Com. v. Alston, A. ( 2015 )


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  • J-S48025-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee               :
    :
    v.                           :
    :
    ADREESE B. ALSTON,                      :
    :
    Appellant              :   No. 95 WDA 2015
    Appeal from the Order entered January 2, 2015,
    Court of Common Pleas, Erie County,
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-MD-0000710-2014
    and CP-51-CR-0010363-2007
    BEFORE: PANELLA, DONOHUE and WECHT, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.:                       FILED AUGUST 19, 2015
    Adreese B. Alston (“Alston”) appeals pro se from the order of court
    denying his appeal of the Erie County District Attorney’s (the “District
    Attorney” or “Commonwealth”) disapproval of his private criminal complaint.
    Following our review, we affirm.
    The trial court succinctly summarized the underlying facts as follows:
    [Alston], a convicted murderer, is currently
    serving a life sentence at the State Correctional
    Institution in Albion.   [Alston] previously filed a
    criminal complaint against [the] Superintendent of
    SCI-Albion, Nancy Giroux, alleging that he is being
    incarcerated unlawfully at Philadelphia County
    Docket No. 10363-2007.        According to [Alston],
    there is no sentencing order at the challenged docket
    and, therefore, he is illegally incarcerated.     On
    October     14,   2014,   the    [District  Attorney]
    disapproved the complaint for lacking prosecutorial
    merit.
    J-S48025-15
    On November 6, 2014, [Alston] filed a
    [p]etition for [r]eview [f]rom the [d]enial of
    [Alston’s] [p]rivate [c]riminal [c]omplaint … . The
    Commonwealth filed a timely response on December
    12, 2014, and subsequently provided the [c]ourt
    with [Alston’s] sentencing [o]rder and other
    supporting documentation at Philadelphia County
    Docket No. 1316-2007. []
    Trial Court Opinion, 1/2/15, at 1.
    The trial court denied Alston’s petition for review on January 2, 2015.
    This timely appeal follows, in which Alston argues that the trial court erred in
    denying his petition because he “set forth a strong prima facie showing that
    [Giroux] [is] subjecting [Alston] to official oppression, involuntary servitude,
    peonage, and penal servitude … because [Alston] has not ever been
    sentenced by a court of law through a legal written, signed, and sealed
    sentencing order and judgment.” Alston’s Brief at 6.
    Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 506 governs private criminal
    complaints. It provides as follows:
    (A)   When the affiant is not a law enforcement
    officer, the complaint shall be submitted to an
    attorney for the Commonwealth, who shall
    approve or disapprove it without unreasonable
    delay.
    (B)   If the attorney for the Commonwealth:
    (1)       approves the complaint, the attorney
    shall indicate this decision on the
    complaint form and transmit it to the
    issuing authority;
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    J-S48025-15
    (2)         disapproves the       complaint, the
    attorney shall state the reasons on
    the complaint form and return it to
    the affiant. Thereafter, the affiant
    may petition the court of common
    pleas for review of the decision.
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 506.
    In this case, the District Attorney disapproved Alston’s criminal
    complaint   because       it   concluded    that   it   lacked   prosecutorial   merit.
    Commonwealth’s Response to Petition for Review, 12/12/14, at 1.                    Our
    courts have long held that disapproval for lack of prosecutorial merit is a
    disapproval based upon policy considerations.              In re Private Criminal
    Complaint of Rafferty, 
    969 A.2d 578
    , 582 (Pa. Super. 2009).
    [W]hen the district attorney disapproves a private
    criminal complaint on wholly policy considerations
    […] the trial court's standard of review of the district
    attorney's decision is abuse of discretion. This
    deferential standard recognizes the limitations on
    judicial power to interfere with the district attorney's
    discretion in these kinds of decisions. ... Thereafter,
    the appellate court will review the trial court's
    decision for an abuse of discretion, in keeping with
    settled principles of appellate review of discretionary
    matters. ... The district attorney's decision not to
    prosecute a criminal complaint for reasons including
    policy matters carries a presumption of good faith
    and soundness. ... The complainant must create a
    record that demonstrates the contrary. Thus, the
    appropriate scope of review in policy-declination
    cases is limited to whether the trial court
    misapprehended or misinterpreted the district
    attorney's decision and/or, without a legitimate basis
    in the record, substituted its judgment for that of the
    district attorney. We will not disturb the trial court's
    decision unless the record contains no reasonable
    -3-
    J-S48025-15
    grounds for the court's decision, or the court relied
    on rules of law that were palpably wrong or
    inapplicable. Otherwise, the trial court's decision
    must stand, even if the appellate court would be
    inclined to decide the case differently.
    ***
    The private criminal complainant has the burden to
    prove the district attorney abused his discretion, and
    that burden is a heavy one. In the Rule 506 petition
    for review, the private criminal complainant must
    demonstrate      the   district attorney's    decision
    amounted to bad faith, fraud or unconstitutionality.
    The complainant must do more than merely assert
    the district attorney's decision is flawed in these
    regards. The complainant must show the facts of the
    case lead only to the conclusion that the district
    attorney's decision was patently discriminatory,
    arbitrary or pretextual, and therefore not in the
    public interest. In the absence of such evidence, the
    trial court cannot presume to supervise the district
    attorney's exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and
    should leave the district attorney's decision
    undisturbed.
    Commonwealth v. Michaliga, 
    947 A.2d 786
    , 791-92 (Pa. Super. 2008)
    (internal citations omitted).
    Accordingly, Alston was required to establish that         the District
    Attorney’s determination that his complaint lacked prosecutorial merit was
    based on fraud, unconstitutionality, or bad faith.      To that end, Alston
    seemingly alleged bad faith, in that he argued that the District Attorney was
    “ignor[ing] the law as written as well as … turn[ing] a blind eye and deaf
    ear” to his private criminal complaint because he established prima facie
    evidence that he was illegally incarcerated.   Petition for Review from the
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    J-S48025-15
    Denial of Petitioner’s Private Criminal Complaint, 11/6/14, at 7.       The trial
    court rejected this allegation based upon its finding that Alston’s sentence
    was memorialized in a written sentencing order, thereby demolishing that
    premise for the offenses Alston sought to have brought against Giroux. Trial
    Court Opinion, 1/2/15, at 2-3.
    We can find no abuse of discretion in that determination.1              The
    foundation of Alston’s private criminal complaint was his claim that his
    incarceration was illegal because his judgment of sentence was not reduced
    to a written order. In its response to Alston’s petition for review, the District
    Attorney provided a copy of the written order. Commonwealth’s Response to
    Petition for Review, 12/12/14, at 3; Trial Court Opinion, 1/2/15, at Exhibit A.
    The written sentencing order nullifies Alston’s claims and supports the
    District Attorney’s determination that his private criminal complaint lacks
    prosecutorial merit. In light of this evidence, Alston has failed to establish
    “how the facts of the case lead only to the conclusion that the district
    attorney's decision was patently discriminatory, arbitrary or pretextual, and
    therefore not in the public interest.” Michaliga, 
    947 A.2d at 792
    . Having
    found no abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s order.
    Order affirmed.
    1
    “An abuse of discretion occurs where the law is overridden or misapplied,
    or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
    partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence or the record.”
    Commonwealth v. Adams, 
    104 A.3d 511
    , 517 (Pa. 2014) (quoting
    Commonwealth v. Randolph, 
    873 A.2d 1277
    , 1281 (Pa. 2005)).
    -5-
    J-S48025-15
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/19/2015
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 95 WDA 2015

Filed Date: 8/19/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024