Bair v. Manor Care of Elizabethtown, PA ( 2015 )

J-A31002-14
2015 Pa. Super. 9
M. SYLVIA BAIR, EXECUTRIX OF THE IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
ESTATE OF MARTHA A. EDWARDS, PENNSYLVANIA
DECEASED,
Appellee
v.
MANOR CARE OF ELIZABETHTOWN, PA,
LLC D/B/A MANORCARE HEALTH
SERVICES-ELIZABETHTOWN,
MANORCARE HEALTH SERVICES, INC.,
MANOR CARE, INC., HCR MANORCARE,
INC., HCR HEALTHCARE, LLC, HCR II
HEALTHCARE, LLC, HCR III
HEALTHCARE, LLC, HCR IV
HEALTHCARE, LLC,
Appellants No. 435 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered January 31, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Civil Division at No(s): 12-17156
BEFORE: BOWES, OTT, and STABILE, JJ.
OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED JANUARY 15, 2015
Manor Care of Elizabethtown, PA, LLC d/b/a Manorcare Health Services
– Elizabethtown and other Manor Care and HCR defendants (collectively
“Manor Care”) appeal from the January 31, 2014 order overruling their
preliminary objections pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(6), and finding no
agreement to arbitrate. After thorough review, we affirm.
M. Sylvia Bair, Executrix of the Estate of Martha A. Edwards
(“Decedent”), commenced this wrongful death and survival action against
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Manor Care alleging that neglect and abuse of her mother during her stay in
its facility from April 15, 2011 through July 8, 2011, ultimately caused her
death on October 5, 2011. Manor Care filed preliminary objections to the
complaint seeking to have the case referred to arbitration pursuant to the
terms of an arbitration agreement executed by Ms. Bair on behalf of
Decedent upon admission to the facility. The trial court permitted discovery
on the issue of the enforceability of the arbitration agreement.
Sylvia Bair was deposed and testified as follows. Ms. Bair arrived at
Manor Care on April 15, 2011, and was presented with admissions
paperwork for her mother, Martha Edwards. According to Ms. Bair, that
person was not the Admissions Director Dale Young, but a female
administrator. No one explained the nature of the arbitration agreement
and Ms. Bair did not recall discussing the agreement with anyone at the
facility. Bair Deposition, 6/3/13, at 33-34. Ms. Bair signed all the
paperwork at that time. Id. at 35. Ms. Bair testified that she believed that
the agreement had to be signed in order to facilitate her mother’s admission.
Id. at 48. She possessed a power of attorney from her mother dated May 5,
2000, and she signed the agreement on the line designated for the personal
representative of the patient. No Manor Care representative completed or
signed the form on behalf of the entity.
During her deposition, Ms. Bair was also shown an executed arbitration
agreement dated June 24, 2009. She identified the signature of the
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patient’s legal representative as her signature, although she had no
recollection of signing the form, but confirmed that her mother had been a
patient in Manor Care at that time. In contrast to the 2011 agreement, the
blanks on the form for the date and the names of the parties were
completed and it was signed by all parties.
Manor Care offered Dale Young, the facility’s Admissions Director at
the time of Decedent’s admission, for deposition. While Mr. Young was the
person who usually supervised the admissions process, he had no
recollection of Ms. Bair and could not confirm that he presented the
admission paperwork to her. His testimony was limited to what he routinely
would advise new patients or their representatives about the arbitration
agreement, and not based upon any specific recollection of a conversation
with Ms. Bair.
The trial court overruled Manor Care’s preliminary objections, thus
permitting the litigation to proceed in the court of common pleas. Manor
Care timely appealed and raises one issue for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in
concluding that Manor Care did not accept the subject
Arbitration Agreement based on the lack of a signature of
the nursing home representative on the agreement itself?
Appellant’s brief at 4.
