Com. v. Prolenski, C. ( 2015 )


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  • J.S24038/14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,               :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :          PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee          :
    :
    v.                      :
    :
    :
    CHRISTOPHER JOHN PROLENSKI,                 :
    :
    Appellant         :     No. 1860 WDA 2013
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 18, 2013
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County
    Criminal Division No(s).: CP-26-CR-0002315-2012
    BEFORE: BOWES, JENKINS, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.:                      FILED JANUARY 13, 2015
    Appellant, Christopher John Prolenski, appeals from the judgment of
    sentence of five to twelve years’ imprisonment, imposed after a jury found
    him guilty of, inter alia, burglary and robbery.1         Appellant claims the
    evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions, the trial court erred in
    overruling his objection to the Commonwealth’s closing argument, and the
    Commonwealth failed to disclose a police report.        We are constrained to
    affirm.
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3502(a)(1), 3701(a)(1)(i).
    J. S24038/14
    We summarize the evidence adduced at trial.         On September 26,
    2012, shortly after 12:00 p.m., the complainant, Carol Lowther, returned to
    her home and found it had been ransacked. When she yelled out to check if
    someone was in the home, a man approached her from behind, twisted her
    arm around her back, and placed a screwdriver against her abdomen.       The
    individual stated he would kill her if she did not give him what he wanted.
    The complainant struggled with the individual and was able to turn around
    and face him. She saw his face from a distance of approximately one foot.
    Her initial impression of the individual was “[j]ust tall and skinny, a white
    person.” N.T., 11/5/13, at 22. He was wearing a dark colored sweatshirt
    with the hood over his head. 
    Id. at 21.
    She broke free, ran to a neighbor’s
    house, and called 911. The two shirts complainant was wearing at the time
    were torn, and she suffered a dislocated shoulder, as well as a scratch on
    her abdomen.
    Pennsylvania State Trooper Douglas E. Urey responded to the 911 call
    and talked to the complainant. The complainant described the individual as
    a white male with dark hair, approximately 5’10” tall with a medium build.
    She stated she noticed an unfamiliar red Mustang parked near a neighbor’s
    home before the incident. Trooper Urey collected the complainant’s shirts as
    evidence. Several items located inside and outside the complainant’s home
    were also taken as evidence.
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    Pennsylvania State Trooper Joseph Michael Timms was assigned to
    investigate the case.   He interviewed the complainant on September 27,
    2012, the day after the incident, and obtained her description of the
    individual.   Trooper Timms then selected suspects from the area based on
    the complainant’s description. He compiled two photographic arrays, each
    containing eight pictures. The first array contained a picture of a suspect,
    Seth Annis.2 The second array contained a picture of Appellant.
    On October 30, 2012, Trooper Timms met the complainant at her
    home and showed her the arrays. The complainant did not identify any of
    the photographs in the first array.    According to Trooper Timms, he then
    showed her the second array, at which time she pointed at Appellant’s
    picture and stated, “Oh my God, that’s him. I am going to be sick.” 
    Id. at 60.
    She became nauseous and went to the bathroom. When she returned,
    she again identified Appellant as the assailant. She had not seen Appellant
    before the incident.
    Trooper Timms filed a criminal complaint against Appellant on
    November 19, 2012, and arrested him the following day, November 20th.
    Appellant waived his Miranda3 rights and denied being involved in the
    incident.     According to Trooper Timms, Appellant asked if there was
    2
    On cross-examination, Trooper Timms stated Annis owned a red Mustang.
    No evidence established that Appellant owned a red Mustang.
    3
    Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    (1966).
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    fingerprint evidence and stated he “would get an alibi because he wasn’t
    there.” 
    Id. at 63.
    A jury trial was held on November 5 and 6, 2013. The Commonwealth
    presented the testimony of the complainant, Trooper Urey, and Trooper
    Timms recounting the above-stated events.       The Commonwealth did not
    present any forensic evidence. Appellant, in turn, presented an alibi defense
    and testified on his own behalf that he was working on the day of the
    crimes. Two witnesses testified in corroboration of Appellant’s alibi, namely,
    Andrew Coliny, Appellant’s girlfriend’s father, for whom he was working, and
    the homeowner who hired Coliny to demolish her kitchen.         The jury, on
    November 6, 2013, found Appellant guilty of the above-stated crimes and
    related offenses.
