In Re: Adoption of: M.M.L.R., a Minor ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: M.M.L.R., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: K.L.A. & P.O.R., :
NATURAL PARENTS : No. 1322 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Decree Entered July 27, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2017-0072
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: C.J.I.R., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: K.L.A. AND P.O.R., :
NATURAL PARENTS : No. 1323 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Decree Entered July 27, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2017-0084
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MURRAY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED FEBRUARY 06, 2018
Appellant’s, K.L.A. (“Mother”) and P.O.R. (“Father”), appeal from the
decrees entered in the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans
Court Division, which granted the petitions of the York County Offices of
Children Youth and Families (“CYF”) for involuntary termination of Mother
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and Father’s parental rights to their minor children, M.M.L.R. and C.J.I.R.
(“Children”) and changed the goal for M.M.L.R. to adoption. We affirm.
In May 2016, Children Youth and Families (“CYF”) received a referral
about M.M.L.R. At birth, M.M.L.R. was placed on a feeding tube and hospital
staff immediately had concerns about parents’ ability to feed and care for
the child. CYF obtained an emergency protective custody order on May 23,
2016, and the court ordered M.M.L.R. placed in foster care when released
from the hospital. CYF visited the home, which was in deplorable condition.
On May 26, 2016, the court held a shelter care hearing and awarded
legal and physical custody of M.M.L.R. to CYF. The court adjudicated
M.M.L.R. dependent on July 27, 2016. While the proceedings were ongoing,
Mother became pregnant and gave birth to parents’ second child, C.J.I.R.
C.J.I.R. was immediately placed in the same foster home as M.M.L.R. and
adjudicated dependent on May 5, 2017. CYF filed a petition for a goal
change and for involuntary termination of parents’ parental rights to
M.M.L.R. on May 4, 2017; on June 1, 2017, CYF filed a petition for
involuntary termination of parents’ parental rights to C.J.I.R. The court held
a termination hearing on July 19, 2017. At the conclusion of the hearing,
the court entered separate decrees (filed July 27, 2017) granting involuntary
termination of parents’ parental rights to Children. On August 2, 2017, the
court changed the goal of M.M.L.R. to adoption. The initial goal for C.J.I.R.
was adoption, so there was no goal change ordered for C.J.I.R. Parents
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timely filed notices of appeal from the termination decrees at No. 1322 MDA
2017 regarding M.M.L.R. and at No. 1323 MDA 2017 regarding C.J.I.R.
Parents also filed Rule 1925 statements on August 23, 2017. On August 24,
2017, Parents timely filed a notice of appeal from the goal change order
regarding M.M.L.R. at No. 1329 MDA 2017, with a Rule 1925 statement. On
September 14, 2017, this Court sua sponte consolidated the termination
appeals at Nos. 1322 and 1323 MDA 2017, at journal number J-S01041-18,
and listed the related goal-change appeal consecutively at journal number J-
S01042-18. Nevertheless, Parents raise identical issues in both cases.
Parents raise four issues for our review:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CHANGING THE
GOAL FROM REUNIFICATION TO ADOPTION?
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TERMINATING THE
PARENTAL RIGHTS OF MOTHER AND FATHER PURSUANT
TO SECTIONS 2511(A)(1), (2), (5) AND (8) OF THE
ADOPTION ACT?
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS WOULD BEST
SERVE THE NEEDS AND WELFARE OF THE CHILDREN
PURSUANT TO SECTION 2511(B) OF THE ADOPTION ACT?
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TERMINATING THE
PARENTAL RIGHTS OF MOTHER AND FATHER IN LIGHT OF
THE AGE OF THE MINOR CHILDREN?
(Parents’ Brief at 14).
On appeal, goal change decisions are subject to an abuse of discretion
standard of review. In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 822 (Pa.Super. 2006).
In order to conclude that the trial court abused its
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discretion, we must determine that the court’s judgment
was manifestly unreasonable, that the court did not apply
the law, or that the court’s action was a result of partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the record. We are
bound by the trial court’s findings of fact that have support
in the record. The trial court, not the appellate court, is
charged with the responsibilities of evaluating credibility of
the witnesses and resolving any conflicts in the testimony.
In carrying out these responsibilities, the trial court is free
to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. When the
trial court’s findings are supported by competent evidence
of record, we will affirm, even if the record could also
support an opposite result.
Id. at 822-23 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
The Juvenile Act controls the disposition of dependent children. In re
R.P., 957 A.2d 1205, 1217 (Pa.Super. 2008). Section 6351 provides in
relevant part:
§ 6351. Disposition of dependent child
* * *
(f) Matters to be determined at permanency
hearing.—At each permanency hearing, a court shall
determine all of the following:
(1) The continuing necessity for and
appropriateness of the placement.
(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of
compliance with the permanency plan developed for
the child.
(3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating
the circumstances which necessitated the original
placement.
