Com. v. Bidwell, J. ( 2015 )


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  • J-A25042-14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    JAMES BIDWELL
    Appellant                  No. 50 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of August 22, 2013
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
    Criminal Division at No.: CP-45-CR-0002816-2011
    BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., WECHT, J., and PLATT, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.:                             FILED MARCH 06, 2015
    James Bidwell (“Bidwell”) appeals the August 22, 2013 judgment of
    sentence. For the reasons set forth herein, we conclude that the trial court
    abused its discretion in allowing the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of
    Bidwell’s prior bad acts pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of
    Evidence.    Accordingly, we vacate Bidwell’s judgment of sentence, and we
    remand for additional proceedings consistent with this memorandum.
    The trial court set forth the pertinent factual and procedural history of
    this case as follows:
    On November 18, 2010, Corporal Lucas Bray of the Pocono
    Mountain Regional Police Department (“PMRPD”) received
    information from a confidential informant that [Bidwell] and
    another individual by the name of Chase Argot (“Argot”) would
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A25042-14
    be traveling in a red [tractor-trailer] towing another truck.[1]
    The informant stated that the two had travelled to Philadelphia in
    order to pick up quantities of [m]ethamphetamine[,] and that
    they were now on their way back to the area. Corporal Bray
    informed Corporal Matt Nero, also of [the] PMRPD, of the
    information provided by the informant. At the time, Corporal
    Nero was on patrol in an unmarked, black Dodge Charger,
    working the 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. shift. While parked on Route 115
    near Interstate 80 in Blakeslee, [Pennsylvania,] Corporal Nero
    observed a vehicle that matched the description provided by
    Corporal Bray. Corporal Nero spotted a red [tractor-trailer]
    exiting from Interstate 80 onto Route 115 [northbound] . . . .
    Corporal Nero saw that the truck had run the stop sign at the
    end of the exit ramp. In addition to the stop sign violation,
    Corporal Nero noticed that the tag on the trailer was obstructed;
    a metal object appeared to be blocking the truck’s tag.
    Corporal Nero activated his vehicle’s siren and lights[,] and
    initiated a traffic stop on Route 115 near the Best Western Hotel.
    Corporal Nero approached the vehicle from the passenger side;
    Argot was driving the vehicle and [Bidwell] was sitting in the
    passenger seat drinking water and using his [iPad.] Corporal
    Nero asked Argot and [Bidwell] for identification, insurance, and
    registration. When Corporal Nero returned to his patrol vehicle,
    he ran a criminal history check on Argot and [Bidwell, which
    indicated] that Argot and [Bidwell] each had a criminal history.
    Specifically, [Bidwell’s] criminal background check revealed prior
    drug charges.
    Corporal Nero next asked Argot to step out of the vehicle. Argot
    stated that there were no illegal substances on his person, nor
    were there any illegal substances located in the truck. Argot
    ____________________________________________
    1
    Corporal Bray’s confidential informant “ha[d] been deemed credible
    and reliable in the past through information provided[,] which lead [sic] to
    several arrests, the issuance of warrants[,] and the seizure of . . . controlled
    substances.” Affidavit of Probable Cause, 11/19/2010, at 4. In addition to
    the confidential informant, police also received information from three
    additional sources, each of whom stated that Bidwell and Argot were
    involved in the illegal distribution of methamphetamine. These individuals
    are referred to in the affidavit of probable cause as “concerned citizen,”
    “concerned resident,” and “confidential source,” respectively. 
    Id. at 3-4.
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    consented to a personal search, as well as a search of the truck.
    [Bidwell then informed Corporal Nero that the truck belonged to
    him, and refused to consent to any searches.] After [Bidwell]
    denied Corporal Nero’s request to search the truck, [Corporal
    Nero] deployed [his canine,] Niko[,] to perform a search of the
    vehicle’s perimeter based on his suspicion that illegal narcotics
    were present [in the truck.]
    Niko . . . alert[ed] to the presence of a controlled substance.
    Upon Niko’s alert, a decision was made to have the vehicle
    impounded[,] and the truck was towed to the police
    headquarters approximately twelve miles away. While located at
    police headquarters, the truck was under constant visual
    inspection. On November 19, 2010, at 8:45 a.m., Magisterial
    District Judge Anthony Fluegel signed a warrant authorizing a
    search of [Bidwell’s] truck.
    Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 6/1/2012, at 1-3 (unnumbered).
    Upon searching Bidwell’s tractor-trailer, police discovered a small
    amount of methamphetamine (approximately .11 grams) inside of a
    briefcase that belonged to Argot.                They also found 3.3 grams of
    methamphetamine (commonly referred to as an “eight ball”) underneath a
    mattress, which was directly behind the area where Bidwell was sitting at
    the time of the traffic stop.
    On June 9, 2011, Corporal Bray filed a criminal complaint charging
    Bidwell with possession of a controlled substance, possession of a controlled
    substance with intent to deliver (“PWID”), possession of drug paraphernalia,
    and conspiracy to commit PWID.2            On February 29, 2012, Bidwell filed an
    ____________________________________________
    2
    35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(16), 780-113(a)(30), and 780-113(a)(32); and
    18 Pa.C.S. § 903 (35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30)), respectively.
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    omnibus pretrial motion to suppress the physical evidence obtained from the
    search of his truck. Therein, Bidwell argued that: (1) the stop, detention,
    and seizure of Bidwell’s tractor-trailer were unconstitutional; (2) Corporal
    Nero conducted a canine search of the exterior of Bidwell’s tractor-trailer
    without the requisite reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was carrying
    controlled substances; and (3) the November 19, 2010 search warrant was
    not supported by adequate probable cause.             Bidwell’s Omnibus Pretrial
    Motion, 2/29/2012, at 2-6. In his motion, Bidwell also sought disclosure of
    the identity of the Commonwealth’s confidential informant.          On June 1,
    2012, the trial court denied Bidwell’s motion by opinion and order following a
    hearing.
