Com. v. Jones, O. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S34040-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    OLAJUWON N. JONES,
    Appellant                 No. 2807 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 24, 2016
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
    Criminal Division at No.: CP-23-CR-0000206-2016
    BEFORE: BOWES, J., SOLANO, J., and PLATT, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.:                                 FILED JUNE 22, 2017
    Appellant, Olajuwon N. Jones, appeals from the judgment of sentence
    imposed following his bench conviction of driving under the influence of
    alcohol (DUI, high rate of alcohol) and failure to stop at a stop sign.1 We
    affirm.
    The trial court aptly set forth the factual background of this matter as
    follows:
    On June 18, 2015, at approximately 1:27[a.m.], while
    stationed in the area of 1919 Chichester Avenue, Upper
    Chichester, Delaware County, PA Officer Kevin J. Mitchell of the
    Upper Chichester Township Police Department noticed a silver
    Mercedes Benz traveling southbound making a very quick U-turn
    in the middle of the intersection and accelerating northbound.
    Officer Mitchell proceeded to follow the vehicle.
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(b) and 3323(b), respectively.
    J-S34040-17
    The lone occupant driver of the vehicle, later determined
    to be [Appellant], made a right turn on Pleasant Avenue and
    accelerated toward the intersection of Vernon Avenue. At this
    intersection, [Appellant] failed to properly stop at a posted stop
    sign. [Appellant] then proceeded to quickly stop at a nearby
    roadway on Opal Avenue. [Appellant] exited the vehicle through
    the driver’s door and began to walk quickly toward a residence
    located at 2033 Opal Avenue, Upper Chichester, Delaware
    County, PA.
    Officer Mitchell, who had been following [Appellant] in his
    marked police vehicle without activating his emergency lights,
    exited his vehicle and attempted to make contact with
    [Appellant] on foot. After a failed attempt to make [Appellant]
    stop and talk to him, Officer Mitchell shined his flashlight on
    himself so that [Appellant] could see he was a police officer in
    uniform, and asked [Appellant] again to stop walking. Once
    [Appellant] had stopped, Officer Mitchell approached him and
    proceeded to ask [Appellant] where he was headed and for his
    identification.   [Appellant] provided Officer Mitchell with his
    [d]river’s [l]icense and stated that he was “going home,”
    confirming that he lived on 2033 Opal Avenue, Upper Chichester,
    Delaware County, PA. Since [Appellant]’s [d]river’s [l]icense
    indicated that he lived in Marcus Hook, Delaware County, Officer
    Mitchell made contact with the resident of 2033 Opal Avenue,
    and the resident confirmed that she knew [Appellant] and he
    was welcomed to spend the night at the residence.
    While speaking with [Appellant], Officer Mitchell detected a
    heavy odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from his breath,
    as well as reddened and glassy eyes, dropping eyelids, and
    slurred speech. Suspecting that [Appellant] was intoxicated,
    Officer Mitchell requested [Appellant] to perform three field
    sobriety tests. [Appellant] failed to successfully perform the
    tests. Officer Mitchell proceeded to place [Appellant] under
    arrest and to transport him to the Upper Chichester Township
    Police Department headquarters.       At the Upper Chichester
    Township Police Department, after Officer Mitchell read to
    [Appellant] the PennDot DL-26 form, [Appellant] signed the form
    and agreed to submit to chemical testing. Officer Mitchell used
    an Intoximeter EC/IR to test [Appellant]’s level of alcohol on his
    breath and the result of that testing revealed a 0.116 percent
    Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC).
    -2-
    J-S34040-17
    (Trial Court Opinion, 11/01/16, at 1-3) (record citations omitted).
    Appellant proceeded to a one-day bench trial on June 24, 2016, and
    the trial court found him guilty of the above-mentioned offenses. On that
    same date, the court sentenced Appellant to a term of not less than forty-
    eight hours nor more than six months’ incarceration.        The court denied
    Appellant’s timely post-sentence motion following a hearing on August 2,
    2016. This timely appeal followed.2
    Appellant raises two issues for our review:
    1. [Did t]he trial court err[] in admitting the results of the
    breath test, as the 20-minute observation period was not
    followed[?]
    2. [] Whether the verdict was against the weight of the
    evidence when the Commonwealth presented evidence that
    was so seriously lacking any creditability to shock one’s sense
    of justice?
