In Re: B. Fiedler, Appeal of: E. Fiedler ( 2015 )


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  • J-A22019-14
    
    2015 PA Super 10
    IN RE: BETTY J. FIEDLER                    :      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :           PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    :
    APPEAL OF: E. O’REAN FIEDLER               :      No. 2264 MDA 2013
    Appeal from the Order Entered December 4, 2013,
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County,
    Orphans’ Court Division, at No. 36-2010-1237.
    IN RE: BETTY J. FIEDLER                    :      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :           PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    :
    APPEAL OF: LATISHA BITTS                   :      No. 35 MDA 2014
    Appeal from the Order Entered December 4, 2013,
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County,
    Orphans’ Court Division, at No. 36-2010-1237.
    BEFORE: PANELLA, SHOGAN and FITZGERALD*, JJ.
    OPINION BY SHOGAN, J.:                                FILED JANUARY 16, 2015
    This is an appeal from the Adjudication of Account (“Account”) by E.
    O’Rean Fiedler (“O’Rean”) and a cross-appeal by Latisha Bitts (“Latisha”).
    We affirm in part and reverse in part.
    Betty Fiedler (“Decedent”) had two daughters, O’Rean, the objector to
    the Account, and Latisha, who were sole, equal beneficiaries under
    Decedent’s will. O’Rean has no children; Latisha has a biological son, Adam
    Buckius   (“Adam”)   and   a   step-son,       Sean   Bitts   (“Sean”),   and   two
    grandchildren.
    __________________
    *Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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    Decedent resided at St. Anne’s Retirement Community from July 2005
    until her death on September 10, 2009.     N.T., 1/7/13, at 65, 128.   All of
    Decedent’s assets were contained in an Ameriprise account (“Ameriprise
    Account”), which was established prior to 2006, with an original principal
    balance of $709,953.00. The Ameriprise Account was titled to Decedent as
    a “TOD” or “transfer on death” account; both O’Rean and Latisha were
    named as beneficiaries of the Ameriprise Account. N.T., 1/7/13, at 56. On
    February 17, 2004, Decedent had designated both of her daughters as her
    agents pursuant to a power of attorney (“POA”). 
    Id.
     at 57–58. Both Latisha
    and O’Rean testified that under the POA, O’Rean paid all of Decedent’s bills,
    managed her affairs, and “was more involved” with Decedent than Latisha.
    
    Id.
     at 86–87, 94, 132.    O’Rean signed checks that paid Decedent’s bills.
    She did not sign gift checks to Latisha or herself, testifying that it was
    inappropriate to gift herself or her sister money from her mother. 
    Id. at 86
    ;
    N.T., 1/9/13, at 243.
    O’Rean testified that in July 2006, Decedent told her that Latisha
    wanted Decedent to gift Latisha and O’Rean $10,000. N.T., 1/9/13, at 245.
    O’Rean was opposed to the action because Decedent had already gifted
    them over $12,000 each in personal property when Decedent sold her house
    that year.   Nevertheless, O’Rean wrote a check to herself dated July 5,
    2006, in the amount of $10,000, which was signed by Decedent, and an
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    identical check to Latisha, also signed by Decedent, at Decedent’s direction.
    
    Id.
     at 88–89.     Similarly, O’Rean wrote a $10,000 check to Adam at
    Decedent’s direction, which O’Rean signed. 
    Id. at 96
    . On the memo line of
    the check was the word, “Final.” 
    Id. at 146
    . Latisha testified that her son
    telephoned O’Rean for an explanation of the memo line, and her response
    was that Decedent had told her “this would be the last check.” 
    Id. at 146
    .
    Upon hearing that, Latisha visited Decedent and inquired about O’Rean’s
    response to Adam; Decedent allegedly denied saying the check was to be
    Adam’s last check. 
    Id.
     Less than two months later, Latisha asked Gregory
    Nauman, Decedent’s financial advisor, to change the mailing address of
    Decedent’s Ameriprise Account statements from O’Rean to Latisha.      
    Id. at 17
    , 146–147. O’Rean visited her mother on September 29, 2006, and asked
    why the Ameriprise Account statements had been changed to Latisha’s
    address.   Decedent refused to discuss the change, and asked O’Rean to
    leave her room. 
    Id.
     at 82–83. That was the last time O’Rean and Decedent
    spoke. 
    Id. at 82
    . One month later, on October 11, 2006, Decedent revoked
    the POA naming both daughters as agents and executed a new POA
    designating Latisha as her sole agent. 
    Id. at 44, 146
    .
    Latisha agreed that “as soon as [she] became the agent under the
    subsequent power of attorney signed in 2006, gifts started to be made.” 