    On December 20, 2012, Bidwell filed a motion in limine seeking to
    preclude Corporal Nero from testifying that Bidwell refused to consent to a
    search of his tractor-trailer. On January 28, 2013, the Commonwealth filed
    written notice of its intent to introduce at trial evidence of prior bad acts
    pursuant to Pa.R.E. 404(b).3         Specifically, the Commonwealth intended “to
    call multiple witnesses to establish that [Bidwell] regularly delivered
    methamphetamine to others.” Commonwealth’s Notice Pursuant to Pa.R.E.
    404(b)(4),     1/28/2013,       at    1    (unnumbered).    According   to   the
    ____________________________________________
    3
    See Pa.R.E. 404(b)(3) (“In a criminal case the prosecutor must
    provide reasonable notice in advance of trial . . . of the general nature of
    any [Rule 404(b)] evidence the prosecutor intends to introduce at trial.”)
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    Commonwealth, the evidence of Bidwell’s prior drug deliveries would
    “establish [Bidwell’s] intent in the present case.” 
    Id. In response,
    Bidwell
    filed a second motion in limine arguing that the Commonwealth should be
    precluded from introducing the proffered Rule 404(b) evidence.
    On March 4, 2013, the Commonwealth filed an amended notice of its
    intent to introduce evidence of Bidwell’s prior bad acts.        In the amended
    notice, the Commonwealth specifically named Chase Argot, Clark Kitchell,
    and Andrew Dehaan as the witnesses who would testify that Bidwell
    previously had distributed methamphetamine to his friends and to his
    employees.4        Commonwealth’s         Amended   Notice   Pursuant   to   Pa.R.E.
    404(b)(4), 3/4/2013, at 1 (unnumbered). According to the Commonwealth,
    this testimony would establish Bidwell’s “intent, modus operandi, common
    scheme, guilty knowledge, and the res gestae of the case as a whole.” 
    Id. at 2.
    On May 7, 2013, Bidwell proceeded to a jury trial. Immediately before
    the trial commenced, the court granted Bidwell’s December 20, 2012 motion
    in limine, thereby barring Corporal Nero from testifying that Bidwell had
    refused to consent to a search of his tractor-trailer. The trial court denied
    Bidwell’s January 28, 2013 motion in limine, thereby permitting the
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    4
    Bidwell is the owner of Christian Containers, a garbage hauling
    company. Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 5/7/2013, at 28.
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    Commonwealth to introduce evidence of Bidwell’s prior drug deliveries
    pursuant to Pa.R.E. 404(b).
    Despite the trial court’s evidentiary ruling, on the first day of Bidwell’s
    trial, Corporal Nero testified that Bidwell “would not give [him] consent to
    search the vehicle.”5        Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 5/7/2013, at 43-44.
    Following Corporal Nero’s utterance, Bidwell immediately moved for a
    mistrial, which the trial court denied. The trial court offered to give the jury
    a cautionary instruction, but Bidwell declined the offer.
    The Commonwealth then presented testimony from Kitchell, Dehaan,
    and Argot, which demonstrated that, on prior occasions, Bidwell had shared
    methamphetamine with his friends and his employees. Near the close of the
    Commonwealth’s case, the trial court permitted Corporal Bray to testify over
    Bidwell’s objection that, in his expert opinion, the methamphetamine found
    in Bidwell’s vehicle was consistent with possession with intent to deliver.
    On May 9, 2013, the jury found Bidwell guilty of all counts. On August
    22, 2013, the trial court sentenced Bidwell to an aggregate term of twenty-
    four to sixty months’ incarceration.           Sentencing Order, 8/28/2013, at 1-3.
    Bidwell then timely filed post-sentence motions, which the trial court denied
    on December 17, 2013.
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    5
    Corporal Nero testified in response to a question posed by Bidwell’s
    own counsel on cross-examination.
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    On December 31, 2013, Bidwell timely filed a notice of appeal.       On
    January 8, 2014, the trial court directed Bidwell to file a concise statement
    of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).     Bidwell
    timely complied.   On February 12, 2014, the trial court issued an opinion
    pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
    Bidwell presents five issues for our consideration:
    1. Whether the trial court erred when it allowed the
    Commonwealth to introduce [Bidwell’s] prior drug use and
    deliveries as [Rule] 404(b) evidence during trial over defense
    objections?
    2. Whether the [trial] court erred when it denied [Bidwell’s
    m]otion for [m]istrial after [Corporal] Nero testified
    nonresponsively to a defense question stating [Bidwell]
    refused consent to a search of the vehicle?
    3. Whether the [trial] court erred when it refused to order the
    disclosure of confidential informants and to suppress the
    methamphetamine seized from the [tractor-trailer] by
    warrant which relied upon an unlawful canine sniff and no
    facts upon which the alleged informants could be found
    reliable?
    4. Whether the trial court erred when it refused to order
    disclosure of the identity of the witness who alleged that
    Argot was his drug dealer?
    5. Whether the trial court erred in allowing [Corporal] Bray to
    testify over objection that the eight ball of methamphetamine
    found in the [tractor-trailer] was possessed with intent to
    deliver?
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    Brief for Bidwell at 6.6
    In his first issue, Bidwell argues that the trial court erred in denying
    his motion in limine “to preclude any evidence of prior drug deliveries.” 
    Id. at 12.
