Com. v. Martinez, N. ( 2015 )


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  • J. S12038/15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,               :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :          PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee          :
    :
    v.                      :
    :
    NASUIL MARTINEZ,                            :
    :
    Appellant         :     No. 1680 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 28, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division No(s).: CP-51-CR-0002804-2011
    CP-51-CR-0002773-2011
    CP-51-CR-0002774-2011
    CP-51-CR-0002775-2011
    CP-51-CR-0011128-2011
    BEFORE: BOWES, SHOGAN, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.:                         FILED MARCH 09, 2015
    Appellant, Nasuil Martinez, appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas following a waiver
    trial and his convictions for one count of first-degree murder,1 four counts of
    attempted murder,2 four counts of aggravated assault of a protected class
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    18 Pa.C.S. § 2502.
    2
    18 Pa.C.S. § 901.
    J. S12038/15
    member,3 four counts of assault of a law enforcement officer,4 one count of
    theft of a handgun,5 one count of robbery,6 and one count of possessing an
    instrument of crime.7      Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to
    convict him of murder where the conviction was based upon his possession
    of the murder weapon before and after the homicide. We affirm.
    The trial court summarized the facts and procedural history of this
    case as follows:
    On December 9, 2010, [Appellant] was present at the
    Black Pumpkin, a bar on Whitaker Avenue and Wyoming
    Avenue in Philadelphia.        Frank Parran was on duty
    providing security. Parran was armed with a .45 caliber
    pistol, which was housed in a holster with a faulty closing
    mechanism. As a part of his duties, Parran searched
    individuals entering and leaving the bar, including
    [Appellant], who frequently entered and left the bar that
    evening. At approximately 2:45 a.m. on December 10,
    2010, Parran noticed that his firearm was missing from its
    holster, having last checked to confirm that the firearm
    was in his possession at approximately 2:00 a.m. Parran
    reviewed the security footage taken by a surveillance
    camera located within the bar and noticed that [Appellant]
    was the only individual in his vicinity at the time that he
    believed his firearm had been taken. Later that day,
    Parran identified [Appellant] in a photo array.
    3
    18 Pa.C.S. § 2702.
    4
    18 Pa.C.S. § 2702.1.
    5
    18 Pa.C.S. § 3921.
    6
    18 Pa.C.S. § 3701.
    7
    18 Pa.C.S. § 907.
    -2-
    J. S12038/15
    In the early morning hours of December 10, 2010,
    sometime before 3:00 a.m., Officer Kevin [Gorman] and
    his partner were on patrol, driving eastbound on Allegheny
    Street, when they noticed a silver Grand Marquis traveling
    towards them at an extremely high rate of speed. The
    officers initiated a traffic stop at Hope Street and
    Westmoreland Street. Upon Officer Gorman exiting the
    police vehicle, [Appellant], seated in the back passenger
    side seat of the Grand Marquis, exited the vehicle and ran
    northbound up Hope Street and Gorman pursued.
    [Appellant] then scaled a chain-link fence on the side of
    the street, turned, and shot twice at Gorman with a black
    handgun, striking him once in the left shoulder. Officer
    Gorman lost sight of [Appellant] at this time. The bullet
    that struck Gorman was recovered in the sleeve of his
    shirt, while two fired cartridge cases were later recovered
    by the Crime Scene Unit. The remaining occupants of the
    Grand Marquis, Miguel Montalvo, Neftaly Aulet, and Hector
    Ortiz, were transported to the Philadelphia Police Station at
    8th and Race Street. Montalvo and Aulet both identified
    [Appellant] in a photo array. Later in the afternoon of the
    same day, Gorman identified [Appellant] in a photo array
    as the individual who had shot him.
    At some point in mid-December, [Appellant] began
    staying in the basement apartment of Tillie Moless on
    Sanger Street in Philadelphia. This apartment had an
    entrance separate from the rest of the building, where
    individuals could enter and exit without entering any
    common area of the residence. While staying with Moless,
    [Appellant] constantly had a firearm in his possession,
    either on his belt or in his hand. When Moless asked [him]
    why he seemed nervous all the time, [Appellant] showed
    her a TV news segment, indicating that he was wanted for
    Gorman’s shooting.