    Id.
    at 151–152. During the period in which Latisha was named as sole agent
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    under the POA, she signed and wrote checks made payable to herself, her
    sons, and their wives, including Appellees Adam, Adam’s then-wife, Kimberly
    Buckius, Sean, and Sean’s wife, Christy Bitts (collectively, Additional
    Respondents) that totaled $480,515.00.1    N.T., 1/7/13, at 113–123; N.T.,
    1/9/13, at 181–182, 186–189, 191–196. Decedent’s expenses at St. Anne’s
    Retirement Community totaled $239,758.86.      Account, 6/15/10, Summary
    at unnumbered page 2. The Account listed the “combined balance on hand”
    as $0.00 
    Id.
    Included in the checks that Latisha signed as POA was a check to her
    son, Adam, in the amount of $330,000.00. Both Latisha and Mr. Nauman
    testified that Latisha contacted him about the “large gift to Adam.”   N.T.,
    1/9/13, at 245; N.T., 1/7/13, at 46.     Indeed, Mr. Nauman testified, “My
    understanding was that Latisha Bitts wanted to make a gift to Adam. That is
    what I was told.” N.T., 1/7/13, at 47.
    Latisha maintained that she did not exercise discretionary power in
    making any gifts as POA and that the checks she wrote were at Decedent’s
    direction. N.T., 1/7/13, at 112–128. Conversely, O’Rean characterized the
    checks as gifts of money made by Latisha pursuant to the POA. Petition to
    Show Cause, 4/9/10, at 2.
    1
    Latisha also wrote checks to Adam’s daughters, Lydia and Emma Buckius.
    Account, 6/15/10, at 3, Addendum to ¶ 6.
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    Procedurally, the instant matter began on April 9, 2010, when O’Rean
    filed a petition directing Latisha to show cause why she should not file an
    Account with respect to the POA.2 Latisha filed an answer on May 13, 2010,
    in which she objected to filing the Account. Following oral argument on the
    issue, the orphans’ court ordered the Account to be filed.     Latisha filed a
    petition for reconsideration on May 26, 2010.     Latisha ultimately filed the
    Account on June 15, 2010, for the period from October 11, 2006, through
    November 27, 2009, identifying the category of “gifts”3 that totaled
    $480,515.00. Account, 6/15/10, Summary at unnumbered 2. As noted, the
    Account listed the balance on hand as $0.00. 
    Id.
    O’Rean filed objections to the Account on June 23, 2010, and the
    Account was called for audit on July 6, 2010. On August 4, 2010, O’Rean
    filed a petition to show cause why Latisha and Additional Respondents
    should not be required to return the gifts they received from Decedent. That
    day, the orphans’ court issued a citation to show cause why Adam and Kim
    2
    Latisha had offered the last will and testament of Decedent into probate
    and, as executrix of the estate, averred that there were no probate assets.
    Petition to Show Cause, 4/9/10, at 1; Petition for Reconsideration, 5/26/10,
    at ¶ B.
    3
    As the orphans’ court noted, the Account filed by Latisha grouped the
    monetary transfers together into one category entitled “gifts.” Orphans’
    Court Opinion, 12/4/13, at 2 n.1. While we adopt this nomenclature to
    describe the checks in question for ease of reference, their categorization as
    “gifts” was at issue below. As the orphans’ court stated, “It is apparent that
    the real question in the instant action is who gave these ‘gifts’ and whether
    they were indeed valid gifts.” 
    Id.
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    Buckius and Sean and Christy Bitts should not be deemed additional
    respondents. Latisha and Additional Respondents filed an answer and new
    matter to the petition to show cause on September 9, 2010. On September
    29, 2010, O’Rean filed preliminary objections to the answer, and Latisha
    filed an amended answer on October 19, 2010.               O’Rean then filed
    preliminary objections to the amended answer, which the orphans’ court
    denied on January 27, 2011.
    Thereafter, O’Rean filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings
    on March 16, 2011, seeking the return to the estate of $360,000 in gifts to
    Latisha and Adam.      The orphans’ court denied the motion on August 31,
    2011.     By separate order that same date, the orphans’ court ruled upon
    O’Rean’s August 4, 2010 citation to show cause why Adam and Kim Buckius
    and Sean and Christy Bitts should not be deemed additional respondents,
    and added them to the lawsuit.
    On June 22, 2012, O’Rean filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude
    any testimony, on relevance grounds, regarding Decedent’s verbalized intent
    prior to her death.     The orphans’ court denied the motion in limine on
    September 12, 2012.
    A two-day hearing was held on January 7 and 9, 2013. At the start of
    the January 7, 2013 hearing, all counsel entered a stipulation, which in part,
    set forth the name of each recipient of the funds in dispute, the amount of
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    funds transferred to each recipient, and whether the amount transferred was
    in excess of the amount that could be excluded from taxable gifts under the
    Internal Revenue Code.     N.T., 1/7/13, at 7–10.    In pertinent part, that
    stipulation provided:
    AND NOW THIS 7th day of January, 2013, counsel of record
    hereby stipulate[] and agree[] to the following:
    * * *
    2. The transfer of $12,000 to Christy Bitts on December 23,
    2006 was not in excess of the amount which could be excluded
    from taxable gifts by Sections 2503(b) or 2503(e) of the Internal
    Revenue Code, including exclusions available through the use of
    Section 2513 of the [I]nternal Revenue Code (“annual exclusion
    amount”).