(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the
current placement goal for the child.
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(5) The likely date by which the placement goal for
the child might be achieved.
(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to
finalize the permanency plan in effect.
(6) Whether the child is safe.
* * *
(9) If the child has been in placement for at least
15 of the last 22 months or the court has determined
that aggravated circumstances exist and that
reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need
to remove the child from the child’s parent, guardian
or custodian or to preserve and reunify the family
need not be made or continue to be made, whether
the county agency has filed or sought to join a
petition to terminate parental rights and to identify,
recruit, process and approve a qualified family to
adopt the child unless:
(i) the child is being cared for by a relative
best suited to the physical, mental and moral
welfare of the child;
(ii) the county agency has documented a
compelling reason for determining that filing a
petition to terminate parental rights would not
serve the needs and welfare of the child; or
(iii) the child’s family has not been provided
with necessary services to achieve the safe
return to the child’s parent, guardian or
custodian within the time frames set forth in the
permanency plan.
* * *
(f.1) Additional determination.—Based upon the
determinations made under subsection (f) and all relevant
evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall
determine one of the following:
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(1) If and when the child will be returned to the
child’s parent, guardian or custodian in cases where
the return of the child is best suited to the safety,
protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of
the child.
(2) If and when the child will be placed for
adoption, and the county agency will file for
termination of parental rights in cases where return
to the child’s parent, guardian or custodian is not
best suited to the safety, protection and physical,
mental and moral welfare of the child.
(3) If and when the child will be placed with a legal
custodian in cases where the return to the child’s
parent, guardian or custodian or being placed for
adoption is not best suited to the safety, protection
and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.
(4) If and when the child will be placed with a fit
and willing relative in cases where return to the
child’s parent, guardian or custodian, being placed
for adoption or being placed with a legal custodian is
not best suited to the safety, protection and physical,
mental and moral welfare of the child.
* * *
(f.2) Evidence.—Evidence of conduct by the parent that
places the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk,
including evidence of the use of alcohol or a controlled
substance that places the health, safety or welfare of the
child at risk, shall be presented to the court by the county
agency or any other party at any disposition or
permanency hearing whether or not the conduct was the
basis for the determination of dependency.
(g) Court order.—On the basis of the determination
made under subsection (f.1), the court shall order the
continuation, modification or termination of placement or
other disposition which is best suited to the safety,
protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the
child.
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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f), (f.1), (f.2), (g).
“When the child welfare agency has made reasonable efforts to return
a [dependent] child to [the child’s] biological parent, but those efforts have
failed, then the agency must redirect its efforts towards placing the child in
an adoptive home.” In re N.C., supra at 823 (citing In re G.P.-R., 851
A.2d 967, 973 (Pa.Super. 2004)).
Although the agency has the burden to show a goal change
would serve the child’s best interests, “[s]afety,
permanency, and well-being of the child must take
precedence over all other considerations” under Section
6351. In re D.P., 972 A.2d 1221, 1227 (Pa.Super. 2009),
appeal denied, 601 Pa. 702, 973 A.2d 1007 (2009)
(emphasis in original); In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 978
(Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 598 Pa. 782, 959 A.2d
320 (2008). “[T]he parent’s rights are secondary” in a
goal change proceeding. In re D.P., supra.Because the focus is on the child’s best interests, a goal
change to adoption might be appropriate, even when a
parent substantially complies with a reunification plan. In
re N.C., supra at 826-27. Where a parent’s “skills,
including her judgment with regard to the emotional well-
being of her children, remain problematic[,]” a goal change
to adoption might be appropriate, regardless of the
parent’s compliance with a permanency plan. Id. at 825.
The agency is not required to offer services indefinitely,
where a parent is unable to properly apply the instruction
provided. In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 340 (Pa.Super.
2002). See also In re S.B., supra at 981 (giving priority
to child’s safety and stability, despite parent’s substantial
compliance with permanency plan); In re A.P., 728 A.2d
375, 379 (Pa.Super. 1999), appeal denied, 560 Pa. 693,
743 A.2d 912 (1999) (holding where, despite willingness,
parent cannot meet “irreducible minimum parental
responsibilities, the needs of the child must prevail over
the rights of the parent”). Thus, even where the parent
makes earnest efforts, the “court cannot and will not
subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and
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stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the
future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513
(Pa.Super. 2006).
In re R.M.G., 997 A.2d 339, 347 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 608 Pa.
648, 12 A.3d 372 (2010) (some internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Appellate review of termination of parental rights cases implicates the
following principles:
In cases involving termination of parental rights: “our
standard of review is limited to determining whether the
order of the trial court is supported by competent
evidence, and whether the trial court gave adequate
consideration to the effect of such a decree on the welfare
of the child.”
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Pa.Super. 2010) (quoting In re I.J., 972
A.2d 5, 8 (Pa.Super. 2009)).
Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or
insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s
decision, the decree must stand. … We must
employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record
in order to determine whether the trial court’s
decision is supported by competent evidence.
In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en
banc), appeal denied, 581 Pa. 668, 863 A.2d 1141 (2004)
(internal citations omitted).
Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the
finder of fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility
of witnesses and all conflicts in testimony are to be
resolved by the finder of fact. The burden of proof is
on the party seeking termination to establish by
clear and convincing evidence the existence of
grounds for doing so.
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In re Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 228 (Pa.Super.
2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
The standard of clear and convincing evidence means
testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing
as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
without hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.
In re J.D.W.M., 810 A.2d 688, 690 (Pa.Super. 2002). We
may uphold a termination decision if any proper basis
exists for the result reached. In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197,
1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc). If the court’s findings
are supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the
court’s decision, even if the record could support an
opposite result. In re R.L.T.M., 860 A.2d 190, 191-92
(Pa.Super. 2004).
In re Z.P., supra at 1115-16 (quoting In re Adoption of K.J., 936 A.2d
1128, 1131-32 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 597 Pa. 718, 951 A.2d
1165 (2008)).
CYF filed a petition for the involuntary termination of Parents’ parental
rights to Children on the following grounds:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General Rule.―The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of
at least six months immediately preceding the filing
of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose
of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has
refused or failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
well-being and the conditions and causes of the
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied by the parent.
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* * *
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency for a period of at least six months,
the conditions which led to the removal or placement
of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or
will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable
period of time, the services or assistance reasonably
available to the parent are not likely to remedy the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child within a reasonable period of time and
termination of the parental rights would best serve
the needs and welfare of the child.
* * *
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed
from the date of removal or placement, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child continue to exist and termination of
parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating
the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to
the developmental, physical and emotional needs and
welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be
terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors
such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing
and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the
parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to
subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider
any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to
the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b). “Parental rights
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may be involuntarily terminated where any one subsection of Section
2511(a) is satisfied, along with consideration of the subsection 2511(b)
provisions.” In re Z.P., supra at 1117.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The
party seeking termination must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the
statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section
2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent’s
conduct warrants termination of [the parent’s] parental
rights does the court engage in the second part of the
analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best
interests of the child.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted).
Termination under Section 2511(a)(1) involves the following:
To satisfy the requirements of [S]ection 2511(a)(1), the
moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence
of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to
the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a
settled intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a
refusal or failure to perform parental duties. In addition,
Section 2511 does not require that the parent
demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to
perform parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights
may be terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) if
the parent either demonstrates a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to
perform parental duties.
Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental
duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights,
the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the
parent’s explanation for [the parent’s] conduct; (2) the
post-abandonment contact between parent and child; and
(3) consideration of the effect of termination of parental
rights on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).
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In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations
omitted). Regarding the six-month period prior to filing the termination
petition:
[T]he trial court must consider the whole history of a given
case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory
provision. The court must examine the individual
circumstances of each case and consider all explanations
offered by the parent facing termination of [the parent’s]
parental rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the
totality of the circumstances, clearly warrants the
involuntary termination.
In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa.
718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005) (internal citations omitted).
The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section
2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not
limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary those grounds may include
acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re
A.L.D., supra at 337. “Parents are required to make diligent efforts
towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities.”
Id. at 340. The fundamental test in termination of parental rights under
Section 2511(a)(2) was long ago stated in the case of In re Geiger, 459 Pa.
636, 331 A.2d 172 (1975), where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
announced that under what is now Section 2511(a)(2), “the petitioner for
involuntary termination must prove (1) repeated and continued incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal
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caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” In Interest of Lilley, 719 A.2d
327, 330 (Pa.Super. 1998).
“Termination of parental rights under Section 2511(a)(5) requires
that: (1) the child has been removed from parental care for at least six
months; (2) the conditions which led to removal and placement of the child
continue to exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the child.” In re Z.P., supra at 1118.
“[T]o terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a)(8), the following
factors must be demonstrated: (1) [t]he child has been removed from
parental care for 12 months or more from the date of removal; (2) the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to
exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-76
(Pa.Super. 2003). “Section 2511(a)(8) sets a 12–month time frame for a
parent to remedy the conditions that led to the children's removal by the
court.” In re A.R., 837 A.2d 560, 564 (Pa.Super. 2003). Once the 12–
month period has been established, the court must next determine whether
the conditions that led to the child's removal continue to exist, despite the
reasonable good faith efforts of the Agency supplied over a realistic time.
Id. Termination under Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to
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evaluate a parent’s current willingness or ability to remedy the conditions
that initially caused placement or the availability or efficacy of Agency
services. In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 396 (Pa.Super. 2003);
In re Adoption of M.E.P., supra.