    (Appellant’s Brief, at 4, 11).3
    In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in
    admitting evidence of his BAC because the twenty-minute observation
    period, required under 67 Pa.Code § 77.24(a), did not occur prior to
    ____________________________________________
    2
    Appellant filed a timely concise statement of errors complained of on
    appeal on September 19, 2016. The trial court entered an opinion on
    November 1, 2016. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    3
    Appellant’s statement of the questions involved quotes statutory law and
    fails to “state concisely the issues to be resolved, expressed in the terms and
    circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail.” Pa.R.A.P. 2116.
    Therefore, we have taken Appellant’s first question from the argument
    section of his brief.
    -3-
    J-S34040-17
    administration of the breath test.       (See Appellant’s Brief, at 11-13).
    Appellant maintains that Officer Mitchell’s testimony that this observation
    requirement was met amounted only to speculation and conjecture, because
    the officer did not note the specific times of the observation period, or use
    the twenty-minute clock on the breath test machine to record the period.
    (See id. at 12-13). This issue does not merit relief.
    Initially, we note that the failure to comply with the twenty–minute
    observation rule goes to the admissibility of the blood alcohol evidence. See
    Commonwealth v. Barlow, 
    776 A.2d 273
    , 275 (Pa. Super. 2001) (“The
    Code’s requirements go to the trustworthiness of the evidence. If that issue
    is raised, failure to comply does not permit the results to be admitted as
    substantive evidence with lessened reliability[;] it precludes admission.”).
    “Questions concerning the admission of evidence are left to the sound
    discretion of the trial court, and we, as an appellate court, will not disturb
    the trial court’s rulings regarding the admissibility of evidence absent an
    abuse of that discretion.”   Commonwealth v. Sitler, 
    144 A.3d 156
    , 163
    (Pa. Super. 2016) (en banc) (citations omitted).
    Under section 77.24(a) of the Pennsylvania Code, a police officer or a
    certified breath test operator must observe a DUI suspect for a period of at
    least twenty consecutive minutes immediately prior to the administration of
    the breath test. The provision states:
    (a) Observation. The person to be tested with breath test
    equipment shall be kept under observation by a police officer or
    certified breath test operator for at least 20 consecutive minutes
    -4-
    J-S34040-17
    immediately prior to administration of the first alcohol breath
    test given to the person, during which time the person may not
    have ingested alcoholic beverages or other fluids, regurgitated,
    vomited, eaten or smoked. Custody of the person may be
    transferred to another officer or certified breath test operator
    during the 20 consecutive minutes or longer period as long as
    the person to be tested is under observation for at least 20
    consecutive minutes prior to initial administration of the alcohol
    breath test.
    67 Pa.Code § 77.24(a).
    “In [Barlow, 
    supra],
     we stated the Commonwealth must prove, by a
    preponderance   of   the   evidence,    that   an   individual   subjected   to   a
    breathalyzer test did not ingest anything for the [twenty] minutes prior to
    administration of the test, but that ‘observation,’ as used in 67 Pa.Code §
    77.24(a), did not mean ‘eyes on his mouth 100% of the time.’”
    Commonwealth v. Snell, 
    811 A.2d 581
    , 586 (Pa. Super. 2002), appeal
    denied, 
    820 A.2d 162
     (Pa. 2003).
    Here, the record reflects that Officer Mitchell detained Appellant
    outside of the Opal Avenue residence at about 1:30 a.m., and the drive to
    the police station following Appellant’s arrest took five to seven minutes.
    (See N.T. Trial, 6/24/16, at 10, 28-29, 50). Officer Mitchell testified that,
    upon arrival at the police station, Appellant was “continuously in [his]
    custody[.]” (Id. at 29). The officer further stated, “[Appellant] was always
    in my presence especially at the police station [and] he was observed by me
    for at least 30 minutes” prior to administration of the first breath test, at
    2:46 a.m.   (Id.; see id. at 34).      On cross-examination, Officer Mitchell
    acknowledged that he did not use the clock on the breath test machine to
    -5-
    J-S34040-17
    record the twenty-minute observation period, nor did he note the exact
    times the observation period began and ended.           (See id. at 60-61).
    However, he testified that, as a certified breath test operator who had
    administered hundreds of tests, he was well aware of the twenty-minute
    observation rule, and he agreed that it is an important procedure that police
    must follow. (See id. at 31-32, 61-62). Officer Mitchell reiterated that he
    followed the proper procedures in this case, with the observation period
    starting “at least [twenty] minutes prior to the time that the test was given.”
