Stewart, T. v. Fedex Express ( 2015 )

J-A04042-15
2015 Pa. Super. 86
TIMOTHY J. STEWART, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
FEDEX EXPRESS AND FEDERAL :
EXPRESS CORPORATION, :
:
Appellees : No. 1104 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered June 24, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County
Civil Division, at No(s): 11222-2013
BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
OPINION BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED APRIL 17, 2015
Timothy J. Stewart (“Stewart” or “Mr. Stewart”) appeals from the June
24, 2014 order which sustained the preliminary objections filed by FedEx
Express and Federal Express Corporation (“FedEx”), and dismissed Stewart’s
complaint. We affirm.
The trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows.
[Mr. Stewart] was employed at FedEx as a senior security
specialist for almost six years, from April 9, 2007 through April
17, 2013. On April 5, 2013, Mr. Stewart and Kelly Kraemer,
another senior security specialist, traveled together for work
from the FedEx Pittsburgh Ground headquarters to the FedEx
office in Cranberry. Mr. Stewart used his [] personal vehicle for
this trip. During their trip from one FedEx location to another,
Mr. Kraemer asked Mr. Stewart if he could put his car keys in the
glove compartment of Mr. Stewart’s car. Mr. Stewart gave Mr.
Kraemer permission to put the keys in the glove box, but he
advised Mr. Kraemer that he carried a handgun in the glove
compartment. Mr. Stewart also informed Mr. Kraemer that he
had a valid permit to carry a weapon. At all relevant times, Mr.
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Stewart maintained a Pennsylvania License to Carry Firearms
issued by the Sheriff of Beaver County.
A few days later, on April 10, 2013, Mr. Stewart was
summoned to a meeting at the Pittsburgh airport. At the
meeting, Tom Herity, Manager of FedEx Zone Security in
Chicago, informed Mr. Stewart that he was being investigated
because of allegations concerning a handgun in the glove
compartment of his car. A week later, on April 17, 2013, Mr.
Stewart was terminated for violation of FedEx Policy 8.10, which,
in relevant part, prohibits employees from possessing firearms or
weapons on company property.
Specifically, the FedEx policy provides:
No firearms or weapons are permitted on Company
property, in Corporate aircraft, in Company vehicles,
or in Corporate buildings unless authorized by
Corporate Security. Where federal, state or local
laws impose different or additional requirements, the
Company will abide by governing law.
Mr. Stewart identified the policy in his Complaint. There is
no dispute that he was terminated because of the firearm in his
car on April 5, 2013. Following his termination, Mr. Stewart
initiated this lawsuit against FedEx alleging wrongful discharge.
Mr. Stewart claims that his termination violates public policy.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/24/2014, at 2-3 (citations omitted).
FedEx filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer
pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(4), which the trial court sustained by order of
June 24, 2014. Stewart timely filed a notice of appeal. The trial court did
not order Stewart to file a statement of errors complained of on appeal, and
none was filed.
Stewart presents one question for this Court’s consideration: “whether
the [trial] court wrongfully dismissed [Mr. Stewart’s] case determining a
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question of fact whether a licensed firearm in a personal vehicle’s glove
compartment is located on Mr. Stewart’s or [FedEx’s] property?” Stewart’s
Brief at 4.
We consider Stewart’s question mindful of the following standard of
review.
When reviewing the dismissal of a complaint based upon
preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, we treat as
true all well-pleaded material, factual averments and all
inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Where the preliminary
objections will result in the dismissal of the action, the objections
may be sustained only in cases that are clear and free from
doubt. To be clear and free from doubt that dismissal is
appropriate, it must appear with certainty that the law would not
permit recovery by the plaintiff upon the facts averred. Any
doubt should be resolved by a refusal to sustain the objections.
Moreover, we review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of
discretion or an error of law.
B.N. Excavating, Inc. v. PBC Hollow-A, L.P., 71 A.3d 274, 277-78 (Pa.
Super. 2013) (en banc) (quoting Ira G. Steffy & Son, Inc. v. Citizens
Bank of Pennsylvania, 7 A.3d 278, 282–83 (Pa. Super. 2010)).
