Com. v. McKenzie, P. ( 2015 )

J-A03010-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
PAUL MCKENZIE
Appellant No. 884 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 16, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0000409-2012
BEFORE: MUNDY, J., STABILE, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED APRIL 06, 2015
Appellant, Paul McKenzie, appeals from the December 16, 2013
aggregate judgment of sentence of 26½ to 53 years’ imprisonment after a
jury found him guilty of aggravated assault, rape by forcible compulsion,
aggravated indecent assault by forcible compulsion, and unlawful restraint.1
After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court set forth the facts of the violent sexual assault as
follows.
In this case, [K.N.] testified that [Appellant]
strangled her multiple times to the point of losing
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1), 3121(a)(1), 3125(a)(2), and 2902(a)(1),
respectively.
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consciousness. The first time he strangled her was
with his hands, the second time was with his [t]-
[s]hirt that he had taken off and twisted into a
straight line and then wrapped it around her neck,
and the third time was with a shoelace he had
removed from one of his sneakers. While
[Appellant] was strangling [K.N] with the shoelace,
she tried to get her fingertips underneath the
shoelace so she could get some air. [K.N.] also
testified that [Appellant] punched her in her head –
behind the ears, on top of the head, and around her
forehead. [K.N.] tried to block the blows by putting
her hands over her head. [Appellant] also punched
her in her back to get her to release her hands so he
could continue punching her in the head. [K.N.] also
testified that [Appellant] shoved his fingers up inside
her [vagina] so hard that it pushed her back against
the wall. [K.N.] also testified that [Appellant] raped
her twice during this ordeal.
When [K.N.] tried to get away, [Appellant]
caught up with her[,] grabbed her by her hair and
around the neck[,] and dragged her back to the
room. The next thing [K.N.] remembered was
[Appellant] standing over her and taking his shoelace
out of his shoe, telling her that “now you really
f[***]ed up.” Furthermore, throughout the entire
ordeal, [Appellant] kept telling [K.N.] that “it was
time to die,” that he was going to kill her, and that
she was going to die.
[K.N.]’s account of what occurred on
November 4, 2011 into November 5, 2011 was
corroborated by the injuries that were documented
by Geneva Keirn, the SAFE Nurse at York Hospital.
Ms. Keirn prepared body maps of those injuries and
also took photos of the injuries sustained by [K.N.].
The kinds of injuries found on [K.N.] were:
 Abrasions and scratches to her chest; []
 Her left eye had redness to the inner area of
the white of her eye, redness and blood in
the sclera and around the eye; []
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 Her back had swelling and redness; []
 Her buttocks had swelling and redness; []
 Her scalp had redness, pain and
tenderness; []
 Her genital area had lacerations, redness,
and tenderness; abrasions to the labia and
bottom of the vagina; []
 Her left arm had redness; []
 Her right arm had abrasions and scratches;
[]
 Her left leg had swelling and redness, and
red marks on her left upper thigh area and
left lower leg; []
 Her left knee had red marks and abrasions
and bruising; []
 Her right leg had swelling and redness; []
 Her right knee had abrasions and red
marks; []
 Her right hand had swelling and redness to
top of hand and fingers; []
 Her left hand had redness to all fingers
extending to the palm and down to the
thumb. There was redness, swelling, and
purplish marks to her left thumb and parts
of her left index finger; []
 The top of her left hand had redness and
swelling to all fingers and extends to the top
of the hand; and
 Her neck had various kinds of bruising,
redness, abrasions, lines, and marks.
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In addition, Dr. Wayne Ross, a forensic pathologist,
examined the medical records of [K.N.], the SAFE
[n]urse’s notes and documentation of injuries, the
photos of the scene, photos of [K.N.] taken by the
SAFE [n]urse and by her family members and police,
reviewed the police report and preliminary
statements by [K.N.], and performed an analysis.
His conclusions were consistent with [K.N.]’s account
of what happened. Dr. Ross concluded that her
various injuries were consistent with: [h]air being
pulled[,] [b]lunt force trauma[,] [r]epeated
strangulation[,] and [d]efensive wounds. Dr. Ross
also concluded that [K.N.]’s injuries were
inconsistent with consensual intercourse as there
were multiple tears, and the injuries indicate a
severe amount of force was used and penetration
was significant and severe. In addition, Dr. Ross
also testified that his findings are inconsistent with
rough sex, [for the following reasons.]
