Com. v. Meekins, R. ( 2015 )


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  • J-A04024-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    ROBERT IRVING MEEKINS,
    Appellant                  No. 1009 WDA 2014
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of May 22, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0008574-2011
    BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON AND STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                           FILED FEBRUARY 24, 2015
    Appellant, Robert Irving Meekins, appeals from the judgment of
    sentence entered on May 22, 2014 following his stipulated bench trial
    convictions for three narcotics offenses and false identification to law
    enforcement authorities.1           On appeal, Appellant challenges only the
    sufficiency of the evidence to support his false identification to law
    enforcement      authorities    conviction.2   Appellant’s   Brief   at   5.   The
    Commonwealth agrees with Appellant’s contention that the evidence of
    record is insufficient to establish the offense of false identification to law
    ____________________________________________
    1
    35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), 780-113(a)(16), and 780-113(a)(31); 18
    Pa.C.S.A. § 4914.
    2
    Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his
    other convictions.
    *Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A04024-15
    enforcement authorities. Commonwealth’s Brief at 8.       Upon review of the
    certified record, we vacate Appellant’s false identification to law enforcement
    authorities conviction, vacate his sentence in its entirety as illegal, and
    remand for resentencing.
    When reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, our
    standard of review is as follows:
    The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
    evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at
    trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there
    is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
    element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
    applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence
    and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition,
    we note that the facts and circumstances established by the
    Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
    innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be
    resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
    and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of
    fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The
    Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every
    element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means
    of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the
    above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
    evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
    finder of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses
    and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe
    all, part or none of the evidence.
    Commonwealth v. Harden, 
    103 A.3d 107
    , 111 (Pa. Super. 2014)
    “A person commits [the] offense [of false identification to law
    enforcement authorities] if he furnishes law enforcement authorities with
    false information about his identity after being informed by a law
    enforcement officer who is in uniform or who has identified himself as a law
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    J-A04024-15
    enforcement officer that the person is the subject of an official investigation
    of a violation of law.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4914. Under the plain language of the
    statute, three conditions must be satisfied before an individual will be found
    to have violated the statute by providing false information about his identity:
    First, if the law enforcement officer is not in uniform, the
    officer must identify himself as a law enforcement officer.
    Second, the individual must be informed by the law
    enforcement officer that he is the subject of an official
    investigation of a violation of law. Third, the individual must
    have furnished law enforcement authorities with false
    information after being informed by the law enforcement
    officer that he was the subject of an official investigation of
    a violation of law.
    In re D.S., 
    39 A.3d 968
    , 974 (Pa. 2012) (emphasis supplied).
    In this matter, the case proceeded to a stipulated bench trial wherein
    both parties moved to incorporate the notes of testimony from the
    suppression hearing into the record. N.T., 5/22/2014, at 7. Officer Randy
    Lamb of the Wilkins Township Police Department testified that on March 5,
    2011, police conducted a traffic stop of a car wherein the driver was arrested
    for driving under the influence.    N.T., 3/5/2014, at 3.     Appellant was a
    passenger in the back seat.        
    Id. at 3-4.
        Appellant was asked for
    identification and he stated his name was “Jonathon Hutchinson.” 
    Id. at 4.
    After Appellant got out of the car, he told Officer Lamb, “he lied about who
    he was and that he had an active warrant out of Cambria County.” 
    Id. at 5.
    Officer Lamb confirmed that there was an active arrest warrant issued for
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    J-A04024-15
    Appellant with the Johnstown Police Department.                
    Id. Police arrested
    Appellant. 
    Id. at 6.
    Noticeably absent from the examination of Officer Lamb was any
    evidence that the police officers involved were in uniform or that Appellant
    had been advised that he was the subject of an investigation or a violation of
    law. Appellant volunteered the false information during the investigation of
    the driver, not him.      Thus, we conclude that the Commonwealth failed to
    elicit   sufficient   evidence   to   support   Appellant’s   conviction   for   false
    identification to law enforcement authorities; hence, we vacate that
    conviction.
    The trial court sentenced Appellant to a mandatory term of three to six
    years of imprisonment on one of his narcotics’ convictions. 
    Id. at 13.
    The
    trial court sentenced Appellant to “[n]o further penalty at any remaining
    counts.” 
    Id. Because Appellant
    was not sentenced on the false identification
    to law enforcement authorities, we would normally conclude the trial court’s
    sentencing scheme was not upset and, thus, a remand for resentencing
    would be unwarranted. Commonwealth v. Lomax, 
    8 A.3d 1264
    , 1268 (Pa.
    Super. 2010) (“Because we can vacate the indecent assault sentence
    without disturbing the overall sentencing scheme, we need not remand.”),
    citing Commonwealth v. Thur, 
    906 A.2d 552
    , 569 (Pa. Super. 2006)
    (stating that when our disposition does not upset overall sentencing scheme,
    there is no need for a remand). However, upon further review, Appellant’s
    -4-
    J-A04024-15
    sentence is illegal3 and, therefore, we are constrained to vacate his sentence
    in its entirety.
    This Court has previously concluded:
    A challenge to the legality of a sentence may be entertained
    as long as the reviewing court has jurisdiction. It is also
    well-established that if no statutory authorization exists for
    a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to
    correction. An illegal sentence must be vacated. Issues
    relating to the legality of a sentence are questions of law.
    Our standard of review over such questions is de novo and
    our scope of review is plenary.
    Commonwealth v. Fennell, 
    105 A.3d 13
    (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations,
    quotations, and ellipses omitted). In Fennell, this Court determined that 18
    Pa.C.S.A. § 7508,4 a statute which imposes a mandatory minimum sentence
    based upon the weight of narcotics recovered, was unconstitutional in its
    entirety based upon the United States Supreme Court decision in Alleyne v.
    United States, 
    133 S. Ct. 2151
    (2013). See Fennell generally.
    Based upon our sua sponte review of the record, we are constrained to
    vacate Appellant’s illegal sentence.           Appellant was convicted of possession
    ____________________________________________
    3
    “[T]his Court is endowed with the ability to consider an issue of illegality of
    sentence sua sponte.” Commonwealth v. Orellana, 
    86 A.3d 877
    , 883 n.7
    (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).
    4
    Section 7508 of the Crimes Code provides that “when the aggregate weight
    of the compound or mixture containing [cocaine] is at least ten grams and
    less than 100 grams; [the mandatory minimum sentence imposed shall be]
    three years in prison and a fine of $15,000 or such larger amount as is
    sufficient to exhaust the assets utilized in and the proceeds from the illegal
    activity[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7508(a)(3)(ii).
    -5-
    J-A04024-15
    with the intent to deliver crack cocaine.      The parties stipulated that the
    narcotics weighed 83.1 grams. N.T., 5/22/2014, at 8. The Commonwealth
    asked for a mandatory minimum sentence of three years of imprisonment.
    
    Id. at 12.
       The sentencing guideline form, contained within the certified
    record, recommends a mandatory minimum sentence of 3 years based upon
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7508. The trial court entered a mandatory sentence of three
    to six years of imprisonment.     
    Id. at 13.
       We are bound by Fennell to
    vacate Appellant’s sentence as illegal.
    Conviction for false identification to law enforcement authorities
    vacated. Remaining narcotics convictions affirmed. Sentence vacated in its
    entirety.    Remand for resentencing consistent with this memorandum.
    Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 2/24/2015
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1009 WDA 2014

Filed Date: 2/24/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/24/2015