Com. v. Williams, E. ( 2015 )


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  • J-S12020-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    ENECA WILLIAMS,
    Appellant                   No. 859 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 18, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0004607-2013
    BEFORE: BOWES, SHOGAN, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:                               FILED APRIL 10, 2015
    Appellant, Eneca Williams, appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered on February 18, 2014, in the Delaware County Court of Common
    Pleas. We affirm.
    Following a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of driving under the
    influence (“DUI”), second offense, and driving while operating privileges
    were suspended, DUI related.             On February 18, 2014, the trial court
    imposed a sentence of nine to twenty-three months of incarceration,
    followed by three years of probation on the DUI conviction, and a concurrent
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S12020-15
    term of sixty days of incarceration on the driving while operating privileges
    were suspended charge.1
    Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and the trial court directed
    Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
    pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).          Appellant complied and raised one issue:
    “The Trial Court made unduly prejudicial statements to the jury suggesting
    that the failure to reach a unanimous verdict would cause a financial burden
    to Delaware County.” Appellant’s Concise Statement of Errors Complained
    of on Appeal, 4/10/14 (full italicization omitted).         However, on appeal,
    Appellant has abandoned this issue and instead purports to present a
    challenge to the legality of his sentence involving the application of a
    mandatory minimum sentence.                Appellant’s Brief at 11.   Appellant’s
    argument is premised on this Court’s decisions in Commonwealth v.
    Newman, 
    99 A.3d 86
     (Pa. Super. 2014), and Commonwealth v.
    Valentine, 
    101 A.3d 801
     (Pa. Super. 2014), which applied the United States
    Supreme Court’s holding from Alleyne v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 
    133 S.Ct. 2151
     (2013).
    ____________________________________________
    1
    While flat sentences are generally not permitted in Pennsylvania,
    Appellant’s flat sentence of sixty days is permissible pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.
    § 1543(b)(1). See Commonwealth v. Klingensmith, 
    650 A.2d 444
     (Pa.
    Super. 1994) (stating that 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(b) implicitly created an
    exception to the minimum/maximum sentencing requirements of 42 Pa.C.S.
    § 9756(b) by specifically authorizing a trial court to impose a flat sentence
    for driving with a suspended license when the license was suspended as a
    result of a prior DUI conviction).
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    J-S12020-15
    As a general rule, where an appellant is directed to comply with
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), any issues not raised in a timely filed concise statement
    of errors complained of on appeal will be deemed waived. Commonwealth
    v. Castillo, 
    888 A.2d 775
    , 780 (Pa. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v.
    Lord, 
    719 A.2d 306
    , 309 (Pa. 1998)).          However, issues concerning the
    legality of one’s sentence can, in some instances, be raised for the first time
    on appeal.    “Generally, a challenge to the application of a mandatory
    minimum sentence is a non-waiveable challenge to the legality of the
    sentence.” Commonwealth v. Akbar, 
    91 A.3d 227
    , 238 (Pa. Super. 2014)
    (citation and quotation marks omitted).
    Because we conclude that Appellant has presented a non-waiveable
    challenge to the legality of his sentence, we shall address the issue
    presented.   We note that issues challenging the legality of a sentence are
    questions of law, and our standard of review over such questions is de novo
    and our scope of review is plenary. Akbar, 
    91 A.3d at 238
    .
    As noted above, Appellant argues that the decisions in Newman and
    Valentine, which apply the Alleyne holding, afford him relief. We disagree.
    In Alleyne, the United States Supreme Court held that facts which increase
    a mandatory minimum sentence must be submitted to the jury and must be
    found beyond a reasonable doubt.         Alleyne, 
    133 S.Ct. at 2163
    .      Both
    Newman       and   Valentine   dealt   with   mandatory   minimum   sentences
    resulting from findings that were determined to be elements of the offense
    -3-
    J-S12020-15
    itself; therefore, the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Alleyne mandated
    those determinations to be submitted to the jury as required by Apprendi
    v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
     (2000).              Newman, 99 A.3d at 97;
    Valentine, 
    101 A.3d at 804
    .2
    However, in the case at bar, the fact supporting the mandatory
    minimum, a prior DUI conviction, is not an element of the current offense.
    Thus, the instant matter is readily distinguishable from the mandatory
    minimum sentences struck down in Newman and Valentine.
    Furthermore, Apprendi explicitly distinguished the bases for an
    increase in a sentence, and noted that prior convictions were excepted from
    its mandate.     See Apprendi, 
    530 U.S. at 490
     (“Other than the fact of a
    prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
    prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
    beyond a reasonable doubt.”).3 Here, it is undisputed that the increase in
    Appellant’s minimum sentence was due to his prior DUI conviction.4
    ____________________________________________
    2
    While Valentine does not specifically cite Apprendi, its analysis cites to
    Alleyne and its application of Apprendi. See Alleyne, 
    133 S.Ct. at 2155
    .
    3
    We are cognizant that this area of our jurisprudence has indeed been called
    into question. Commonwealth v. Hale, 
    85 A.3d 570
    , 585 n.13 (Pa. Super.
    2014). However, we are bound by stare decisis to adhere to the law in its
    current state.
    4
    We also note that after a request by Appellant’s counsel, the trial court, in
    an abundance of caution, placed the issue of Appellant’s prior conviction
    before the jury. N.T., Trial, 1/30/14, at 15. Following deliberations which
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    -4-
    J-S12020-15
    Therefore, neither Newman, Valentine, Alleyne, nor Apprendi, affords
    Appellant relief.       Accordingly, because Appellant’s mandatory minimum
    sentence is not illegal, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judge Bowes Joins the memorandum.
    Justice Fitzgerald Notes Dissent.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/10/2015
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    were held separately from those that resulted in the guilty verdict on the
    charges of DUI and driving while operating privileges were suspended, the
    jury specifically determined, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant had
    a prior DUI conviction. Id. at 19.
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