Com. v. Torres, J. ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JOSE TORRES,
Appellant No. 464 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of January 13, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0011954-2010
BEFORE: MUNDY, OLSON and WECHT, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED MARCH 24, 2015
Appellant, Jose Torres appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
on January 13, 2014. We affirm.
The trial court accurately summarized the factual background of this
case as follows:
On May 9, 2010, at around 6:30 p.m., Felix Santos Sr. [(“Felix
Sr.”], along with his wife Cristina, seven-year-old daughter, and
[18]-year-old son Felix [Santos] Jr. [(“Felix Jr.”], returned to
West Butler Street in Philadelphia. Felix Sr. double-parked his
car in front of the Torres household, and his family began to
unload the shopping bags from the car. A few minutes later,
while Felix Sr. was still in the house, Felix Jr. noticed that a
parking spot had become available, and told his father that he
would move the car into the spot. Once he did so, some of the
Torres family came out of their house, including Blanca
Hernandez, [Appellant’s] mother. Hernandez proceeded to spit
in Felix Sr.’s face for taking her parking spot. At this point, Felix
Sr. decided to take his family inside in order to avoid a violent
confrontation.
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Just minutes later, while Felix Sr. was telephoning the police,
[Appellant] came up to the Santos house and began to shake the
front gate. [Appellant] told Felix Sr. to come outside so that he
c[ould] kill him. Before the police arrived, [Appellant] went back
to his house, returned with a shovel, and began to smash the
[Santos’] car with it. Because of [Appellant’s] actions, the car
alarm went off, and Felix Sr. saw that the hood and mirror of the
car were damaged. After hearing the alarm, while still waiting
for the police to arrive, Felix Sr. decided to go outside, and his
wife, [Felix Jr.], and young daughter followed. In order to
protect himself from any further violence, Felix Sr. took his son’s
baseball bat on his way outside. After a brief scuffle between a
young woman from the Torres family and Felix Sr.’s son and
daughter, the police finally arrived. The police [] told both
parties to go back to their respective houses, and to not come
back out. After doing so, the police departed.
The Santos family followed the police’s orders, and returned to
their house, along with their other son, [D.S.], who was [14] at
the time, as well as Felix Sr.’s brother. The latter two were not
present during the initial incident, but returned from work while
the police were on scene. Just minutes after the Santos family
had returned to their house, they received a call from Stephany,
Felix Sr.’s niece, saying that [A.], Felix Sr.’s [14]-year-old
nephew, was getting beaten up on the street. Felix Sr. decided
to go back outside in order to help his nephew. Again, his family
followed him outside in order to assist him.
After trying to help his nephew, three males, one of them being
[Appellant], came after Felix Sr. Felix Sr. tried running back into
his house out of fear of what they may do to him. However,
while he was still on his porch, two of the individuals grabbed his
arms, and [Appellant] proceeded to stab him three times in the
chest. After stabbing Felix Sr., the two males that had held him
down, and [Appellant], left the crime scene. At this point, Felix
Sr.’s family saw him lying bloody and unconscious on the porch
of his house. Stephany called the police.
When the police arrived, they rushed Felix Sr. to the emergency
room at Temple University Hospital. According to Dr. Amy
Goldberg, the physician who treated Felix Sr., the stab wounds
were very serious. When Felix Sr. arrived at the hospital, he had
a very faint pulse, if any, and was barely breathing. Because of
the extreme loss of blood and corresponding lengthy lack of
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oxygen, his brain suffered severely. To this day, he remains on
life support and is unconscious.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/30/14, at 2-4 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
The procedural history of this case is as follows. On October 6, 2010,
Appellant was charged via criminal information with attempted murder,1
conspiracy to commit murder,2 aggravated assault,3 conspiracy to commit
aggregated assault,4 possessing an instrument of crime,5 making terroristic
threats,6 simple assault,7 and recklessly endangering another person.8 Jury
selection began on September 19, 2012 and trial began on September 20,
2012. On September 28, 2012, Appellant was found guilty of attempted
murder, aggregated assault, and conspiracy to commit aggravated assault.
On September 26, 2013, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of
40 to 80 years’ imprisonment.
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901, 2502(a).