    At approximately 2:00 a.m. on December 21, 2010, the
    decedent, Carlos Fernandez, was returning home from a
    night at the Sugar House Casino in Philadelphia. Jeanette
    Bobe, Fernandez’s wife, briefly met with him in the
    downstairs portion of the house before returning upstairs
    to return to bed. Shortly thereafter, Bobe heard multiple
    gunshots coming from the first floor of her home. Bobe
    went into the hallway in order to gather her two children
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    and saw Fernandez lying on the floor. Bobe then locked
    herself and her children in her room and dialed 911,
    informing the police that her husband was shot and that
    someone was in the house. While talking with the police,
    Bobe heard a male voice through her bedroom door, telling
    her to give him all the money in the house and that he
    would leave them alone.         Subsequent investigation
    revealed that Fernandez had been shot a total of three
    times in the chest, and one grazing shot to his arm. Two
    bullets were recovered from the body.
    Surveillance video footage from the casino
    showed Fernandez wearing a distinctive set of
    earrings and a watch on the night he was murdered.
    According to Bobe, Fernandez was wearing the earrings
    and watch when he returned home from the casino.
    Police did not find any earrings or watch on
    Fernandez following the murder.
    Approximately three months before Fernandez’s
    murder, September 27, 2010, [Appellant] and Fernandez
    had been involved in an incident arising out of Fernandez’s
    loaning of money to [Appellant’s] sister, Littles. Fernandez
    had loaned Littles $300, keeping Littles’ car as collateral.
    A friend of Littles, Darnella,[8] sought the return of the
    vehicle without payment on the debt and the situation
    spiraled into an argument. [Appellant] paid Fernandez the
    $300 in order to “drop the confrontation,” while Darnella
    yelled that she was “going to get someone to shoot
    [Fernandez] or kill him, or whatever.”             Fernandez
    responded that he could “get guns” if needed, while
    [Appellant] stated that he had already been shot before,
    showing a scar.
    On December 22, 2010, police received information that
    [Appellant] might be located at Moless’s Sanger Street
    residence.   SWAT officers arrived at the house at
    approximately 4:15 in the morning, together with police
    from the 2nd District. Police subsequently entered the
    home, searching for [Appellant]. Sergeant [Christopher]
    Binns, together with Officers [Michael] Mocharnuk and
    8
    Our review of the record did not reveal her last name.
    -4-
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    [Francis] Whalen, descended into the basement,
    announcing their presence.      All three officers were
    equipped with protective tactical gear, including body
    armor and a Kevlar helmet. Upon entering the basement
    the officers found a closed door and wall, separating the
    basement into two halves. Sergeant Binns opened the
    door, while Officer Mocharnuk searched the room beyond.
    Officer Whalen remained behind the wall separating the
    rooms.     Immediately upon entering the room, Officer
    Mocharnuk located and recognized [Appellant], who was
    standing behind a bed towards the back wall.
    Officer Mocharnuk ordered [Appellant] to show his
    hands and informed Sergeant Binns that he had located
    [him], whereupon [Appellant] disappeared from view.
    Immediately      upon     losing   sight     of  [Appellant],
    approximately five to eight gunshots were fired from the
    location where [Appellant] was last seen.             Officer
    Mocharnuk was not hit by the gunfire. Sergeant Binns was
    struck in the left temple-area on his helmet during the
    initial volley. The force of the bullet strike knocked Binns
    into Mocharnuk, who heard the distinctive sound of the
    bullet striking the helmet. Officer Whalen was struck in
    the direct center of his vest, where a ceramic trauma plate
    provided additional protection, by a bullet that punctured
    the interior wall separating him from the room where
    [Appellant] was located. The three officers returned fire
    and retreated up the staircase to the main floor of the
    building. [Appellant] fired a second volley of shots while
    the officers were retreating.
    Upon the officers[’] retreat, [Appellant] stated, “Come
    on down, I got clips for days.” [Appellant] further stated
    that he had a female hostage in the basement and that he
    had booby-trapped the basement door with a grenade.
    Officer [Inocencio] Amaro entered into negotiations with
    [Appellant], centered largely on providing [Appellant] with
    a cell phone.     After approximately two hours, officers
    heard a single gunshot from the basement. [Appellant]
    then stated “Oh, shit, the gun went off” and requested
    assistance. [Appellant] was bleeding from a wound in the
    neck/shoulder area and was unconscious at the base of the
    stairs when officers re-entered the basement, taking
    [Appellant] into custody and providing medical assistance.
