Com. v. Giles, E. ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
EMMIT GILES, :
:
Appellant : No. 1498 EDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order July 24, 2012,
Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County,
Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0833361-1989
BEFORE: DONOHUE, WECHT and JENKINS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED MARCH 19, 2015
Emmit Giles (“Giles”) appeals the July 24, 2012 order entered by the
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division, dismissing
his third petition filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”),
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46, as untimely. We affirm.
The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of
this case as follows:
Following a bench trial, [Giles] was found guilty of
first-degree murder and sentenced to a term of life
imprisonment on May 8, 1991 by the Honorable
Judge Michael Stiles. [Giles] appealed to the
Superior Court. On May 27, 1992, the Superior
Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. The
Supreme Court denied allocatur on March 31, 1993.
Following an unsuccessful petition for federal habeas
corpus relief, [Giles] filed his first PCRA petition on
January 3, 1996. Relief was denied on February 16,
2000, and the Superior Court affirmed the denial on
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December 7, 2000. The Supreme Court denied
allocator on June 5, 2001. On December 10, 2002,
[Giles] filed his second PCRA petition. This petition
was dismissed as untimely on October 20, 2003. No
further appeal was filed.
PCRA Court Memorandum and Order, 7/24/12, at 1-2 (footnote omitted).
On March 13, 2012, Giles filed his third PCRA petition wherein he
attempted to plead the newly discovered evidence exception to the PCRA’s
timeliness requirements, averring that the police provided false testimony at
his trial and that police hid exculpatory evidence from the trial court. PCRA
Petition, 3/15/12, at 3. On May 31, 2012, the PCRA court filed a notice of
intent to dismiss Giles’ PCRA petition pursuant to Rule 907 of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. On June 27, 2012, Giles filed a
response objecting to the PCRA court’s dismissal notice. On July 24, 2012,
the PCRA court dismissed Giles’ PCRA petition as untimely, finding that he
had failed to successfully plead and prove the newly discovered evidence
exception to the PCRA’s timeliness requirements.
On July 29, 2013, Giles filed his fourth PCRA petition wherein he
alleged that the Philadelphia County Clerk of Courts failed to transmit to this
Court his notice of appeal from the July 24, 2012 order dismissing his third
PCRA petition. On April 9, 2014, the PCRA court granted Giles’ fourth PCRA
petition, reinstating his right to appeal the July 24, 2012 order dismissing his
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third PCRA petition nunc pro tunc. On May 7, 2014, Giles filed a timely
notice of appeal.1
“Pennsylvania law makes clear no court has jurisdiction to hear an
untimely PCRA petition.” Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076,
1079 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quoting Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d
1157, 1161 (Pa. 2003)). A petitioner must file a PCRA petition within one
year of the date on which the petitioner’s judgment became final, unless one
of the three statutory exceptions apply:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the
result of interference by government officials with
the presentation of the claim in violation of the
Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the
Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that
was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United
States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after
the time period provided in this section and has been
held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A petitioner must file a petition invoking one of
these exceptions “within 60 days of the date the claim could have been
presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). If a petition is untimely, and the
petitioner has not pled and proven any exception, “‘neither this Court nor
1
We note that Giles has filed a counseled brief with our Court for this
appeal.
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the trial court has jurisdiction over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we
simply do not have the legal authority to address the substantive claims.’”
Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. 2006)).
Here, Giles’ third PCRA petition is facially untimely and he does not
contest this determination. Accordingly, we are without jurisdiction to
decide Giles’ appeal unless he pled and proved one of the three timeliness
exceptions of section 9545(b)(1). See Derrickson, 923 A.2d at 468. Here,
Giles attempted to plead the newly discovered evidence exception of section
9545(b)(1)(ii), averring the police provided false testimony at his trial and
also that police hid exculpatory evidence from the trial court. PCRA Petition,
3/15/12, at 3. However, in his appellate brief, rather than making any
argument that he successfully pled and proved the timeliness exception of
section 9545(b)(1)(ii), Giles argues the following issues:
I. Did the trial court err in denying [Giles] an
evidentiary hearing when he alleged a material issue
of fact?
II. Did the trial court err in not appointing the
[sic] PCRA Counsel for [Giles] in PCRA proceedings in
the trial court because the defendant was indigent
and entitled to appointment of counsel in PCRA
proceedings?
Giles’ Brief at 2.
“No question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of
questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby.” Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a). As a
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result, Giles has waived his newly discovered evidence claim. Waiver is
further supported by the fact that Giles included no argument on the issue in
his appellate brief. See Giles Brief at 6-7. “Where an appellate brief fails to
provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails
to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that
claim is waived.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 924
(Pa. 2009)); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)-(b). Accordingly, Brown has
waived the issue on appeal.
Moreover, even if Giles had successfully preserved his argument that
his case falls under the timeliness exception of 9545(b)(1)(ii), we find that it
is without merit. In his PCRA petition, Giles does not explain what false
testimony police provided at trial or what evidence police kept hidden from
the trial court. See PCRA Petition, 3/15/12, at 3. Additionally, Giles
provides no indication of when he discovered this information, preventing
the trial court from determining whether the facts upon which the claim is
predicated were unknown to Giles and could not have been ascertained by
the exercise of due diligence. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). The trial
court likewise could not determine whether Giles filed his third PCRA petition
within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented. See
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). Therefore, Giles failed to plead and prove an
exception under section 9545(b)(1), and we are without jurisdiction to
address the merits of his appeal.
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Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/19/2015
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