2
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903, 2502(a).
3
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a).
4
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903, 2702(a).
5
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(a).
6
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a)(1).
7
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a).
8
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705.
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On October 4, 2013, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion. On
October 24, 2013, the trial court granted Appellant’s post-sentence motion
and vacated his judgment of sentence. On January 13, 2014, the trial court
re-sentenced Appellant to 30 to 60 years’ imprisonment. This timely appeal
followed.9
Appellant presents one issue for our review:
Did the [trial c]ourt err in denying [Appellant’s] request for a
Kloiber charge for Commonwealth witnesses Cristina Santos,
Carmen Santos[,] and [D.S.]?
Appellant’s Brief at 3.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred by not giving a jury
instruction pursuant to Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 106 A.2d 820 (Pa.
1954). “A Kloiber instruction informs the jury that an eyewitness
identification should be viewed with caution when either the witness did not
have an opportunity to view the defendant clearly, equivocated on the
identification of the defendant, or has had difficulties identifying the
defendant on prior occasions.” Commonwealth v. Pander, 100 A.3d 626,
635 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (citation omitted). “We evaluate whether a
Kloiber instruction is necessary under an abuse of discretion standard.”
9
On February 11, 2014, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal (“concise statement”). See
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On February 22, 2014, Appellant filed his concise
statement. On June 30, 2014, the trial court issued its Rule 1925(a)
opinion. Appellant’s lone issue on appeal was included in his concise
statement.
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Commonwealth v. Sanders, 42 A.3d 325, 332–333 (Pa. Super. 2012),
appeal denied, 78 A.3d 1091 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted).
Appellant’s lone argument on appeal is waived. As this Court recently
explained:
In order to preserve a claim that a jury instruction was
erroneously [omitted], the Appellant must have objected to the
charge at trial. Pa.R.A.P. 302(b) (“A general exception to the
charge to the jury will not preserve an issue for appeal. Specific
exception shall be taken to the language or omission
complained of.”); Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(B) (“No portions of the
charge nor omissions from the charge may be assigned as
error, unless specific objections are made thereto before the jury
retires to deliberate.”). . . .
The pertinent rules, therefore, require a specific objection to the
charge or an exception to the trial court’s ruling on a proposed
point to preserve an issue involving a jury instruction. Although
obligating counsel to take this additional step where a specific
point for charge has been rejected may appear counterintuitive,
as the requested instruction can be viewed as alerting the trial
court to a defendant’s substantive legal position, it serves the
salutary purpose of affording the court an opportunity to avoid
or remediate potential error, thereby eliminating the need for
appellate review of an otherwise correctable issue.
Commonwealth v. Parker, 104 A.3d 17, 29 (Pa. Super. 2014) (certain
citations omitted; emphasis added).
In this case, Appellant did not object after the jury charge was given.
See N.T., 9/28/12, at 132. Accordingly, Appellant has waived any challenge
to the jury charge in this case. Furthermore, even if we were to reach the
merits of Appellant’s lone issue on appeal, we would conclude that he is not
entitled to relief.
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Appellant contends that a Kloiber charge was required because
Cristina, Carmen, and D.S. were all involved in a melee at the time they saw
Appellant assaulting Felix Sr. Appellant contends that because Cristina was
being held down during the melee, this made her identification unreliable.
He also argues that Carmen’s identification was unreliable because she had
not previously mentioned to police that she saw Appellant lunge towards
Felix Sr. and then saw blood on Felix Sr.’s side. Appellant contends that
D.S.’s identification is unreliable because he did not mention to police during
the investigation that he saw Appellant attempt to hit his father with a
baseball bat immediately prior to the stabbing.
As to D.S., the trial court did give a Kloiber instruction during trial.
Specifically, it informed the jury that “[D.S.] did not identify defendant Jose
Torres in any prior statement or investigation by the authorities. I’m
instructing you giving you that instruction now in view of some of the
testimony that you heard just before we broke.” N.T., 9/25/12, at 50.