    3. The transfer of $12,000 to Christy Bitts on December 16,
    2007 was not in excess of the annual exclusion amount.
    4. The transfer of $12,000 to Latisha Bitts during 2007 was not
    in excess of the annual exclusion amount.
    5. The transfer of $100 to Latisha Bitts on December 30, 2008
    was not in excess of the annual exclusion amount.
    6. The transfer of $12,000 to Sean Bitts on December 23, 2006
    was not in excess of the annual exclusion amount.
    7. The transfer of $12,000 to Sean Bitts on December 16, 2007
    was not in excess of the annual exclusion amount.
    8. The transfer of $12,000 to Adam Buckius on January 1, 2007
    was not in excess of the annual exclusion amount.
    9. The transfer of $12,000 to Adam Buckius on January 1, 2008
    was not in excess of the annual exclusion amount.
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    10. The transfer of $12,000 to Kim Buckius on December 23,
    2006 was not in excess of the annual exclusion amount.
    11. The transfer of $12,000 to Kim Buckius on August 20, 2007
    was not in excess of the annual exclusion amount.
    12. The transfer of $12,000 to Kim Buckius on January 1, 2008
    was not in excess of the annual exclusion amount.
    13. The transfer of $106.50 to Lydia was not in excess of the
    annual exclusion amount.
    14. The transfer of $108.50 to Emma was not in excess of the
    annual exclusion amount.
    15. Betty J. Fiedler was a resident of St. Anne’s Retirement
    Community from July, 2005 until the time of her death on
    October 11, 2009.[4]
    16. Latisha Bitts received gifts of $25,200 during 2007 in excess
    of the annual gift tax exclusion.
    17. Adam Buckius received gifts of $335,000 during 2008 in
    excess of the annual gift tax exclusion.
    Stipulation, 1/7/13, at unnumbered 1–2.
    On December 4, 2013, the orphans’ court entered its adjudication
    confirming the Account with the exception of two gifts Latisha made to
    herself totaling $25,200.00 and to post-death funeral expenses in the
    amount of $7,674.00.   The orphans’ court determined that all of the gifts
    that were within the annual IRS exclusion amount were valid and
    4
    Elsewhere in the record, the date of death was described as September
    10, 2009. See e.g., N.T., 1/7/13, at 128. The orphans’ court, as well,
    utilized September 10, 2009, as the date of death. Orphans’ Court Opinion,
    12/4/13, at 1.
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    permissible; thus, the gifts to Additional Respondents were deemed valid
    gifts pursuant to the POA. The orphans’ court also concluded that gifts of
    $335,000.00 to Adam, which were not within the annual exclusion amount,
    nevertheless were valid because they were supported by independent
    testimony that they were not made pursuant to the POA but were valid inter
    vivos gifts from Decedent.        The orphans’ court surcharged5 Latisha
    $25,200.00 plus $7,674.00, for a total of $32,874.00.
    O’Rean filed a notice of appeal on December 23, 2013, and Latisha
    filed a cross-appeal on December 31, 2013.       All parties and the orphans’
    court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. This Court consolidated the appeals on
    February 6, 2014.
    O’Rean’s appeal docketed at 2264 MDA 2013 raises the following two
    issues:
    A. Whether the orphans’ court erred in failing to grant all of
    O’Rean Fiedler’s objections to the account based on the
    documentary evidence she presented and the stipulations of
    counsel, and in allowing and considering certain testimonial
    evidence?
    B. Whether, even assuming arguendo that the orphans’ court
    did not err in failing to grant all of O’Rean Fiedler’s objections to
    the account based on the documentary evidence she presented
    and the stipulations of counsel, and in allowing and considering
    5
    “Surcharge is the penalty for failure to exercise common prudence,
    common skill and common caution in the performance of the fiduciary’s duty
    and is imposed to compensate beneficiaries for loss caused by the fiduciary’s
    want of due care.” In re Estate of Bechtel, 
    92 A.3d 833
    , 839 (Pa. Super.
    2014) (citing In re Miller’s Estate, 
    26 A.2d 320
    , 321 (Pa. 1942)).
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    certain testimonial evidence, the orphans’ court erred in finding
    the testimonial evidence supported the [Latisha’s] gift making
    activities?
    O’Rean’s Brief at 3.
    Latisha’s cross-appeal docketed at 35 MDA 2014 raises the following
    two issues:
    1. Should [O’Rean’s] demand for surcharge of Latisha Bitts for
    $7,674.00 for payment of Decedent’s funeral expenses be
    denied when [O’Rean] withdrew her objection to payment of the
    funeral expenses from Latisha’s account, failed to meet her
    burden in proving the payment was improper, and Latisha was a
    beneficiary of the account and therefore had authority to write
    checks from the account?
