pistol, but she did not know
what caliber it was. Nelson further stated that, even
though she was scared when [Appellant] put the gun
to her head, she never reported any of the incidents
to the police. Thus, the jury had ample evidence
upon which to base their verdict aside from the fact
that [Appellant] was issued a Florida license to carry
a concealed firearm[.]
Trial Court Opinion, 10/31/14, at 26-27. Based on the foregoing, we
conclude the admission of evidence that Appellant obtained a Florida license
to carry a concealed firearm approximately two months after the murder of
Fox was harmless error. Barnett, supra. As such, Appellant’s first issue
fails.
We next address Appellant’s third issue which also implicates the
admission of evidence. In his third issue, Appellant asserts that he is
entitled to a new trial because the trial court erred in overruling “a motion
for a mistrial proffered after the prosecutor elicited from the victim’s mother
- 10 -
J-S18034-15
that the victim was all about family, he always helped family members, and
had the names of his family tattooed on his body.” Appellant’s Brief at 23-
24.
Our standard of review is as follows.
It is well-settled that the review of a trial court’s
denial of a motion for a mistrial is limited to
determining whether the trial court abused its
discretion. An abuse of discretion is not merely an
error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the
law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment
exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will … discretion is
abused. A trial court may grant a mistrial only
where the incident upon which the motion is based is
of such a nature that its unavoidable effect is to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial by preventing the
jury from weighing and rendering a true verdict. A
mistrial is not necessary where cautionary
instructions are adequate to overcome prejudice.
Commonwealth v. Fortenbaugh, 69 A.3d 191, 193 (Pa. 2013) (citation
omitted).
Appellant avers that “[t]he law is clear that the Commonwealth is
prohibited from introducing evidence tending to induce sympathy for the
victim or the victim’s family.” Appellant’s Brief at 24. Relying on
Commonwealth v. Story, 383 A.2d 155 (Pa. 1978), Appellant asserts
“otherwise irrelevant evidence garnering sympathy for the victim or his
family [is] clearly inadmissible[].” Appellant’s Brief at 24.
Upon review, we conclude Appellant mischaracterizes our Supreme
Court’s holding in Story. In 1974, Story was accused of murdering a
- 11 -
J-S18034-15
Pittsburgh police officer, for which he was convicted of first-degree murder.
Story, supra at 158. Over objection at trial, the Commonwealth admitted
into evidence testimony “that the victim left a widow and a handicapped
daughter, and that his widow was forced to work after her husband’s
death[.]” Id. Further, two photographs of the officer and his daughter on
vacation were admitted into evidence. Id. Story argued, and our Supreme
Court agreed, that the admission of “this evidence injected extraneous
considerations into the case and prejudiced appellant by creating sympathy
for the victim and his family.” Id. at 159. In holding that the evidence was
admitted in error, the Story Court cautioned as follows.
Ordinarily, in determining whether evidence is
admissible at trial, the trial court must balance
the probativeness of the evidence against its
prejudicial impact. In this case, however, the
evidence in question was totally irrelevant to the
determination of appellant’s guilt or innocence. It
was therefore unnecessary for the trial court to
determine whether the probativeness outweighed
the prejudice.
Id. at 160 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
The instant matter is distinguishable, as the evidence Appellant asserts
should have been inadmissible, was not irrelevant. At trial, the victim’s
mother, Antoinette Smith, testified that she and the victim resided together,
and that on the night he was murdered he borrowed her car when he left
their house. N.T., 2/21/14, at 173. Smith testified that she last spoke to
her son around 1:30 a.m. when she called him and asked him to come home
- 12 -
J-S18034-15
because his son, whom she was watching, was not sleeping well. Id. She
then testified as follows.
[The Commonwealth]:
Q. Did you identify your son’s body at the morgue?
[Smith]:
A. Yes, I did.
Q. F.O.E., your son’s signature on his cell phone
that he put on some of his text messages, do you
know what that means?
A. F.O.E. means family over everything. [Appellant]
was about family most definitely. Every event, any
event [Appellant] was there on the spot helping and
that night [Appellant]’s life was taken doing what he
thought - - what he did best, helping someone.
Q. And, in fact, does he have F.O.E. tattooed on his
body?
A. Yes. He had a body scroll of everyone’s name.
That was a project that he was doing to honor his
family.
Id. at 175.
