Green Acres Rehabilitation & Nursing Center v. Sullivan , 2015 Pa. Super. 73 ( 2015 )


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  • J-S10039-15
    
    2015 PA Super 73
    GREEN ACRES REHABILITATION AND           :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    NURSING CENTER                           :          PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                    :
    :
    HENRY SULLIVAN AND HENRIETTA             :
    SULLIVAN                                 :
    :
    APPEAL OF: HENRIETTA SULLIVAN            :         No. 2084 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the Order Entered June 13, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Civil Division at No(s): 070301125
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., STABILE, J., AND PLATT, J.*
    OPINION BY GANTMAN, P.J.:                           FILED APRIL 13, 2015
    Appellant, Henrietta Sullivan, appeals from the order entered in the
    Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which denied her petition to
    strike a default judgment entered in favor of Appellee, Green Acres
    Rehabilitation and Nursing Center (“Green Acres”), in this breach of contract
    case. We affirm.
    The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.
    Appellant’s father, Henry Sullivan, became a resident at Green Acres on
    January 21, 2005.1      Mr. Sullivan executed a power of attorney (“POA”)
    agreement, designating Appellant as his agent, on April 28, 2005. On March
    1
    Although Appellant stated in her petition to strike the judgment that Mr.
    Sullivan died on December 22, 2007, the record, as it existed at the time the
    default judgment was entered, contains no evidence of Mr. Sullivan’s date of
    death.
    _____________________________
    *Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S10039-15
    13, 2007, Green Acres filed a complaint against Mr. Sullivan and Appellant,
    seeking $114,497.13 in damages based on allegations that Mr. Sullivan had
    failed to pay for nursing home services provided by Green Acres.             The
    complaint included counts of breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and
    quantum meruit against Mr. Sullivan and Appellant, and one count of breach
    of fiduciary duty against Appellant. In the following months, the complaint
    was reinstated several times to allow for service. With respect to Appellant,
    Green Acres served the complaint on September 22, 2007, at Appellant’s
    residence on an adult relative who refused to give her name to the process
    server. Appellant did not file an answer.
    On December 12, 2007, Green Acres sent to Appellant’s address via
    certified mail a ten-day notice of intent to file a praecipe for entry of default
    judgment. The notice stated in relevant part:
    To:      Henrietta Sullivan
    Date:    October 24, 2007
    IMPORTANT NOTICE
    YOU ARE IN DEFAULT BECAUSE YOU HAVE FAILED TO
    ENTER A WRITTEN APPEARANCE PERSONALLY OR BY
    ATTORNEY AND FILE IN WRITING WITH THE COURT YOUR
    DEFENSES OR OBJECTIONS TO THE CLAIMS SET FORTH
    AGAINST YOU. UNLESS YOU ACT WITHIN TEN DAYS
    FROM THE DATE OF THIS NOTICE, A JUDGMENT MAY BE
    ENTERED AGAINST YOU WITHOUT A HEARING AND YOU
    MAY LOSE YOUR PROPERTY OR OTHER IMPORTANT
    RIGHTS. YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS NOTICE TO A LAWYER
    AT ONCE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER OR CANNOT
    AFFORD ONE, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE FOLLOWING
    OFFICE TO FIND OUT WHERE YOU CAN GET LEGAL HELP:
    -2-
    J-S10039-15
    Philadelphia Bar Association
    Lawyer Referral and Information Service
    1101 Market Street, 11th Floor
    Philadelphia, PA 19107
    (215) 238-6300
    (See Petition to Strike Judgment, Exhibit F; R.R. at 78a).             Fourteen days
    later, on December 26, 2007, Green Acres filed a praecipe for entry of
    default judgment against Appellant. Green Acres attached to the praecipe to
    enter default judgment a copy of the notice of intent to file the praecipe and
    a certification Green Acres had sent the notice to Appellant. The certification
    stated in relevant part: “Pursuant to R 4:43-1, the Motion for Final Judgment
    by Default has been sent by first class U.S. Postal Mail and Certified Mail,
    return receipt requested to [Appellant], Henrietta Sullivan….” (See Petition
    to Strike Judgment, Exhibit G; R.R. at 81a).            Judgment by default was
    entered against Appellant in the amount of $114,497.13.2
    Appellant took no further action in this case until April 10, 2014, when
    she filed a petition to strike the default judgment on, inter alia, the following
    grounds: (1) the trial division of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas
    lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case; (2) the judgment was
    improperly   entered   against   Appellant   in   her    individual,    rather   than
    representative, capacity; and (3) Green Acres attached to the praecipe to
    enter default judgment a fatally defective certification that it had sent
    2
    Mr. Sullivan was personally served with the complaint on May 1, 2007, and
    served on July 23, 2007, with notice of intent to take a default judgment.