    On November 18, 2013, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an
    aggregate five to twelve years’ imprisonment.     Appellant did not file post-
    sentence motions but timely filed a notice of appeal and a court-ordered
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
    Appellant presents the following questions for review:
    WHETHER THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO FIND
    THE APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND A REASON[A]BLE DOUBT
    OF   THE   CRIMINAL   CHARGES   WHEN   APPELLANT
    PRESENTED AN ALIBI DEFENSE?
    WHETHER   THE    PROSECUTION    MADE             IMPROPER
    STATEMENTS IN CLOSING ARGUMENT?
    WHETHER THE COURT ERR[ED] IN ALLOWING TROOPER
    UREY TO TESTIFY TO TROOPER’S REPORT WHEN DEFENSE
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    COUNSEL DID NOT RECEIVE THE REPORT PRIOR TO
    TRIAL?
    Appellant’s Brief at 7.
    Appellant first claims the evidence was insufficient to sustain his
    convictions because the complainant’s identification contradicted his alibi
    evidence and, therefore, was unworthy of belief and unreliable. In support,
    Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Bennett, 
    303 A.2d 220
    (Pa. Super.
    1973). Appellant’s Brief at 12-13. According to Appellant, no probability of
    fact that he committed the crimes could be drawn from the evidence. 
    Id. at 13.
    He thus requests that his convictions be reversed or, in the alternative,
    that a new trial be granted. 
    Id. at 15.
    No relief is due.
    The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of
    evidence is whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at
    trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there
    is sufficient evidence to enable the factfinder to find every
    element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
    applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence
    and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. In
    addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
    established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
    possibility of innocence.         Any doubts regarding a
    defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless
    the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter
    of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the
    combined circumstances. . . . Moreover, in applying the
    above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
    evidence actually received must be considered. Finally,
    the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of
    witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free
    to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
    Commonwealth v. Jones, 
    954 A.2d 1194
    , 1196-97 (Pa. Super. 2008)
    (citations omitted and punctuation omitted).
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    “An alibi is a defense that places the defendant at the relevant time in
    a different place than the scene involved and so removed therefrom as to
    render it impossible for him to be the guilty party.”      Commonwealth v.
    Hawkins, 
    894 A.2d 716
    , 717 (Pa. 2006) (citation and punctation omitted).
    The defense, if established, permits a jury to acquit the defendant if the
    “alibi evidence, even if not wholly believed, raises a reasonable doubt of his
    presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission and, thus,
    of his guilt.” 
    Id. at 718
    (citation and punctuation omitted) (discussing jury
    instruction regarding alibi defense).
    This Court has held that a complainant’s identification of the defendant
    alone     provides   sufficient   evidence    to   rebut   an   alibi   defense.
    Commonwealth v. Brison, 
    618 A.2d 420
    , 422-423 (Pa. Super. 1992).
    Similarly, we have held that a positive identification by the complainant
    provides sufficient basis to establish the identity of a defendant as the
    perpetrator of the offenses charged.      Commonwealth v. Patterson, 
    940 A.2d 493
    , 502 (Pa. Super. 2007).
    As noted above, Appellant relies on our decision in Bennett.          In
    Bennett, the defendant was found guilty of receiving stolen property, an
    automobile, based on the following facts:
    [The d]efendant had been a passenger in the stolen
    automobile while it was being driven by one Harry Jones.
    Later [the defendant,] had been found driving the vehicle
    in Philadelphia with Jones as a passenger. Jones, after
    denials, confessed to the automobile’s theft and it was on
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    his testimony that the Commonwealth relied in its proof of
    charges against [the] defendant. . . .
    Jones (who had been contradictory with respect to his
    own perpetration of the larceny) sought to implicate the
    defendant by giving several wholly different, conflicting
    and inconsistent versions of when and how he had told her
    that the car had been in fact stolen by him. On a previous
    occasion Jones had denied he had ever conveyed to [the]
    defendant knowledge of the car’s theft. With each new
    version Jones would recant the previous one and protest
    that the newest version was in fact the true one.
    
    Bennett, 303 A.2d at 220-21
    .