This appeal, though interlocutory, is appealable as of right pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(8), which provides that an interlocutory appeal may be
taken as of right from “an order which is made appealable by statute or
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general rule.” The Pennsylvania Uniform Arbitration Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7320
et seq., provides that an appeal taken from an order denying a petition or
application to compel arbitration is appealable. 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 7320(a)(1),
7342.
In reviewing a claim that the trial court improperly denied preliminary
objections in the nature of a petition to compel arbitration, we are “limited to
determining whether the trial court's findings are supported by substantial
evidence and whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the
petition." Gaffer Ins. Co. v. Discover Reinsurance Co., 936 A.2d 1109,
1112 (Pa.Super. 2007). Since contract interpretation is a question of law,
“our review of the trial court's decision is de novo and our scope is plenary.”
Bucks Orthopaedic Surgery Associates, P.C. v. Ruth, 925 A.2d 868,
871 (Pa.Super. 2007).
Arbitration cannot be compelled in the absence of an express
agreement to arbitrate. E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279
(2002); Emlenton Area Municipal Authority v. Miles, 548 A.2d 623, 625
(Pa.Super. 1988). The touchstone of any valid contract is mutual assent and
consideration. The issue of whether parties agreed to arbitrate is generally
one for the court, not the arbitrators. Gaffer, supra; Ross Development
Co. v. Advanced Building Dev., Inc., 803 A.2d 194 (Pa.Super. 2002).
When addressing that issue, courts generally apply ordinary state law
contract principles, “but in doing so, must give due regard to the federal
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policy favoring arbitration.” Gaffer, supra at 1114 n.7. If the court
determines there is a valid agreement, it must then determine if the dispute
in question is within the scope of the agreement. We are mindful that the
burden was on Manor Care to demonstrate that a valid agreement to
arbitrate existed between the parties, and that the dispute was within the
scope of the agreement. 42 Pa.C.S. § 7304(a).
The “Voluntary Arbitration Agreement” at issue is a form with blanks
on the first page for the insertion of the names of the contracting parties and
the date. None of these blanks was completed. In addition, the agreement
provides that, “arbitration is described in the voluntary arbitration program
brochure,” a copy of which is “attached and made part of this agreement.”
Voluntary Arbitration Agreement, at 1. The brochure was not attached.
Above the signature lines, the agreement provides, in bold capital
letters,
THE PARTIES CONFIRM THAT EACH OF THEM
UNDERSTANDS THAT EACH HAS WAIVED THE RIGHT TO
TRIAL BEFORE A JUDGE OR JURY AND THAT EACH
CONSENTS TO ALL OF THE TERMS OF THIS VOLUNTARY
AGREEMENT. PATIENT ACKNOWLEDGES THE RIGHT TO
REVIEW THIS AGREEMENT WITH AN ATTORNEY OR
FAMILY BEFORE SIGNING.
There are signature lines for the Patient, the Patient’s Legal
Representative in both his/her representative capacity and in his/her
individual capacity, and for the Center Representative. Ms. Bair signed as
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the Patient’s legal representative, but only in her representative capacity;
the signature line for the Center Representative is blank.
It is Manor Care’s position that the lack of a signature by a facility
representative does not render the agreement unenforceable. It cites
Hopkins v. New Day Fin., 643 F. Supp. 2d 704, 720 (E.D. Pa. 2009), for the
proposition that the writing need not be signed by either party, and certainly
not the party attempting to enforce it. Manor Care relies upon decisions
from other jurisdictions in support of its position that an agreement is
enforceable if it is executed by the party to be held to its terms. Manor Care
maintains that its presentation of the form agreement to Ms. Bair constituted
an offer to arbitrate; by signing the agreement, Ms. Bair accepted the offer.
Thus, Manor Care submits that it manifested its intent to submit to
arbitration any and all disputes that might arise. In addition, Manor Care
asserts that the fully executed arbitration agreement from Decedent’s prior
admission in 2009 did not support the trial court’s inference that Manor Care
did not intend to be bound by the unsigned 2011 agreement.