    Judgment by default against Mr. Sullivan was previously entered on
    December 12, 2007, in the same amount.
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    J-S10039-15
    Appellant notice of its intent to file the praecipe to enter default judgment.3
    The trial court denied the petition on June 13, 2014.         Appellant filed a
    motion for reconsideration and a timely notice of appeal on July 8, 2014. On
    July 9, 2014, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of
    errors complained of on appeal, per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), which Appellant
    timely filed on July 22, 2014.      The court denied Appellant’s motion for
    reconsideration on July 30, 2014.
    Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
    WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR OF
    LAW WHEN IT FAILED TO STRIKE (EITHER UPON
    [APPELLANT’S PETITION] TO STRIKE OR ITS OWN
    [MOTION]) THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST
    [APPELLANT], REGARDLESS OF THE PASSAGE OF TIME, AS
    VOID DUE TO LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
    IN THE TRIAL DIVISION WHEN ALL ALLEGATIONS OF
    WRONGDOING AND PRAYERS FOR RELIEF AVERRED IN
    THE COMPLAINT AGAINST [APPELLANT] ARE AGAINST HER
    IN HER REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY AS AGENT FOR HER
    FATHER, HENRY SULLIVAN, UNDER A FINANCIAL POWER
    OF ATTORNEY?
    WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR OF
    LAW WHEN IT FAILED TO STRIKE (EITHER UPON
    [APPELLANT’S PETITION] TO STRIKE OR ITS OWN
    [MOTION]) THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST
    [APPELLANT] IN HER INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, REGARDLESS
    OF THE PASSAGE OF TIME, AS VOID FOR FAILURE TO SUE
    [APPELLANT] IN THE CORRECT CAPACITY, WHEN THE
    FACE OF THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO CONTAIN ANY
    ALLEGATIONS OF WRONGDOING OR ANY CLAIM AGAINST
    [APPELLANT] IN HER INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, BOTH OF
    WHICH ARE NECESSARY TO SUPPORT A DEFAULT
    JUDGMENT AGAINST HER IN THAT CAPACITY?
    3
    The record fails to show that Appellant properly served the petition to
    strike on Green Acres.
    -4-
    J-S10039-15
    WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR OF
    LAW WHEN IT FAILED TO STRIKE (EITHER UPON
    [APPELLANT’S PETITION] TO STRIKE OR ITS OWN
    [MOTION]) THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST
    [APPELLANT], REGARDLESS OF THE PASSAGE OF TIME, AS
    VOID DUE TO A DEFECTIVE PROOF OF SERVICE OF THE
    NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT
    WHICH (A) FAILS TO CERTIFY THAT A WRITTEN NOTICE
    OF PRAECIPE TO ENTER JUDGMENT WAS MAILED OR
    DELIVERED AS REQUIRED BY [PA.R.C.P.] 237.1(A)(2),
    BUT RATHER CITES TO A NEW JERSEY RULE OF CIVIL
    PROCEDURE, WHICH IS OF NO EFFECT IN THE
    COMMONWEALTH      OF    PENNSYLVANIA    AND    (B)
    REFERENCES THE SERVICE OF A “MOTION FOR FINAL
    JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT” AND NOT A NOTICE OF PRAECIPE
    TO ENTER DEFAULT JUDGMENT AS REQUIRED BY THE
    RULE; BOTH OF WHICH REMOVED THE PROTHONOTARY’S
    AUTHORITY TO ENTER SUCH A DEFAULT JUDGMENT?
