K.L. v. G.L., III ( 2015 )

J. A03033/15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
K.L. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
Appellee : PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
G.L., III :
Appellant : No. 1264 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered June 24, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Civil Division No(s).: 64 DR 2013
BEFORE: MUNDY, STABILE, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED APRIL 21, 2015
Appellant, G.L., III (“Father”), appeals from the order entered in the
Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas determining the amount of child
and spousal support he is to pay Appellee, K.L. (“Mother”), for her and the
parties’ three children (“Children”). Father contends the court erred by
assigning an earning capacity to him, while also using educational grants
and his Veterans Administration (“VA”) disability income. He also claims the
court violated his constitutional right to equal protection under the law by
treating him differently than other obligors similarly situated. We affirm.
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J. A03033/15
The trial court summarized the facts and procedural posture of this
case as follows:
[Father and Mother] were married June 20, 2005 and
divorced November 13, 2013. They have three [Children],
currently ages seven, six and two, who primarily reside
with [Mother]. [She] filed a complaint seeking support
[on] January 7, 2013. Following an office conference, [the
trial court] issued orders as recommended by the
conference officer, directing [Father to] pay child and
spousal support. After [Father] sought de novo review,
and following a hearing, I issued an order [on] July 18,
2013, directing that, effective January 7, 2013, [Father]
pay [Mother] $2,607 per month, allocated $2,225 for child
support and $382 for spousal support. In determining the
amount of support due, I assigned [Father] a monthly net
income of $4,486. At the time the order was entered,
[Father] was a full-time undergraduate student at Penn
State University [and] was not employed. [Father’s]
assigned income included federal and state educational
grants, a government housing allowance and VA disability
benefits. I also assigned him full-time wages based upon
an earning capacity of $10 per hour over a forty-hour work
week.
[Father] did not appeal from the July 18, 2013 order;
however, . . . on August 1, 2013, he filed a petition to
suspend his support obligation based upon increased
custodial time. Following an office conference, I entered
two orders on December 26, 2013, as recommended by
the conference officer. The first, effective, August 1, 2013
through November 12, 2013, required [Father] to pay
$2,352 per month allocated $1,992 for child support
($1,304 basic child support, $665 child care, $22 dance)
and $360 for spousal support. Effective November 13,
2013, the date of the parties’ divorce, the order was
reduced to child support only of $1,992 per month.
In determining the support due, the conference officer
assigned [Father] and [Mother] net incomes of $4,343 and
$1,150, respectively. [Father’s] income again included
federal Pell grant money, the housing allowance, VA
disability benefits and the same earning capacity assigned
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to him in the prior proceeding. The conference officer also
included as income to [Father] state educational grant
money he was not receiving in 2014 because, according to
the conference officer, [Father] told her at the conference
that he did not apply for the state grant solely because he
did not want that money included in calculating his support
obligation.1 [Mother] who had been primarily a stay-at-
home parent during the parties’ marriage, was assigned an
earning capacity of $7.50 per week working full-time (forty
hours per week).
1
[Father’s] income included $5,645 per year federal Pell
grant (net), $3,700 per year state grant (net), $10,179
per year housing allowance (net) based upon a stipend of
$1,131 per month for nine months, $15,372 per year VA
benefits (net) and an earning capacity of $400 per week
(gross).
[Father] filed a timely request for a de novo hearing,
held February 26, 2014. The relevant evidence offered
concerning [Father’s] income and earning capacity was
a[s] follows: [Father] is a U.S. