Com. v. Laston, E. ( 2019 )


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  • J-A10043-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee                :
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    ELI ANTHONY LASTON                         :
    :
    Appellant               :      No. 2343 EDA 2018
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 23, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0006987-2017
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.E.:                           FILED JUNE 07, 2019
    Appellant, Eli Anthony Laston,1 appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, following his bench
    trial convictions for three counts of adulteration of a controlled substance, and
    one count each of possession of an adulterated controlled substance,
    possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia,
    firearms not to be carried without a license, possession of a weapon, and
    prohibited offensive weapons.2 We affirm.
    The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
    Chief Anthony R. Paparo is currently employed by the
    ____________________________________________
    1 Appellant’s last name is spelled variously throughout the certified record as
    “Laston” and “Latson.”
    2 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(2), (a)(1), (a)(16), (a)(32); 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§
    6106(a)(1), 907(b), 908(a), respectively.
    J-A10043-19
    Yeadon Borough Police Department and was previously
    employed by the Upper Darby Police Department as a Patrol
    Captain, where he was so employed on September 14,
    2017.
    At approximately 12:30 p.m., on September 14, 2017,
    Captain Paparo was on patrol in an unmarked Dodge
    Charger on Crosley Road, approaching the area of
    Greenwood Avenue and Radbourne Road when he observed
    [Appellant] operating a Dodge Ram pickup truck. The truck
    was coming off of Greenwood Avenue making a right turn
    onto Crosley Road.
    Captain Paparo observed the Dodge Ram drive through the
    intersection, failing to stop at the stop sign at Greenwood
    Avenue and Crosley Road. Captain Paparo estimated the
    Dodge Ram was proceeding at a rate of speed of over 30
    mph, in excess of the speed limit.
    Captain Paparo observed the Dodge Ram fail to stop at the
    following intersection and again at the stop sign at the
    following intersection of Emerson Street and Atlantic
    Avenue. Captain Paparo made a U-turn and pulled up
    behind the Dodge and activated his warning lights.
    Captain Paparo could see through the rear window of
    Appellant’s vehicle, although tinted, and observed Appellant
    moving around the front seat of the vehicle and he appeared
    to be placing some kind of large object into the backseat.
    Due to the tint on the window, Captain Paparo was unable
    to determine with certainty that there were any other
    occupants of the vehicle.
    Captain Paparo the[n] approached driver’s side of the
    vehicle; Appellant rolled down his window and the two
    began to converse. At that time, Captain Paparo was fairly
    certain that Appellant was the only occupant. Captain
    Paparo asked for Appellant’s registration and insurance,
    which Appellant complied with.       Captain Paparo asked
    Appellant what happened with the stop signs to which
    Appellant said that he didn’t see them.
    Captain Paparo asked Appellant about the movements
    Appellant was making in the front seat when he was pulled
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    J-A10043-19
    over and that he made Captain Paparo concerned. Appellant
    stated that he had reached over to open the center console
    to find all of his paperwork as he knew he was being
    stopped. Appellant demonstrated the movement to Captain
    Paparo, which revealed a prescription bottle in the center
    console. Appellant then closed the center console.
    Captain Paparo asked Appellant if he was taking any
    prescription medication and Appellant stated that he was
    taking it but hadn’t for a while. Captain Paparo asked
    Appellant to hand him the prescription bottle, which
    Appellant freely handed over. Captain Paparo observed that
    [t]he name on the bottle did not match Appellant’s name.
    Appellant stated that it was a friend’s bottle.
    At this point, Captain Paparo asked Appellant to step out of
    the vehicle for [officer] safety. As Appellant stepped out,
    Captain Paparo observed another prescription bottle in the
    driver’s [side door] pocket that appeared to have the label
    scraped off.    Captain Paparo led Appellant to [the] back
    area of the truck and conducted a pat down, where [Captain
    Paparo] detected what was immediately apparent to him to
    be pills in Appellant’s pocket in what felt to be an envelope.
    Upon removing the envelope containing the pills, the
    envelope turned out to be a…parking ticket. As [Captain
    Paparo] was removing the envelope, Appellant stated that
    they were his pills and that he did not like to carry his whole
    prescription with him so he carried it like that. Captain
    Paparo was able to identify the pills as oxycodone.
    Appellant was told to sit down at the rear of his vehicle;
    Captain Paparo asked if there were other controlled
    substances in the vehicle to which Appellant responded
    “no.”
    Captain Paparo told Appellant that he was going to look in
    the vehicle based on the fact that [Appellant] had a
    prescription not properly labeled on his person. Captain
    Paparo retrieved the prescription bottle along the [driver’s]
    side door. A search of the remainder of the vehicle resulted
    in “a bunch of empty bottles” notably, a oxycodone bottle,
    one that would hold 100 pills, which [Captain Paparo] knows
    at this time to be in excess of what a pharmacy would
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    J-A10043-19
    dispense to an individual for use.
    In the front portion of the center console, there was another
    compartment, which contained a “fake looking gun that was
    gold in color.” At that time, Captain Paparo told another
    officer who had arrived on scene to watch the gun and
    [Captain Paparo] went and placed Appellant into custody for
    further investigation, telling Appellant that he was under
    arrest for the prescription bottles not having his name on
    them and the firearm. Appellant responded that it was a
    starter gun.
    When Captain Paparo was holding the gun he couldn’t find