    (Appellant’s Brief at 4).4
    In her first issue, Appellant argues all allegations against her in Green
    Acres’ complaint concern Appellant’s alleged wrongdoing in her capacity as
    Mr. Sullivan’s POA. Appellant asserts all prayers for relief in the complaint
    4
    In a footnote in the statement of the case in her brief, Appellant also
    complains Green Acres’ service of the complaint was improper because the
    return of service did not indicate how the process server identified the
    person served as a relative of Appellant or a person in charge of Appellant’s
    residence. Nevertheless, this argument appears nowhere in the argument
    section of Appellant’s brief. Appellant also fails to include this issue in her
    statement of the questions involved. Moreover, the footnote contains no
    citations to relevant authority. For these reasons, Appellant’s short footnote
    commentary regarding improper service is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)
    (stating argument shall be divided into as many sections as there are
    questions presented, followed by discussion with citation to relevant legal
    authority); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    604 Pa. 176
    , 
    985 A.3d 915
    (2009), cert. denied, 
    562 U.S. 906
    , 
    131 S.Ct. 250
    , 
    178 L.Ed.2d 165
     (2010)
    (explaining appellant waives issue on appeal where she fails to present claim
    with citations to relevant authority or to develop issue in meaningful fashion
    capable of review).
    -5-
    J-S10039-15
    likewise refer to her as “Power of Attorney, Henrietta Sullivan.”      Appellant
    contends the trial division lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims
    against    her   because   the   Orphans’   Court   Division   has   “mandatory”
    jurisdiction over matters pertaining to an agent’s actions under a POA.
    Appellant concludes the default judgment is void on its face, and the court
    erred when it denied Appellant’s petition to strike the default judgment on
    this basis. We disagree.
    An appeal regarding a petition to strike a default judgment implicates
    the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. Oswald v. WB Public Square
    Associates, LLC, 
    80 A.3d 790
    , 793 (Pa.Super. 2013). Issues regarding the
    operation of procedural rules of court present us with questions of law. 
    Id.
    Therefore, “our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is
    plenary.” 
    Id.
    “A petition to strike a judgment is a common law proceeding which
    operates as a demurrer to the record. A petition to strike a judgment may
    be granted only for a fatal defect or irregularity appearing on the face of the
    record.”   Midwest Financial Acceptance Corp. v. Lopez, 
    78 A.3d 614
    ,
    622-23 (Pa.Super. 2013). “[A] petition to strike is not a chance to review
    the merits of the allegations of a complaint. Rather, a petition to strike is
    aimed at defects that affect the validity of the judgment and that entitle the
    petitioner, as a matter of law, to relief.”   Oswald, 
    supra at 794
    . A fatal
    defect on the face of the record denies the prothonotary the authority to
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    J-S10039-15
    enter judgment. Erie Ins. Co. v. Bullard, 
    839 A.2d 383
    , 388 (Pa.Super.
    2003).   When a prothonotary enters judgment without authority, that
    judgment is void ab initio. 
    Id.
     “When deciding if there are fatal defects on
    the face of the record for the purposes of a petition to strike a [default]
    judgment, a court may only look at what was in the record when the
    judgment was entered.” Cintas Corp. v. Lee’s Cleaning Services, Inc.,
    
    549 Pa. 84
    , 90, 
    700 A.2d 915
    , 917 (1997).
    A judgment is void on its face if one or more of three
    jurisdictional elements is found absent: jurisdiction of the
    parties; subject matter jurisdiction; or the power or
    authority to render the particular judgment. The term
    “jurisdiction” relates to the competency of the individual
    court, administrative body, or other tribunal to determine
    controversies of the general class to which a particular
    case belongs. Moreover, it is never too late to attack a
    judgment or decree for want of jurisdiction, as any such
    judgment or decree rendered by a court which lacks
    jurisdiction of the subject matter or the person is null and
    void, and can be attacked by the parties at any time. A
    petition to strike a judgment founded on a jurisdictional
    deficiency is therefore not subject to the same “timeliness”
    considerations as a petition to open the judgment.
    Flynn v. Casa Di Bertacchi Corp., 
    674 A.2d 1099
    , 1105 (Pa.Super. 1996).
    Article V, Section 5 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states as follows:
    § 5. Courts of common pleas
    There shall be one court of common pleas for each judicial
    district (a) having such divisions and consisting of such
    number of judges as shall be provided by law, one of
    whom shall be the president judge; and
    (b) having unlimited original jurisdiction in all cases except
    as may otherwise be provided by law.