       Specifically, Bidwell sought to preclude the Commonwealth from
    introducing evidence that he had, on prior occasions unrelated to his arrest
    for the instant offenses, provided methamphetamine to his employees.
    Because the certified record demonstrates that this testimony had no
    relevance other than to demonstrate Bidwell’s propensity to distribute
    methamphetamine, the trial court not only erred, but also abused its
    discretion in denying Bidwell’s motion in limine.
    “In evaluating the denial or grant of a motion in limine, our standard
    of review is the same as that utilized to analyze an evidentiary challenge.”
    Commonwealth v. Pugh, 
    101 A.3d 820
    , 822 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc).
    The admission of evidence is committed to the sound discretion
    of the trial court, and a trial court’s ruling regarding the
    admission of evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless that
    ruling reflects manifest unreasonableness, or partiality,
    prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support to be clearly
    erroneous.
    
    Id. (quoting Commonwealth
    v. Minich, 
    4 A.3d 1063
    , 1068 (Pa. Super.
    2010)).
    ____________________________________________
    6
    In his Rule 1925(b) statement, Bidwell also claimed that the jury’s
    verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Bidwell has abandoned that
    issue on appeal.
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    In Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 
    982 A.2d 483
    (Pa. 2009), our
    Supreme Court summarized Rule 404(b)7 of the Pennsylvania Rules of
    Evidence as follows:
    Generally, evidence of prior bad acts or unrelated criminal
    activity is inadmissible to show that a defendant acted in
    conformity with those past acts or to show criminal propensity.
    Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). However, evidence of prior bad acts may be
    admissible when offered to prove some other relevant fact, such
    as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
    identity, and absence of mistake or accident. Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2).
    In determining whether evidence of other prior bad acts is
    admissible, the trial court is obliged to balance the probative
    value of such evidence against its prejudicial impact.
    
    Sherwood, 982 A.2d at 497
    .
    Stated simply, Rule 404(b) operates to prevent the jury from drawing
    an inference of a defendant’s guilt based upon his or her propensity to
    commit criminal acts. In this regard, our Supreme Court has explained that:
    ____________________________________________
    7
    Pa.R.E. 404(b), entitled “Other crimes, wrongs, or acts,” provides in
    relevant part as follows:
    (1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is
    not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show
    that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with
    the character.
    (2) Permitted Uses.       This evidence may be admissible for
    another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
    preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or
    lack of accident. In a criminal case this evidence is admissible
    only if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential
    for unfair prejudice.
    Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1)-(2).
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    The purpose of [Rule 404(b)] is to prevent the conviction of an
    accused for one crime by the use of evidence that he has
    committed other unrelated crimes, and to preclude the inference
    that because he has committed other crimes he was more likely
    to commit that crime for which he is being tried. The presumed
    effect of such evidence is to predispose the minds of the jurors
    to believe the accused guilty, and thus effectually to strip him of
    the presumption of innocence.
    Commonwealth v. Spruill, 
    391 A.2d 1048
    , 1049-50 (Pa. 1978) (citations
    omitted).
    There are, of course, narrow exceptions to this rule, which may apply
    when the prior criminal acts are so closely related to the crime charged that
    they demonstrate a defendant’s motive, intent, malice, identity, or a
    common scheme, plan or design.       Commonwealth v. Stanley, 
    398 A.2d 631
    , 633-34 (Pa. 1979). These exceptions, however, “cannot be stretched
    in ways that effectively eradicate the rule.” Commonwealth v. Ross, 
    57 A.3d 85
    , 104 (Pa. Super. 2012) (en banc).
    As a starting point, we review the relevant testimony elicited at
    Bidwell’s trial. First, Clark Kitchell, one of Bidwell’s employees, testified as
    follows:
    Q:    Did [Bidwell] tell you anything else when he said to stick
    around [at his shop on November 18, 2010]?
    A:    Yeah. I know they were going to Philadelphia to pick
    something up, methamphetamines, at the time.
    Q:    He told you that?
    A:    Yes.
    Q:    He delivered it to you in the past?
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    A:    He gave it to me in the past. He didn’t deliver to me [in]
    the past.
    Q:    Well, he handed it to you?
    A:    Yes.
    Q:    But he would not make you pay for it?
    A:    No. He never made me pay for it. Mostly it was he gave
    all the workers mostly methamphetamine to keep them
    working at the shop.
    Q:    And when he gave it to you how would it be packaged?
    A:    It would be packaged—he would pack it up in a little like
    dime[-]sized bags. Like in the ziplocked, [sic] little bags.
    N.T., 5/7/2013, at 64-65.
    The Commonwealth also offered testimony from another one of
    Bidwell’s employees, Andrew Dehaan.
    Q:    Okay.    Now, before [November 19, 2010,] had you
    received methamphetamine from [Bidwell]?
    A:    I received it how?
    Q:    Did he give it to you?
    A:    He let me do some. He didn’t just give it to me. There is
    a difference.
    Q:    Tell us how that happened?
    A:    Just like anyone else I partied with. You know, I did drugs
    with him. I cut out a couple of lines and we did some
    drugs.
    Q:    So he would cut out a couple of lines or you would?
    A:    He would.
    Q:    He would cut out a couple of lines. And you would do a
    line and he would do a line. Is that how it worked?
    A:    Yeah.
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    Id. at 100-01.
    Finally, Chase Argot testified as follows:
    Q:    How often would [Bidwell] give you methamphetamine?
    A:    I guess you can say regular [sic]. I don’t really know.
    Q:    Maybe a couple times a week or a couple times a month?
    A:    A couple times a week.
    Q:    Did you know where he was getting his methamphetamine
    from?
    A:    I do not.
    
    Id. at 139-40.
