Com. v. Garulle, N. ( 2015 )


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  • J-A22014-14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    NICHOLAS JAMES GARULLE
    Appellant                  No. 99 MDA 2014
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 19, 2013
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-54-CR-0000779-2012
    BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SHOGAN, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.                             FILED MARCH 27, 2015
    Appellant, Nicholas James Garulle, appeals from the judgment of
    sentence entered after the trial court revoked his probation.        Garulle
    contends that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
    sentence. After careful review, we affirm.
    On November 14, 2012, Garulle pled guilty to receiving stolen
    property.     Pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement, the trial court
    sentence Garulle to 23 months of probation. Slightly over a year later, the
    Commonwealth moved to revoke Garulle’s probation, alleging, among other
    things, that Garulle had removed his electronic monitor and had been found
    in possession of heroin.
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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    After a hearing on the Commonwealth’s motion, the trial court revoked
    Garulle’s probation and entertained testimony on an appropriate sentence.
    At the conclusion of this testimony, the trial court sentenced Garulle to a
    term of imprisonment of 24 months to 60 months.          This timely appeal
    followed.
    On appeal, Garulle argues that the sentence imposed by the trial court
    was excessive.    On appeal from a judgment of sentence following the
    revocation of probation
    [o]ur review is limited to determining the validity of the
    probation revocation proceedings and the authority of the
    sentencing court to consider the same sentencing alternatives
    that it had at the time of the initial sentencing. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
    9771(b).
    Commonwealth v. Fish, 
    752 A.2d 921
    , 923 (Pa. Super. 2000). This scope
    of review encompasses a review of the discretionary aspects of the sentence
    imposed after revocation.    See Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 
    83 A.3d 1030
    , 1042 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc).
    “Revocation of a probation sentence is a matter committed to the
    sound discretion of the trial court and that court's decision will not be
    disturbed on appeal in the absence of an error of law or an abuse of
    discretion.”   Commonwealth v. Ahmad, 
    961 A.2d 884
    , 888 (Pa. Super.
    2008) (citation omitted).   A court may revoke an order of probation upon
    proof of the violation of specified conditions of the probation.          See
    Commonwealth v. Infante, 
    888 A.2d 783
    , 791 (Pa. 2005). “A probation
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    violation is established whenever it is shown that the conduct of the
    probationer indicates the probation has proven to have been an ineffective
    vehicle to accomplish rehabilitation and not sufficient to deter against future
    antisocial conduct.” 
    Id., at 791
    . Technical violations are sufficient to trigger
    revocation.   See Commonwealth v. Sierra, 
    752 A.2d 910
     (Pa. Super.
    2000).
    As noted above, Garulle contends that the sentence imposed by the
    trial court is excessive. Garulle concedes that this claim raises a challenge
    to the discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed. See Commonwealth
    v. Hornaman, 
    920 A.2d 1282
    , 1284 (Pa. Super. 2007).
    “A challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence must be
    considered a petition for permission to appeal, as the right to pursue such a
    claim is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. McAfee, 
    849 A.2d 270
    , 274 (Pa.
    Super. 2004) (citation omitted). When challenging the discretionary aspects
    of the sentence imposed, an appellant must present a substantial question
    as to the inappropriateness of the sentence.        See Commonwealth v.
    Tirado, 
    870 A.2d 362
    , 365 (Pa. Super. 2005). “Two requirements must be
    met before we will review this challenge on its merits.” McAfee, 
    849 A.2d at 274
    . “First, an appellant must set forth in his brief a concise statement of
    the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the
    discretionary aspects of a sentence.” 
    Id.
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    “Second, the appellant must show that there is a substantial question
    that the sentence imposed is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.”
    
    Id.
        That is, “the sentence violates either a specific provision of the
    sentencing scheme set forth in the Sentencing Code or a particular
    fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process.” Tirado, 
    870 A.2d at 365
    .    We examine an appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement to determine
    whether a substantial question exists. See 
    id.
     “Our inquiry must focus on
    the reasons for which the appeal is sought, in contrast to the facts
    underlying the appeal, which are necessary only to decide the appeal on the
    merits.” 
    Id.
    In the present case, Garulle’s appellate brief contains the requisite
    Rule 2119(f) concise statement, and, as such, is in technical compliance with
    the requirements to challenge the discretionary aspects of his sentence.
    Garulle argues in his Rule 2119(f) statement that the sentence imposed by
    the trial court “goes against the rehabilitative nature of the Sentencing
    Code[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 6.       Even assuming that this statement
    constitutes a substantial question, we conclude that Garulle is due no relief.
    Garulle testified that before he was arrested for the probation
    violations, he was “trying to turn myself into a mental hospital because I
    have a problem.” N.T., revocation hearing, 12/19/13, at 34. This problem
    caused him to cut off his electronic monitor in an attempt to commit suicide.
    See id., at 33.    The trial court explained its decision to impose a state
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    sentence on Garulle as follows:      “Right now there’s only one feasible
    disposition for Mr. Garulle, and he’s out of control; and the only way to
    impose that control is to get him into a facility where he can have the proper
    treatment.”   Id., at 52.   Thus, the trial court indicated that a primary
    purpose of the sentence imposed was the rehabilitation of Garulle. Garulle’s
    contention that the sentence disregarded his rehabilitative needs is therefore
    unsupported by the record. Garulle’s sole issue on appeal merits no relief.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/27/2015
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