1. [K.N.] was repeatedly beaten; []
2. [K.N.] had bruises all over her body; []
3. [K.N.] had traumatic alopecia where her
hair had been torn from her head; []
4. [K.N.] had bruises all over her chest; []
5. There were at least five (5) areas of
strangulation to the neck; []
6. There were bruises all over her body; and
7. The tears down at the vaginal introitus are
inconsistent with rough sex.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/29/14, at 2-5 (citations omitted).
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By criminal information filed on January 30, 2012, the Commonwealth
charged Appellant2 with the aforementioned offenses as well as attempted
murder, rape by threat of forcible compulsion, sexual assault, aggravated
indecent assault without consent, aggravated indecent assault by threat of
forcible compulsion, false imprisonment, and terroristic threats.3 On
September 3, 2013, a three-day jury trial commenced. On September 5,
2013, the jury found Appellant guilty of aggravated assault, rape by forcible
compulsion, aggravated indecent assault by forcible compulsion, and
unlawful restraint. The jury found Appellant not guilty of attempted murder.
The remaining charges were nolle prossed. A court-ordered sexually violent
predator assessment was completed and Appellant was not determined to be
a sexually violent predator. N.T., 12/16/13, at 1. Thereafter, on December
16, 2013, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 26½ to 53 years’
imprisonment.4
____________________________________________
2
We note that although the criminal information is contained within the
certified record and was file-stamped on January 30, 2012, it was not
entered on the trial court’s docket until February 2, 2012. However,
“[a]lthough the trial court docket is part of the official record, when it is at
variance with the certified record it references, the certified record controls.”
Shelly Enters., Inc. v. Guadagnini, 20 A.3d 491, 494 (Pa. Super. 2011).
As a result, we conclude that Appellant was charged on January 30, 2012.
3
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 3121(a)(2), 3124.1, 3125(a)(1), 3125(a)(3),
2903(a), and 2706(a)(1), respectively.
4
Specifically, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of imprisonment
of eight and one-half to 17 years for aggravated assault. On the conviction
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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On December 23, 2013, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion
asserting the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and challenging
the discretionary aspects of sentencing. On April 22, 2014, the trial court
denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion. Appellant filed a timely notice of
appeal on May 21, 2014.5
On appeal, Appellant presents the following three issues for our
review.
1. Was there insufficient evidence to conclude that []
Appellant used forcible compulsion based on prior
consensual sexual encounters between the victim
and the Appellant?
2. Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s
post[-]sentence motion because the jury’s verdict
against [] Appellant was so against the weight of
the evidence as presented at trial so as to shock
one’s sense of justice?
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
for rape by forcible compulsion, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term
of imprisonment of nine and one-half to 19 years. On the conviction for
aggravated indecent assault by forcible compulsion, the trial court sentenced
Appellant to a term of imprisonment of five to ten years. On the conviction
for unlawful restraint, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of
imprisonment of three and one-half to seven years. All the sentences were
imposed to run consecutively.
5
The trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 1925(b), and Appellant timely filed his Rule 1925(b) statement.
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court discusses Appellant’s challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence and directs this Court to its April 29, 2014
opinion for its discussion of its reasons for denying Appellant’s post-sentence
motion on the remaining issues. Trial Court Opinion, 7/22/14.
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3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by imposing
an unduly harsh and unreasonable sentence when
it imposed sentences in the upper end of the
aggravated range and ordered all sentences to be
served consecutively because the trial court failed
to consider Appellant’s rehabilitative needs with
the public’s safety?
Appellant’s Brief at 7.
In his first issue, Appellant contests the sufficiency of the evidence the
Commonwealth presented to convict him of the above-mentioned charges.
Id. at 22. Specifically, Appellant contends “in the present case, there is
insufficient evidence to conclude that the victim did not consent to this
conduct.” Id. at 23. Appellant argues that he and K.N. had a sexually
active relationship that ended four days prior to the incident. Id. He claims
that on the night of the incident, he met K.N. for drinks after which he went
to her apartment. Id. Appellant maintains that K.N. voluntarily followed
him to the bedroom where they engaged in consensual sex twice. Id. at 24.
Appellant suggests “K.N. fabricated the story because she wanted to get
back at Appellant for not reciprocating her romantic advances.” Id. at 26.
Our standard of review for challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence
is well settled. “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider
whether the evidence presented at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the
verdict winner, support the jury’s verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Commonwealth v. Patterson, 91 A.3d 55, 66 (Pa. 2014) (citation
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omitted), cert. denied, Patterson v. Pennsylvania, --- S.Ct. ---, 2015 WL
731963 (2015). “The Commonwealth can meet its burden by wholly
circumstantial evidence and any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be
resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive
that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the
combined circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108, 113
(Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted),
appeal denied, 95 A.3d 277 (Pa. 2014). As an appellate court, we must
review “the entire record … and all evidence actually received[.]” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he trier of fact while
passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence
produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.”