Ms. Bair counters that the form does not indicate who the parties are
or that the parties agreed on the “material and necessary details of their
bargain.” Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 30 (Pa.Super. 2006). The fact
that the form was “facially devoid of essential terms[,]” not just the
signature, renders it unenforceable. She continues the parties are
unidentified; the definition line of the party only references “Center.” It is
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undated. Ms. Bair argues that there are no indicia of mutual assent. She
maintains that the alleged agreement expressly requires both parties to
confirm that they are waiving their right to a jury trial and consenting to the
terms of the agreement by affixing their signatures. The fact that there is a
signature line for “Center Representative” and that it is blank further
indicates that there was no mutual assent. See Baier v. Darden
Restaurants, 420 S.W.3d 733, 739 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014).
The trial court determined that there was no agreement in 2011. It
arrived at that conclusion after viewing the signed arbitration agreement in
2009 as evidence from which one could reasonably infer that Manor Care did
not intend to be legally bound by the unsigned agreement in 2011. Manor
Care challenges the reasonableness of that inference and asserts that this
prior dealings evidence suggests instead that Ms. Bair intended to enter into
an agreement to arbitrate.
The issue is not whether the arbitration agreement was signed by the
party sought to be bound, but whether there was a meeting of the minds,
that is, whether the parties agreed in a clear and unmistakable manner to
arbitrate their disputes. The trial court concluded that the parties did not
agree, and we concur. Even if we were to view the presentation of the form
as an offer, as Manor Care suggests, it lacked essential terms such as the
names of the contracting parties, the date of the agreement, and the
brochure describing the arbitration process, which was expressly made part
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of the agreement. “[A]n offer to contract must be intentional and
sufficiently definite in its terms, and no offer will be found to exist where its
essential terms are unclear.” Lackner, supra at 31 (quoting Beaver
Valley Alloy Foundry, Co. v. Therma-Fab, Inc., 814 A.2d 217, 222
(Pa.Super. 2002)).
We note, too, that while the absence of signatures is not fatal unless
required by law or by the intent of the parties, the agreement herein
expressly required the signatures of both parties. The bold-print language
above the signature lines established that “the parties” confirmed that they
waived the right to a trial and consented to arbitration by signing the
agreement on the designated lines. In light of the fact that Manor Care
supplied the form document and terms therein, it is presumed to have
known the effect of its terms and conditions. By failing to affix its signature,
Manor Care did not consent to arbitrate. Herein, the party seeking to
enforce the arbitration agreement is the party who did not sign the
document. Absent mutual assent, there was no enforceable agreement to
arbitrate.
Finally, Manor Care takes issue with the inference drawn by the trial
court from the parties’ prior course of dealing. It argues that the proper
inference from the 2009 executed arbitration agreement was that Ms. Bair
intended to enter into an agreement to arbitrate disputes, not that the
signature of the Manor Care representative was required for an enforceable
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agreement.1 Manor Care’s argument misses the mark. Absent herein was
mutual assent of the parties to the alleged contract. It was not Ms. Bair’s
consent that was the problem; it was Manor Care’s failure to fill in essential
terms such as the names of the parties and sign the agreement that fell
short in manifesting its consent to arbitrate. The 2009 signed arbitration
agreement was prior course of dealing evidence from which the trial court
reasonably inferred that Manor Care typically consented to arbitration by
completing the blanks and signing the agreement, which it did not do in
2011. For these reasons, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court in overruling the preliminary objections and refusing to compel
arbitration.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/15/2015
____________________________________________
1
Manor Care does not argue on appeal that language in the executed 2009
arbitration agreement providing that “this Agreement shall be binding on the
Patient for this and all of the Patient’s other admissions to the Center
without any need for further renewal” compels arbitration herein.
Arbitration Agreement, 6/24/09, at ¶ E.
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