    -5-
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    Recovered from the basement were twenty-three
    individual pieces of ballistic evidence and the pistol stolen
    from Parran two weeks earlier.
    [Appellant] was subsequently treated at Temple
    University Hospital, which took custody of [his]
    personal items upon his admittance, namely two
    earrings and a watch, and gave these items to
    [Appellant’s] mother.       Detective [Kenneth] Rossiter
    obtained a warrant and seized the two earrings and a
    watch repair slip at [Appellant’s] mother’s home on April
    28, 2011, while the watch itself was recovered the next
    day from the repair shop. Detective Rossiter then asked
    the victim’s wife, Bobe, if she could identify the earrings
    and watch as belonging to her late husband.          Bobe
    identified the jewelry, stating that she had no doubt
    that the jewelry was owned by Fernandez. In May,
    2011, Tillie Moless, owner of the apartment where
    [Appellant] was found, recovered a camera that had been
    recording video during a forty-seven minute section of the
    stand-off between [Appellant] and the police. In the
    video, [Appellant] could be clearly seen in
    possession of a semi-automatic firearm and wearing
    the jewelry that would be recovered by the hospital
    following the conclusion of the stand-off.
    Trial Ct. Op., 8/13/14, at 2-7 (footnote and citations omitted).
    At trial, Officer William Trenwith testified, inter alia, as follows: he had
    been assigned to the Crime Scene Unit for 21 years. N.T., 11/5/13, at 37-
    38. Fernandez did not have a watch or earrings on when he conducted his
    investigation on the night of the murder. Id. at 47-48. He collected “three
    fired cartridge cases .45 caliber” from the premises.
    Dr. Gary Collins, deputy chief of the Medical Examiner’s Office,
    testified at trial.   Id. at 90.   The entrance of the first gunshot wound he
    described was located on the right side of the chest.         Id. at 94.    “The
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    wound went through the chest from front to back and slightly from
    the right side to the left side and it went through the heart and the
    left lung and existed on the left side of his back.”      Id. at 95.   Another
    gunshot wound went through the soft tissue of Fernandez’s chest, through
    the “right lung, esophagus, left lung, and a bullet was recovered
    somewhere in the soft tissues of the armpit on the left side.” Id. at 96. The
    third gunshot wound was lower than the second gunshot wound. Id. The
    fourth gunshot wound was a graze wound, “located on the inner aspect of
    the arm.” Id. at 97.
    Officer Gregory Welsh, “an expert in the field of firearms identification
    and tool mark analysis[,]” testified at trial.   Id. at 204.   He “perform[ed]
    ballistic analysis with respect to several fired cartridge casings [“FCC”] as
    well as a .45 handgun related to [the] homicide and shootings of police
    officers[.]” Id. at 205. He testified regarding the three separate incidents.
    Id. at 207. The FCC’s from Officer Gorman’s shooting on Hope Street
    and the SWAT team shootings on Sanger Street were determined to
    have been fired from the same gun. Id. at 222. The FCC’s from the
    homicide scene were fired from the same gun. Id. at 225-26. Welsh
    responded in the affirmative when asked: “Were the findings that you made
    with respect to matching up the fired cartridge casings from all three scenes
    done so within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty?” Id. at 227.
    -7-
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    Appellant was convicted following a three day non-jury trial.       On
    February 28, 2014, he was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of life plus
    80 to 160 years’ imprisonment.       Post-sentence motions were filed and
    denied.   This timely appeal followed.      Appellant filed a court-ordered
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. 9 The trial
    court filed a responsive opinion.
    Appellant raises the following issue for our review:10   “Was not the
    evidence insufficient to sustain [A]ppellant’s conviction of murder where the
    conviction was based upon [A]ppellalnt’s possession of the murder weapon
    before and after the homicide?” Appellant’s Brief at 2.
    9
    Appellant filed a Rule 1925(b) statement. He then filed a request for an
    extension of time to file a Rule 1925(b) statement upon receipt of all of the
    notes of testimony. The court entered an order on June 30, 2014, granting
    the request for an extension of time. Appellant filed a supplemental 1925(b)
    statement on July 7, 2014. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(2) (“Upon application of
    the appellant and for good cause shown, the judge may . . . permit an
    amended or supplemental Statement to be filed. Good cause includes, but is
    not limited to, delay in the production of a transcript necessary to develop
    the Statement . . . .”).