    On appeal, the defendant in Bennett challenged the sufficiency of the
    evidence. This Court agreed that Jones’ testimony was “so inconsistent and
    contradictory as to be insufficient to support a finding of her guilt” for
    receiving stolen property. 
    Id. at 220.
    We reasoned:
    This situation presented the jury not with a mere conflict
    or contradiction in testimony which was reasonably
    reconcilable by them, but a situation falling within the rule:
    ‘. . . a case should not go to the jury where the party
    having the burden offers testimony of a witness, or of
    various witnesses, which is so contradictory on the
    essential issues that any finding by the jury would be a
    mere guess . . . When the testimony is so contradictory
    on the basic issues as to make any verdict based thereon
    pure conjecture the jury should not be permitted to
    consider it[.]’
    
    Id. at 221
    (citation omitted). We thus reversed the defendant’s conviction.
    
    Id. The Pennsylvania
       Supreme      Court,   in   Commonwealth      v.
    Farquharson, 
    354 A.2d 545
    , 550 (Pa. 1976), subsequently limited
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    Bennett.   The Farquharson Court discussed the appropriate standard of
    review governing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as follows:
    ‘On appellate review of a criminal conviction, we will
    not weigh the evidence and thereby substitute our
    judgment for that of the finder of fact. To do so
    would require an assessment of the credibility of the
    testimony and that is clearly not our function.’
    This concept, however, must be distinguished from an
    equally fundamental principle that a verdict of guilt may
    not be based upon surmise or conjecture. Following this
    principle, courts of this jurisdiction have recognized that
    where evidence offered to support a verdict of guilt is so
    unreliable and/or contradictory as to make any verdict
    based thereon pure conjecture, a jury may not be
    permitted to return such a finding.
    
    Id. at 550
    (citations omitted). The Court concluded, “The Bennett principle
    is applicable only where the party having the burden of proof presents
    testimony to    support that burden which is either so unreliable or
    contradictory as to make any verdict based thereon obviously the result of
    conjecture and not reason.” 
    Id. Instantly, the
    principal issue at trial was whether Appellant was the
    perpetrator of the crimes. The Commonwealth relied on the identification of
    Appellant by the complainant.     The complainant testified she managed to
    wrestle herself away from the perpetrator and see his face from a distance
    of one foot.   N.T., 11/5/13, at 21-22.   She provided a description of the
    assailant to Trooper Urey shortly after the incident. 
    Id. at 48.
    One month
    later, she later identified Appellant from a photo array without hesitation.
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    Id. at 31,
    60. She again identified Appellant at trial with no suggestion of
    uncertainty or qualification. 
    Id. at 32.
    Based on the foregoing, we discern no merit to Appellant’s argument
    that the Commonwealth’s evidence was so contradictory on the issue of his
    identification as the perpetrator that he was entitled to relief under Bennett.
    See 
    Farquharson, 354 A.2d at 550
    . Rather, in light of the complainant’s
    unequivocal and unwavering identifications of Appellant, the jury was
    entitled to reject Appellant’s alibi and mistaken identity theories and resolve
    conflicts in the evidence.4 See 
    Brison, 618 A.2d at 423
    . Thus, Appellant’s
    challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence warrants no relief.
    Appellant also argues that his alibi evidence, which was corroborated
    by two witnesses, should be entitled such greater weight than the
    complainant’s identification testimony that the latter must be deemed
    unreliable. We also note that the complainant’s identification implicating him
    4
    We note that eyewitness identification is arguably one of the most
    powerful, but least reliable, forms of evidence.              See generally
    Commonwealth v. Walker, 
    92 A.3d 766
    , 779 (Pa. 2014). The hazards of
    “inaccurate, but honestly held recollections” when making an identification
    are well-documented. See 
    id. We are
    mindful that the complainant here
    was not familiar with Appellant, had but a brief opportunity to view the
    assailant’s face during the attack, and identified Appellant from a
    photographic array more than one month after the incident. However, we
    are bound by our standard of review, which does not permit this Court “to
    ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt
    beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, 
    934 A.2d 1233
    , 1235 (Pa. 2007) (citation and punctuation omitted).