Under Section 2511(b), the court must consider whether termination
will meet the child’s needs and welfare. In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 520
(Pa.Super. 2006). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability
are involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child. The
court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond,
paying close attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing the
bond.” Id. Significantly:
In this context, the court must take into account whether a
bond exists between child and parent, and whether
termination would destroy an existing, necessary and
beneficial relationship.
When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not
required to use expert testimony. Social workers and
caseworkers can offer evaluations as well. Additionally,
Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.
In re Z.P., supra at 1121 (internal citations omitted).
“The statute permitting the termination of parental rights outlines
certain irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents must provide
for their children, and a parent who cannot or will not meet the requirements
within a reasonable time following intervention by the state, may properly be
considered unfit and have [the parent’s] rights terminated.” In re B.L.L.,
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787 A.2d 1007, 1013 (Pa.Super. 2001). This Court has said:
There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties.
Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of
a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and
support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be
met by a merely passive interest in the development of the
child. Thus, this [C]ourt has held that the parental
obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative
performance.
This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial
obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a
genuine effort to maintain communication and association
with the child.
Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental
duty requires that [parent’s must exert themselves] to
take and maintain a place of importance in the child’s life.
Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively
with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every
problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship
to the best of [the parent’s] ability, even in difficult
circumstances. A parent must utilize all available
resources to preserve the parental relationship, and must
exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed
in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship.
Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a more
suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental
responsibilities while others provide the child with his or
her physical and emotional needs.
In re B.,N.M., supra at 855 (internal citations omitted). “[A] parent’s basic
constitutional right to the custody and rearing of [the parent’s] child is
converted, upon the failure to fulfill [the parent’s] parental duties, to the
child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential
in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” Id. at 856.
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
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applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Kathleen J.
Prendergast, we conclude Parents’ issues merit no relief. The Orphans Court
opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions
presented. (See Orphans’ Court Opinions, filed July 27, 2017, at 1-13 and
September 21, 2017, at 2-7) (finding: (1) in deciding to change M.M.L.R.’s
goal to adoption, court considered number of factors including child’s need
for stability, consistency, and permanency to best serve child’s needs; for all
reasons that follow regarding termination of parents’ parental rights,
changing goal to adoption was proper; (2) court focused on Sections
2511(a)(2), (5), and (8); notwithstanding their best efforts, parents are
unable to care for Children; both parents were incapable of caring for
Children when common events occurred, such as Children becoming sick,
and parents required constant supervision; testimony from multiple
witnesses indicated parents most likely cannot ever reach point where they
could care for Children without supervision; parents have below average
capacity to parent; CYF has provided services for over one year but parents
have been unable to show significant improvement in their parenting
abilities; conditions which led to M.M.L.R.’s removal continue to exist, such
as severe environmental issues, parenting skills, and ability to meet
Children’s needs on regular basis; M.M.L.R. has special needs that parents
cannot address and which require early intervention; C.J.I.R. has been in
foster care since birth; Mother has been unable to reach point where she can
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be unsupervised with Children for specific period of time; parents were
unable to handle incident where one child was vomiting; becoming sick is
common and foreseeable circumstance; parental inability to address that
issue without supervision indicates to court that Children are without
essential parental care and control; parents’ decisions regarding housing and
pets in home creates questions about their ability to provide ongoing,
appropriate environment for Children; despite best efforts of Catholic
Charities team, parents were unable to make significant progress with issues
they needed to address; continued services will unlikely aid parents; parents
lack basic skills such as changing diapers without prompting and engaging in
appropriate activities with Children; M.M.L.R. has been in care for over 12
months; conditions which led to her removal continue to exist; C.J.I.R. has
been in care almost 12 months, since three weeks after her birth; court will
not find Section 2511(a)(8) applies to C.J.I.R. since she has not been in
foster care for more than 12 months, but court can glean from record that
parents will be unable to remedy conditions which led to removal of C.J.I.R.
as well; based on parents’ intellectual limitations, they cannot meet
Children’s needs at this point in time; (3) parents are living in maternal
grandmother’s home which is in poor condition; Catholic Charities tried to
address some hygiene issues such as pet feces on floor, urine in bottles, and
sewage everywhere; Children have developed close bond with foster
parents, who have become Children’s primary caretakers; familiarity bond
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between M.M.L.R. and Mother is similar to bond between M.M.L.R. and
caseworker; it would be detrimental to pull M.M.L.R. from foster parents’
care; Children are bonded to foster parents; foster parents have been
primary caregivers for both Children; termination of parents’ parental rights
will serve Children’s best interests (4) given young age when Children were
placed into foster care, Children have developed close bond only with their
foster parents; M.M.L.R. has some bond of familiarity with Mother; Father
has even less bond with M.M.L.R. due to Father’s unwillingness or inability to
interact with her). Accordingly, we affirm based on the Orphans’ Court’s
opinions.
Decrees affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 02/06/2018
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Circulated 01/30/2018 11:16 AM
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF YORK COUNTY, PENNSYL¥.ANf�
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In re: Adoption of:
M.M.L.R. No. 2017-0072
C.J.I.R. No. 2017-0084
Minors Termination of Parental Rights
OPINION IN SUPPORT OF ORDER PURSUANT TO Pa.R.A.P. No. 1925(a)
Appellants, � ("Mother") and }
("Father"), appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania the Judgment entered by this
Court on July 27, 2017. On August 23, 2017, pursuant to Pa.RAP. No. 1925(a)(2)(i),
Mother and Father filed a Statement of f-r"V"'oV-6 Complained of on Appeal ("Statement").
Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. No. 1925(a)(2)(ii), the Court issues the following Opinion.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 25, 2017, a Petition to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of the
parents over the children, · (M.M.L.R) and c
(CJ.LR.), was ordered by this Court. On July 31, 2017, the
Court granted the York County Office of Children Youth and Families' (hereinafter
"CYF" or "the Agency") Petition to change the court-ordered goal from reunification
with a parent to placement for adoption for M.M.L.R. Mother and Father filed a Notice
of Appeal for both orders on August 23 and 24, 2017. This Opinion follows.
DISCUSSION
The reasons for this Court's Order granting the Petition to change the court-
ordered goal from reunification with a parent to termination of parental rights and
placement for adoption and petition to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of the
parents of the Children already appear of record in the July 27, 2017 Opinion and Order
("Opinion"). The Court's decision is consistent with the weight of the evidence provided
at trial and now it supplements its Opinion with the following to address each issue
raised.
1. The first issue raised is whether there was an error in changing the goal from
reunification to adoption.
The standard of review for a challenge to a trial court's order changing the goal of
a dependent child to adoption is abuse of discretion. In re N.C., 2006 PA Super 285, � 11,
909 A.2d 818, 822 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) citing In re G.P.-R., 2004 PA Super 205, 851
A.2d 967, 973 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004). The trial court must be upheld unless the "court's
judgment was manifestly unreasonable, that the court did not apply the law, or that the
court's action was a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the
record." Id. at 823. The reviewing court is "bound by the trial court's findings of fact that
have support in the record." Id.
On review, the Superior Court has stated that, "[t]he trial court must focus on the
child and determine the goal with reference to the child's best interests, not those of the
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parents." In re S.B., 208 Pa.Super. 21, 943 A.2d 973, 978 (2008). The "safety,
permanency, and well-being of the child must take precedence over all other
considerations." In re N.C., 909 A.2d at 823. "Further, at the review hearing for a
dependent child who has been removed from the parental home, the court must consider
the statutorily mandated factors." Id.In reaching the determination to change the Court Ordered Goal to adoption, the
Court cited a number of factors, including the need for the child to have stability,
consistency, and permanency to serve the best interest of the child who the Court ruled
for a change of goal, M.R. While this factor was listed first on the 1925(a) form filed, it
really should be considered last. All of the reasons stated for the termination below relate
to the change of goal and do not need to be repeated. It does not make sense to have a
goal as anything other than adoption when the children have been in a stable foster home
and the rights of the parents have been terminated.
2. The second issue raised was whether the court erred in terminating the parental
rights of Mother and Father pursuant to Sections 251 l(a)(l), (2), (5), and (8) of the
Adoption Act.
The standard of review by the Superior Court of an appeal from a decree
terminating parental rights is limited to determining whether the decision of the trial court
is supported by competent evidence. In re K.C.W., 456 Pa.Super. 1, 689 A.2d 294, 298
(1997). Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support
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for the trial court's decision, the decree must stand. Id. Where a trial court has granted a
petition to involuntarily terminate parental rights, the Superior Court must accord the trial
judge's decision the same deference given to a jury verdict. In re Child M., 452 Pa.Super.
230, 681 A.2d 793, 800 (1996). The Superior Court employs a comprehensive review of
the record to determine whether the trial court's decision is supported by competent
evidence. In re Matsock, 416 Pa.Super. 520, 611 A.2d 737, 742 (1992). The
"[p]ermissible grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights are specified in 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511," as discussed above. In re C.S., 2000 PA Super 318, ,r,r 8-9, 761 A.2d
1197, 1199-200 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
Under 23 Pa.C.S. §2511, the court may terminate the rights of a parent if any one
of the eleven factors exist. This Court stated that they were going to focus primarily on
§251 l(a)(2),(5), and (8). (Opinion, page 3.) As discussed in the Opinion, this case was
not a case of the parents willfully neglecting their children, but rather a case where,
despite the best efforts of the services being provided, the Mother could not care for the
children. (Id.) Section 251 l(a)(2) discusses a reason for the termination of parental
rights to be the repeated and continued incapacity of a parent that has caused the child to
go without essential parental care needed for the child's physical or mental wellbeing that
cannot be remedied by the parent. Both parents were incapable of caring for the children
when common events, such as the child becoming sick, occurred and needed constant
supervision. (Id.) There was testimony by many of the caregivers that the parents will
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most likely never be able to get to the point where they can sufficiently care for the
children without supervision. (Id. at 5.) Therefore, this Court feels as though the
necessary grounds exist under this section to terminate the parental rights in regards to
both children.
