Com. v. McKinley, S. ( 2015 )


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  • J-A23034-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    SEAN DONTAE MCKINLEY
    Appellant                  No. 1451 WDA 2014
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 4, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0008514-2013
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.:                         FILED AUGUST 24, 2015
    Appellant, Sean Dontae McKinley, appeals from the judgment of
    sentence entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, following
    his jury trial convictions of persons not to possess a firearm, escape,
    carrying a loaded weapon, possession of a controlled substance, possession
    or distribution of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and a
    summary traffic (faulty rear lighting) violation.1 We affirm.
    In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant
    facts and procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no reason to
    ____________________________________________
    1
    18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6106(a)(1), 5121(a), 6106.1(a); 35 P.S. §§ 780-
    113(a)(16), (31), (32); 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4303(b), respectively.
    J-A23034-15
    restate them.2
    Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
    DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR WHEN IT DENIED
    [APPELLANT’S] MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE
    FOUND IN HIS JEEP GRAND CHEROKEE BECAUSE THE
    SEARCH WAS UNREASONABLE, WENT BEYOND THE SCOPE
    OF AN INVENTORY SEARCH, AND WAS DONE FOR THE
    SOLE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATION, IN VIOLATION OF
    THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
    CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 8 OF THE
    PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION?
    (Appellant’s Brief at 8).
    On appeal, Appellant argues the sole motive for the inventory search
    of his vehicle was to find incriminating evidence. Appellant claims the record
    is devoid of any document showing the police conducted an “inventory” of
    the vehicle. Appellant asserts that after the officer smelled marijuana, the
    officer undoubtedly suspected the vehicle contained other drug evidence and
    the search of the vehicle could not be classified as simply an inventory
    search. Appellant further avers the scope of the search was unreasonable
    because the officers found the shotgun under the back seat, an area where
    nobody would store belongings of value for purposes of an inventory.
    Appellant concludes the court should have suppressed the evidence obtained
    as a result of the vehicle search. We disagree.
    ____________________________________________
    2
    We make one small correction to the trial court opinion at page 1. The
    court held the suppression hearing on December 18, 2013, and denied relief
    on the same date.
    -2-
    J-A23034-15
    We review the denial of a suppression motion as follows:
    Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial
    court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to
    determining whether the factual findings are supported by
    the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from
    those facts are correct.
    [W]e may consider only the evidence of the
    prosecution and so much of the evidence for the
    defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the
    context of the record as a whole. Where the record
    supports the findings of the suppression court, we
    are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the
    court erred in reaching its legal conclusions based
    upon the facts.
    Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    941 A.2d 14
    , 26-27 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en
    banc) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).                “It is within the
    suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass on the credibility of
    witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.” Commonwealth v.
    Clemens, 
    66 A.3d 373
    , 378 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v.
    Gallagher, 
    896 A.2d 583
    , 585 (Pa.Super. 2006)).
    Nevertheless, “appellate review of an order denying suppression is
    limited to examination of the precise basis under which suppression initially
    was sought; no new theories of relief may be considered on appeal.”
    Commonwealth v. Little, 
    903 A.2d 1269
    , 1272-73 (Pa.Super 2006).
    “[T]he failure to raise a suppression issue prior to trial precludes its litigation
    for   the    first   time   at   trial,   in    post-trial   motions   or   on   appeal.”
    Commonwealth v. Douglass, 
    701 A.2d 1376
    , 1378 (Pa.Super. 1997).
    Instantly, in Appellant’s motion to suppress, he argued the police
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    J-A23034-15
    officer acted without a search warrant, Appellant was not under arrest, no
    exigent circumstances existed to allow the vehicle inventory search,
    Appellant did not consent to the search, and the items taken from the
    vehicle and his person were seized in violation of the United States and
    Pennsylvania Constitutions. At the suppression hearing, Appellant argued he
    should not have been asked to step out of the vehicle, because the officer
    had no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, even after Appellant
    admitted he had drugs on his person.      Appellant also argued the officer
    should have obtained a warrant to search the vehicle and should not have
    searched the vehicle at the scene without a warrant. On appeal, Appellant
    raises an entirely new claim that the search was unreasonable because it
    exceeded the scope of an inventory search and was done for the sole
    purpose of investigation. Appellant did not contest in his motion to suppress
    or at the suppression hearing the reasonableness, scope, and sole purpose
    of the inventory search as investigative. Therefore, his issue on appeal is
    waived.
    Moreover, even if Appellant had properly preserved his claim, we
    would affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion.    (See Trial Court
    Opinion, filed March 20, 2015, at 3-5) (finding: officer testified Appellant
    was under arrest and car he was driving was partially on roadway and would
    have to be towed; officer followed municipal policy regarding inventory
    searches and did not exceed scope of search; in conducting inventory
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    search, officer observed dislodged rear seat that appeared to be blocked by
    something underneath; upon inspection, officer and his partner found
    shotgun wrapped in t-shirt blocking seat from upright position; police
    discovered weapon as part of police caretaking function, not investigative
    function; court properly denied motion to suppress). See Commonwealth
    v. Chambers, 
    920 A.2d 892
     (Pa.Super. 2007) (reiterating general rule that
    inventory search of impounded vehicle is reasonable if conducted under
    standard police procedures, in good faith, and not for sole purpose of
    investigation).   Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.     See
    generally In re K.L.S., 
    594 Pa. 194
    , 197 n.3, 
    934 A.2d 1244
    , 1246 n.3
    (2007) (stating trial court order or judgment is more properly “affirmed,”
    when appellant has failed to preserve issues for appeal).
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/24/2015
    -5-