Botz, A. v. Botz, III, J. ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
ANGELA M. BOTZ IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JOHN P. BOTZ III
Appellant No. 1604 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered on September 8, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County
Civil Division at No.: 2011-20769
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., WECHT, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED APRIL 17, 2015
John P. Botz III (“Husband”) appeals the September 8, 2014 order
that denied his motion to enforce a marriage settlement agreement (“MSA”).
We affirm.
The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this
case as follows:
Angela M. Botz [“Wife”] and Husband were married on August
29, 2007. Wife filed for Divorce on October 19, 2011. On
[October 9, 20111], the parties entered into a [MSA]. On June
21, 2013, Wife filed a Petition to Enforce the Marriage
Settlement Agreement. A Hearing was scheduled for August 6,
2013. On July 22, 2013, a Motion to Withdraw the Petition was
granted by the [trial c]ourt as the parties had reached a
resolution prior to the scheduled hearing.
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1
The parties executed the MSA on October 9, 2011. It was docketed on
February 21, 2012 and incorporated, but not merged, into the February 22,
2012 divorce decree.
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On May 12, 2014, Husband filed a Petition to Enforce the
Marriage Settlement Agreement. Specifically, Husband
claim[ed] that according to the terms of the [MSA], Wife agreed
that the proceeds from the sale of a marital property were to [be
used to] pay off a line of credit. The [MSA] was originally
drafted by Husband’s attorney. The parties negotiated through
their respective attorneys and came to a final agreement. The
final draft of the [MSA] contained the following provision:
HUSBAND and WIFE agree to sell the Mifflin County real
estate for the best price obtainable and, after payment of
any sales and transfer costs, and payment of any
outstanding liens, the remaining proceeds shall be applied
to the line of credit owed to Northwest Bank. If there are
any remaining proceeds after payment of the line of credit,
the proceeds shall be divided equally between HUSBAND
and WIFE.
Marital Settlement Agreement, dated October 9, 2011,
paragraph 9.
On September 22, 2011, prior to the parties signing the [MSA],
Husband’s parents had paid off in full the line of credit specified
in the [MSA]. At the time, Husband was aware that his parents
were paying off the line of credit owed to Northwest Bank, but
Wife claim[ed] that she was not aware of this fact. The [MSA] is
dated October 9, 2011 and was signed by both parties.
Husband’s mother signed as witness for Husband.
In his Petition to Enforce, Husband avers that he and Wife are
equally responsible for reimbursing his parents for this payment
under the terms of the [MSA]. The Mifflin County real estate
was sold on October 25, 2013 for $45,000.00. The proceeds of
the same in the amount of $43,339.50 were placed in escrow by
agreement of the parties pending resolution of Husband’s
Petition to Enforce the Marriage Settlement Agreement. A
hearing was held before [the trial c]ourt on June 24, 2014.
Trial Court Memorandum and Order (“T.C.M.”), 9/8/2014, at 2-3.
On September 8, 2014, the trial court denied Husband’s motion. On
September 24, 2014, Husband filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial court
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ordered, and Husband timely filed, a concise statement of errors complained
of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Husband raises one issue on appeal: “Did the lower court err and/or
abuse its discretion in denying [Husband’s] Petition to Enforce Marital
Settlement Agreement by failing to properly consider the intention of the
parties, thereby resulting in an unintended windfall to [Wife?]” Husband’s
Brief at 4.
Our standard of review is well settled:
When interpreting a marital settlement agreement, “the trial
court is the sole determiner of facts and absent an abuse of
discretion, we will not usurp the trial court’s fact-finding
function.” Chen v. Chen, 840 A.2d 355, 360 (Pa. Super. 2003),
appeal granted in part, 853 A.2d 1011 (Pa. 2004). On appeal
from an order interpreting a marital settlement agreement, we
must decide whether the trial court committed an error of law or
abused its discretion.
“[J]udicial discretion” requires action in conformity with
law on facts and circumstances before the trial court after
hearing and due consideration. Such discretion is not
absolute, but must constitute the exercises of sound
discretion. This is especially so where, as here, there is
law to apply. On appeal, a trial court’s decision will
generally not be reversed unless there appears to have
been an abuse of discretion or a fundamental error in
applying correct principles of law. An “abuse of discretion”
or failure to exercise sound discretion is not merely an
error of judgment. But if, in reaching a conclusion, law is
overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is
manifestly unreasonable or lacking in reason, discretion
must be held to have been abused.
