Com. v. Woodall, J. ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JASON WOODALL,
Appellant No. 355 WDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 24, 2010
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0015796-2006
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JASON WOODALL,
Appellant No. 356 WDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 30, 2011
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0015787-2006
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, and ALLEN, JJ.
CONCURRING STATEMENT BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED MARCH 27, 2015
I join the learned majority’s disposition in the above captioned case.
However, I author this concurring statement to expound upon the portion of
Appellant’s second issue in which he contends that the trial court erred in
admitting into evidence facts pertaining to the crimes of June 7, 2006, that
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occurred the week after the charges relating to Appellant’s conduct on
May 31 and June 1, 2006. In essence, Appellant claims that the trial court
should have granted his motion in limine that sought to preclude admission
of evidence regarding the subsequent criminal events of June 7, 2006,
because they did not occur prior to the crimes in question.
A motion in limine is a procedure for obtaining a ruling on the
admissibility of evidence prior to or during trial, but before the evidence has
been offered. Commonwealth v. Freidl, 834 A.2d 638, 641 (Pa. Super.
2003). The basic requisite for the admissibility of any evidence in a case is
that it be competent and relevant. Id. Furthermore, it is well settled that
“[t]he admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court,
and will be reversed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court
clearly abused its discretion.” Commonwealth v. Miles, 846 A.2d 132,
136 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc) (citing Commonwealth v. Lilliock, 740
A.2d 237 (Pa. Super. 1999)). Abuse of discretion requires a finding of
misapplication of the law, a failure to apply the law, or judgment by the trial
court that exhibits bias, ill-will, prejudice, partiality, or was manifestly
unreasonable, as reflected by the record. Commonwealth v. Montalvo,
986 A.2d 84, 94 (Pa. 2009).
A trial court should find evidence admissible if it is relevant, that is “if
it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact
at issue more or less probable, or supports a reasonable inference or
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presumption regarding a material fact.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 896
A.2d 523, 539 (Pa. 2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. Stallworth, 781
A.2d 110, 117-118 (Pa. 2001)). However, the Pennsylvania Rules of
Evidence state that the probative value of relevant evidence might be
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Pa.R.E. 403. “Unfair
prejudice” is defined as “a tendency to suggest decision on an improper
basis or to divert the jury’s attention away from its duty of weighing the
evidence impartially.” Pa.R.E. 403 cmt. This rule does not suggest that all
evidence harmful to the defendant should be excluded. “Exclusion is limited
to evidence so prejudicial that it would inflame the jury to make a decision
based upon something other than the legal propositions relevant to the
case.” Commonwealth v. Page, 965 A.2d 1212, 1220 (Pa. Super. 2009)
(citing Commonwealth v. Owens, 929 A.2d 1187, 1191 (Pa. Super.
2007)).
In addition, the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence state that generally
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person. Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). Such evidence may be admissible
“where it is relevant for some other legitimate purpose and not utilized
solely to blacken the defendant’s character.” Commonwealth v. Russell,
938 A.2d 1082, 1092 (Pa. Super. 2007). As Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2) explains,
evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts may be admissible for purposes
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such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity or absence of mistake or accident.
This Court has determined that the plain language of “Rule 404(b)
does not distinguish between prior and subsequent acts.” Commonwealth
v. Wattley, 880 A.2d 682, 685 (Pa. Super. 2005).1 Indeed, case law prior
to the adoption of the Rules of Evidence in 1998 generally holds that
subsequent other acts may be admissible. See Commonwealth v. Collins,
703 A.2d 418, 423 (Pa. 1997) (holding that “[a]lthough evidence of a
subsequent offense is usually less probative of intent than evidence of a
prior offense, evidence of a subsequent offense can still show the
defendant’s intent at the time of the prior offense.”); Commonwealth v.
Ritter, 615 A.2d 442, 445 (Pa. Super. 1992) (evidence of subsequent
threats against witnesses admissible to show intent to deliver drugs);
Commonwealth v. Green, 505 A.2d 321, 325 (Pa. Super. 1986) (evidence
of subsequent discussion between defendant and third party admissible to
show defendant’s intent to shoot during robbery). See also
Commonwealth v. Styles, 431 A.2d 978, 980 (Pa. 1981) (evidence of
subsequent criminal conduct admissible to show that killing was not
accidental); Commonwealth v. Sparks, 492 A.2d 720, 722-723 (Pa.
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1
In Wattley, this Court held that evidence of subsequent acts of sexual
abuse by a defendant was admissible under Pa.R.E. 404(b) for the purpose
of showing a continuing course of conduct. Wattley, 880 A.2d at 687.
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Super. 1985) (evidence of subsequent knowing purchase of stolen goods
admissible to show intent to receive stolen property in earlier transaction).
Instantly, the mere fact that the June 7, 2006 sale of narcotics occurred
after the May 31 and June 1, 2006 crimes does not bar the evidence.
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