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    in the crimes was not corroborated by any physical or forensic evidence. As
    suggested above, however, these arguments challenge the weight, not the
    sufficiency, of the evidence.    See 
    Patterson, 940 A.2d at 502
    ; see
    generally Commonwealth v. Widmer, 
    744 A.2d 745
    , 751-52 (Pa. 2000)
    (distinguishing standards relevant to reviewing sufficiency and weight of
    evidence challenges).
    To the extent Appellant seeks a new trial based on the weight of the
    evidence, our review reveals no indication that Appellant raised a weight of
    the evidence claim in the trial court.   See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A) (requiring
    “[a] claim that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence . . . be
    raised with the trial judge in a motion for a new trial: (1) orally, on the
    record, at any time before sentencing; (2) by written motion at any time
    before sentencing; or (3) in a post-sentence motion”).            Moreover,
    Appellant’s brief does not contain a statement of the place of raising such
    issue. See Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c), 2119(e). Therefore, Appellant has waived his
    weight of the evidence claim, and we are precluded from considering
    whether he was entitled to a new trial.          See Commonwealth v.
    Sherwood, 
    982 A.2d 483
    , 494 (Pa. 2009).
    Appellant’s next challenges the following portion of the prosecutor’s
    closing argument:
    You also heard about DNA. This is not CSI Miami or
    New York. I like those shows the same as everyone else.
    They are entertaining, but that’s what they are, they are
    entertaining.
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    In real life, DNA evidence is much different than it is on
    television.    As you heard, I believe on redirect from
    Trooper Timms, these items weren’t sent to the lab. The
    lab typically doesn’t do DNA analysis when you already
    have a suspect identified. The primary purpose in real life
    of law enforcement to do DNA analysis is to try and to
    ascertain . . . .
    N.T., 11/6/13, at 77. Appellant objected, noting the trial evidence did not
    explain why DNA tests were not conducted. 
    Id. The prosecutor
    responded
    that Trooper Timms explained his decision not to seek DNA testing. 
    Id. The court
    overruled Appellant’s objection, stating the jury would determine
    whether the argument was supported by the trial evidence. 
    Id. Appellant presently
    asserts the trial court erred in overruling his
    objection because the prosecutor’s argument lacked an adequate basis in
    the trial evidence or legitimate inferences therefrom. Appellant’s Brief at 17-
    18. He contends the prosecutor violated his professional responsibilities by
    advancing an unsupported argument. 
    Id. at 16-17.
    No relief is due.
    The principles governing our review are well settled:
    [T]he trial court is vested with discretion to grant a mistrial
    whenever the alleged prejudicial event may reasonably be
    said to deprive the defendant of a fair and impartial trial.
    In making its determination, the court must discern
    whether misconduct or prejudicial error actually occurred,
    and if so, . . . assess the degree of any resulting prejudice.
    Our review of the resulting order is constrained to
    determining whether the court abused its discretion.
    Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with [the]
    law on facts and circumstances before the trial court after
    hearing and consideration.         Consequently, the court
    abuses its discretion if, in resolving the issue for decision,
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    it misapplies the law or exercises its discretion in a manner
    lacking reason.
    Commonwealth v. Judy, 
    978 A.2d 1015
    , 1019 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation
    omitted).
    With respect to closing arguments, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    has stated:
    A prosecutor may make fair comment on the admitted
    evidence and may provide fair rebuttal to defense
    arguments. Even an otherwise improper comment may be
    appropriate if it is in fair response to defense counsel’s
    remarks. Any challenge to a prosecutor’s comment must
    be evaluated in the context in which the comment was
    made.
    Commonwealth v. Burno, 
    94 A.3d 956
    , 974 (Pa. 2014) (citation and
    quotation marks omitted). Moreover,
    It is well settled that a prosecutor has considerable latitude
    during closing arguments and his arguments are fair if
    they are supported by the evidence or use inferences that
    can reasonably be derived from the evidence. Further,
    prosecutorial misconduct does not take place unless the
    unavoidable effect of the comments at issue was to
    prejudice the jurors by forming in their minds a fixed bias
    and hostility toward the defendant, thus impeding their
    ability to weigh the evidence objectively and render a true
    verdict. Prosecutorial misconduct is evaluated under a
    harmless error standard.
    
    Judy, 978 A.2d at 1020
    (citation omitted).