    a serial number on it and it felt heavy. Captain Paparo
    noticed that it actually had a magazine in it that had…four
    live 380[-caliber] rounds and [a] round that appeared to be
    a blank. Once he cleared the weapon and inspected it
    further, Captain Paparo noticed that [it] looked like
    someone had actually taken a drill bit and drilled out the
    bore of the barrel and the gun was located with live
    ammunition (the firearm was later sent to a state police
    crime lab and found to be a functioning weapon).
    Appellant advised that he did not have a permit to carry or
    a sportsman permit to carry. A further search of the vehicle
    revealed numerous drug paraphernalia, including multiple
    bottles for various types of different pills[, some of which
    contained controlled substances].
    *    *      *
    On April 23, 2018, Appellant filed a Motion to Suppress
    seeking to suppress the evidence located in Appellant’s
    vehicle and on his person as the searches were unsupported
    by probable cause or reasonable suspicion. A hearing was
    held on May 7, 2018, at which time the Commonwealth
    presented testimony from Captain Anthony Paparo. Captain
    Paparo testified to the facts as set forth above. [The c]ourt
    took the matter under advisement and permitted both
    parties to file briefs. On June 5, 2018, [the c]ourt issued an
    Order denying the Motion which included extensive Findings
    of Fact and Conclusions of Law….
    On July 3, 2018, the case proceeded to a stipulated non-
    -4-
    J-A10043-19
    jury trial. … [The c]ourt took the matter under advisement.
    On July 11, 2018, after reviewing exhibits, [the c]ourt
    issued an order finding Appellant guilty of [nine separate
    counts].
    Appellant was sentenced on July 23, 2018, to an aggregate
    term of 23 months’ intermediate punishment plus seven
    years of probation. No Post-Sentence Motions were filed.
    On August 10, 2018, Appellant filed a timely Notice of
    Appeal and a timely response to [the c]ourt’s [Rule] 1925(b)
    request [on August 31, 2018].
    (Trial Court Opinion, filed September 10, 2018, at 1-6) (internal citations
    omitted).
    Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
    DID THE COURT ERR IN DENYING THE MOTION TO
    SUPPRESS WHERE THE OFFICER LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE
    TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE?
    (Appellant’s Brief at 8).
    Appellant argues the mislabeled prescription pill bottle did not give
    Captain Paparo probable cause to search Appellant’s vehicle.        Appellant
    contends Captain Paparo could not determine whether the pills contained in
    the mislabeled bottle were illegal substances. Appellant posits Captain Paparo
    unlawfully searched Appellant’s vehicle without definitive knowledge of
    possible contraband and no other facts to give rise to probable cause.
    Appellant concludes this Court should vacate the judgment of sentence,
    reverse the order denying suppression, and remand for a new trial.        We
    disagree.
    Our standard of review of the denial of a motion to suppress evidence
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    is as follows:
    [An appellate court’s] standard of review in addressing a
    challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to
    determining whether the suppression court’s factual
    findings are supported by the record and whether the legal
    conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because
    the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court,
    we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth
    and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains
    uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a
    whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
    supported by the record, [the appellate court is] bound by
    [those] findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal
    conclusions are erroneous.       Where…the appeal of the
    determination of the suppression court turns on allegations
    of legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are
    not binding on [the] appellate court, whose duty it is to
    determine if the suppression court properly applied the law
    to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the [trial court
    are] subject to plenary review.
    Commonwealth v. Hoppert, 
    39 A.3d 358
    , 361-62 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal
    denied, 
    618 Pa. 684
    , 
    57 A.3d 68
     (2012).
    An officer may order an occupant to exit his vehicle after the detention
    of the vehicle for a violation of traffic law until the traffic stop is completed,
    even    absent   reasonable     suspicion    that   criminal   activity    is   afoot.
    Commonwealth v. Harris, 
    176 A.3d 1009
    , 1020-21 (Pa.Super. 2017). The
    officer can conduct a pat-down of a suspect’s outer garments if the officer
    observes conduct that leads him to reasonably believe the suspect may be
    armed and dangerous.        Commonwealth v. Mack, 
    953 A.2d 587
    , 590
    (Pa.Super.   2008)    (noting   officer’s   observation   of   suspect’s    reaching
    movements while suspect was in vehicle can lead officer to reasonably
    -6-
    J-A10043-19
    conclude his safety is in jeopardy).
    “[T]he Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
    I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable
    searches and seizures and, to that end, a search conducted without a warrant
    is generally presumed unreasonable unless it is undertaken pursuant to a
    recognized exception to the warrant requirement.”        Commonwealth v.
    Lechner, 
    685 A.2d 1014
    , 1016 (Pa.Super. 1996).
    The level of probable cause necessary for warrantless
    searches of automobiles is the same as that required to
    obtain a search warrant. The well-established standard for
    evaluating whether probable cause exists is the “totality of
    the circumstances” test. This test allows for a flexible,
    common-sense approach to all circumstances presented.
    Probable cause typically exists where the facts and
    circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient
    to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that
    an offense has been or is being committed. The evidence
    required to establish probable cause for a warrantless
    search must be more than a mere suspicion or a good faith
    belief on the part of the police officer.
    
