In Re: Priv. Complaint of A.D. Brown ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: PRIVATE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
OF ALTON D. BROWN PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: ALTON D. BROWN
No. 1997 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered on October 31, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-31-MD-0000207-2014
BEFORE: BOWES, J., WECHT, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED AUGUST 21, 2015
Alton Brown appeals, pro se the October 31, 2014, order denying his
Petition for Review of Private Criminal Complaint in the Court of Common
Pleas of Huntingdon County. We affirm.
The trial court recited the procedural and factual history of this case as
follows:
Sometime after November 25, 2014, Mr. Brown submitted a
twenty-nine page private criminal complaint to the Huntingdon
County District Attorney. In the complaint, Mr. Brown named
numerous proposed defendants, who [the trial court]
presume[d] [were] employees of the Department of Corrections.
The district attorney denied Mr. Brown’s request for approval of
the private criminal complaint, and in doing so, identified two
reasons for the denial. First, the district attorney asserted that
the “violations” occurred in other counties, and therefore, did not
fall under the jurisdiction of the Huntingdon County District
Attorney’s Office. Second, [the district attorney] opined that Mr.
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Brown’s claims were civil in nature and concerned the policies
and procedures of the Department of Corrections.
In [the trial court’s] view, the Huntingdon County District
Attorney’s Office outlined sound policy and reasoning for
disapproving Mr. Brown’s private criminal complaint. Therefore,
the district attorney’s decision created a presumption that he
acted in good faith, which absent proof to the contrary, was
sufficient for [the trial court] to dismiss [the] appeal. In this
regard, Mr. Brown proffered nothing that suggested that the
district attorney’s decision was pre-textual, arbitrary or
discriminatory.
As far as [the trial court could understand,] the logic behind Mr.
Brown’s epistle [is that] he is not happy with the conditions of
his confinement. His criticisms raise issues better suited for our
civil courts. This obvious attempt to disguise a civil action by the
filing of a private criminal complaint is noted, and as such, the
district attorney’s decision not to approve the filing was
appropriate.
Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”) at 1-2 (some capitalization modified; internal
citations omitted).
The trial court considered and denied that petition in an order dated
October 31, 2014. Brown filed a timely notice of appeal on November 25,
2014. By order dated December 12, 2014, the trial court directed Brown to
file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) and he timely complied. The trial court filed its opinion
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on January 21, 2015.
Brown raises three issues for this Court’s consideration:
1. Whether [the] trial court abused its discretion or
committed an error of law in affirming the district
attorney’s disapproval of the private criminal complaint?
2. Whether the manner in which the district attorney
disapproved the private criminal complaint constitutes
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an error and hinders Brown’s appeal to the trial court
and this Court?
3. Whether the trial court’s refusal to require the district
attorney to provide Brown with an official copy of the
private complaint constitutes an error in law, and a
demonstration of bad faith, fraud, or
unconstitutionality?
Brief for Brown at 1 (some capitalization modified).
In his first issue, Brown contends that the trial court abused its
discretion or committed an error of law in affirming the district attorney’s
disapproval of the private criminal complaint. To proceed with a private
criminal complaint, a complainant must secure the approval of an attorney
for the Commonwealth. Pa.R.Crim.P. 506(A). A prosecutor is required to
investigate a private criminal complaint after it is filed. In re Wilson, 879
A.2d 199, 211 (Pa. Super. 2005). In deciding whether a prima facie case
has been established, the prosecutor must consider both the content of the
complaint, and the result of the investigation of the case. Id.[E]ven if the facts recited in the complaint make out a prima
facie case, the district attorney cannot blindly bring charges,
particularly where an investigation may cause [him or her] to
question their validity. Forcing the prosecutor to bring charges
in every instance where a complaint sets out a prima facie case
would compel the district attorney to bring cases [he or she]
suspects, or has concluded via investigation, are meritless. The
public prosecutor is duty bound to bring only those cases that
are appropriate for prosecution. This duty continues throughout
a criminal proceeding and obligates the district attorney to
withdraw charges when [he or she] concludes, after
investigation, that the prosecution lacks a legal basis.
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Id. at 211-212 (citations omitted; brackets in original). If the attorney for
the Commonwealth disapproves the complaint, the district attorney must
notify the complainant of the reasons for the disapproval. Pa.R.Crim.P.
506(B)(2). A private criminal complainant is permitted to seek judicial
review of the denial of his or her complaint by the district attorney.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 506.
The trial court’s standard of review is dependent upon the reasons
provided by the district attorney for the disapproval. Commonwealth v.
Cooper, 710 A.2d 76, 80 (Pa. Super. 1998). When the district attorney’s
denial is based upon a legal evaluation of the evidence, the trial court
undertakes de novo review of the matter. Id. Where the district attorney’s
disapproval is based upon policy considerations, the trial court accords
deference to the decision and will not interfere in the absence of bad faith,
fraud, or unconstitutionality. Id. at 79, 80. In the event that the district
attorney offers a hybrid of legal and policy reasons for disapproval,
deference to the district attorney’s decision, rather than de novo review, is
the correct standard of review to be employed. Id.When seeking review in the trial court, a private criminal complainant
bears the heavy burden of proving that the district attorney abused his
discretion. In a Rule 506 petition for review:
the private criminal complainant must demonstrate the district
attorney’s decision amounted to bad faith, fraud or
unconstitutionality. The complainant must do more than merely
assert the district attorney’s decision is flawed in these regards.