    The trial court held that the above testimony was admissible to
    demonstrate Bidwell’s motive, intent, common scheme or plan, and modus
    operandi. T.C.O., 6/1/2012, at 14. We disagree.
    In order for Rule 404(b) evidence to be admissible to demonstrate
    motive or intent there must be a firm basis for concluding that the crime
    currently on trial “grew out of or was in any way caused by the prior set of
    facts and circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Camperson, 
    612 A.2d 482
    ,
    484 (Pa. Super. 1992) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 
    421 A.2d 734
    ,
    736 (Pa. Super. 1980)).     This analysis is guided by factors such as the
    proximity in time between the incidents; the similarity in the circumstances
    surrounding the incidents; and whether evidence of the prior crime is
    necessary to rebut the accused’s evidence or contention of accident,
    mistake, or lack of required intent. Commonwealth v. Sparks, 492 A.2d
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    720, 722 (Pa. Super. 1985); Commonwealth v. Barba, 
    460 A.2d 1103
    ,
    1109 (Pa. Super. 1983).
    It   would   be    illogical   to   conclude    that   Bidwell’s    possession     of
    methamphetamine grew out of or was caused by the fact that Bidwell had
    previously given methamphetamine to the three witnesses. The two
    occurrences do not share the close factual nexus that is required by Rule
    404(b). 
    Camperson, 612 A.2d at 484
    . For example, Bidwell’s possession
    of methamphetamine logically could not have been caused by the fact that,
    on    some    earlier    occasion,    Bidwell   “cut   out    a   couple    of   lines”   of
    methamphetamine, and shared them with Dehaan. N.T., 5/7/2013, at 100-
    01.   Nor did the facts surrounding the instant offense grow out of that
    behavior.
    The trial court also held that the Commonwealth’s Rule 404(b)
    evidence was admissible to prove a common scheme or plan and Bidwell’s
    modus operandi.          T.C.O., 6/1/2012, at 14.             Under Pennsylvania law,
    evidence of prior bad acts is admissible to prove “a common scheme, plan or
    design where the crimes are so related that proof of one tends to prove the
    others.”     Commonwealth v. Elliott, 
    700 A.2d 1243
    , 1249 (Pa. 1997),
    abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Freeman, 
    827 A.2d 385
    (Pa. 2003). The existence of a common scheme is relevant to establish any
    element of a crime, “so long as it does not merely indicate the defendant’s
    propensity to commit similar crimes.” Commonwealth v. Bronshtein, 
    691 A.2d 907
    , 915-16 (Pa. 1997).
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    In Elliott, for example, the appellant was accused of sexually
    assaulting and then killing a young woman whom he approached outside of a
    particular club at 4:30 a.m.     Our Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s
    decision to permit three other young women to testify that the appellant had
    similarly preyed upon each of them as they were leaving the exact same
    club in the early morning hours, and that he had physically and sexually
    assaulted them.     
    Elliott, 700 A.2d at 1250-51
    .          Our Supreme Court
    reasoned that the testimony was admissible to establish a common scheme,
    plan or design in light of the “close similarity between [the] assaults.” 
    Id. Relatedly, in
    order to establish a defendant’s modus operandi, the
    Commonwealth must demonstrate that the crimes in question are “so nearly
    identical in method as to earmark them as the handiwork of the accused.”
    Commonwealth v. Rush, 
    646 A.2d 557
    , 561 (Pa. 1994) (quoting
    McCormick on Evidence, § 190 (2d ed. 1972)). “More is demanded [than]
    the mere repeated commission of crimes of the same class, such as
    repeated burglaries or thefts.     The device used must be so unusual or
    distinctive as to be like a signature.” Commonwealth v. Blady, 
    444 A.2d 670
    , 671-72 (Pa. Super. 1982)
    Here,   any   similarity   between   Bidwell’s   prior    methamphetamine
    deliveries (as testified to by Kitchell, Dehaan, and Argot) and this case falls
    short of proof of a common scheme, plan or design.             The Commonwealth
    presented evidence of similarity only at the most basic level—to wit, that
    both incidents involved methamphetamine.        Cf. 
    Elliott, 700 A.2d at 1249
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    (holding that evidence of prior bad acts is admissible to prove “a common
    scheme, plan or design where the crimes are so related that proof of one
    tends to prove the others.”).          Bidwell’s drug deliveries did not share a
    distinctive modus operandi. There was, for example, no testimony that the
    methamphetamine seized (or its packaging) was uniquely consistent with
    Bidwell’s prior deliveries. The prior bad acts testimony demonstrated merely
    that Bidwell previously had shared methamphetamine with his friends and
    employees; it did not illustrate “a unique ‘signature’ modus operandi.”
    
    Ross, 57 A.3d at 104
    .
    Of course, the Commonwealth did not argue that Bidwell’s prior drug
    deliveries actually caused him to possess methamphetamine subsequently,
    or   that   the   instant   offenses    developed   from   Bidwell’s   sharing   of
    methamphetamine with his employees. Instead, the Commonwealth relied
    upon the exact reasoning that Rule 404(b) forbids—the inference that,
    because Bidwell distributed methamphetamine on a prior occasion, he must
    have intended to distribute this methamphetamine.          Indeed, the assistant
    district attorney candidly acknowledged this fact.
    I want to be clear that the reason that we want to bring in this
    [evidence] is because I can’t think of any other way to get the
    testimony from the witnesses that they knew that they were
    going to get methamphetamine from [Bidwell] other than based
    upon their prior deliveries. . . . If the court limits that and cuts
    that off, the evidence will make no sense to the jury. They will
    have no reason to believe that these witnesses had any
    knowledge of what [Bidwell] was going to do[,] and it all goes
    down to [Bidwell’s] possession and his intent to deliver.