    Id.
     (internal citations omitted). “[P]robable cause does not require certainty,
    but rather exists when criminality is one reasonable inference, not necessarily
    even the most likely inference.” Commonwealth v. Spieler, 
    887 A.2d 1271
    ,
    1275 (Pa.Super. 2005).
    Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution affords no greater
    protection with respect to warrantless searches of motor vehicles than does
    the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Commonwealth
    v. Gary, 
    625 Pa. 183
    , 242, 
    91 A.3d 102
    , 138 (2014).              Under either
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    J-A10043-19
    constitutional provision, “[t]he prerequisite for a warrantless search of a motor
    vehicle is probable cause to search; no exigency beyond the inherent mobility
    of a motor vehicle is required.” 
    Id.
     Additionally, “[i]f a car is readily mobile
    and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth
    Amendment permits police to search the vehicle without more.” 
    Id. at 199
    ,
    
    91 A.3d at 111-12
     (quoting Pennsylvania v. Labron, 
    518 U.S. 938
    , 940,
    
    116 S. Ct. 2485
    , 2487, 
    135 L. Ed. 2d 1031
    , ___ (1996)).
    Instantly, Captain Paparo witnessed Appellant disregard multiple stop
    signs and stopped his vehicle. Captain Paparo then saw Appellant place a
    large object in the rear of his vehicle. The captain approached the vehicle and
    asked Appellant about his movements; Appellant stated he had searched for
    his registration and insurance.     Appellant opened the center console to
    demonstrate his earlier movements, and Captain Paparo noticed a prescription
    pill bottle in the console. The captain asked Appellant to hand over the pill
    bottle, and Appellant complied. The captain observed that the name on the
    pill bottle was not Appellant’s name.
    Captain Paparo asked Appellant to exit his vehicle. Upon Appellant’s exit,
    the captain saw another prescription pill bottle in the driver’s-side door pocket
    with the label torn off. Captain Paparo conducted a pat down for officer safety
    and detected pills, which the captain later determined to be oxycodone, in an
    envelope in Appellant’s pants pocket. Appellant denied having any more pills
    in his vehicle. Captain Paparo searched Appellant’s vehicle and discovered
    -8-
    J-A10043-19
    multiple prescription bottles for other pills, some of which contained controlled
    substances, and a firearm in the center console. Appellant filed a motion to
    suppress the items found on his person and in the vehicle based on an illegal
    search   without   reasonable    suspicion   or   probable    cause;   the   court
    subsequently denied Appellant’s motion to suppress.
    Here, Captain Paparo legally stopped Appellant after he disregarded
    several stop signs and asked Appellant to exit his vehicle for officer safety.
    See Harris, supra. Captain Paparo’s observation of Appellant moving a large
    object in the back seat gave the captain a reasonable belief that his safety
    was in jeopardy, which justified his pat down of Appellant and the seizure of
    the loose oxycodone pills on Appellant’s person. See Mack, supra. Further,
    under the totality of the circumstances, Captain Paparo had probable cause to
    believe Appellant’s vehicle contained contraband, after he saw a mislabeled
    prescription pill bottle, a prescription pill bottle with the label ripped off, and
    recovered loose oxycodone pills from Appellant’s person. See Gary, 
    supra;
    Spieler, 
    supra;
     Lechner, 
    supra.
     Therefore, Captain Paparo legally searched
    Appellant’s vehicle; and the court properly denied Appellant’s motion to
    suppress.   See Hoppert, 
    supra.
            Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of
    sentence.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    -9-
    J-A10043-19
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/7/19
    - 10 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2343 EDA 2018

Filed Date: 6/7/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024