Commonwealth v. Orie, 88 A.3d 983, 1014 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
omitted), appeal denied, 99 A.3d 925 (Pa. 2014). “Because evidentiary
sufficiency is a question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our
scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Diamond, 83 A.3d 119,
126 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted), cert. denied, Diamond v. Pennsylvania,
135 S. Ct. 145 (2014).
Instantly, Appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, rape by
forcible compulsion, aggravated indecent assault by forcible compulsion, and
unlawful restraint. A person commits aggravated assault if he “attempts to
cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally,
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knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1).
Further, a person is guilty of rape by forcible compulsion “when the person
engages in sexual intercourse with a complainant [b]y forcible compulsion.”
Id. § 3121(a)(1). Additionally, a person commits aggravated indecent
assault by forcible compulsion when the person “engages in penetration,
however slight, of the genitals or anus of a complainant with a part of the
person’s body for any purpose other than good faith medical, hygienic or law
enforcement procedures … by forcible compulsion.” Id. § 3125(a)(2).
Finally, a person is guilty of unlawful restraint if “he knowingly … restrains
another unlawfully in circumstances exposing him to risk of serious bodily
injury.” Id. § 2902(a)(1). With regards to each of these crimes, Appellant’s
sole argument is that K.N. consented to conduct. Appellant’s Brief at 23.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth
as the verdict-winner, the evidence belies Appellant’s contention that the
Commonwealth did not demonstrate forcible compulsion. Regardless of the
prior sexual relationship between Appellant and K.N., our review of the
record clearly demonstrates that the sexual assault by Appellant on
November 4-5, 2011 was not consensual. As detailed above, Appellant
violently assaulted K.N. against her will, both physically and sexually.
During the assault, K.N. testified that Appellant strangled her on at least
three occasions, beat her, and told her he was going to kill her. N.T.,
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9/3/13, at 115-126. He also digitally penetrated her and raped her twice.
Id. at 122-126. As a result of these attacks, K.N. sustained extensive
injuries to her neck, chest, eye, back, buttocks, scalp, genital region, both
arms, both legs, and both hands, which were consistent with her description
of events. N.T., 9/4/13, at 260-285. A forensic pathologist testified that
these injuries were not consistent with consensual sex or rough sex. Id. at
301-302, 310, 314-315. Accordingly, the totality of the evidence presented
at trial overwhelmingly establishes the forcible, nonconsensual nature of the
assault and clearly supports the jury’s verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Patterson, supra. As a result, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his
first issue. See Diamond, supra.
In his second issue, Appellant contends “[t]he jury’s verdict in this
case was against the weight of the evidence presented at trial and shocks
one’s sense of justice.” Appellant’s Brief at 27. We begin by acknowledging
that “[a] true weight of the evidence challenge concedes that sufficient
evidence exists to sustain the verdict but questions which evidence is to be
believed.” Commonwealth v. Thompson, 106 A.3d 742, 758 (Pa. Super.
2014) (citation omitted). Our Supreme Court has clarified that, “[a] motion
for a new trial alleging that the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.” Commonwealth
v. Weathers, 95 A.3d 908, 910-911 (Pa. Super. 2014), quoting
Commonwealth v. Diggs, 949 A.2d 873, 879 (Pa. 2008), appeal denied,
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106 A.3d 726 (Pa. 2014). Therefore, on appeal, the reviewing court
“reviews the exercise of discretion, not the underlying question whether the
verdict is against the weight of the evidence.” Id. Indeed, it is well
established that it is for the factfinder to determine the weight given to the
evidence produced at trial. Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 107 A.3d 206,
212 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). Because it is the role of the
factfinder to weigh the evidence, an appellant seeking to challenge the
weight of the evidence carries a heavy burden.
If the factfinder returns a guilty verdict, and if a
criminal defendant then files a motion for a new trial
on the basis that the verdict was against the weight
of the evidence, a trial court is not to grant relief
unless the verdict is so contrary to the evidence as
to shock one’s sense of justice.
Id. at 212-213. We also highlight that “[a] new trial is not warranted
because of a mere conflict in the testimony and must have a stronger
foundation than a reassessment of the credibility of witnesses.”
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, --- A.3d ---, 2015 WL 252446, at *8 (Pa.