    (Id. at 61).
    Thus, the record demonstrates that Officer Mitchell detained Appellant
    at about 1:30 a.m., and administered the first breath test at 2:46 a.m.
    During the intervening time, Officer Mitchell arrested Appellant and
    transported him to the police station, where the officer unequivocally
    testified that Appellant was in his continuous custody during the requisite
    observation period prior to administration of the test.     Upon review, we
    conclude the Commonwealth established, by a preponderance of the
    evidence, that Officer Mitchell sufficiently observed Appellant for the twenty
    minutes prior to the test, in compliance with the regulation, and the trial
    court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Appellant’s BAC.
    See Snell, 
    supra at 586
    ; see also Sitler, supra at 163.             Therefore,
    Appellant’s first issue does not merit relief.
    Appellant next challenges the weight of the evidence supporting his
    DUI conviction, arguing the breath test machine was not functioning
    -6-
    J-S34040-17
    properly, rendering the test results unreliable. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 14-
    18).4 Appellant contends that because the machine needed servicing and a
    replacement component in August 2015, the June 2015 test results in
    instant case are untrustworthy. (See id. at 17). This issue does not merit
    relief.
    Our standard of review is as follows:
    A verdict is not contrary to the weight of the
    evidence because of a conflict in testimony or
    because the reviewing court on the same facts might
    have arrived at a different conclusion than the fact[-
    ]finder. Rather, a new trial is warranted only when
    the . . . verdict is so contrary to the evidence that it
    shocks one’s sense of justice and the award of a new
    trial is imperative so that right may be given another
    opportunity to prevail. Where, as here, the judge
    who presided at trial ruled on the weight claim
    below, an appellate court’s role is not to consider the
    underlying question of whether the verdict is against
    the weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate review
    is limited to whether the trial court palpably abused
    its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.
    One of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying
    a new trial is the lower court’s determination that the verdict
    was or was not against the weight of the evidence and that new
    process was or was not dictated by the interests of justice.
    Thus, only where the facts and inferences disclose a palpable
    abuse of discretion will the denial of a motion for a new trial
    based on the weight of the evidence be upset on appeal.
    ____________________________________________
    4
    Appellant preserved his weight claim by raising it in his post-sentence
    motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(3).
    -7-
    J-S34040-17
    Commonwealth v. Morales, 
    91 A.3d 80
    , 91–92 (Pa. 2014), cert denied,
    
    135 S.Ct. 1548
     (2015) (emphasis original; citations omitted).
    Here,    Officer    Mitchell    testified   that   the   breath   test    machine
    successfully tested Appellant’s breath, and he explained that the device goes
    through a series of internal checks to ensure accuracy before a sample is
    provided and in between samples.            (See N.T. Trial, at 34-35, 79).           Police
    Officer Jason Yaletchko, the certified custodian of the breath test machine
    who had performed the annual and monthly accuracy and calibration tests
    on it for four years as of the time of trial, testified that the Commonwealth of
    Pennsylvania has certified and approved it as a breath-testing device. (See
    id. at 70-72). Officer Yaletchko explained that if the machine has any type
    of malfunction or if contamination is present in the machine, “[i]t will abort
    itself[,] . . . take itself out of service . . . [and] say removed from service[]”
    because of its software design. (Id. at 77; see id. at 84). He stated that,
    in his opinion, “this device [was] properly serviced, calibrated and accurate
    at the time [Appellant] took the test[.]” (Id. at 78-79).
    The trial court, as fact-finder, found the officers’ testimony credible.
    (See Trial Ct. Op., at 11).           It determined that “[t]he device was not
    contaminated     at      the   time    [Appellant’s]     alcohol   breath      test    was
    administered[,]” and that “[t]he device was properly serviced, calibrated and
    accurate at the time Officer Mitchell administered . . . the alcohol breath
    test[.]” (Id. at 10-11). After review, we conclude that the trial court did
    not palpably abuse its discretion in ruling on Appellant’s weight claim. See
    -8-
    J-S34040-17
    Morales, supra at 91-92.      Therefore, Appellant’s final issue on appeal
    merits no relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/22/2017
    -9-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Com. v. Jones, O. No. 2807 EDA 2016

Filed Date: 6/22/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/22/2017