    2. Should [O’Rean’s] demand for surcharge of Latisha Bitts in
    the amount of $25,200.00 for gifts be denied when Adam
    Buckius and Latisha Bitts were both competent witnesses whose
    testimony proved the validity of the gifts and [O’Rean] offered
    no and/or insufficient evidence to invalidate the gifts?
    Latisha’s Brief at 3. We will address the issues, in that they all relate to the
    validity of the gifts, as a whole.
    Our standard of review is as follows:
    Our standard of review of the findings of an Orphans’
    Court is deferential.
    When reviewing a decree entered by the
    Orphans’     Court,   this  Court   must
    determine whether the record is free
    from legal error and the court’s factual
    findings are supported by the evidence.
    Because the Orphans’ Court sits as the
    fact-finder, it determines the credibility
    of the witnesses and, on review, we will
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    not reverse its credibility determinations
    absent an abuse of that discretion.
    However, we are not constrained to give the same
    deference to any resulting legal conclusions.
    In re Estate of Harrison, 
    745 A.2d 676
    , 678–79 (Pa. Super.
    2000), appeal denied, 
    563 Pa. 646
    , 
    758 A.2d 1200
     (2000)
    (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “The Orphans’
    Court decision will not be reversed unless there has been an
    abuse of discretion or a fundamental error in applying the
    correct principles of law.” In re Estate of Luongo, 
    823 A.2d 942
    , 951 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, 
    577 Pa. 722
    , 
    847 A.2d 1287
     (2003).
    In re Estate of Whitley 
    50 A.3d 203
    , 206–207 (Pa. Super. 2012).
    This Court’s standard of review of questions of law is de novo and the
    scope of review is plenary, as we may review the entire record in making our
    determination. Kripp v. Kripp, 
    849 A.2d 1159
    , 1164 n.5 (Pa. 2004). When
    we review questions of law, our standard of review is limited to determining
    whether the trial court committed an error of law.        Kmonk-Sullivan v.
    State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 
    746 A.2d 1118
    , 1120 (Pa.
    Super. 1999) (en banc).
    In its December 4, 2013 decision, the orphans’ court listed and
    grouped the checks by payee that Latisha wrote and signed, as follows:
    Christy Bitts:      $12,000.00 on December 23, 2006.
    Christy Bitts:      $12,000.00 on December 16, 2007.
    Latisha   Bitts:    $25,100.00   on January 1, 2007.
    Latisha   Bitts:    $100.00 on   December 11, 2007.
    Latisha   Bitts:    $12,000.00   on December 17, 2007.
    Latisha   Bitts:    $100.00 on   December 30, 2008.
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    Sean Bitts:       $12,000.00 on December 23, 2006.
    Sean Bitts:       $12,000.00 on December 16, 2007.
    Adam   Buckius:   $12,000.00 on January 1, 2007.
    Adam   Buckius:   $12,000.00 on January 1, 2008.
    Adam   Buckius:   $5,000.00 on April 29, 2008.
    Adam   Buckius:   $330,000.00 on October 1, 2008.
    Kim Buckius:      $12,000.00 on December 23, 2006.
    Kim Buckius:      $12,000.00 on August 20, 2007.
    Kim Buckius:      $12,000.00 on January 1, 2008.
    Lydia Buckius:    Birthday gift of $50.00 undated.
    Christmas gift of $56.50 undated.
    Emma Buckius:     Birthday gift of $52.00 undated.
    Christmas gift of $56.50 undated.
    Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/4/13, at 3–4.
    The Pennsylvania legislature set forth special rules for empowering an
    agent to make a gift through a power of attorney in 1999 when it added 20
    Pa.C.S. § 5601.2, Special rules for gifts, to the Decedents, Estates and
    Fiduciaries Code6 (“Code”); see also 
    1999 Pa. Laws 39
    . In relevant part,
    section 5601.2 provides as follows:
    § 5601.2. Special rules for gifts
    (a) General rule.--A principal may empower an agent to make
    a gift in a power of attorney only as provided in this section.
    6
    Act 1974, Dec. 10, P.L. 816, No. 271, § 5, imd. effective, substituted
    “Decedents, Estates and Fiduciaries” for “Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries
    Code.”
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    (b) Limited gifts.--A principal may authorize an agent to make
    a limited gift as defined under section 5603(a)(2) (relating to
    implementation of power of attorney) by the inclusion of:
    (1) the language quoted in section 5602(a)(1)[7]
    (relating to form of power of attorney); or
    (2) other language showing a similar intent on the
    part of the principal to empower the agent to make a
    limited gift.
    (c) Unlimited gifts.--A principal may authorize an agent to
    make any other gift only by specifically providing for and
    defining the agent’s authority in the power of attorney.
    * * *
    (e) Equity.--An agent and the donee of a gift shall be liable as
    equity and justice may require to the extent that, as determined
    by the court, a gift made by the agent is inconsistent with
    prudent estate planning or financial management for the
    principal or with the known or probable intent of the principal
    with respect to disposition of the estate.