    -7-
    J-S10039-15
    Pa. Const. art. 5, § 5.     See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 931(a) (stating: “Except
    where exclusive original jurisdiction of an action or proceeding is by statute
    or by general rule…vested in another court of this Commonwealth, the courts
    of common pleas shall have unlimited original jurisdiction of all actions and
    proceedings….”); Posner v. Sheridan, 
    451 Pa. 51
    , 
    299 A.2d 309
     (1973)
    (explaining 1968 Pennsylvania Constitution abolished former system of
    separate trial courts and combined them into unified common pleas system).
    The Judicial Code establishes three separate divisions within the
    Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas:
    § 951. Court divisions
    (a) Philadelphia County.—The Court of Common Pleas
    of Philadelphia County shall have the following divisions:
    (1) Trial division.
    (2) Orphans’ court division.
    (3) Family court division.
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 951(a). Section 711 of the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries
    Code provides in relevant part as follows:
    § 711. Mandatory exercise of jurisdiction through
    orphans’ court division in general
    Except as provided in section 712 (relating to
    nonmandatory exercise of jurisdiction through the orphans’
    court division) and section 713 (relating to special
    provisions for Philadelphia County),[5] the jurisdiction of
    the court of common pleas over the following shall be
    exercised through its orphans’ court division:
    5
    Section 713 addresses matters relating to adoptions and birth records.
    -8-
    J-S10039-15
    *    *    *
    (22) Agents.—All matters pertaining to the exercise of
    powers by agents acting under powers of attorney as
    provided in…Chapter 56 (relating to powers of attorney).
    20 Pa.C.S.A. § 711(22). Section 952 of the Judicial Code, however, states
    the following:
    § 952. Status of court divisions
    The divisions of a court of common pleas are
    administrative units composed of those judges of the court
    responsible for the transaction of specified classes of the
    business of the court. In a court of common pleas having
    two or more divisions each division of the court is
    vested with the full jurisdiction of the whole court,
    but the business of the court may be allocated among the
    divisions of the court by or pursuant to general rules.
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 952 (emphasis added). With respect to matters filed in the
    wrong division, Section 5103(c) directs:
    § 5103. Transfer of erroneously filed matters
    *    *    *
    (c) Interdivisional transfers.—If an appeal or other
    matter is taken to, brought in, or transferred to a division
    of a court to which such matter is not allocated by law, the
    court shall not quash such appeal or dismiss the matter,
    but shall transfer the record thereof to the proper division
    of the court, where the appeal or other matter shall be
    treated as if originally filed in the transferee division on the
    date first filed in a court or magisterial district.
    Id. § 5103(c).      With reference to these constitutional and statutory
    provisions, our Supreme Court explained:
    [J]urisdictional restraints upon the former common pleas
    -9-
    J-S10039-15
    court under the old system no longer exist. The court of
    common       pleas,   as    reconstituted,     possesses    the
    jurisdictions of the former courts of common pleas, courts
    of quarter sessions, courts of oyer and terminer, orphans’
    courts, and juvenile courts. One of the purposes of the
    unified court is, of course, to simplify procedure and
    remove archaisms from the judicial system. A case may
    not be dismissed because brought in the wrong court; if
    the matter is justiciable, there is jurisdiction in the court of
    common pleas to hear it, and in a multi-division court the
    remedy for bringing the case in the wrong division is not a
    dismissal, but a transfer of the matter to the correct
    division.
    Gorden      v.   Cutler,   
    471 A.2d 449
    ,     453   (Pa.Super.   1983)     (quoting
    Commonwealth v. Waszinski, 
    485 Pa. 247
    , 254-55, 
    401 A.2d 1129
    , 1132
    (1978)).
    Instantly, Green Acres filed its complaint for breach of contract in the
    trial division of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas.                   As
    Appellant concedes, the court of common pleas had subject matter
    jurisdiction over this case. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 931(a). Thus, as a division of
    the court of common pleas, the trial division was vested with the full
    jurisdiction of the whole court to hear the case. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 952;
    Gorden, 
    supra.
             The question of whether the trial division was the
    appropriate administrative unit to hear the case is immaterial to the issue of
    subject matter jurisdiction.