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    N.T., 5/7/2013, at 11. The assistant district attorney plainly encouraged the
    jury to draw this inference in his closing argument: “And the reason why we
    know that [Bidwell] had it to deliver is because that was what he did with his
    methamphetamine. He cut it up into lines, [and] shared [it] with his friends
    or so-called friends.” 
    Id. at 38.
    The purpose of Rule 404(b) is to prevent
    the jury from drawing such a propensity inference.
    This does not end our inquiry. Before we may grant Bidwell relief, we
    must find that the trial court’s error was not harmless. It is well-settled that
    the Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing that the error was
    harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Story, 
    383 A.2d 155
    , 162 n.11 (Pa. 1978).
    Harmless error exists where (1) the error did not prejudice the
    defendant or the prejudice was de minimis; (2) the erroneously
    admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other untainted
    evidence which was substantially similar to the erroneously
    admitted evidence; or (3) the properly admitted and
    uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming and the
    prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant by comparison
    that the error could not have contributed to the verdict.
    Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 
    811 A.2d 556
    , 561 (Pa. 2002) (quoting
    Commonwealth v. Robinson, 
    721 A.2d 344
    , 350 (Pa. 1999)).
    Our Supreme Court has noted that “[e]vidence of prior criminal
    activity . . . is probably only equaled by a confession in its prejudicial impact
    upon a jury.”   
    Spruill, 391 A.2d at 1050
    .      “The presumed effect of such
    evidence is to predispose the minds of the jurors to believe the accused
    guilty, and thus effectually to strip him of the presumption of innocence.”
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    Commonwealth v. Trowery, 
    235 A.2d 171
    , 172 (Pa. Super. 1967). For
    this reason, Rule 404(b)(1) explicitly prohibits introduction of evidence of
    prior bad acts for the purpose of showing that the defendant has a
    generalized propensity to commit a particular crime—here, the proclivity to
    distribute methamphetamine.
    Instantly, the Commonwealth’s Rule 404(b) evidence was nothing
    more than an invitation to the jury to infer that Bidwell intended to distribute
    methamphetamine because he had done so in the past. The prospect that
    the jury would draw such an inference was underscored by the assistant
    district attorney’s closing argument, which unmistakably called upon the jury
    to infer Bidwell’s guilt based upon his prior bad acts. See N.T., 5/9/2013, at
    38 (“[T]he reason why we know that [Bidwell] had [methamphetamine] to
    deliver is because that was what he did with his methamphetamine. He cut
    it up into lines, [and] shared [it] with his friends.”). Moreover, the evidence
    of Bidwell’s prior methamphetamine deliveries was not cumulative; it was
    the cornerstone of the Commonwealth’s case against Bidwell. 8               The
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    8
    Although Corporal Bray, an expert in the field of drug trafficking,
    testified   that    the   facts   surrounding    Bidwell’s    possession    of
    methamphetamine were consistent with possession with intent to deliver,
    Corporal Bray also testified that he based his opinion, at least in part, upon
    the Commonwealth’s Rule 404(b) evidence. N.T., 5/7/2013, at 165-67.
    Therefore, the evidence of Bidwell’s prior bad acts tainted Corporal Bray’s
    expert testimony. See 
    Hutchinson, 811 A.2d at 561
    (“Harmless error
    exists where . . . the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative
    of other untainted evidence which was substantially similar to the
    erroneously admitted evidence.” (emphasis added)).
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    J-A25042-14
    Commonwealth needed the jury to draw that connection in order to prove
    that Bidwell intended to distribute the narcotics at issue.      The assistant
    district attorney plainly conceded this fact to the trial court. N.T., 5/7/2013,
    at 11.
    Based upon the particularly prejudicial nature of prior bad acts
    testimony and the lack of any other compelling evidence of Bidwell’s intent
    to deliver methamphetamine, the trial court’s admission of Rule 404(b)
    evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.          Accordingly, the
    trial court not only erred, but also abused its discretion by permitting such
    evidence. Consequently, Bidwell is entitled to a new trial.
    Having determined that Bidwell is entitled to a new trial, we now
    address his remaining issues inasmuch as they may arise upon remand. In
    his second issue, Bidwell contends that the trial court erred in denying his
    motion for a mistrial. Brief for Bidwell at 27-29.
    The trial court granted Bidwell’s motion in limine, which precluded at
    trial any evidence regarding Bidwell’s refusal to consent to the search of his
    truck.    Nevertheless, during defense counsel’s cross-examination, Corporal
    Nero testified that Bidwell “would not give [him] consent to search the
    vehicle.” N.T., 5/7/2013, at 43-44. The remedy for such a violation would
    be a new trial, the same remedy we granted to Bidwell on his first issue.
    Our resolution of Bidwell’s first issue, therefore, has rendered this claim
    moot. See In re D.A., 
    801 A.2d 614
    , 616 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“As a general
    rule, an actual case or controversy must exist at all stages of the judicial
    - 18 -
    J-A25042-14
    process, or a case will be dismissed as moot.”).                 Nothing about our
    resolution of this issue should be taken as an expansion or constriction of
    the trial court’s evidentiary ruling, which remains viable and applies with
    equal force upon remand.             Accordingly, these unique circumstances are
    unlikely to recur at Bidwell’s retrial.
    In his third issue, Bidwell argues that the trial court erred in denying
    his pretrial motion to suppress the physical evidence obtained from the
    search of his truck. Specifically, Bidwell contends that: (1) because Corporal
    Nero lacked reasonable suspicion that Bidwell and Argot were involved in
    drug trafficking, the canine search of Bidwell’s truck violated Article I, § 8 of
    the Pennsylvania Constitution; (2) the search warrant failed to articulate the
    confidential informant’s reliability and basis of knowledge; and (3) the trial
    court    erred   in   failing   to   order   disclosure   of   the   identity   of   the
    Commonwealth’s confidential informant.             Brief for Bidwell at 15-22.       We
    disagree.
