Com. v. Warfield, B. ( 2015 )

J-S15044-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
BLAINE MATTHEW WARFIELD
Appellee No. 1075 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered June 24, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-18-CR-0000129-2014
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., WECHT, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED APRIL 07, 2015
The Commonwealth appeals from the trial court’s order granting Blaine
Warfield’s motion to suppress. We conclude that there were valid grounds to
stop Warfield for an investigative detention to determine whether Warfield
furnished liquor to minors. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this memorandum.
Warfield was charged with furnishing liquor to minors1 based on a
series of events in and around Lock Haven, Pennsylvania on October 5,
2013.2 Warfield filed a pretrial motion to suppress alleging that liquor code
____________________________________________
1
18 Pa.C.S. § 6310.1.
2
Warfield also was charged with unlawful acts relating to liquor beverages
(“unlawful acts”) under 47 P.S. § 4-493. Following a preliminary hearing, a
magisterial district justice dismissed the unlawful acts charge. The case
proceeded to the trial court on the furnishing liquor charge alone.
J-S15044-15
enforcement officers stopped him and his companions in violation of his
constitutional rights. The trial court held a suppression hearing in which
three liquor code enforcement officers testified for the Commonwealth.
There were no defense witnesses. On June 24, 2014, the trial court entered
an order and opinion granting Warfield’s motion to suppress. The
Commonwealth timely filed a notice of appeal3 and a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement of matters complained of on appeal. The trial court filed a
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion incorporating its June 24, 2014 opinion by
reference.
The Commonwealth raises two issues in this appeal:
1. Did the trial court err in finding that the interaction
between the officer and the defendant was an
investigative detention?
2. Did the trial court err in finding that any investigative
detention was not supported by reasonable
suspicion?
Brief For Appellant, p. 4.
When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, our scope
of review consists of the evidence from the defendant’s witnesses together
with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the
____________________________________________
3
The Commonwealth may appeal an interlocutory order suppressing
evidence when it certifies in its notice of appeal that the order terminates or
substantially handicaps the prosecution. Pa.R.A.P. 311(d); Commonwealth
v. Whitlock, 69 A.3d 635, 636 n. 2 (Pa.Super.2013). The Commonwealth
provided the required certification in its notice of appeal.
-2-
J-S15044-15
record as a whole, remains uncontradicted. Whitlock, supra, 69 A.3d at
637. We defer to the suppression court’s findings of fact that are supported
by the record because, as the finder of fact, the suppression court has the
prerogative to decide the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of their
testimony. Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d 298, 302 (Pa.2014). We are
not bound by the suppression court’s conclusions of law, and we must
determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.
Whitlock, supra, 69 A.3d at 637.
The relevant facts of this case, derived from the certified record in
accordance with the above scope and standards of review, are as follows.
On October 5, 2013, Officer Harbach and other liquor code enforcement
officers followed Warfield’s car to four establishments in or near Lock Haven.
N.T., 6/18/14, pp. 11-14 (suppression hearing). Warfield was driving, and
two young males accompanied Warfield. Id. Officer Harbach followed
Warfield in one vehicle, and two other officers followed in a second vehicle.
Id. at 11. At the first stop, a state liquor store, Warfield walked into the
store alone and purchased items that he carried back to the car in plastic
bags. Id. at 31-33. At the second stop, Puff’s Six Pack, an establishment
that sells alcoholic beverages, Warfield walked inside alone and purchased
one 6-pack of bottles. Id. at 15. He returned to his car and dropped off the
6-pack, and then he walked back into the store alone and purchased one 12-
pack of cans. Id. The fact that Warfield made two separate purchases
-3-
J-S15044-15
indicated that he purchased alcoholic beverages, because Pennsylvania law
prohibits restaurant licensees such as Puff’s from selling more than two 6-
packs in one sale. Id. at 16.
At the third stop, one of the two young males purchased what
appeared to be soda. N.T., 6/18/14, pp. 33-34. At the final stop, Eagle
Distributors, Warfield walked inside alone and purchased one 30-pack of
Busch Beer. Id. at 34-35.
Based on Warfield’s string of purchases, Officer Harbach suspected
that the two males with Warfield were minors. N.T., 6/18/14, p. 15. She
testified that “[it] is a red flag … when somebody is making all the purchases
[alone and] there [are other] occupants, [because] if [the other occupants]
were 21 [they] could have made it all in one single sale … they all could
have carried [alcoholic beverages] out.” Id.