    Moreover, the complaint sought damages based on Mr. Sullivan’s
    alleged failure to pay for nursing home services in accordance with his
    contract with Green Acres.       All allegations in the complaint stemmed from
    - 10 -
    J-S10039-15
    Mr. Sullivan’s alleged debt to Green Acres.           The allegations against
    Appellant, which concerned her failure to exercise her POA to pay this debt
    with Mr. Sullivan’s funds, were wholly derivative of the claims for breach of
    contract and unjust enrichment against Mr. Sullivan. Green Acres included
    the allegations against Appellant as an alternative means to recover the
    money damages it sought from her father. The gravamen of the complaint
    is that Mr. Sullivan breached his contract with Green Acres.            Although
    irrelevant to the question of whether the trial division had subject matter
    jurisdiction, this case fell outside the scope of 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 711(22), in any
    event. Even if Green Acres had filed its complaint in the wrong division as
    an administrative matter, the proper action would be to transfer the case to
    the correct division, not to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5103(c). Therefore, the trial division had
    subject matter jurisdiction over this case. See Gorden, 
    supra.
    In her second issue, Appellant argues the caption of the complaint
    indicates Appellant was sued in her individual capacity even though all of the
    allegations against Appellant concerned her actions as Mr. Sullivan’s agent
    under a POA. Appellant asserts an allegation against her in her individual
    capacity was “an absolute prerequisite to the entry of a default judgment
    against her in that capacity.” (Appellant’s Brief at 20). Appellant contends
    the statute of limitations has now run on Green Acres’ claims, and the
    default   judgment   cannot    be   amended    to   name    Appellant    in   her
    - 11 -
    J-S10039-15
    representative capacity. Appellant concludes this alleged defect is clear on
    the face of the complaint and renders the default judgment void.            We
    disagree.
    “A petition to open a default judgment and a petition to strike a default
    judgment seek distinct remedies and are generally not interchangeable.”
    Stauffer v. Hevener, 
    881 A.2d 868
    , 870 (Pa.Super. 2005) (opening, not
    striking, default judgment based on meritorious statute of limitations
    defense raised in appellant’s petition to strike and/or open default
    judgment).
    A petition to open a default judgment is an appeal to the
    equitable powers of the court. The decision to grant or
    deny a petition to open a default judgment is within the
    sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not overturn
    that decision absent a manifest abuse of discretion or error
    of law.
    Graziani v. Randolph, 
    856 A.2d 1212
    , 1223 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal
    denied, 
    583 Pa. 663
    , 
    875 A.2d 1075
     (2005).         “Conversely, a petition to
    strike a default judgment should be granted where a fatal defect or
    irregularity appears on face of record.” Erie Ins. Co., supra at 386.
    Ordinarily, if a petition to open a judgment is to be
    successful, it must meet the following test: (1) the petition
    to open must be promptly filed; (2) the failure to appear or
    file a timely answer must be excused; and (3) the party
    seeking to open the judgment must show a meritorious
    defense…. In making this determination, a court can
    consider facts not before it at the time the judgment was
    entered.
    Mother’s     Restaurant,   Inc.   v.    Krystkiewicz,   
    861 A.2d 327
    ,   336
    - 12 -
    J-S10039-15
    (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc) (quoting Cintas Corp., supra at 93-94, 
    700 A.2d at 918-19
    ).
    Here, Appellant averred in her petition to strike the default judgment
    that Mr. Sullivan died on December 22, 2007, four days before the default
    judgment was entered.      Mr. Sullivan’s death would have terminated the
    POA, as there is no evidence the POA was coupled with an interest that
    made it irrevocable.    See Appeal of Yerkes, 
    99 Pa. 401
    , 401 (1882)
    (stating: “A power of attorney ceases to be operative upon the death of the
    party giving it, unless it is coupled with such an interest as renders it
    irrevocable”).   See generally In re Estate of Eastman, 
    760 A.2d 16
    (Pa.Super. 2000) (stating death of principal operates as instantaneous and
    absolute revocation of agent’s authority to act for principal unless agency is
    coupled with irrevocable interest). Thus, at the time the default judgment
    was entered against Appellant, she might no longer have been Mr. Sullivan’s
    agent. Under those circumstances, a default judgment could not have been
    entered against Appellant in her “representative capacity” because that
    capacity no longer existed. Here, the default judgment was entered against
    Appellant in her individual capacity, not as Mr. Sullivan’s POA.