    After reviewing the trial transcript, we agree that the Commonwealth
    did not present any evidence explaining why DNA tests were not performed.
    Nevertheless, in the context of the closing arguments as a whole, the
    prosecutor’s statement attempted to focus the jury’s attention upon the
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    strength of the complainant’s identification and away from the lack of any
    objective evidence corroborating the identification. Such an argument falls
    within the bounds of zealous advocacy granted to the prosecutor and
    responded to Appellant’s arguments emphasizing the absence of forensic
    evidence.      See 
    id. at 1020,
    1022-23.        Moreover, even if we were to
    conclude that the prosecutor’s misstatement of the record constituted
    misconduct, we discern no basis to conclude the jury was incapable of
    objectively weighing the evidence actually presented at trial. 5         See 
    id. at 1020.
    Thus, no relief is due.
    Appellant lastly contends that the Commonwealth failed to disclose a
    report prepared by Trooper Urey following his response to the complainant’s
    911 call.     By way of background to this claim, Appellant, on January 14,
    2013, filed a pretrial request for discovery and bill of particulars, seeking,
    inter alia, “a copy of any police reports.” Appellant’s Req. for Disc. & Bill of
    Particulars, 1/14/13, at ¶ 3. The Commonwealth filed its answer on March
    6, 2013, and responded, “The entire police arrest report is not subject to
    discovery pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. To the
    extent items in said police arrest report are discoverable and requested,
    copies   of    the   relevant   requested   portions   are   attached.   .   .   .   .”
    5
    We also note the trial court cautioned the jury that the arguments of
    counsel were not evidence, and when overruling Appellant’s objection,
    reminded the jury that it was responsible for determining whether the
    evidence supported the prosecutor’s argument. N.T., 11/6/13, at 49, 77.
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    Commonwealth’s Answer to Req. for Disc. & Bill of Particulars, 3/6/13, at ¶
    3. Attached to the Commonwealth’s answer was a copy of a Pennsylvania
    State Police Incident Report dated September 27, 2012, and signed by
    Trooper Urey.      Although the copy of the incident report appeared
    incomplete,6 Appellant did not file any further discovery motions.
    On the first day of trial, Trooper Urey testified on cross examination
    that he prepared a report.      N.T., 11/5/13, at 52.   Counsel for Appellant
    stated she did not have the report. 
    Id. Following a
    sidebar conference that
    was not recorded, the trial court overruled the objection.            
    Id. at 53
    Appellant’s counsel then elicited Trooper Urey’s testimony that his report
    contained the complainant’s description of the perpetrator as having a
    strong body odor and a smell of alcohol. 
    Id. Counsel concluded
    her cross-
    examination of Trooper Urey but reserved her right to recall the trooper. At
    the conclusion of the day, counsel received a copy of the report. 
    Id. at 85.
    On the second day of trial, Appellant recalled Trooper Urey during the
    defense’s case-in-chief.     Appellant asked the trooper three substantive
    questions regarding “information that no vehicle was seen in the area.”
    N.T., 11/6/13, at 44.      Trooper Urey responded he believed there was no
    vehicle seen in the area and acknowledged that the “report sa[id] that there
    was no vehicle in the area, just the description of the actor.” 
    Id. 6 For
    example, the narrative portion of Trooper Urey’s incident report began
    with the incomplete phrase “vehicles in the area.” Incident Report, 9/27/12,
    at 3.
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    It is unclear from the present record or Appellant’s arguments whether
    Appellant’s challenge involves missing portions of Trooper Urey’s September
    27th incident report or a separate, additional report.         Nevertheless,
    Appellant contends he was unaware that Trooper Urey prepared a report and
    the Commonwealth violated its continuing duty to disclose discovery
    materials. Appellant’s Brief at 19. He concludes he is entitled to discharge
    or a new trial. 
    Id. We disagree.
    Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 573 states:
    (A) Informal. Before any disclosure or discovery can
    be sought under these rules by either party, counsel for
    the parties shall make a good faith effort to resolve all
    questions of discovery, and to provide information required
    or requested under these rules as to which there is no
    dispute. When there are items requested by one party
    which the other party has refused to disclose, the
    demanding party may make appropriate motion. . . . .
    (B) Disclosure by the Commonwealth.