“Although the trial court did not use the magic words that the jury must
receive the identification evidence ‘with caution,’ the modified Kloiber
instruction adequately alerted the jury of the potential problems with that
testimony.” Pander, 100 A.3d at 637. Appellant did not object to the
adequacy of this instruction. See Commonwealth v. Charleston, 16 A.3d
505, 528 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 30 A.3d 486 (Pa. 2011)
(requiring a defendant to object to a cautionary instruction if he believes it is
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inadequate). Furthermore, it is well-settled that the trial court may choose
to give a cautionary instruction either during the trial or during the general
charge. See Commonwealth v. Overby, 809 A.2d 295, 315 n.1 (Pa.
2002). Therefore, the trial court gave a Kloiber charge that satisfied
Appellant at trial. Accordingly, Appellant’s claim that the trial court failed to
give a Kloiber charge as to D.S. is without merit.
As to Cristina and Carmen, Appellant relies upon Commonwealth v.
Simmons, 647 A.2d 568 (Pa. Super. 1994), appeal denied, 659 A.2d 987
(Pa. 1995), in support of his argument that he was entitled to a Kloiber
instruction. Simmons, however, is distinguishable from the case at bar. In
Simmons, the witness testified at the preliminary hearing that he saw the
defendant flee from a certain door. Id. at 569. At trial, a police officer
testified it would have been physically impossible for the witness to see the
defendant flee from that door. Id. Also at trial, the witness changed his
testimony and said that he saw the defendant flee from a different door. Id.
Thus, in Simmons, the witness’ testimony changed completely from the
preliminary hearing to the trial. Furthermore, a police officer testified that
the witness’ original testimony was physically impossible. Neither of those
situations is present in this case. Cristina and Carmen never changed their
testimony and it is physically possible that both witnesses would have been
able to see Appellant during, or immediately prior to, the stabbing.
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Appellant also relies upon Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 318 A.2d 703
(Pa. 1974), in support of his argument that he was entitled to a Kloiber
charge. In Mouzon, two accomplices to a murder testified at trial that the
defendant beat the victim with a radio antenna. Id. at 704. Two police
officers testified that at the time of the crime the lighting was poor – which
would have made eyewitness identification difficult. Id. at 705. Thus, our
Supreme Court held that Mouzon was entitled to a Kloiber charge. Id. In
the case sub judice, there was no evidence that the lighting conditions at the
scene of the stabbing were poor.
Instead, we find that this case is more analogous to Commonwealth
v. Reid, 99 A.3d 427 (Pa. 2014). In Reid, two witnesses failed to identify
the defendant when they initially spoke to police. Id. at 448. Nonetheless,
our Supreme Court noted that the witnesses knew the defendant and had an
opportunity to view the defendant at the time of the murder. Id. at 448-
449. As our Supreme Court emphasized, “case law makes clear that the
need for a Kloiber charge focuses on the ability of a witness to identify the
defendant.” Id. at 449 (emphasis in original). Therefore, our Supreme
Court held that Reid was not entitled to a Kloiber instruction.
Furthermore, our Supreme Court has held that a Kloiber charge is not
required in circumstances where the identifications at issue were more
suspect than the identifications in this case. In Commonwealth v.
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Paolello, 665 A.2d 439 (Pa. 1995), our Supreme Court held that even
though the witnesses were
under the influence of alcohol, the room was dark, they had
been awakened from sleep, and the events being observed were
confusing [the defendant’s] objections relate to the credibility of
the eyewitness testimony, not to the actual physical ability of the
witnesses to observe from their respective positions in relation to
the events. Accordingly, a Kloiber charge was not required.
Id. at 445. Again, as in Reid, our Supreme Court focused on the physical
ability of the witnesses to view the defendant.
In this case, both Cristina and Carmen could clearly see Appellant.
Although they were involved in an altercation at the time of the incident,
there is no indication that they were physically prevented them from viewing
Appellant. Instead, as in Paolello, the fact that they were involved in an
altercation at the time they witnessed Appellant stab Felix Sr. went to
Carmen’s and Cristina’s credibility – not their actual physical ability to
observe the incident. As neighbors, they knew Appellant and his
appearance. As in Reid, Cristina and Carmen did not originally identify
Appellant to the police. Nonetheless, they made unequivocal identifications
at trial and they had the ability to view Appellant’s attack on Felix Sr.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give a
Kloiber charge as to Cristina and Carmen.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/24/2015
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