Com. v. Martin, K. ( 2017 )

J-S30007-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
KRISTINE MARIE MARTIN,
Appellee No. 1951 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered November 1, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-01-CR-0000678-2016
BEFORE: SHOGAN, RANSOM, and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JUNE 22, 2017
Appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, appeals from the
November 1, 2016 order granting the pretrial motion filed by Appellee,
Kristine Marie Martin, and suppressing the results of her blood alcohol test.1
Following our careful review of the record and the law, we affirm.
Appellee was charged with one count of driving under the influence of
alcohol or a controlled substance pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(1)(ii),
second offense, graded as a first degree misdemeanor; one count of driving
____________________________________________
1
The Commonwealth may appeal an interlocutory order suppressing
evidence when it provides a certification with its notice of appeal that the
order terminates or substantially handicaps the prosecution.
Commonwealth v. Petty, 157 A.3d 953, 954 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citing
Commonwealth v. Whitlock, 69 A.3d 635, 636 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2013));
Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) (same). The notice of appeal contains the required
certification.
J-S30007-17
under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance pursuant to 75
Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(2), second offense, graded as a first degree
misdemeanor; and the summary offense of driving on roadways laned for
traffic pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3309(1), in relation to an incident on New
Year’s Eve, 2015.
On July 21, 2016, Appellee filed an omnibus pretrial motion seeking
suppression of blood test results in reliance upon Birchfield v. North
Dakota, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 2160 (2016). The trial court reported that
“in lieu of [a] hearing, written stipulations of fact were submitted October
18, 2016,” which the trial court incorporated into its Opinion on [Appellee’s]
omnibus pretrial motion. Opinion on [Appellee’s] Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion,
11/1/16, at 1. The stipulated facts are as follows:
STIPULATION
The parties to the above-captioned matter stipulate to the
following:
1) Kristine Martin was placed into custody for
suspicion of DUI on 12/31/15 along Mt. Carmel Rd.,
Franklin Twp., Adams County at approximately 1022
hours.
2) Kristine Martin was read the previous version of
the DL-26 form at Gettysburg Hospital, which
included the prohibited language that refusal would
lead to “more severe penalties . . . the same
penalties that would be imposed if you were
convicted of driving with the highest rate of alcohol,
which include a minimum of 72 consecutive hours in
jail and a minimum fine of $1,000, up to a maximum
of five years in jail and a maximum fine of $10,000.”
-2-
J-S30007-17
3) Following the reading of the DL-26 form, Kristine
Martin consented to a blood draw for purposes of
determining BAC and/or the presence of controlled
substances.
Stipulation, 10/18/16, at 1.
On November 1, 2016, the trial court granted suppression of the
blood-test results “[a]fter considering the factual stipulations of the parties”
and “for the reasons set forth in the Honorable Thomas R. Campbell’s
Opinion of Commonwealth v. Dannie Stephenson at CP-01-CR-430-2016
(decided: August 16, 2016).” Opinion on [Appellee’s] Omnibus Pre-Trial
Motion, 11/1/16, at 1. The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal;
both the Commonwealth and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.2
The Commonwealth raises the following single issue on appeal: “Did
the Honorable Suppression Court err in applying the exclusionary rule and
suppressing the results of Appellee’s blood draw when a good faith exception
to the rule should have been applied?” Commonwealth’s Brief at 4.
Our standard of review of a trial court’s order granting a motion to
suppress evidence is well established. When the Commonwealth appeals
from a suppression order, we follow a clearly defined standard of review and
____________________________________________
2
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court represented that “[a]ll issues
which have been raised on appeal were addressed in this [c]ourt’s Order
dated November 1, 2016[,] and Judge Thomas R. Campbell’s Opinion of
Commonwealth v. Dannie Stephenson at CP-01-CR-430-2016, decided on
August 16, 2016[,] and attached to this Opinion.” Trial Court Opinion,
12/16/16, at 1.
-3-
J-S30007-17
consider only the evidence from the defendant’s witnesses together with the
evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the record,
remains uncontradicted. Petty, 157 A.3d 953. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has clarified that the scope of review for a suppression issue is limited
to the record available to the suppression court. In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073,
1085, 1089 (Pa. 2013). Moreover,
[t]he suppression court’s findings of fact bind an appellate court
if the record supports those findings. The suppression court’s
conclusions of law, however, are not binding on an appellate
court, whose duty is to determine if the suppression court
properly applied the law to the facts. Commonwealth v.
Miller, 56 A.3d 1276, 1278–79 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations
omitted). “Our standard of review is restricted to establishing
whether the record supports the suppression court’s factual
findings; however, we maintain de novo review over the
suppression court’s legal conclusions.” Commonwealth v.
Brown, 606 Pa. 198, 996 A.2d 473, 476 (2010) (citation
omitted). Commonwealth v. Korn, 139 A.3d 249, 252–53 (Pa.
Super. 2016).
Commonwealth v. Runyan, ___ A.3d ___, ___, 2017 PA Super 114, *3
(Pa. Super. 2017).
There was no testimony presented; rather, the parties stipulated to
the facts surrounding Appellee’s placement into custody and consent to the
blood draw. It is well settled that the stipulation of facts is binding upon the
court and the parties. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 902 A.2d 430, 460 (Pa.
2006). Our Supreme Court stated in Mitchell, “A stipulation is a declaration
that the fact agreed upon is proven, and a valid stipulation must be enforced
according to its terms.” Id.-4-
J-S30007-17
Our review of the record, parties’ briefs, and relevant law compels our
conclusion that the trial court properly ordered suppression in the instant
case because the “blood draw was not voluntary.” Opinion on [Appellee’s]
Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, 11/1/16, at 1; See Trial Court Opinion, 12/16/16
(attaching trial court opinion in Commonwealth v. Stephenson, Adams
County docket number CP-01-CR-430-2016, at 4–11)3 (concluding the
trooper complied with Pennsylvania’s then-valid implied consent statute
pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b); under Birchfield, police can no longer
conduct warrantless blood tests based upon implied consent; Birchfield
held criminal penalties imposed by implied consent laws vitiate consent to
draw blood; good faith exception fails to further aims of Article I, Section 8
of Pennsylvania Constitution under these circumstances; the Commonwealth
presented no evidence of exigent circumstances; Appellee asserted that the
threat of enhanced criminal penalties coerced her consent to blood draw;
Appellee was in custody when she signed the DL-26 form; DL-26 form
advised that her refusal would compel imposition of harsher penalties;
Appellee was not told that she could refuse blood draw; reasonable person in
Appellee’s position would consent to blood draw because refusal
automatically meant harsher criminal punishment; under totality of
circumstances, Appellee did not provide knowing and voluntary consent).
____________________________________________
3
Commonwealth v. Stephenson, 1482 MDA 2016 (Pa. Super. filed May
1, 2017) (unpublished memorandum).
-5-
J-S30007-17
See Appellee’s Omnibus Pretrial Motion, 7/21/16, at ¶¶ 1–29. Accordingly,
we affirm.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/22/2017
-6-