In re Deed of Trust of Rose Hill Cemetery Ass'n Dated Jan.
14, 1960, 590 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa. 1991) (internal citations omitted).
“Because contract interpretation is a question of law, this Court
is not bound by the trial court’s interpretation.” Chen, supra at
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360. “Our standard of review over questions of law is de novo
and to the extent necessary, the scope of our review is plenary
as [the appellate] court may review the entire record in making
its decision.” Kripp v. Kripp, 849 A.2d 1159, 1164 n.5 (Pa.
2004). However, we are bound by the trial court’s credibility
determinations. Wade v. Huston, 877 A.2d 464 (Pa. Super.
2005).
Stamerro v. Stamerro, 889 A.2d 1251, 1257-58 (Pa. Super. 2005)
(footnote and some citations omitted; citations modified).
We also note that:
In Pennsylvania, we enforce property settlement agreements
between husband and wife in accordance with the same rules
applying to contract interpretation. . . .
It is well-established that the paramount goal of contract
interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the parties’
intent. When the trier of fact has determined the intent of the
parties to a contract, an appellate court will defer to that
determination if it is supported by the evidence.
When construing agreements involving clear and unambiguous
terms, this Court need only examine the writing itself to give
effect to the parties[’] understanding. The court must construe
the contract only as written and may not modify the plain
meaning of the words under the guise of interpretation. When
the terms of a written contract are clear, this Court will not
rewrite it or give it a construction in conflict with the accepted
and plain meaning of the language used. Conversely, when the
language is ambiguous and the intentions of the parties cannot
be reasonably ascertained from the language of the writing
alone, the parol evidence rule does not apply to the admission of
oral testimony to show both the intent of the parties and the
circumstances attending the execution of the contract.
Lang v. Meske, 850 A.2d 737, 739-40 (Pa. Super. 2004) (quoting Osial v.
Cook, 803 A.2d 209, 213-14 (Pa. Super. 2002)) (citations omitted).
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Husband asserts that the MSA is not ambiguous. Instead, Husband
argues that the parties intended to sell the Mifflin property, satisfy the line of
credit, and then split the remaining proceeds of the sale. Husband contends
that the trial court disregarded the intent of the parties in deciding that
Husband and Wife did not need to reimburse Husband’s parents after they
paid off the line of credit. Therefore, Wife would receive an unintended
windfall. Husband’s Brief at 9-11.
Wife agrees that the MSA was not ambiguous. Wife argues that the
MSA is clear that the Mifflin property would be sold and then costs of sale,
liens, and the Northwest Bank line of credit would be paid before the parties
split the remainder. Wife asserts that she was unaware that Husband’s
parents paid off the line of credit before the MSA was signed and that
Husband signed the MSA knowing that the line of credit had been paid off
without telling her. Wife argues that the MSA only contemplates paying the
Northwest Bank line of credit and does not speak to paying a personal loan
or reimbursement to Husband’s parents. Because the MSA is not
ambiguous, Wife contends that the court cannot re-write the contract to
include a clause for reimbursement to Husband’s parents. Wife’s Brief at
6-9.
The trial court found that the MSA was unambiguous. The trial court
determined that the MSA contemplated paying costs and fees of sale,
outstanding liens, and the Northwest Bank line of credit prior to the
distribution of the proceeds. T.C.M. at 4. The trial court reasoned that the
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line of credit no longer existed and that the MSA contained no provision for
repaying Husband’s parents. The trial court found that Husband knew the
line of credit was retired prior to finalizing the MSA. Id. The trial court
found, and the record supports, that Wife was unaware that the line of credit
was paid prior to signing the MSA. Id.; Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”),
6/24/2014, at 8. Husband’s counsel prepared the MSA. Id. at 16, 24.
Neither party argues that the MSA is ambiguous. We agree and
therefore, are bound by the plain language of the MSA. Lang, supra. The
MSA clearly delineates the debts that are to be paid from the proceeds of the
Mifflin property. Those debts do not include any personal liability or
reimbursement to Husband’s family. Further, Husband was the only party to
the MSA who was in a position to know that the line of credit listed in the
provision no longer existed. Husband’s attorney drafted the MSA. Husband
could have requested that his attorney update the MSA to reflect a loan from
Husband’s parents. He chose not to do so. Because the language of the
MSA is unambiguous, we may not look beyond the document to examine
Husband’s intention. We cannot re-write the MSA or “modify the plain
meaning of the words under the guise of interpretation.” Lang, 850 A.2d at
740. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Husband’s motion.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/17/2015
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