    20 Pa.C.S. § 5601.2 (emphasis added in subpart (a)).8
    Section 5603 of the Code, Act of June 30, 1972, P.L. 508, No. 164, § 2
    (as amended 20 Pa.C.S. §§ 101–8815), describes, inter alia, an agent’s
    power to make limited gifts, in relevant part, as follows:
    § 5603. Implementation of power of attorney
    (a) Power to make limited gifts.—
    7
    20 Pa.C.S. § 5602(a)(1) delineates the power “[t]o make limited gifts.”
    8
    Pursuant to 2014, July 2, P.L. 855, No. 95, § 220 Pa.C.S., 20 Pa.C.S. §
    5601.2 is repealed effective Jan. 1, 2015, and the “amendment, addition or
    repeal of 20 Pa.C.S . . . § 5601.2 . . . applies only to powers of attorney
    created on or after the effective dates of those provisions.”
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    * * *
    (2) A power “to make limited gifts” shall mean that
    the agent may make only gifts for or on behalf of the
    principal which are limited as follows:
    (i) The class of permissible donees under this
    paragraph shall consist solely of the principal’s
    spouse, issue and a spouse of the principal’s
    issue (including the agent if a member of any
    such class), or any of them.
    (ii) During each calendar year, the gifts
    made to any permissible donee, pursuant to
    such power, shall have an aggregate value not
    in excess of, and shall be made in such
    manner as to qualify in their entirety for, the
    annual exclusion from the Federal gift tax
    permitted under section 2503(b) of the
    Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (Public Law 99-
    514, 
    26 U.S.C. § 1
     et seq.) for the principal
    and, if applicable, the principal’s spouse.
    20 Pa.C.S. § 5603 (emphasis added to subpart (a)(2)(ii)). 9 Thus, authorized
    gifts to qualified individuals cannot exceed that calendar year’s annual gift
    tax exclusion amount.
    We must examine the relevant language of the instant POA document.
    A power of attorney is “an instrument granting someone authority to act as
    agent or attorney-in-fact for the grantor.”   BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 1209
    (8th ed. 2004).    An attorney-in-fact is someone “who is designated to
    9
    Although not relevant here, new legislation encompassing an agent’s
    power to make limited gifts will be added effective January 1, 2015. 20
    Pa.C.S. § 5603(a.1); 30 Standard Pennsylvania Practice 2d § 143:28
    (footnotes omitted).
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    transact business for another; a legal agent.”     Id. at 138; see also 20
    Pa.C.S. § 5601(f) (defining the term “agent” as a “person designated by a
    principal in a power of attorney to act on behalf of that principal”). The POA
    document signed by Decedent defined the type of limited gifts Latisha was
    authorized to make, as follows:
    SPECIFIC ADDITIONAL POWERS INCLUDED IN GENERAL
    POWER
    * * *
    3. Power Concerning Gifts.
    To make limited gifts, as defined in Chapter 56 of the
    Pennsylvania Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code. In
    addition, to make gifts to, or for the benefit of, any donee who
    has been the recipient of gifts from me or whom my attorney
    reasonably considers to be the natural object of my bounty. All
    gifts made under this Section 3. shall be gifts which can be
    excluded from taxable gifts by Sections 2503(b) or 2503(e) of
    the Internal Revenue Code, including exclusions available
    through the use of Section 2513 of the Internal Revenue Code.
    General Power of Attorney, 10/11/06, at 4 (emphasis added to ¶ 3);
    O’Rean’s Exhibit 2; Petition to Show Cause, 4/9/10, Exhibit A at 4.
    O’Rean assails the orphans’ court decision upholding Latisha’s gifts to
    herself and Additional Respondents.      Referencing the Code and the POA
    document, O’Rean asserts that if the orphans’ court had followed the
    applicable statutory language and the clear, unambiguous limited gifting
    language in the POA, in conjunction with the stipulations of counsel, it would
    have disallowed the two 2008 gifts to Adam totaling $335,000.00 and
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    ordered them to be returned to Decedent’s estate because they exceeded
    the $12,000.00 IRS annual exclusion amount. We agree.10
    Referencing the language of the POA document, O’Rean also argues
    that the individual gifts to Kim Buckius, Sean, and Christy Bitts were not
    allowable because there was no evidence that these individuals had received
    gifts from Decedent prior to the effective date of the POA, and no evidence
    that they reasonably could have been considered by Latisha to be the
    natural objects of Decedent’s bounty “since [Additional Respondents] were
    not directly related to [Decedent] and were not beneficiaries in any capacity
    under [Decedent’s] will.” O’Rean’s Brief at 20. We disagree.
    10
    Due to our disposition, we need not address O’Rean’s argument that the
    orphans’ court erred in considering testimonial evidence concerning
    Decedent’s donative intent in allowing the gifts to Adam. Peterson v.