The complainant must show the facts of the case lead only to the
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conclusion that the district attorney’s decision was patently
discriminatory, arbitrary[,] or pretextual, and therefore not in
the public interest. In the absence of such evidence, the trial
court cannot presume to supervise the district attorney’s
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and should leave the district
attorney’s decision undisturbed.
In re Wilson, 879 A.2d at 215.
Our standard of review also depends upon the district attorney’s
rationale for the disapproval. Where the district attorney’s decision is based
solely upon legal conclusions, and the trial court’s standard of review is de
novo, “the appellate court will review the trial court’s decision for an error of
law. As with all questions of law, the appellate standard of review is de novo
and the appellate scope of review is plenary.” Id. at 214 (footnotes
omitted). Where the district attorney’s decision is based upon policy
considerations or a hybrid of legal and policy considerations, and the trial
court’s standard of review is abuse of discretion, “the appellate court will
review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, in keeping with
settled principles of appellate review of discretionary matters.” Id. at 215.
Applying the legal principles pertinent to a private criminal complaint,
Brown’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion or committed an
error of law in affirming the district attorney’s disapproval of the private
criminal complaint is without merit. In its order dated October 31, 2014, the
trial court determined that the district attorney based his disapproval of the
complaint upon purely legal grounds, and therefore, it undertook de novo
review of the district attorney’s decision. Upon reviewing Brown’s twenty-
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nine page criminal complaint, the trial court was satisfied that the
Huntingdon County District Attorney’s Office reached the proper legal
conclusion. However, in its opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial
court applied the hybrid approach with an abuse of discretion standard of
review. The trial court indicated that the district attorney’s disapproval was
not made in bad faith, fraudulent, or unconstitutional.
We agree with the trial court’s subsequent determination in its
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion that the district attorney’s decision was a hybrid
of legal and policy considerations. This is so because the district attorney’s
determination that Brown’s complaints were civil in nature is a policy
consideration. See Commonwealth v. Cooper, 710 A.2d 76 (Pa. Super.
1998) (noting that a district attorney’s conclusion that a civil action would be
more prudent because the complainant was attempting to utilize the justice
system for private purposes is a valid policy reason.) Additionally, the
district attorney’s decision that the “violations” that Brown claimed had
occurred in other counties than Huntingdon County was a legal
consideration. Therefore, the district attorney’s decision to disapprove the
private criminal complaint was comprised of both policy and legal
considerations requiring utilization of the hybrid approach. Accordingly, due
to the district attorney’s hybrid approach, the trial court’s standard of review
should have been an abuse of discretion. In its opinion pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court implicitly applied the abuse of discretion
standard and found that the district attorney did not act in bad faith,
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fraudulently or unconstitutionally, which is sufficient for the trial court to
uphold the district attorney’s disapproval.
The district attorney’s disapproval in this case was based in part upon
a policy decision. Thus, in accordance with our standard of review we must
evaluate the disapproval to determine whether it was based upon bad faith,
fraud, or unconstitutionality.
Brown brings forth two assertions of bad faith. First, he contends the
district attorney exercised bad faith because the district attorney stated that
the Huntingdon District Attorney’s Office lacked jurisdiction over the
complaints in his disapproval. Second, Brown contends the trial court
exercised bad faith by pointing out Brown’s history of litigation. However,
Brown has waived both assertions of bad faith because Brown failed to
provide a developed legal argument. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (“the argument
shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and
shall have at the head of each part—indistinctive type or in type distinctively
displayed—the particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion
and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent”); Commonwealth v.
B.D.G., 959 A.2d 362 (Pa. Super. 2008) (noting that when an appellant fails
to develop his issue in an argument and fails to cite any pertinent legal
authority, the issue is waived.) Further, the trial court did not detect an
allegation of fraud, bad faith or unconstitutionality. Finally, our independent
review reveals none. Accordingly, we dismiss Brown’s first issue.
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In his second and third issues, Brown challenges the manner in which
the district attorney disapproved his private criminal complaint. We review
those two issues together. Rule 506(B)(2) states, “if the attorney for the
Commonwealth . . . disapproves the complaint, the attorney shall state the
reasons on the complaint form and return it to the affiant. Thereafter, the
affiant may petition the court of common pleas for review of the decision.”
Pa.R.Crim.P. 506(B)(2) Brown submitted his private criminal complaint in
the form of a twenty-nine page front-to-back handwritten complaint. Brown
provided a limited amount of space for the district attorney to adequately set
forth the reasoning for the disapproval. Instead of handwriting a response
in the limited available space provided by Brown, the district attorney
elected to provide Brown with a typewritten version of the disapproval on a
separate form. Brown was provided with the same information that would
have been provided to him had it come in the form proscribed by Rule
506(B)(2). While the Commonwealth did not fully adhere to Rule 506(B)(2),
Brown is unpersuasively elevating form over substance. Even if we were to
rule in favor of Brown on these points, we would require the district attorney
to fill out the bottom of Brown’s twenty-nine page criminal complaint with
the same information that has already been provided to Brown. In other
words, any remedy would place Brown exactly where he is now. He has
suffered no harm or prejudice. As such, he is not entitled to any form of
relief.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/21/2015
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