Stewart sets forth three arguments in support of his position that the
trial court erred in dismissing his complaint on preliminary objections. First,
he argues that the trial court erred in holding that FedEx could terminate
him for “no reason” when FedEx never informed him that he was terminated
for “no reason.” Stewart’s Brief at 8. Next, Stewart claims that the trial
court erred in ruling that FedEx could terminate him based upon an
ambiguous company policy. Id. at 8-9. Finally, Stewart maintains that
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FedEx’s termination of him violated an important Pennsylvania public policy,
namely, the right to bear arms. Id. at 9-15.
This Court has summarized Pennsylvania’s at-will employment doctrine
as follows.1
“In Pennsylvania, absent a statutory or contractual provision to
the contrary, either party may terminate an employment
relationship for any or no reason.” Weaver v. Harpster, 975
A.2d 555, 562 (Pa. 2009). “[A]s a general rule, there is no
common law cause of action against an employer for termination
of an at-will employment relationship.” Id. at 563.
An employee may bring a cause of action for a
termination of that relationship only in the most
limited circumstances, where the termination
implicates a clear mandate of public policy. In our
judicial system, the power of the courts to declare
pronouncements of public policy is sharply restricted.
Rather, it is for the legislature to formulate the public
policies of the Commonwealth. The right of a court
to declare what is or is not in accord with public
policy exists only when a given policy is so obviously
for or against public health, safety, morals, or
welfare that there is a virtual unanimity of opinion in
regard to it. Only in the clearest of cases may a
court make public policy the basis of its decision. To
determine the public policy of the Commonwealth,
we examine the precedent within Pennsylvania,
looking to our own Constitution, court decisions, and
statutes promulgated by our legislature.
Id. at 563 (quotation and citations omitted).
Applying this standard, Pennsylvania courts have found
actionable exceptions where the employee was terminated for
filing a claim for worker’s compensation benefits, Shick v.
Shirey, 716 A.2d 1231 (Pa. 1998); for filing a claim for
unemployment benefits, Highhouse v. Avery Transportation,
1
Stewart does not claim that he was employed by FedEx pursuant to a
contract.
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660 A.2d 1374 (Pa. Super. 1995); for failing to submit to a
polygraph test where a statute prohibited employers from so
requiring, Kroen v. Bedway Security Agency, Inc., 633 A.2d
628 (Pa. Super. 1993); for complying with a statutory duty to
report violations to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Field v.
Philadelphia Electric Co., 565 A.2d 1170 (Pa. Super. 1989);
and for serving jury duty, Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc.,
386 A.2d 119 (Pa. Super. 1978).
Courts have found no public policy exception where the
employee was terminated as a result of sexual discrimination by
an employer not covered by the Pennsylvania Human Relations
Act, Weaver, supra; for complaining about violations of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, McLaughlin v.
Gastrointestinal Specialists, Inc., 750 A.2d 283 (Pa. 2000);
for expressing concerns that the employer’s product was unsafe,
Geary v. U.S. Steel Corporation, 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974); for
disengaging an illegal surveillance system, Hineline v.
Stroudsburg Electric Supply Co., 559 A.2d 566 (Pa. Super.
1989), appeal denied 574 A.2d 70 (Pa. 1989); or for complaining
about the waste of taxpayer money, Rossi v. Pennsylvania
State University, 489 A.2d 828 (Pa. Super. 1985).
In sum, “an employer (1) cannot require an employee to
commit a crime, (2) cannot prevent an employee from
complying with a statutorily imposed duty, and (3) cannot
discharge an employee when [specifically] prohibited from doing
so by statute.” Donahue v. Federal Exp. Corp., 753 A.2d 238,
244 (Pa. Super. 2000) (quoting Spierling v. First Am. Home
Health Servs., Inc., 737 A.2d 1250, 1252 (Pa. Super. 1999)).
Outside of those categories of our legislature’s expression of
public policy, a court may find a public policy exception that will
sustain a wrongful termination action only if the public policy “is
so obviously for or against public health, safety, morals, or
welfare that there is a virtual unanimity of opinion in regard to
it.” Weaver, 975 A.2d at 563.
Mikhail v. Pennsylvania Organization for Women in Early Recovery,
63 A.3d 313, 316-17 (Pa. Super. 2013).
From the above it is immediately clear that Stewart’s first two
arguments warrant no relief. He has no cause of action against FedEx for
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wrongful termination unless the termination violates public policy.