Super. 2015). “[O]nly where the facts and inferences disclose a palpable
abuse of discretion will the denial of a motion for a new trial based on the
weight of the evidence be upset on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Morales,
91 A.3d 80, 91 (Pa. 2014) (emphasis in original, citation omitted).
Instantly, Appellant claims that the evidence was inconsistent and “not
indicative of a forcible sexual encounter.” Id. Instead, Appellant maintains
the weight of the evidence shows a sexual encounter that “got out of hand
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and [was] too rough, but … did not rise to the level of a nonconsensual
sexual experience.” Id. at 28. Specifically, Appellant claims there was no
history of violence in the relationship, K.N. invited Appellant to her house
after the two met for drinks that evening, and neither she nor her parents
initially wanted the police involved. Id. at 28-31.
However, the jury heard the evidence of Appellant’s physical and
sexual assault on K.N. as detailed above, and was free to find K.N.’s
testimony credible and resolve any inconsistencies in the Commonwealth’s
favor. The jury was free to find that the sexual encounter was not
consensual. See Commonwealth v. Horne, 89 A.3d 277, 286 (Pa. Super.
2014) (concluding weight of the evidence claim could not prevail as “the jury
resolved the inconsistencies among the testimonies as it saw fit and reached
a verdict[]”), appeal denied, 102 A.3d 984 (Pa. 2014). As an appellate
court, we will not reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that
of the factfinder. Commonwealth v. Serrano, 61 A.3d 279, 289 (Pa.
Super. 2013) (citation omitted). The trial court thoroughly reviewed
Appellant’s challenge to the weight of the evidence and concluded, “it is
clear that the verdict is not so contrary to the evidence as to shock the
conscience, and a new trial is not warranted.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/29/14,
at 10. Based on these considerations, we conclude the trial court did not
commit a palpable abuse of discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for a
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new trial based on the weight of the evidence. See Morales, supra.
Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his second issue.
Appellant’s third issue raises a challenge to the discretionary aspects
of sentencing. Appellant’s Brief at 31. We begin by noting our well-settled
standard of review.
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion
of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be
disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of
discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is
not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
the appellant must establish, by reference to the
record, that the sentencing court ignored or
misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for
reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(citations omitted), appeal denied, 105 A.3d 736 (Pa. 2014).
It is well settled that, with regard to the
discretionary aspects of sentencing, there is no
automatic right to appeal. [Therefore, b]efore we
reach the merits of this issue, we must engage in a
four part analysis to determine: (1) whether the
appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved his
issue; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a
concise statement of the reasons relied upon for
allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary
aspects of sentence; and (4) whether the concise
statement raises a substantial question that the
sentence is appropriate under the sentencing code.
The third and fourth of these requirements arise
because Appellant’s attack on his sentence is not an
appeal as of right. Rather, he must petition this
Court, in his concise statement of reasons, to grant
consideration of his appeal on the grounds that there
is a substantial question. [I]f the appeal satisfies
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each of these four requirements, we will then
proceed to decide the substantive merits of the case.
Commonwealth v. Edwards, 71 A.3d 323, 329-330 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(citations omitted), appeal denied, 81 A.3d 75 (Pa. 2013).
Instantly, Appellant has met the first two requirements by filing a
timely notice of appeal and by raising his sentencing claim in his post-
sentence motion. However, Appellant’s brief does not include a Rule 2119(f)
statement of reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal. Nevertheless,
because the Commonwealth does not object to this procedural defect, we
will not find waiver. See Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 759
(Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014). Consequently,
we must determine whether Appellant has presented a substantial question
that his sentence is inappropriate under the sentencing code. See
Edwards, supra.
Appellant asserts that his sentence of 26½ to 53 years’ imprisonment
was “in the aggravated range at each count, with all sentences running
consecutively[,]” which “was excessive[,] and the trial court’s refusal to
downwardly modify the sentence was in error.” Id. at 34-35. Specifically,
Appellant contends that the trial court failed to impose an individualized
sentence when it departed from the probation office’s recommendation of 16
to 36 years’ and instead punished Appellant based on the circumstances of
the crime alone. Id. at 35-36, citing Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d
12, 13 (Pa. 1988). This Court has held that “a claim that the [trial] court
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erred by imposing an aggravated range sentence without consideration of
mitigating circumstances raises a substantial question.” Commonwealth v.
Felmlee, 828 A.2d 1105, 1107 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc) (citation
omitted). We therefore proceed to review the merits of Appellant’s claim.