    Our standard of review of a denial of suppression is whether the
    record supports the trial court’s factual findings and whether the
    legal conclusions drawn therefrom are free from error. Our
    scope of review is limited; we may consider only the evidence of
    the prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as
    remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record
    as a whole. Where the record supports the findings of the
    suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse
    only if the court erred in reaching its legal conclusions based
    upon the facts.
    Commonwealth v. Reppert, 
    814 A.2d 1196
    , 1200 (Pa. Super. 2002)
    (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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    J-A25042-14
    In Bidwell’s first sub-issue, he claims that there was “no reasonable
    suspicion to use [the] drug dog.” Brief for Bidwell at 15. We disagree.
    Pursuant to Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, a canine
    sniff constitutes a search.9 Commonwealth v. Johnston, 
    530 A.2d 74
    , 79
    (Pa. 1987). However, this type of search “is inherently less intrusive upon
    an individual’s privacy than other searches such as wiretapping or
    rummaging through one's luggage.”                  
    Id. Because canine
    searches
    “amount[] to a relatively minor intrusion upon privacy,” they need not be
    supported by probable cause.              Instead, the police must possess only
    reasonable suspicion that narcotics will be found in the area subject to the
    canine search. 
    Id. Reasonable suspicion
    is a less stringent standard than probable
    cause necessary to effectuate a warrantless arrest, and depends
    on the information possessed by police and its degree of
    reliability in the totality of the circumstances. In order to justify
    the seizure, a police officer must be able to point to “specific and
    articulable facts” leading him to suspect criminal activity is afoot.
    Commonwealth v. Brown, 
    996 A.2d 473
    , 477 (Pa. 2010) (citing Terry v.
    Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 88 (1968)).
    ____________________________________________
    9
    Cf. United States v. Place, 
    462 U.S. 696
    (1983) (holding that a sniff
    by a trained narcotics detection dog is not a search within the meaning of
    the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution).
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    J-A25042-14
    Here, Bidwell does not dispute that Corporal Nero stopped Bidwell’s
    tractor-trailer after observing two violations of the Motor Vehicle Code.10
    Bidwell argues that, once Corporal Nero issued a warning to Argot for those
    offenses, he no longer had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was
    afoot.    Bidwell therefore concludes that the canine search (which Corporal
    Nero conducted after the traffic stop had concluded) was unsupported by the
    required reasonable suspicion.
    Our review of the suppression record demonstrates that Corporal Bray
    informed Corporal Nero that a known confidential informant had reported
    that Bidwell and Argot would be returning from Philadelphia on the night in
    question. N.T., 4/2/2012, at 13, exh. 1. The confidential informant further
    stated that the pair would be transporting methamphetamine in a red
    tractor-trailer.   
    Id. The confidential
    informant had provided accurate and
    reliable information in the past. 
    Id. Moreover, the
    confidential informant’s
    tip was buttressed by the uncorroborated reports from three anonymous
    sources, which the police referred to as “concerned citizen,” “concerned
    resident,” and “confidential source” in the affidavit of probable cause.   
    Id. Each of
    these sources identified Bidwell and Argot as methamphetamine
    dealers, and at least one of the anonymous sources echoed the confidential
    ____________________________________________
    10
    See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3323(b) (duties at stop signs); 75 Pa.C.S. § 1332
    (display of registration plate).
    - 21 -
    J-A25042-14
    informant’s prediction that Bidwell and Argot would be traveling to
    Philadelphia to pick up bulk quantities of methamphetamine. 
    Id. Corporal Nero
    observed a tractor-trailer that matched the confidential
    informant’s description. Corporal Nero then identified the two occupants as
    Bidwell and Argot, and determined that Bidwell’s extensive criminal history
    included violations relating to the illegal manufacture and distribution of
    controlled substances. N.T., 4/2/2012, at 48. The trial court concluded that
    these facts, combined with the tip provided by a known confidential
    informant who had proven reliable in the past, were sufficient to give rise to
    reasonable suspicion.
    Our Supreme Court has held that an informant’s tip may produce
    probable cause—a requirement more stringent than the reasonable suspicion
    needed for a canine search—where police independently corroborate the tip,
    or where the informant has previously provided accurate information of
    criminal activity.   Commonwealth v. Luv, 
    735 A.2d 87
    , 90 (Pa. 1999).
    Here, the police possessed such a tip from a known informant who had
    proved to be reliable in the past.   That information was, to some degree,
    corroborated by anonymous tips from various “concerned citizens.” Finally,
    Corporal Nero observed Argot and Bidwell traveling in a vehicle consistent
    with the informant’s tip, at the time and in the direction that the informant
    - 22 -
    J-A25042-14
    predicted.    Accordingly, the trial court did not err in holding that Corporal
    Nero reasonably suspected that narcotics would be found in Bidwell’s truck. 11
    Next, Bidwell maintains that the affidavit in support of the search
    warrant did not “articulate reasons supporting the reliability of the alleged
    informants.”12 Brief for Bidwell at 20. This argument is without merit.
    When reviewing whether a search warrant was sufficiently supported
    by probable cause, we employ the “totality of the circumstances” analysis of
    Illinois v. Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    (1983).            See Commonwealth v. Gray,
    
    503 A.2d 921
    (Pa. 1985) (adopting the “totality of circumstances” test in
    Pennsylvania).