    10
    We note that Appellant raised an additional issue in his supplemental Rule
    1925(b) statement. He stated: “The sentences imposed consecutively to life
    without parole were unreasonably excessive.” This issue was not raised in
    Appellant’s brief on appeal and is therefore waived. See Commonwealth
    v. Jones, 
    815 A.2d 598
    , 604 n.3 (Pa. 2002) (“issue included in appellant’s
    ‘Statement of Questions Involved’ was waived by failure to address issue in
    brief itself”).
    -8-
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    Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to convict him of
    murder of the first degree.11   He avers “[t]he conviction for murder . . .
    rested on circumstantial evidence that [A]ppellant was in possession of
    the murder weapon both eleven days before the killing and more than a day
    after the killing and [A]ppellant’s possession of jewelry similar in appearance
    to (and identified as) that having belonged to decedent.”           Id. at 11
    (emphasis added). He avers “[t]here was no evidence that [A]ppellant had
    any animosity toward the decedent.”          Id. at 12.      Appellant claims
    11
    Initially, however, we note that Appellant's argument consists of two and
    one-third pages in support of his insufficiency of the evidence claim. He
    cites the elements of first degree murder with reference to the statute. He
    cites one case without setting forth the principle for which it is cited. See
    Pa.R.A.P. 29119(b). Appellant’s Brief at 11-13. This court has stated:
    Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure,
    failure to cite to relevant authority provides a basis for us
    to find waiver. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119; Commonwealth v.
    Einhorn, 
    911 A.2d 960
    , 970 (Pa. Super. 2006) (holding
    that appellant’s failure to properly develop claims in brief
    rendered the claims waived); Commonwealth v. Drake,
    [ ] 
    681 A.2d 1357
    , 1360 ([Pa. Super.] 1996) (explaining
    that this Court will not become the counsel for an
    appellant, “and will not, therefore, consider issues . . .
    which are not fully developed in [the] brief[ ]”) (citation
    omitted). Nevertheless, considering that the trial court
    addressed [the a]ppellant’s [. . .]       claim in its well-
    reasoned Rule 1925 opinion, we consider the merits of [the
    a]ppellant’s claim.
    Commonwealth v. Bowen, 
    55 A.3d 1254
    , 1263 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2012),
    appeal denied, 
    64 A.3d 630
     (Pa. 2013). Similarly, in the instant case,
    because the trial court addressed Appellant’s claim in its well-reasoned Rule
    1925(a) opinion, we will consider the merits of Appellant’s insufficiency
    claim. See 
    id.
    -9-
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    “[a]lthough the Commonwealth argued that robbery was the motive, that is
    inconsistent with the facts that the decedent still had rings, a bracelet and
    cash on him.”     
    Id.
     (emphasis added).         Appellant states “[t]he homicide
    conviction rests entirely on [A]ppellant’s exclusive possession of the firearm
    before and after the killing . . . .” Id. at 13. We find no relief is due.
    “A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of
    law.” Commonwealth v. Widmer, 
    744 A.2d 745
    , 751 (Pa. 2000).
    [T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the
    evidence to support a criminal conviction . . . does not
    require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the
    evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable
    doubt. Instead, it must determine simply whether the
    evidence believed by the fact-finder was sufficient to
    support the verdict. . . .
    *     *      *
    When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an
    appellate court must determine whether the evidence, and
    all reasonable inferences deducible from that, viewed in
    the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict
    winner, are sufficient to establish all of the elements of the
    offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, 
    934 A.2d 1233
    , 1235-36, 1237 (Pa. 2007)
    (citations and quotation marks omitted).
    Section 2502(a) of the Crimes Code defines first degree murder:
    (a) Murder of the first degree.─A criminal homicide
    constitutes murder of the first degree when it is committed
    by an intentional killing.
    18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a).
    Our Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated:
    - 10 -
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    In order to sustain a conviction for first-degree murder,
    the Commonwealth must demonstrate that a human being
    was unlawfully killed; the defendant was responsible for
    the killing; and the defendant acted with malice and a
    specific intent to kill, i.e., the killing was performed in an
    intentional, deliberate, and premeditated manner. Specific
    intent may be established through circumstantial
    evidence, such as the use of a deadly weapon on a
    vital part of the victim’s body.