    Additionally, Appellant is incorrect to suggest as a general matter that
    an agent acting under a POA cannot be held personally liable for her acts or
    omissions under a POA. See Metcalf v. Pesock, 
    885 A.2d 539
     (Pa.Super.
    2005) (holding decedent’s former agent under POA was liable for invalid gift
    - 13 -
    J-S10039-15
    he made to himself during decedent’s lifetime while POA was still effective).
    To the extent Appellant argues she cannot be held personally liable based on
    the specific allegations in Green Acres’ complaint, this claim is an
    inappropriate ground to strike a default judgment because it goes to the
    merits or allegations in the complaint and does not involve a fatal defect or
    irregularity on the face of the record. See Erie Ins. Co., supra. Appellant
    should have raised this defense, if at all, in a petition to open the judgment,
    which is a distinct remedy Appellant failed to seek. See Graziani, supra;
    Mother’s Restaurant, Inc. Therefore, the trial court properly declined to
    strike the default judgment on this ground.
    In her third issue, Appellant argues the certification Green Acres
    attached to its praecipe to enter default judgment failed to comply with
    Pa.R.C.P. 237.1.   Specifically, Appellant contends the certification attached
    to the praecipe to enter default judgment (1) improperly referred to a
    “motion for final judgment by default” and (2) cited an inapplicable New
    Jersey Rule of Civil Procedure. Appellant concludes Green Acres’ certification
    was fatally defective and provides an alternative ground to strike the default
    judgment. We disagree.
    Rule 237.1 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure deals with
    notice of intent to take a default judgment and provides in relevant part as
    follows:
    Rule 237.1 Notice of Praecipe for Entry of Judgment
    of Non Pros for Failure to File Complaint or by
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    J-S10039-15
    Default for Failure to Plead
    (a)(1)   As used in this rule,
    *       *    *
    “judgment by default” means a judgment entered by
    praecipe pursuant to Rules 1037(b), 1511(a), 3031(a) and
    3146(a).
    (2)      No judgment…by default for failure to plead shall
    be entered by the prothonotary unless the praecipe for
    entry includes a certification that a written notice of
    intention to file the praecipe was mailed or delivered
    *       *    *
    (ii)   in the case of a judgment by default, after the
    failure to plead to a complaint and at least ten days
    prior to the date of the filing of the praecipe to the
    party against whom judgment is to be entered and to
    the party’s attorney of record, if any.
    The ten-day notice period in subdivision [(a)(2)(ii)] shall
    be calculated forward from the date of the mailing or
    delivery, in accordance with Rule 106.
    (3)      A copy of the notice shall be attached to the
    praecipe.
    Pa.R.C.P. 237.1(a)(1), (2)(ii), (3). The intent of Rule 237.1 is to allow the
    defaulting party a full ten-day period to cure the default.   Acre v. Navy
    Brand Mfg. Co., 
    571 A.2d 466
    , 469 (Pa.Super. 1990). This rule operates in
    tandem with Rule 237.5, which provides:
    Rule 237.5 Form of Notice of Praecipe to Enter
    Judgment by Default
    The notice required by Rule 237.1(a)(2)           shall   be
    substantially in the following form:
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    J-S10039-15
    (CAPTION)
    To: ___________________________
    (Defendant)
    Date of Notice: ________________
    IMPORTANT NOTICE
    YOU ARE IN DEFAULT BECAUSE YOU HAVE FAILED TO
    ENTER A WRITTEN APPEARANCE PERSONALLY OR BY
    ATTORNEY AND FILE IN WRITING WITH THE COURT YOUR
    DEFENSES OR OBJECTIONS TO THE CLAIMS SET FORTH
    AGAINST YOU. UNLESS YOU ACT WITHIN TEN DAYS
    FROM THE DATE OF THIS NOTICE, A JUDGMENT MAY BE
    ENTERED AGAINST YOU WITHOUT A HEARING AND YOU
    MAY LOSE YOUR PROPERTY OR OTHER IMPORTANT
    RIGHTS.
    YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT
    ONCE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER, GO TO OR
    TELEPHONE THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW. THIS OFFICE
    CAN PROVIDE YOU WITH INFORMATION ABOUT HIRING A
    LAWYER.