Appellant asserts that “the trial court’s refusal to follow th[e]
recommendation [of the probation office] was in error when balancing the
protection of the public with his rehabilitative needs.” Appellant’s Brief at
36. Specifically, Appellant cites his successful completion of his last period
of state parole supervision as well as his incarceration while pending trial in
this case for 736 days without any documented disciplinary problems. Id. at
35. Appellant claims this “demonstrate[s] that he is amenable to
rehabilitation and complies with probation and prison authorities.” Id.
After conducting our own review of Appellant’s claim, along with a
review of the sentencing hearing, we conclude the trial court’s sentence was
appropriate. The trial court noted that it “consider[ed] the protection of the
public and [Appellant]’s rehabilitative needs, as well as various other
factors,” including the following. Trial Court Opinion, 4/29/14, at 11.
 The [p]re-[s]entence [i]nvestigation report
submitted by the York County Probation
Department; []
 The statement by the victim, [K.N.] (both verbal
and written); []
 Argument by [Appellant’s] [c]ounsel; []
 The statement by [Appellant]; []
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 Argument by the Commonwealth; []
 The fact that [Appellant] is not RRRI eligible and
that the Commonwealth was not willing to waive
that ineligibility; []
 The mitigated range sentence, standard range
sentence, and aggravated range sentence for
each crime [Appellant] was convicted of; []
 The Offense Gravity Score (OGS) for each
offense; []
 The fact that the Prior Record Score (PRS) is a 5;
and
 The manner, nature and circumstances
surrounding the crimes committed by [Appellant]
(the sentencing [j]udge is also the [j]udge who
presided over the trial and heard all the
evidence).
Id. at 11-12 (citations omitted). The trial court noted that it took into
account Appellant’s and the Commonwealth’s arguments as well as the
sentencing memoranda. Further, it took into account the York County
Probation Department pre-sentence investigation report (PSI). It is
axiomatic that where “the sentencing court had the benefit of a [PSI], we
can assume the sentencing court was aware of relevant information
regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along
with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 8 A.3d
912, 919 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted),
appeal denied, 25 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2011), cert. denied, Rhoades v.
Pennsylvania, 132 S. Ct. 1746 (2012). The trial court also noted
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Appellant’s refusal to cooperate with the probation department in the
preparation of the PSI. N.T., 12/16/13, at 9. The PSI noted “Paul McKenzie
declined to make any statement on this matter and plans to appeal his
conviction[.]” Id. Thus, to the extent that the PSI was incomplete, it was a
result of Appellant’s unwillingness to participate in the PSI process. Further,
the trial court delineated the following reasons for imposing an aggravated
range sentence.
We note that we have imposed aggravated
range sentences on the [Appellant] in this case
because of the vicious and prolonged nature of the
attacks [Appellant] committed on someone who
trusted him. We find that the aggravated range
sentences are called for because the offender
inflicted extreme mental cruelty on the victim during
the course of the commission of his crimes; that he
inflicted extreme physical cruelty on the victim
during that same period of time; that he injured the
victim; that the victim’s injuries substantially were in
excess of the minimum necessary to prove the
crimes committed; that the victim was in a position
of trust and confidence of [Appellant]; that
[Appellant] is a danger to society; that [Appellant]
had just very recently completed a parole
supervision or probation supervision on prior criminal
charges; that [Appellant] has been subject to
previous incarceration; that [Appellant], given the
nature of his criminal record and his actions in
regards to the crimes he committed in this case, is a
poor candidate for rehabilitation; that the
prosecution recommended the sentences imposed;
and that any lesser sentence imposed upon
[Appellant], given the nature and circumstances of
the crimes he committed, would depreciate the
seriousness of those crimes and the manner in which
he committed them. I don’t think it’s inappropriate
to liken what [Appellant] did to this victim as
torture, threatened to kill, choked her, restrained
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her, chased after her when she tried to escape,
injured her, raped her, and did so over a long period
of time.
N.T., 12/16/13, at 11.
The foregoing clearly demonstrates that the trial court was fully aware
of all of the mitigating circumstances. The trial court acknowledged it was
going beyond the standard sentencing guideline recommendations and
imposing a sentence in the aggravated range and noted its reasons for doing
so on the record. Specifically, the trial court addressed Appellant’s prior
completion of state parole supervision, which Appellant asserts as a reason
for a mitigated sentence. It viewed that fact, among others, as showing
Appellant was not amenable to rehabilitation. The trial court did not abuse
its discretion simply because it drew the opposite inference from this fact as
Appellant desired. See Raven, supra. Accordingly, we conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant in this case.
Id. Appellant is therefore not entitled to relief on his third issue.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude Appellant’s claims are meritless.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s December 16, 2014 judgment of
sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/6/2015
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