Therefore, it matters not whether FedEx articulated no reason or a bad
reason for terminating Stewart’s employment, whether its firearm policy is
vague, or whether Stewart’s gun was on his property or FedEx’s property
when it was in his glovebox. The only relevant question is whether Stewart
has pled that he was terminated for a reason that violates a policy of this
Commonwealth that “is so obviously for or against public health, safety,
morals, or welfare that there is a virtual unanimity of opinion in regard to it.”
Weaver, 975 A.2d at 563.
In his complaint, Stewart claimed that his termination was in violation
of Pennsylvania’s public policy to guard the rights “of citizens of
Pennsylvania to protect themselves.” Complaint, 8/7/2013, at 5. He
averred that this policy was manifest in Article I, Section 21 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, and in 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106. Stewart also
referenced in his complaint the decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court in
Mitchell v. University of Kentucky, 366 S.W.3d 895 (Ky. 2012). For the
following reasons, we hold that Stewart has failed to identify any
Pennsylvania public policy which has been violated by his termination.
Article I, Section 21 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides that the
“right of the citizens to bear arms in defence of themselves and the State
shall not be questioned.” Pennsylvania Constitution, Art. I, § 21. The
statute Stewart invokes is a provision of the Crimes Code entitled “firearms
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not to be carried without a license.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106. Therein our
legislature declared, inter alia, that it is a crime to carry a firearm in a
vehicle without a valid license.
This Court has noted that “neither the Second Amendment to the
United States Constitution, nor the Pennsylvania Constitution, bestows on
any person the right to carry a concealed firearm or transport a loaded
firearm in a vehicle.” Commonwealth v. McKown, 79 A.3d 678, 690 (Pa.
Super. 2013). Similarly, it is evident from the language of 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 6106 that that statute criminalizing the conduct of carrying a firearm in a
vehicle without a license does not conversely create a right to carry a
licensed firearm in a car.
In Mitchell, the plaintiff was fired for having a licensed firearm in his
car on the property of his employer, the University of Kentucky. The
Supreme Court of Kentucky held that Mitchell “established that his discharge
was contrary to a fundamental and well-defined public policy, i.e., the right
to bear arms, as evidenced by existing statutory provisions,” in particular
K.R.S. 237.106, which provides:
(1) No person, including but not limited to an employer, who is
the owner, lessee, or occupant of real property shall prohibit any
person who is legally entitled to possess a firearm from
possessing a firearm, part of a firearm, ammunition, or
ammunition component in a vehicle on the property.
***
(4) An employer that fires, disciplines, demotes, or otherwise
punishes an employee who is lawfully exercising a right
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guaranteed by this section and who is engaging in conduct in
compliance with this statute shall be liable in civil damages. An
employee may seek and the court shall grant an injunction
against an employer who is violating the provisions of this
section when it is found that the employee is in compliance with
the provisions of this section.
Mitchell, 366 S.W.3d at 902 (quoting K.R.S. 237.106).
Stewart points to no Pennsylvania statute comparable to the Kentucky
statute at issue in Mitchell. Indeed, as the trial court noted, such
legislation had been proposed, but not enacted, in Pennsylvania at the time
of Stewart’s termination. Trial Court Opinion, 6/24/2014, at 22-25
(discussing Senate Bill 1438 (2011) and House Bill 2243 (2014)). Therefore,
the reasoning of Mitchell is inapplicable because, unlike Kentucky’s
legislature, our legislature has not declared that Pennsylvania public policy is
violated by FedEx’s termination of Stewart.
Thus, the facts alleged in Stewart’s complaint do not establish that
FedEx (1) required him to commit a crime, (2) prevented him from
complying with a statutorily imposed duty, (3) discharged him in violation of
a statute, or (4) otherwise terminated him in violation of a public policy that
“is so obviously for or against public health, safety, morals, or welfare that
there is a virtual unanimity of opinion in regard to it.” Weaver, 975 A.2d at
563. Accordingly, Pennsylvania law does not permit recovery on the facts
averred, and the trial court properly dismissed Stewart’s complaint.
Order affirmed.
Judge Bowes joins the opinion.
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Judge Olson concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/17/2015
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