Section 251 l(a)(S) indicates that if the conditions that which lead to the removal
or placement of a child with an agency exists for a period of at least six months after the
child has been removed, and the parents cannot remedy those conditions within a
reasonable time, then termination may be best to serve the needs of the children. The
Opinion outlines and points to example after example of services and reports that indicate
that Mother and Father have below the average capacity as parents. (Id.) The parents
have had over a year worth of services that have not been able to yield to any significant
improvement in their parenting abilities. (Id. at 5-6.) Therefore, this Court feels as
though the necessary grounds exist under this section to terminate the parental rights in
regards to both children.
Section 251 l(a)(S) indicates that if the children have been removed or have been
place with an agency for a period of 12 months or more and the conditions which led to
the removal or placement continue to exist, then termination of parental rights would best
serve the needs and welfare of the child. In regards to child, M.R., the conditions that
have led to her removal continue to exist, such as severe environmental issues, parenting
skills issues, and the ability to have her needs met on a regular basis. (Id. at 7.) M.R.
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also has special needs that are not being addressed at home and require Early
Intervention. (Id.) Child, C.R., has been placed with the agency since birth, which has
not quite been 12 months. (Id.) Therefore, this Court feels it has met the necessary
grounds for child, C.R., but not child, M.R. under this factor.
Since 23 Pa.C.S. §2511 only requires that one of the factors is met, this Court
feels as though it has successfully moved in the best interests of the child and did not err
in terminating the parental rights.
3. The third issue raised was whether there was an error in concluding that
termination of parental rights would best serve the children under Section 2511 (b) of the
Adoption Act. As outlined in the Opinion on page 8, the Court believes that terminating
the parental rights would be the best option for the children at this time.
Under 23 Pa.C.S. §251 l(b), the court must give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the children, and the rights
of the parents cannot be terminated solely on a basis of environmental factors if they are
beyond the control of the parent. In this case, the parents are living in maternal
grandmother's home which is in poor condition, to say the least. (Id. at 8-9.) Services,
such as Catholic Charities tried to address some of the hygiene issues, but only so much
could be done when, throughout the entire home, there were pet feces on the floor, urine
in bottles, and sewage everywhere. (Id. at 9.) Furthermore, the children have developed
a close bond with the foster parents, as the foster parents have become their primary
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caretakers. (Id.) M.R. 's bond with Mother is nothing more than the bond M.R. has with
the caseworker. (Id. at 10.) Therefore this Court feels as ifit would be detrimental to
pull her from such a close bond.
4. The fourth issue raised was whether there was an error in terminating the parental
rights of Mother and Father in light of the age of the children. It is precisely the child's
age that makes this Court feel as though the child's best interests are termination of
parental rights. Due to the very young age that the children began their time with the
foster family, both children have developed a very close bond with their foster parents.
(Id.) The bond that the caseworker has described between the M.R. and Mother, in
particular, is nothing more than a familiarity bond. (Id.) Father and M.R. have even less
of a bond due to Father's unwillingness or inability to interact with her. (Id.)
CONCLUSION
In changing the dependent Children's permanency goals to adoption and
terminating the parental rights of AppellantsJthe Court respectfully submits that there was
no abuse of discretion or error as a matter oflaw. This Court relies on its ruling from
July 19, 2017. This Court respectfully requests that the Superior Court find the matters
Appellanscomplain of meritless and affirm this Court's Order.
BY THE COURT:
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Dated: September 1,\, 2017 KATHLEEN J. PRENDERGAST, JUDGE
The Prothonotary is directed to serve copies of this order on Counsel for the
parties and the Agency, as required by law.
8
Circulated 01/30/2018 11:16 AM
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF YORK COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA
In the Interest of CP-67-DP-0000155-2016
2017-0072
[M.R.] and
[C.R.]' CP-67-DP-0000138-2017
2017-0084
Minors
York, Pa., Wednesday, July 19, 2017
Before the Honorable Kathleen J. Prendergast, Judge
APPEARANCES:
MARTIN MILLER, Esquire .....,
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For York county office of children, '- -"
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ALSO PRESENT:
MARLA SPEIR, caseworker
* * *
ORDER AND OPINION
25 There are two issues before the court
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3 today as well as two children, we have a termination of
4 parental rights and change of goal for [M.R.], we have a
5 termination of parental rights for [C.R.] but not a
6 change of goal, as her goal is already adoption, and we
7 have a status conference with regard to both children.