Following the final purchase at Eagle Distributors, the officers followed
Warfield’s car to his residence on North Fairview Street. N.T., 6/18/14, pp.
14, 43. Officer Harbach parked her car two car lengths behind Warfield’s
car. Id. at 14-15. When Warfield and the two males exited Warfield’s car,
Officer Harbach observed that “all occupants were in possession of alcoholic
beverages, and they were walking up towards me because I was actually
standing directly in front of their residence.” Id. at 14. Upon viewing all
three males in possession of alcoholic beverages, Officer Harbach identified
herself as a liquor code enforcement officer and instructed the males to
-4-
J-S15044-15
“drop the alcohol.”4 Id. at 17. Officer Harbach also directed the males to
produce identification and sit down on the ground. Id. at 17, 26. Warfield’s
identification showed that he was 21 years old; the other two individuals
were under age 21. Id. at 18.
The Commonwealth argued in the trial court that the events in front of
Warfield’s residence were a “mere encounter” which did not require the
liquor code enforcement officers to harbor any suspicion of criminal
wrongdoing. Warfield countered that the events constituted an investigative
detention for which the officers needed (but lacked) reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity. The trial court concluded that the incident was an
investigative detention, and that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity.
In this Court, the Commonwealth raises two arguments: (1) the
incident with Warfield was a “mere encounter,” and (2) even if it was an
investigative detention, Officer Harbach had reasonable suspicion to conduct
an investigative stop. We conclude that the incident was a valid
investigative detention supported by reasonable suspicion that Warfield
illegally furnished liquor to minors.
____________________________________________
4
The other two officers arrived at the scene after Officer Harbach
intercepted the males and initiated their detention. The trial court correctly
focused on Officer Harbach as the crucial state actor in this case.
-5-
J-S15044-15
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect individuals against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Commonwealth v. Miller, 56 A.3d
424, 429 (Pa.Super.2012). A seizure is a restraint on personal liberty under
circumstances in which a reasonable person would not feel free to leave.
Lyles, 97 A.3d at 303. Factors which determine whether police have
effectuated a seizure include, but are not limited to: (1) the presence or
absence of police excesses; (2) whether there was physical contact; (3)
whether police directed the citizen’s movements; (4) police demeanor and
manner of expression; (5) the location of the interdiction; (6) the content of
the questions and statements; (7) the existence and character of the initial
investigative detention, including its degree of coerciveness; (8) the degree
of seamlessness between the original encounter and subsequent
developments; (9) whether the officer has told the citizen that he is free to
depart; and (10) whether the officer has told the citizen that he is not
required to consent to the search. Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d
884, 888-89 (Pa.2000).
There are three categories of interactions between citizens and police.
In evaluating the level of interaction, courts conduct an objective
examination of the totality of surrounding circumstances. Lyles, 97 A.3d at
302. The first interaction, a “mere encounter”, does not carry any official
compulsion to stop or respond and therefore does not require the police
-6-
J-S15044-15
officer to have any level of suspicion. Id. A mere encounter is not a
seizure, because a reasonable person would feel free to leave or terminate
the encounter. Id. at 302-03. The second interaction, an “investigative
detention”, is a seizure which subjects an individual to a stop and temporary
detention but is not so coercive as to constitute the functional equivalent of
an arrest. Strickler, 757 A.2d at 889. An investigative detention is
permissible if the police officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion
that the person seized is engaged in criminal activity, and the detention may
continue only so long as is necessary to confirm or dispel such suspicion.
Id.
The third interaction, an arrest or custodial detention, the most
restrictive encounter, is a seizure that must be supported by probable cause.
Strickler, 757 A.2d at 889. Probable cause exists
when the facts and circumstances which are within
the knowledge of the officer at the time of the arrest,
and of which he has reasonably trustworthy
information, are sufficient to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that the suspect has
committed or is committing a crime. The question
we ask is not whether the officer’s belief was correct
or more likely true than false. Rather, we require
only a probability, and not a prima facie showing, of
criminal activity. In determining whether probable
cause exists, we apply a totality of the circumstances
test.
Commonwealth v. Martin, 101 A.3d 706, 721 (Pa.2014) (italics in
original).