Defense counsel did not object to the testimony at the time it was
offered, but after Smith stepped down and the jury was excused, defense
counsel made a motion for a mistrial. The trial court denied his motion for
the following reasons.
I mean, this witness was asked the question that all
of us were wondering and that is what did F.O.E.
mean behind all the texts. I wanted to know what
F.O.E. meant. I didn’t know she was going to give
that explanation. But she answered the question.
- 13 -
J-S18034-15
That is a fact that the jury might want to know what
did F.O.E. mean. She told us. F.O.E. means family
over everything. So it wasn’t anything improper
about that.
Now, for her to go on and say that he was that
kind of person, always doing things for people, I
don’t think that was improper either. So I’m going
to deny your motion.
Id. at 180.
Upon review, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion. Through
Nelson’s testimony presented at trial, F.O.E. was read into the record in
relation to several of Fox’s text messages. Smith as a witness was testifying
to her knowledge of the meaning of F.O.E. Further, her statement that her
son borrowed her car and went out to help Nelson on the night he was
murdered is consistent with the evidence admitted through Nelson’s own
testimony and the cell phone records. Therefore, we conclude that the
probative value of Smith’s testimony was outweighed by any prejudice that
may have resulted in sympathy for the victim. See also Commonwealth
v. Yarris, 549 A.2d 513, 525 (Pa. 1988) (holding “Story prohibited the use
of pictures of the living victim and his family which served no purpose other
than to create sympathy for the family[]”). Accordingly, Appellant’s issue
must fail.
Finally, we address Appellant’s second and forth issues concerning
objections to comments made by the prosecutor in her opening and closing
statements.
- 14 -
J-S18034-15
[A] claim of prosecutorial misconduct either sounds
in a specific constitutional provision that the
prosecutor allegedly violated, or, more commonly,
implicates Fourteenth Amendment due process.
Commonwealth v. Tedford, 960 A.2d 1, 28–29
([Pa.] 2008). The touchstone of due process is the
fairness of the trial, rather than the culpability of the
prosecutor; consequently, it is the trial court’s ruling
on the defendant’s objection to the prosecutor’s
allegedly improper statement that is reviewable on
appeal, and not the prosecutor’s underlying
misconduct. Id. at 29. Nevertheless, the
prosecutor’s statements must be scrutinized in order
to address the propriety of the trial court’s ruling. It
is well-established that “[c]omments by a prosecutor
constitute reversible error only where their
unavoidable effect is to prejudice the jury, forming in
[the jurors’] minds a fixed bias and hostility toward
the defendant such that they could not weigh the
evidence objectively and render a fair verdict.”
Commonwealth v. Bryant, ––– Pa. ––––, 67 A.3d
716, 727 ([Pa.] 2013) (citing Commonwealth v.
Hutchinson, 25 A.3d 277, 307 ([Pa.] 2011)). A
prosecutor’s remarks in opening statements must
be fair deductions from the evidence the
Commonwealth intends to offer, which the
prosecutor believes, in good faith, will be available
and admissible at trial. Commonwealth v. Fultz,
386 A.2d 513, 516 ([Pa.] 1978). In closing
arguments, a prosecutor may comment on the
evidence and any reasonable inferences arising from
the evidence. Commonwealth v. Daniels, 644 A.2d
1175[, [1184] ([Pa.] 1994).
Commonwealth v. Arrington, 86 A.3d 831, 853 (Pa. 2014) (parallel
citations omitted), cert. denied, Arrington v. Pennsylvania, 135 S. Ct. 479
(2014) (emphasis added). Further, “we review the trial court’s
determination that a new trial was warranted due to prosecutorial
- 15 -
J-S18034-15
misconduct for abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Culver, 51 A.3d
866, 871 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted).
Appellant argues in his second issue the trial court committed an
abuse of discretion by “overruling an objection to a comment made by the
prosecutor during her opening speech to the jury wherein she argued that
the killing of the victim had devastating consequences for the victim’s son.”
Appellant’s Brief at 18. Appellant asserts said comment should have been
inadmissible because “comments attempting to evoke sympathy for the
victim or others are irrelevant and not permissible.” Id.
A review of the record indicates that in her opening statement, the
prosecutor said “[s]omething as trivial as jealousy over a woman has
devastating consequences. Bruce Fox’s child has to grow up … without his
father.” N.T., 2/19/14, at 36. Appellant objected to the Commonwealth’s
statement, and the trial court subsequently overruled Appellant’s objection.
Id. at 37.
Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, we agree with the trial court that the
comment made by the prosecutor during the opening statement was
fleeting. Trial Court Opinion, 10/31/14, at 28 (“[w]hile references intended
to engender sympathy for the family of the victim are improper, prejudice
will not result from them if they are fleeting and do not substantially affect
the outcome of the trial[,]” citing Commonwealth v. May, 898 A.3d 559,
567 (Pa. 2006)). Further, we note that Appellant again asserts that Story is
- 16 -
J-S18034-15
controlling. Appellant’s Brief at 21-22. However, as previously discussed,
Story is legally distinguishable from the instant matter, as it involved the
testimony of the victim’s widow solely regarding the impact the loss of the
victim had on their family and child. The instant matter did not involve a
witness’s testimony regarding the impact on the victim’s family, but rather
was a comment made by the prosecutor in her opening statement. As such,
Story is inapplicable.
Further, as the trial court noted, it instructed the jury prior to opening
statements to “not permit any sympathy you feel for any of the witnesses or
for the victim or for the defendant to divert you from your sworn duty to
consider all of the evidence fairly and impartially when deliberating upon
your verdict.” Trial Court Opinion, 10/31/14, at 29, citing N.T., 2/19/14, at
29. We presume the jury followed the trial court’s instructions.
Fortenbaugh, supra at 193. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
overruling defense counsel’s objection.
Similarly, in his fourth issue, Appellant argues the trial court erred in
overruling his objections to comments made by the prosecutor in her closing
argument where she “improperly argued to the jury that it had to ‘look out’
for defense ‘tactics’ and for the jury to keep its eye on the ball.” Appellant’s
Brief at 27. Appellant also argues “[i]f this weren’t bad enough, the
prosecutor criticized and denigrated defense strategy for calling [A]ppellant’s
daughter as a defense witness.” Id. at 27-28.
- 17 -
J-S18034-15
It is well settled that a prosecutor has considerable
latitude during closing arguments and his arguments
are fair if they are supported by the evidence or use
inferences that can reasonably be derived from the
evidence. Further, prosecutorial misconduct does
not take place unless the unavoidable effect of the
comments at issue was to prejudice the jurors by
forming in their minds a fixed bias and hostility
toward the defendant, thus impeding their ability to
weigh the evidence objectively and render a true
verdict. Prosecutorial misconduct is evaluated under
a harmless error standard.
Commonwealth v. Caldwell, --- A.3d ---, 2015 WL 3444594 (Pa. Super.
2015) (en banc), citing Commonwealth v. Judy, 978 A.2d 1015, 1020 (Pa.
Super. 2009).
Instantly, the comments made by the prosecutor during her closing
argument were in direct response to defense counsel’s closing argument.
First, the prosecutor’s statement that the jury should
“keep [their] eye on the ball’ and “look out for the
defense tactics in this case” because “the defense
wants to distract [them] from the very strong
evidence” was a proper response to arguments made
by defense counsel during his closing statement. In
his closing statement, defense counsel repeatedly
attacked Nelson’s character and accused her of a
variety of misdeeds. It was in response to these
statements that the prosecutor rightly characterized
the defense’s tactics as an attempt to distract the
jury from the otherwise overwhelming evidence of
[Appellant]’s guilt. As the prosecutor correctly noted
in making this point, whether or not Nelson was a
likeable witness simply did not have any bearing on
whether [Appellant] killed Fox, especially since there
was ample evidence aside from her testimony that
implicated [Appellant]. Defense counsel also
objected to the prosecutor characterizing the calling
of [Appellant]’s daughter to testify as an act of
desperation. … [N]either [this comment or the
- 18 -
J-S18034-15
previous] comment made by the prosecutor during
her closing statement prevented the jury from
weighing the evidence objectively and arriving at a
true verdict. In this case, the evidence was such
that the jury could arrive at a guilty verdict
regardless of their opinion as to Nelson’s character or
[Appellant]’s daughter’s testimony. Thus, there was
no showing that [Appellant] was in any way
prejudiced by either of the prosecutor’s comments in
her closing statement[.]
Trial Court Opinion, 10/31/14, at 33-35.
Therefore, Appellant’s second and fourth issues concerning
prosecutorial misconduct based on statements made in both her opening
and closing arguments are without merit. Accordingly, Appellant is not
entitled to relief on either issue.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude each of Appellant’s issues is
devoid of merit. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s February 26, 2014
judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/12/2015
- 19 -