    Shreiner, 
    822 A.2d 833
    , 836 (Pa. Super. 2003) (When reversing lower
    court, we need only address reversal issue since we are reversing on that
    basis). Moreover, even if we would consider this claim, Gregory Nauman’s
    testimony, which is assailed by O’Rean as it related to the gift to Adam,
    O’Rean’s Brief at 23, did not support the orphans’ court’s conclusion that
    Decedent intended to make an inter vivos gift to Adam. As noted supra, Mr.
    Nauman testified, “My understanding was that Latisha Bitts wanted to
    make a gift to Adam. That is what I was told.” N.T., 1/7/13, at 47
    (emphasis added). Further, O’Rean’s reliance on Estate of Slomski v.
    Thermoclad, 
    956 A.2d 438
    , 444 (Pa. Super. 2008), reversed on other
    grounds, 
    987 A.2d 141
     (Pa. 2009), is misplaced. Slomski did not address
    the issue of whether a power of attorney authorized the agent to make gifts
    on behalf of the principal or whether the principal ratified an agent’s conduct
    in making such gifts. Instead, at issue before this Court was a dispute over
    leasehold property and whether a power of attorney gave the agent the
    power to grant a right of first refusal in a lease or whether the principal
    ratified the agent’s conduct in granting such a right.
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    As noted, Chapter 56 of the Code addresses powers of attorney and
    was amended in 1999 to include the addition of § 5601.2, Special rules for
    gifts. Under the special rules for gifts, a principal may authorize an agent to
    make a limited gift as defined under section 5603(a)(2). “A limited gift, by
    statutory definition, is one made to a restricted class of permissible
    donees for a value limited to the annual exclusion from the federal
    gift tax permitted under the Internal Revenue Code.”               Metcalf v.
    Pesock, 
    885 A.2d 539
    , 541 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citing 20 Pa.C.S. §
    5603(a)(2)) (emphasis added).     Clearly, limited gifts are narrowly defined
    regarding class and value within the statute. Here, Latisha—not Decedent
    herself—signed each one of the gift checks. Moreover, Latisha signed each
    of the gift checks as Decedent’s POA; otherwise, Latisha had no power or
    authority to sign them. Under the applicable power of attorney document,
    however, Latisha’s power to make such gifts was circumscribed in amount
    by the IRS, pursuant to the clear language of the relevant statutory
    provisions.   Thus, the only question validly before the orphans’ court was
    whether the checks Latisha signed were within the authority of the power of
    attorney and whether they complied with the applicable statutory provisions.
    The scope of authority under a POA is determined by the language of
    the document creating the agency and the Code. See generally 20 Pa.C.S.
    §§ 5601-5611; In re Weidner, 
    938 A.2d 354
    , 357–358 (Pa. 2007)
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    (analyzing language of POA in the context of the Code to determine
    propriety of agent’s actions). The POA signed by Decedent requires that the
    agent “must use due care to act for your benefit and in accordance with this
    power of attorney.”    General Power of Attorney, 10/11/06, at 1 (Notice);
    O’Rean’s Exhibit 2; Petition to Show Cause, 4/9/10, Exhibit A at 1. In the
    “Oath of Agent of a Power of Attorney,” Latisha agreed to “exercise
    reasonable caution and prudence.” General Power of Attorney, 10/11/06, at
    6; O’Rean’s Exhibitibit 2; Petition to Show Cause, 4/9/10, Exhibit A at 6.
    Moreover, the POA is the operative document that controls the outcome of
    this dispute.   As O’Rean asserted, it is axiomatic that in signing the gift
    checks, Latisha was acting either as a principal or as an agent. As there is
    no evidence in the record suggesting that Latisha was a principal, such as
    being a co-owner of Decedent’s Ameriprise account, she had to have been
    an agent, thereby subject to the POA and the relevant Pennsylvania
    statutes. O’Rean’s Brief at 26.
    This Court has construed 20 Pa.C.S. § 5601.2(a) narrowly. Metcalf,
    
    885 A.2d 539
    ; see also Barnett v. U.S., 
    2009 WL 2426246
     (W.D.Pa. 2009)
    (not published in F.Supp.2d). The stated purpose underlying section 5601.2
    is to address the proper manner in which a principal may authorize an agent
    to make a gift under a power of attorney. 20 Pa.C.S. § 5601.2, Comment.
    The statute clearly provides that the power of an agent to make a gift as a
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    power of attorney can only occur “as provided in this section [e.g., Section
    5601.2].” 20 Pa.C.S. § 5601.2(a). Moreover, “powers of attorney are to be
    strictly construed.” Estate of Slomski v. Thermoclad, 
    956 A.2d 438
    , 444
    (Pa. Super. 2008), reversed on other grounds, 
    987 A.2d 141
     (Pa. 2009)
    (quoting In re Estate of Cambest, 
    756 A.2d 45
    , 52 (Pa. Super. 2000)).
    There can be no dispute that Latisha executed each one of the gift
    checks.      It also is clear that Latisha signed each of the gift checks as
    Decedent’s POA. As the orphans’ court concluded, the checks listed in the
    stipulation that are within the IRS annual exclusion amount were valid gifts
    pursuant to Latisha’s authority as Decedent’s power of attorney.