    Commonwealth v. Ramtahal, 
    33 A.3d 602
    , 607 (Pa. 2011) (citations
    omitted and emphasis added). “[P]roof of a motive is not necessary to
    establish a specific intent to kill.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 
    364 A.2d 665
    , 669 (Pa. 1976) (emphasis added).
    The trial court found the evidence was sufficient to establish that
    Appellant killed Fernandez. The court opined:
    The testimony of multiple witnesses established that
    [Appellant] was present in The Black Pumpkin the night
    that Parran’s firearm was stolen. Parran testified that
    [Appellant] was the only individual with the opportunity to
    steal the weapon. Both the driver of the Grand Marquis
    and a fellow passenger testified that [Appellant] was
    present in the car when police pulled it over shortly after
    the group left the bar. Those same individuals, as well as
    Officer Gorman, testified that [Appellant] fled from the
    vehicle.      Officer  Gorman     subsequently   identified
    [Appellant] as the individual who had shot him in the
    shoulder after being shown a photo array containing
    [Appellant’s] photo. Ballistics analysis confirmed that
    Parran’s stolen firearm was used in Officer Gorman’s
    shooting. Tillie Moless testified that [Appellant] had
    a firearm in his possession for the entirety of his
    stay at her house, keeping it either in his hands or in his
    belt. Ballistics analysis further confirmed that this
    same firearm was used in the early morning hours of
    December 21,2010 to shoot and kill Fernandez in his
    home.       On December 22, 2010, the day after
    Fernandez’s      shooting,    this    firearm    was     in
    - 11 -
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    [Appellant’s] possession when SWAT officers
    entered the basement and engaged [Appellant] in a
    shoot-out and standoff. A forty-seven minute video
    of   the   standoff   clearly  showed     [Appellant]
    possessing Parran’s handgun. After the shootout, that
    handgun was seized by police, allowing ballistics
    analysis that not only tied that firearm to the
    shooting of Fernandez, but also to the prior shooting
    of Officer Gorman, and the subsequent shooting of
    SWAT officers Binns and Whalen. That [Appellant]
    possessed and used the murder weapon, both before and
    after the murder was compelling evidence that he shot
    Fernandez.
    Moreover, there was additional compelling evidence to
    establish that [Appellant] was the killer. Pictures taken
    from the Sugar House Casino surveillance cameras
    clearly showed Fernandez wearing a pair of diamond
    clustered earrings and a watch, all of which were
    missing after his death. The video of the standoff
    the day after the murder showed [Appellant]
    wearing an identical pair of diamond cluster earrings
    and watch.        The testimony of Detective Rossiter
    established that this jewelry was taken into the possession
    of Temple University Hospital when [Appellant] was
    receiving medical care. These same pieces of jewelry were
    released to [Appellant’s] mother, who still had the earrings
    when police arrived with a seizure warrant. The watch was
    later recovered where [Appellant’s] mother had taken it for
    repair. All pieces of jewelry were positively identified by
    Ms. Bode upon their recovery as being the jewelry
    belonging to Fernandez.
    . . . Evidence of [Appellant’s] intent to kill may be
    inferred from his shooting Fernandez three times in
    the chest.
    Trial Ct. Op. at 8-10 (citations omitted and emphases added).
    The trial court found that “there was clearly sufficient evidence for a
    fact finder to conclude that [Appellant killed] Fernandez in the early morning
    hours of December 21, 2010.” Trial Ct. Op. at 10.
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    Appellant’s claim that the Commonwealth failed to prove motive is
    meritless. See Robinson, 364 A.2d at 669. Appellant’s contention that the
    earrings and watch were not distinctive in unavailing. It is not for this court
    to substitute its judgment for that of the fact-finder.   See Ratsamy, 934
    A.2d at 1235-36, 1237.       A conviction for first-degree murder can be
    sustained based upon circumstantial evidence where a deadly weapon was
    used on a vital part of the decedent’s body.     See Ramtahal, 33 A.3d at
    607.    We find no relief is due.    See Ratsamy, 934 A.2d at 1235-36;
    Widmer, 744 A.2d at 751.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/9/2015
    - 13 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1680 EDA 2014

Filed Date: 3/9/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024