    The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical,
    common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set
    forth in the affidavit before him, including the “veracity” and
    “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay information,
    that there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
    ____________________________________________
    11
    In its December 17, 2013 opinion, the trial court noted that Bidwell
    appeared to be nervous throughout the traffic stop, and that Argot’s eyes
    were bloodshot “as though he were intoxicated.” T.C.O., 12/17/2013, at 18
    n.9.    The Commonwealth did not present this evidence at Bidwell’s
    suppression hearing. Therefore, we reject the trial court’s analysis insofar
    as it relied upon these factors in concluding that the canine search was
    supported by reasonable suspicion. See In re L.J., 
    79 A.3d 1073
    (Pa.
    2013) (holding that an appellate court’s scope of review in suppression
    matters includes only the suppression hearing record, and excludes any
    evidence elicited at trial).
    12
    Because we conclude that the canine sniff was supported by
    reasonable suspicion, we need not address Bidwell’s contention that the
    search warrant was “tainted by the unlawful sniff.” Brief for Bidwell at 20.
    - 23 -
    J-A25042-14
    crime will be found in a particular place. 
    Gray, 503 A.2d at 925
          (quoting 
    Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39
    ).
    Commonwealth v. Ceriani, 
    600 A.2d 1282
    , 1283-84 (Pa. Super. 1991).
    In reviewing the validity of a search warrant, the “reviewing court is
    limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence supporting the
    issuing authority’s decision to approve the warrant.”    Commonwealth v.
    Cramutola, 
    676 A.2d 1214
    , 1216 (Pa. Super. 1996). “We must limit our
    inquiry to the information within the four corners of the affidavit submitted
    in support of probable cause when determining whether the warrant was
    issued upon probable cause.” Commonwealth v. Rogers, 
    615 A.2d 55
    , 62
    (Pa. Super. 1992).
    Instantly, Bidwell takes issue with the three anonymous sources listed
    in the affidavit of probable cause, whose reliability and basis of knowledge
    were unknown to the police. Bidwell fails to overcome the fact that these
    sources were provided in addition to a known confidential informant who
    “ha[d] been deemed credible and reliable in the past through information
    provided.” Affidavit of Probable Cause, 11/19/2010, at 4.
    We have held that “[p]robable cause to support issuance of a search
    warrant is present where facts and circumstances within the affiant’s
    knowledge, of which he has reasonable trustworthy information, are
    sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in belief that
    a search should be conducted.”      Commonwealth v. Bruner, 
    564 A.2d 1277
    , 1282 (Pa. Super. 1989); see also Commonwealth v. Sudler, 436
    - 24 -
    J-A25042-14
    A.2d 1376 (Pa. 1981) (“[I]dentified citizens who report their observations of
    criminal activity to police are assumed to be trustworthy, in the absence of
    special circumstances.”). Therefore, Bidwell’s assertion that probable cause
    is lacking because the officers failed to corroborate the anonymous
    allegations in the warrant application is misplaced.13
    In his next sub-issue, Bidwell argues that the trial court erred in
    refusing to order the Commonwealth to disclose the identity of its
    confidential informant.14 We disagree.
    “Our standard of review of claims that a trial court erred in its
    disposition of a request for disclosure of an informant’s identity is confined to
    abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Washington, 
    63 A.3d 797
    , 801
    ____________________________________________
    13
    We also reject Bidwell’s contention that probable cause is lacking
    because the affidavit “fail[ed] to state that the canine was certified or
    otherwise reliable in the detection of controlled substances.” Brief for
    Bidwell at 26. It is well-established that an affidavit of probable cause “must
    be viewed in a common sense, nontechnical, ungrudging and positive
    manner.” Commonwealth v. Baker, 
    615 A.2d 23
    , 25 (Pa. 1992). Here,
    the affidavit of probable cause stated that Corporal Nero “deployed K9 Niko
    to conduct a narcotics sweep of the perimeter of vehicle. K9 Niko made a
    positive alert to the presence of a controlled substance about the vehicle.”
    Affidavit of Probable Cause, 11/19/2010, at 4. A common sense reading of
    the affidavit of probable cause belies Bidwell’s argument that the magistrate
    lacked information “that the canine was more than just an ordinary police
    dog.” Brief for Bidwell at 27.
    14
    The confidential informant initially reported that Bidwell and Argot
    would be returning from Philadelphia in a red tractor-trailer containing
    methamphetamine for distribution. Affidavit of Probable Cause, 11/19/2010,
    at 5.
    - 25 -
    J-A25042-14
    (Pa. Super. 2013).         The Commonwealth enjoys a qualified privilege to
    withhold the identity of a confidential source.      Commonwealth v. Bing,
    
    713 A.2d 56
    (Pa. 1998); Commonwealth v. Roebuck, 
    681 A.2d 1279
    ,
    1283 n.6 (Pa. 1996).         In order to overcome this qualified privilege and
    obtain disclosure of a confidential informant’s identity, a defendant first must
    establish that the information sought is material to the preparation of the
    defense, and that the request is reasonable. 
    Roebuck, 681 A.2d at 1283
    .
    Only after a defendant makes such a showing is the trial court required to
    determine whether the information should be revealed by balancing “the
    public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s
    right to prepare his defense.”        Commonwealth v. Marsh, 
    997 A.2d 318
    ,
    321-22 (Pa. 2010); 
    Bing, 713 A.2d at 58
    . Other relevant factors include the
    particular crime(s) charged, any possible defenses, and the potential
    significance of the informer’s testimony. 
    Marsh, 997 A.2d at 322
    .