    O’Rean’s argument, that the yearly checks to Decedent’s grandchild,
    step-grandchild,     their   spouses,   and   the   two   checks   to   her   great-
    grandchildren were not authorized by the gifting language of the POA
    document, is not supported in the record. O’Rean’s claim is based on her
    contention that because there was no testimony that Decedent had made
    gifts to those individuals in the past, and they were not named beneficiaries
    in Decedent’s will, “it was completely unreasonable for [Latisha] to have
    considered them as natural objects of [Decedent’s] bounty.” O’Rean’s Brief
    at 33.
    O’Rean fails to provide any statutory or case law in support of such a
    claim.     The gift recipients’ inclusion in Decedent’s will is not controlling.
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    Moreover, even if O’Rean’s “theory” were supportable, it is not based in fact.
    Decedent’s will provided that if O’Rean did not survive Decedent, “O’Rean’s
    share shall pass to [Latisha], or if she is not then living, to her then living
    issue, per stirpes.” Will of Betty J. Fiedler, 10/11/06, at 1, O’Rean’s Exhibit
    3; N.T., 1/7/13, at 10.     The will further provided that if Latisha did not
    survive her mother by thirty days, Latisha’s share would pass to Latisha’s
    issue, per stirpes, not to O’Rean, unless Latisha had no living issue            
    Id.
    Clearly, Decedent’s inclusion of Latisha’s issue as secondary beneficiaries is
    indicative of the value Decedent placed on those relationships. It was not
    unreasonable for Latisha to draw an inference that Decedent similarly valued
    the relationships with her grandchildren’s parents.       Moreover, there was
    testimony that there was a course of conduct at Christmas when the family
    would receive gift checks from Decedent.        N.T., 1/7/13, at 114.     Finally,
    O’Rean herself testified that she wrote a gift check to Adam in July 2006 at
    Decedent’s direction, thus lending support to the implication that Decedent
    was interested in passing on her bounty. 
    Id.
     at 89–90.
    We have no hesitation in concluding, as did the orphans’ court, that
    Latisha fairly and reasonably could have determined that Additional
    Respondents    reasonably   could   be    considered   “the   natural   object    of
    [Decedent’s] bounty.” General Power of Attorney, 10/11/06, at 4; O’Rean’s
    Exhibit 2; Petition to Show Cause, 4/9/10, Exhibit A at 4.         Following our
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    complete review of the record, we agree with the orphans’ court that “Sean
    Bitts, Christy Bitts, Adam Buckius, Kim Buckius, Lydia and Emma as well as
    [Latisha] herself, were the natural object of Decedent’s bounty and could be
    recipients of limited gifts under the power of attorney.”       Orphans’ Court
    Opinion, 12/4/13, at 7.
    Regarding the gifts to Adam that exceeded the annual exclusion
    amount, however, the orphans’ court completely ignored the language of the
    POA document. The orphans’ court upheld the $5,000.00 check to Adam in
    2008 as a valid gift, despite acknowledging that the stipulation of counsel
    identified it as in excess of the annual gift tax exclusion. The court’s reliance
    on Latisha’s self-serving testimony that “Decedent directed her to write the
    check to Adam,” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/4/13, at 16, does not elevate
    the gift outside of the parameter of the limited gift-giving power of the POA
    document, nor eliminate the applicability of the special rules for gifts as set
    forth in 20 Pa.C.S. § 5601.2.        Because the stipulation and testimony
    established that Latisha had gifted Adam $12,000 on January 1, 2008, the
    $5,000.00 check was in excess of the annual gift tax exclusion and is subject
    to return.
    The same is true of the $330,000.00 gift to Adam in 2008.               In
    upholding the gift, the orphans’ court supported its decision with its
    determination that “[s]ince Decedent delivered[, i.e., handed out, this]
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    gift[], Latisha was not acting under her authority outlined in the Power of
    Attorney.”   Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/4/13, at 17.      That reasoning is
    unsupported both by the orphans’ court and the record.        The consistent
    testimony was that Decedent handed out the gift checks to everyone, not
    just to Adam.   N.T., 1/7/13, at 113–117; N.T., 1/9/13, at 182–183, 186–
    189. The decisive point, however, is that it was a check signed by Latisha as
    Decedent’s POA, and it did not comply with the gifting authority of the POA
    because the gift exceeded the annual IRS exclusion amount. The orphans’
    court also concluded, without any support, that the gift was not subject to
    analysis under 20 Pa.C.S. § 5601.2.      Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/4/13, at
    17. The orphans’ court clearly and properly utilized the POA document and
    20 Pa.C.S. § 5601.2 to uphold the gifts within the annual exclusion amount
    that related to Additional Respondents, but then erroneously ignored the
    very same POA and statutory provisions regarding the 2008 gift to Adam.