8 I will be addressing each of those issues at this point.
9 Also, with regard to the termination of
10 parental rights, that relates to the termination of
11 rights of Mother as well as the termination of rights of
12 Father for both children. I just want to be sure that I
13 touch on all of those issues. I'm going to start with
14 termination of parental rights, as that will affect all
15 of the other issues the court is going to address.
16 The court has no question that both
17 parents love both of these children. The question
18 before the court though is are they now or would they be
19 at some reasonable point in the future able to care for
20 these children full time.
21 Specifically, grounds for involuntary
22 termination are found at 23 Pa.c.s. section 2511, and
23 the court may terminate rights of a parent if they find
24 only one of any of the following grounds that may exist
25 in this case. The court is going to specifically
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3 address section (a)(2), (5) and (8).
4 section (2) says the repeated and
5 continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of a
6 parent has caused the child to be without essential
7 parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his
8 physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
9 causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal
10 cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
11 Especially in the case of Mother, the
12 court commends her for her efforts. This is not a case,
13 especially with Mother, of will not but perhaps a case
14 of cannot. Despite the services that have been
15 provided, Mother has not been able to get to a position
16 where she could be unsupervised with the children for
17 any specific period of time.
18 The court especially finds the testimony
19 with regard to when the child vomited to be disturbing
20 from a point of view of the ability of the parents to
21 move forward with substantial, unsupervised time. A
22 child being physically ill is a common and foreseeable
23 circumstance in which a child may find themselves. The
24 parents' inability to address that issue without
25 supervision indicates to the court that their current
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3 incapacity that they cannot address or have not been
4 able to address affects their ability to parent and
5 provides a situation where the children are without
6 essential parental care and control in those
7 circumstances.
8 other circumstances relate to the housing
9 issue, their ability to address their relationship
10 issues as it affects their parenting, decisions to have
11 pets, like bunn,es and snakes, at a time when they may
12 not be able to meet their own needs creates questions
13 about their ability to provide an ongoing, appropriate
14 environment for the children.
15 Therefore, the court does find that the
16 conditions to terminate parental rights under (a)(2)
17 exist at this time.
18 section (5) indicates that a child has
19 been removed from the care of a parent by the Court
20 under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period
21 of at least six months, the conditions which led to the
22 removal or placement of the child continues to exist,
23 the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions
24 within a reasonable period of time, the services or
25 assistance reasonably available to the parents are not
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3 likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal
4 or placement of the child within a reasonable period of
5 time and termination of the parental rights would best
6 serve the needs and welfare of the child.
7 As previously noted in the report by
8 Dr. Gransee on page 10 of Exhibit 6, he notes that with
9 regard to Father "his capacity to parent seems
10 compromised and well below average and it is likely the
11 case that he will continue to make immature judgments
12 and to evince immature emotional and behavioral
13 functioning regardless of any interventions."
14 while that report was done in 2016,
15 catholic charities was put in place to attempt to
16 provide such interventions. Despite the best efforts of
17 the catholic charities team, unfortunately the parents
18 were not able to make significant progress with regard
19 to the issues they needed to address. Additionally, it
20 is unlikely that continued services are unlikely to do
21 so.
22 The catholic charities team opened
23 May 20th of 2016. Ms. Ohl was there six hours a week
24 working with the parents and has been unable to even
25 bring them to the point where they can be unsupervised
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3 for any significant period of time. It is unlikely that
4 her continued involvement will bring them to a point
5 where within a reasonable time they will be able to
6 address the issues that led to the placement.
7 Specific examples were noted during her
8 testimony with regard to again the relationship issues
9 between the parents, inability to address issues
10 relating to basic parenting skills, like diaper changes,
11 without prompting, and engaging in other appropriate
12 activities with the children.
13 Therefore, the court finds that grounds
14 also exist under (a)(5).
15 (A)(B) indicates that a child has been
16 removed from the care of a parent by the court or under
17 a voluntary agreement with the agency, 12 months or more
18 have elapsed from the date or removal of placement, the
19 conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
20 child continue to exist and termination of parental
21 rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the
22 child.
23 With regard to [M.R.], she has been in
24 care for a period of 12 months. The conditions which
25 led to her removal continue to exist based on the
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3 testimony. specifically, those conditions were pretty
4 severe environmental issues at the grandmother's house,
5 parenting skills issues with regard to the parents and
6 the ability to have her needs met on a regular basis.
7 Additionally, with [M.R.], she has some
8 special needs that required Early Intervention that were
9 not being appropriately addressed at the time that she
10 came into care and the court questions whether the
11 parents have the ongoing ability to meet her special
12 needs going forward.
13 with regard to [C.R.], she came into care
14 basically upon her birth. while she has not been in
15 care for the 12-month period, the court can glean from
16 the situation with [M.R.] that the parents �re not going
17 to be in a position to address her needs either. she's
18 even younger and therefore more vulnerable. However,
19 given that she has not been in care for 12 months, the
20 court cannot find that (8) applies to [C.R.]'s case.