    Instantly, Bidwell has failed to make a showing sufficient to overcome
    the Commonwealth’s qualified privilege to withhold the identity of its
    confidential informant.       Before the trial court, Bidwell asserted that the
    confidential informant was fictitious, but failed to offer any support for his
    claim.15    Moreover, even if Bidwell had made a compelling showing of
    ____________________________________________
    15
    Bidwell’s argument is weakened by the fact that the Commonwealth
    disclosed the identity of one of the confidential sources used in the
    preparation of the search warrant application. Because Kristen Wagner died
    prior to Bidwell’s trial, and her safety was therefore no longer in danger, the
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    - 26 -
    J-A25042-14
    materiality, his claim would still fail because “the disclosure of the identity of
    an informant is not required when the safety of the informant would be
    jeopardized.”     Bing, 
    551 713 A.2d at 60
    .             Here, the Commonwealth
    presented evidence that the confidential sources used in the preparation of
    the search warrant would be in danger of death or serious injury if their
    identities were revealed.        Indeed, the confidential sources explicitly stated
    that they feared that Bidwell would physically harm or kill them if he learned
    of their identities.     N.T., 4/2/2012, at 16.     The trial court also considered
    Bidwell’s violent criminal history, and the fact that the instant charges
    carried with them the possibility of a substantial period of incarceration.
    Based upon this evidence, the trial court concluded that disclosing the
    identity of the confidential sources would jeopardize their safety, and denied
    Bidwell’s motion. We discern no abuse of discretion in that ruling.
    In Bidwell’s fourth issue, he argues that the Commonwealth’s failure to
    disclose the identity of the confidential source who told police that Argot
    regularly sold him methamphetamine16 constituted a violation of Brady v.
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    Commonwealth disclosed her identity.       N.T., 4/2/2012, at 17.        The
    Commonwealth also supplied the defense with a recording of Wagner’s
    statement to the police. 
    Id. Despite this
    disclosure, Bidwell still maintains
    that the Commonwealth has fabricated the confidential informant. See e.g.,
    Brief for Bidwell at 22 (“If ordered to disclose the existence of the
    informants, the Commonwealth could not have complied since they did not
    exist.”).
    16
    This source was described in the affidavit of probable cause as follows:
    “On 9/21/2010 after an individual was arrested for the possession of a
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    - 27 -
    J-A25042-14
    Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
    (1963). Bidwell’s argument on this point consists of
    a single sentence summarizing the essential holding in Brady, followed by
    an assertion that the Commonwealth violated Brady in failing to provide the
    defense with the source’s identity. Bidwell provides no support for his claim
    that the identity of the source was material to his defense, nor does he
    explain how the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to
    disclose the source’s identity. Accordingly, Bidwell has waived this issue due
    to his failure to develop the argument in a manner sufficient to warrant our
    review.   See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    985 A.2d 915
    , 924 (Pa. 2009) (“[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any
    discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the
    issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is
    waived.”).
    In his final issue, Bidwell maintains that the trial court erred in
    “allowing [Corporal] Bray to testify that an eight ball [of methamphetamine]
    was consistent with an intent to deliver.” Brief for Bidwell at 30. Bidwell
    argues that “[Corporal] Bray had no support for his opinion other than the
    testimony [of] Argot, Dehaan[,] and Kitchell . . . that Bidwell had shared
    methamphetamine [with them] on prior occasions and [Corporal] Bray was
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    controlled substance, the individual provided information about the person
    who sells him narcotics. The individual identified Chase Argot as his drug
    dealer.” Affidavit of Probable Cause, 11/19/2010, at 3.
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    J-A25042-14
    simply being used to bolster their credibility.” Brief for Bidwell at 31. This
    claim is without merit.
    The admission of evidence is committed to the sound discretion
    of the trial court, and a trial court’s ruling regarding the
    admission of evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless that
    ruling reflects manifest unreasonableness, or partiality,
    prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support to be clearly
    erroneous.
    
    Pugh, 101 A.3d at 822
    (quoting Commonwealth v. Minich, 
    4 A.3d 1063
    ,
    1068 (Pa. Super. 2010)).
    Here, Corporal Bray testified as an expert in drug trafficking, and
    opined that the facts surrounding Bidwell’s possession of methamphetamine
    were consistent with possession with intent to deliver.    N.T., 5/7/2013, at
    110, 164-65. Corporal Bray testified that the quantity of methamphetamine
    found in Bidwell’s truck typically “would be re-packaged into a bunch of little
    bags . . . and then sold in smaller quantities.” 
    Id. at 161.
    Furthermore, the
    certified record belies Bidwell’s contention that Corporal Bray based his
    opinion solely upon the testimony of Argot, Dehaan, and Kitchell. Corporal
    Bray also considered the quantity and packaging of the methamphetamine,
    and the fact that the methamphetamine was in crystalline, rather than
    powder, form.     The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing
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    J-A25042-14
    Corporal Bray to testify that the amount of methamphetamine discovered in
    Bidwell’s tractor-trailer likely was intended for distribution.17
    For the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred in admitting evidence
    of Bidwell’s prior drug deliveries under the auspices of Rule 404(b). Because
    the certified record is devoid of any other compelling evidence of Bidwell’s
    intent    to   deliver    methamphetamine,         we   cannot   conclude    beyond    a
    reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.                  Accordingly, we vacate
    Bidwell’s judgment of sentence and remand for retrial.
    Judgment    of    sentence    vacated.         Case   remanded     for   further
    proceedings consistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/6/2015
    ____________________________________________
    17
    In light of our holding that the trial court erred in admitting the
    Commonwealth’s Rule 404(b) evidence, and because Corporal Bray based
    his opinion, at least in part, upon that testimony, Corporal Bray’s expert
    opinion necessarily may differ upon remand.
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