    IF YOU CANNOT AFFORD TO HIRE A LAWYER, THIS OFFICE
    MAY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE YOU WITH INFORMATION
    ABOUT AGENCIES THAT MAY OFFER LEGAL SERVICES TO
    ELIGIBLE PERSONS AT A REDUCED FEE OR NO FEE.
    ___________________________
    (Name of Office)
    ___________________________
    (Address of Office)
    ___________________________
    (Telephone Number)
    ____________________________
    (Signature of Plaintiff or Attorney)
    ____________________________
    (Address)
    - 16 -
    J-S10039-15
    Pa.R.C.P. 237.5.
    Under the doctrine of substantial compliance, the trial court may
    “overlook any procedural defect that does not prejudice a party’s rights.”
    Womer v. Hilliker, 
    589 Pa. 256
    , 267, 
    908 A.2d 269
    , 276 (2006) (emphasis
    in original).   “[P]rocedural rules are not ends in themselves, and…rigid
    application of [the Rules] does not always serve the interest of fairness and
    justice.” 
    Id.
     Rule 126 incorporates the doctrine of substantial compliance
    into the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure as follows:
    Rule 126.     Liberal Construction and Application of
    Rules
    The rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just,
    speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or
    proceeding to which they are applicable. The court at
    every stage of any such action or proceeding may
    disregard any error or defect of procedure which does not
    affect the substantial rights of the parties.
    Pa.R.C.P. 126.     Rule 126 allows an equitable exception for parties “who
    commit a misstep when attempting to do what any particular rule requires.”
    Womer, 
    supra at 268-69
    , 
    908 A.2d at 276
    . Rule 126 does not excuse a
    party’s complete noncompliance with the rules, but Rule 126 “is available to
    a party who makes a substantial attempt to conform.” 
    Id. at 271
    , 
    908 A.2d at 278
     (holding there was no compliance, where party failed to take any
    steps to conform with Rule 1042.3 for filing certificate of merit); Pomerantz
    v. Goldstein, 
    479 Pa. 175
    , 178, 
    387 A.2d 1280
    , 1281 (1978) (holding
    appellant substantially complied with Rule 1038(d) for filing exceptions,
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    J-S10039-15
    although pleading was erroneously titled motion for new trial, and appellee
    suffered no prejudice when trial court considered appellant’s pleading).
    Compare Oswald, 
    supra at 796
     (holding ten-day notice was defective
    because it contained generic language from outdated rule and failed to
    conform to amended language required under current Rule 237.5).
    Instantly, Green Acres filed a praecipe for entry of default judgment
    against Appellant on December 26, 2007.             The praecipe included a
    certification that Green Acres had sent Appellant, via certified mail, a ten-
    day notice of its intent to seek a default judgment.       Mail receipts in the
    certified record indicate the ten-day notice was delivered to Appellant’s
    address on December 12, 2007. Green Acres also attached to the praecipe a
    copy of the ten-day notice, which complied with Pa.R.C.P. 237.5. Although
    the certification attached to Green Acres’ praecipe mistakenly referred to a
    “Motion for Final Judgment by Default” and an analogous New Jersey rule of
    court regarding entry of default judgment, the language of the actual ten-
    day notice sent to Appellant was virtually identical to the language set forth
    in current Rule 237.5.
    Additionally, Green Acres sent the ten-day notice to Appellant more
    than ten days before it filed the praecipe for entry of default judgment.
    Thus, Green Acres fulfilled the purpose of Rule 237.1, which is to allow the
    defaulting party a full ten-day period to cure the default. See Acre, 
    supra.
    Appellant fails to explain how Green Acres’ alleged misstep in its certification
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    J-S10039-15
    attached to the praecipe prejudiced Appellant in any way. A review of the
    record as a whole reveals Green Acres had substantially complied with the
    applicable ten-day notice requirements before it sought entry of a default
    judgment against Appellant.       See Pa.R.C.P. 237.1; Pa.R.C.P. 237.5;
    Womer, 
    supra;
     Oswald, 
    supra.
    Based on the foregoing, we conclude Appellant failed to demonstrate a
    fatal defect on the face of the record as it existed when judgment was
    entered.     See Midwest Financial, 
    supra.
        Therefore, the court properly
    denied Appellant’s petition to strike the default judgment. Accordingly, we
    affirm.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/13/2015
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