21 The court can, however, find that (8) applies to
22 [M.R.]'s case.
23 As stated previously, the court only
24 needs to find one ground to terminate, so clearly that
25 exists for both children as it relates to both parents
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3 at this point in time.
4 Again, the court stresses that this is
5 not about love, as the court believes that the parents
6 love the children, and this is not, especially ,n
7 Mother's case, about a lack of effort because the court
8 believes that Mother has made or used significant
9 effort, it is about their limitations creating a case
10 where they cannot meet the needs of the children at this
11 point in time.
12 Moving on to Section (b), the court must
13 also give primary consideration to the developmental,
14 physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.
15 The rights of a parent cannot be terminated solely on a
16 basis of environmental factors, such as inadequate
17 housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care,
18 if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
19 one thing that the Court finds may have
20 been difficult for both parents is that they have not
21 had the best role models themselves in terms of
22 parenting. To describe the conditions of maternal
23 grandmother's house indicates to the court that not only
24 are those the conditions that the parents were more or
25 less economically trapped in to raise their children,
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3 those are the conditions in which maternal grandmother
4 felt it was appropriate to raise Mother.
5 The court appreciates that the catholic
6 charities team has tried to address hygiene issues, but
7 that is very difficult when her role model was raising
8 her in an environment where it was okay to have pet
9 feces on the floor, urine in bottles around the house,
10 sewage throughout the house and other environmental
11 issues.
12 while parents were limited to start, the
13 court does not feel that maternal grandmother's house in
14 particular created an effective role model for Mother
15 which only further complicated what she needed to know
16 in order to raise her children in a different
17 environment.
18 Nonetheless, while the court is
19 sympathetic to mother's position at this point and the
20 substantial burdens that she has faced and continues to
21 face, the court must be concerned about the best
22 interests of her children.
23 The children have bonded with the foster
24 parents. In fact, both of them throughout their lives
25 have been primarily in the care of the foster parents.
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3 Notably, the caseworker described [M.R.]'s bond with
4 Mother as a familiarity bond that may not be
5 significantly different from the one that [M.R.] has
6 with the caseworker herself. The caseworker indicated
7 that the most significant relationships are with the
8 foster family, that that is the family with whom she has
9 an extremely strong bond and the court believes that it
10 would be detrimental to pull her from that situation at
11 this point in time.
12 Because of the age of the children when
13 they began living with the foster parents, if the
14 children have a significant bond, at this point it is
15 with the foster parents. The court believes that the
16 caseworker's description of a familiarity bond is
17 credible as it relates to Mother's bond.
18 The caseworker further testified that the
19 child may not even have that level of a bond with Father
20 given his unwillingness or inability to interact with
21 [M.R.] even in a supervised setting and his deference to
22 Mother's responsibilities in that situation.
23 Therefore, it does appear to be , n the
24 best interests of the children considering their bonds
25 with the foster parents as well as a lack of anything
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3 beyond a familiarity bond with the parents to move
4 forward with the termination.
5 Therefore, at this time the court will
6 find that it is in the best interests of the children to
7 terminate the parental rights of both Mother and Father
8 as it relates to [C.R.] and to [M.R.].
9 Moving next to the issue of the change of
10 goal for [M.R.], having found that termination of
11 parental rights is appropriate at this time as well as
12 for the reasons previously stated, the court finds that
13 it is in the best interests of [M.R.] for her goal to be
14 changed to adoption. Again, her strongest bond is with
15 her foster family. That is the only family she has
16 known at this point.
17 Despite the committed efforts of catholic
18 charities, they have been unable to assist the parents
19 in moving beyond the supervised visits and the court
20 finds that further services would be unlikely to move
21 the parents in a reasonable time to the point that they
22 could care for these children 24/7.
23 Therefore, at this point the court finds
24 that [M.R.]'s goal is changed to adoption.
25 Moving next to the status for both
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3 children, having changed the goal and terminated the
4 parental rights of the parents, further services will no
5 longer be needed with regard to addressing the goal of
6 reunification.
7 It is clearly in the best interests of
8 the children to remain in their current foster home.
9 Therefore, the status quo in the foster home with the
10 services that they have will be maintained going
11 forward.
12 while these situations are very
13 emotional, and the court notes that it has been a very
14 emotional hearing for Mother especially, the court hopes
15 that they can take some comfort in knowing that their
16 children are in a good place.
17 The court has no doubt, and again hopes
18 the parents take comfort, that the foster parents have
19 provided a loving and stable environment and will
20 continue to do so going forward.
21 sometimes giving up children can be a
22 very loving act and knowing that they have landed
23 someplace hopeful for them, while not ideal, should
24 provide some comfort.
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BY THE COURT:
kb
7/21/17
In the Interest of [M.R.] & [C.R.]
No. DP-155-2016 & DP-138-2017
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