    (1) Mandatory. In all court cases, on request by the
    defendant, and subject to any protective order which
    the Commonwealth might obtain under this rule, the
    Commonwealth shall disclose to the defendant's
    attorney all of the following requested items or
    information, provided they are material to the instant
    case.    The Commonwealth shall, when applicable,
    permit the defendant's attorney to inspect and copy or
    photograph such items.
    (a) Any evidence favorable to the accused that is
    material either to guilt or to punishment, and is
    within the possession or control of the attorney for
    the Commonwealth;
    (b) any written confession or inculpatory
    statement, or the substance of any oral confession or
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    inculpatory statement, and the identity of the person
    to whom the confession or inculpatory statement
    was made that is in the possession or control of the
    attorney for the Commonwealth;
    (c) the defendant's prior criminal record;
    (d) the circumstances and results of any
    identification of the defendant by voice, photograph,
    or in-person identification;
    (e) any results or reports of scientific tests, expert
    opinions, and written or recorded reports of
    polygraph examinations or other physical or mental
    examinations of the defendant that are within the
    possession or control of the attorney for the
    Commonwealth;
    (f) any tangible objects, including documents,
    photographs,   fingerprints,  or   other  tangible
    evidence; and
    (g) the transcripts and recordings of any
    electronic surveillance, and the authority by which
    the said transcripts and recordings were obtained.
    (2) Discretionary With the Court.
    (a) In all court cases, except as otherwise
    provided in Rules 230 (Disclosure of Testimony
    Before Investigating Grand Jury) and 556.10
    (Secrecy; Disclosure), if the defendant files a motion
    for pretrial discovery, the court may order the
    Commonwealth to allow the defendant’s attorney to
    inspect and copy or photograph any of the following
    requested items, upon a showing that they are
    material to the preparation of the defense, and that
    the request is reasonable:
    (i)  the   names        and    addresses     of
    eyewitnesses;
    (ii) all written or recorded statements, and
    substantially verbatim oral statements, of
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    eyewitnesses the Commonwealth intends to
    call at trial;
    (iii) all written and recorded statements,
    and substantially verbatim oral statements,
    made      by   co-defendants,  and    by  co-
    conspirators or accomplices, whether such
    individuals have been charged or not; and
    (iv)   any   other    evidence     specifically
    identified by the defendant, provided the
    defendant can additionally establish that its
    disclosure would be in the interests of justice.
    *     *      *
    (D) Continuing Duty to Disclose. If, prior to or
    during trial, either party discovers additional evidence or
    material previously requested or ordered to be disclosed
    by it, which is subject to discovery or inspection under this
    rule, or the identity of an additional witness or witnesses,
    such party shall promptly notify the opposing party or the
    court of the additional evidence, material, or witness.
    (E) Remedy. If at any time during the course of the
    proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that
    a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may
    order such party to permit discovery or inspection, may
    grant a continuance, or may prohibit such party from
    introducing evidence not disclosed, other than testimony of
    the defendant, or it may enter such other order as it
    deems just under the circumstances.
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(A), (B)(1), (B)(2)(a), (D)-(E).
    Under Paragraph (E) of Rule 573, the trial court “possesses discretion
    in fashioning an appropriate remedy for a violation of the rules of discovery.”
    Commonwealth v. Smith, 
    955 A.2d 391
    , 395 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc).
    We review the trial court’s determination of a remedy for an abuse of
    discretion, mindful of the general rule that “[a] continuance is appropriate
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    where the undisclosed statement or other evidence is admissible and the
    defendant’s only prejudice is surprise.” 
    Id. (citation omitted).
    Instantly, Appellant does not describe the contents of the report that
    was belatedly disclosed or demonstrate how the Commonwealth’s late
    disclosure violated Rule 573. Thus, even assuming that the Commonwealth
    violated a duty to disclose, Appellant has not established prejudice. See 
    id. Moreover, he
    does not challenge the trial court’s decision to grant disclosure
    of the report and ensure Trooper Urey was available for further cross-
    examination by the defense. Our own review of the record reveals no basis
    to conclude that the trial court’s remedy constituted an abuse of discretion.
    See 
    id. Accordingly, following
    our review of the record, Appellant is not
    entitled to appellate relief from the belated disclosure of the report.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 1/13/2015
    - 18 -