-7-
J-S15044-15
The incident in this case exceeds the bounds of a mere encounter,
because Officer Harbach exerted “official compulsion to stop or respond” by
directing Warfield and the two minors to “drop the alcohol”, sit on the
ground and produce identification. Lyles, 97 A.3d at 302. A reasonable
person would not have felt free to leave or to terminate this encounter.
Compare Lyles at 304-06 (interaction did not escalate beyond mere
encounter when officers approached defendant and another man in front of
abandoned building in area where numerous burglaries had recently
occurred, asked what they were doing there, and requested identification;
officer’s jotting down of identification information, as opposed to attempting
to memorize it, did not restrain defendant’s freedom of movement; officer’s
request was not accompanied by physical restraint, manifestation of
authority, or mandate to comply; and officer did not tell defendant that he
was not free to leave, or brandish a weapon).
This incident falls within the scope of an investigative detention, which
Officer Harbach had the right to make if she had reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity was afoot. Strickler, 757 A.2d at 889. In the course of an
investigatory stop, an officer may frisk the individual’s outer garments if he
has reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous.
Commonwealth v. Clemens, 66 A.3d 373, 381 (Pa.Super.2013). The
officer also can take other reasonable measures designed to protect himself
during an investigatory detention. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Revere,
-8-
J-S15044-15
888 A.2d 694, 707 (Pa.2005) (“there are certain exigencies—and
particularly, the need for safety or security in conducting and completing an
investigatory detention — the existence of which would make it reasonable
under the authority of Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)] … to place a
suspect in a vehicle and transport him a short distance during an
investigatory detention”); see also United States v. Ramires, 307 F.3d
713, 716 (8th Cir.2002) (based on reasonable suspicion of drug
manufacturing, officers authorized to order defendants out of crawl space at
gunpoint and handcuff them, because drug trafficking is often accompanied
by dangerous weapons). On the other hand, “if the protective search goes
beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no
longer valid under Terry … ” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373
(1993).
Officer Harbach reasonably suspected that Warfield was furnishing
liquor to minors based on several factors: (1) the youthful appearance of the
two passengers in Warfield’s car, (2) Warfield’s solo purchases of alcohol (or
what Officer Harbach reasonably believed was alcohol) at three
establishments while the two young males waited in Warfield’s car, and (3)
Officer Harbach’s observation, from a lawful vantage point, of Warfield and
the two young males carrying alcohol in plain view outside of Warfield’s
residence. Therefore, Officer Harbach had the authority to stop Warfield and
the other two males for an investigative detention. See Commonwealth v.
-9-
J-S15044-15
Hayes, 898 A.2d 1089, 1093-94 (Pa.Super.2006) (officer had articulable
and adequate suspicion that defendant was furnishing alcohol to minors so
as to support investigative detention in which officer stopped vehicle as it
backed out of parking space; officer saw vehicle in front of liquor store and
saw driver pass something to defendant which he thought was money,
officer formed suspicion that driver was probably underage based on
experience as 10-year veteran of police department’s division for
investigating furnishing alcohol to minors, defendant began walking towards
liquor store, but turned back before she went inside and yelled to others in
vehicle, “apple, apple,” and then “oh watermelon,” and defendant purchased
two bottles of what officer believed was alcohol based on appearance and
place of purchase).5
Officer Harbach’s command to “drop the alcohol” was a reasonable
measure to protect herself during the investigative detention. Revere,
supra. At the time of the stop, Warfield or his companions conceivably
could have attacked Officer Harbach with the bottles of alcohol in their
hands. The command to drop the alcohol was a reasonable measure to
prevent Warfield or his friends from using the bottles as weapons.
____________________________________________
5
Notably, Hayes also comments: “It is per se reasonable for one to assume
that when a person goes into a liquor store in Pennsylvania and emerges
with bottles, that person has purchased alcohol.” Id. at 1094.
- 10 -
J-S15044-15
Officer Harbach had the authority to examine Warfield’s license and
the other males’ licenses during the investigatory detention.
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 827 A.2d 469, 478 (Pa.Super.2003) (deputy
was authorized to stop defendant and request identification based on
reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaging in underage drinking).
Upon determining from the licenses that Warfield was 21 and the two other
males were underage, Officer Harbach had probable cause to believe that
Warfield was furnishing liquor to minors in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6310.1.
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court erred by granting
Warfield’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as part of the
investigatory detention outside of Warfield’s residence.
Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/7/2015
- 11 -