    Latisha offered testimony that Decedent intended to gift Adam
    $330,000 because her mother “wanted to help [Adam] buy a house or buy a
    house for [him].”   N.T., 1/7/13, at 124.    There are several problems with
    this testimony. It does not clearly state Decedent’s intent to give a gift to
    Adam; rather, it is a self-serving statement by Latisha, and there is other
    third-party testimony to the contrary.    According to Gregory Nauman, his
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    J-A22019-14
    “understanding was that Latisha Bitts wanted to make a gift to Adam.
    That is what I was told.” N.T., 1/7/13, at 47 (emphasis added).
    Moreover, the method of withdrawing the funds from the Ameriprise
    account was unconventional.     Mr. Nauman testified that in generating the
    Ameriprise form for cash withdrawal for the purpose of making the gift to
    Adam, he filled out the form before taking it to Decedent based on
    direction from Latisha. N.T., 1/7/13, at 20. Mr. Nauman testified, “I was
    told probably by [Latisha] that she wanted to make a withdrawal, make a
    gift.   So I had the form ready when I went to see [Decedent].”          N.T.,
    1/7/13, at 48–49.     His testimony was consistent:    “[Latisha] called [him]
    and told [him] that there should be a liquidation done in order to have a
    check sent or given to [Adam].” Id. at 54. Moreover, Mr. Nauman testified
    that on the Ameriprise Redemption Form, he checked the “No” box in answer
    to the question, “[I]s this transaction based on a recommendation by an
    Ameriprise Financial advisor.” Id. at 37–38. He opined that the transaction
    should have been handled differently. Id. at 52, 59.
    There is nothing about the gifts to Adam to differentiate them from
    any of the other gift checks written and signed by Latisha.       As such, the
    $330,000.00 check and the $5,000.00 check were subject to the authority of
    the POA and the statutory requirements of the Code. They are beyond the
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    J-A22019-14
    annual gift tax exclusion, as evidenced by counsels’ stipulation; thus, they
    are not valid.
    Next, Latisha assails the orphans’ court surcharge to her of $25,200,
    which represented two checks Latisha wrote to herself in 2007, one for
    $25,100 and one for $100.      The orphans’ court correctly concluded that
    since Latisha previously wrote a check to herself for $12,000 in 2007, which
    was within “the limited gifting power outlined in Decedent’s Power of
    Attorney,” the other gifts were “not valid.”       Orphans’ Court Opinion,
    12/4/13, at 17. There is nothing in the record that can validly remove these
    two checks from the applicable language of the POA document and the
    relevant statutes. The same reasoning applicable to the $335,000.00 in gifts
    to Adam, applies to the $25,200.00 in checks to Latisha.
    Finally, Latisha challenges the orphans’ court’s conclusion that her
    payment of $7,674.00 to cover funeral costs should be returned to
    Decedent’s estate.    Latisha contends that O’Rean had withdrawn her
    objection to the payment of funeral expenses. While it is true that O’Rean
    initially testified that she did not object to Latisha’s payment of funeral
    expenses, she later clarified that she indeed objected to their payment.
    N.T., 1/7/13, at 92; N.T., 1/9/13, at 256. The orphans’ court properly relied
    upon O’Rean’s clarification. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/4/13, at 18.
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    Latisha suggests that because the Ameriprise account was titled
    “TOD,” and she, along with O’Rean, “split any assets in the account following
    death,” Latisha’s Brief at 41, as fifty percent owner of the account, Latisha
    had a right to pay Decedent’s funeral expenses. Id. We reject this claim.
    The orphans’ court’s conclusion was correct based on the evidentiary record.
    We do not agree that the record conclusively established Latisha’s lawful
    right to draw checks on the account. As the orphans’ court concluded, when
    she paid the funeral expenses, Latisha “was no longer authorized to make
    withdrawals after her mother’s death.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/4/13, at
    18. Latisha’s authority as agent under the POA expired upon her mother’s
    death.   General Power of Attorney, 10/11/06, at 1 (NOTICE); O’Rean’s
    Exhibit 2; Petition to Show Cause, 4/9/10, Exhibit A at 1. However, also as
    noted by the orphans’ court, “[t]he payment of funeral expenses is a
    legitimate expense of an Estate[,] and the [c]ourt, in this ruling, in no way
    bars [Latisha] from requesting and being reimbursed for this cost from the
    Estate.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/4/13, at 18 n.5.
    Therefore, for the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the validity of
    the gifts that were within the annual gift tax exclusion amount and affirm
    the surcharge to Latisha Bitts of gifts of $25,200.00 and funeral costs of
    $7,674.00, totaling $32,874.00. In addition, we reverse the orphans’ court’s
    decision that the gifts of $330,000 and $5,000.00 to Adam Bitts were not
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    subject to return, and order the repayment of $335,000.00 to Decedent’s
    estate. We remand to the orphans’ court to direct the return of said gifts
    and funeral costs to Decedent’s estate.11 Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 1/16/2015
    11
    In the absence of any particularized argument regarding interest, we
    affirm the orphans’ court’s denial of interest. Orphans’ Court Opinion,
    12/4/13, at 19.
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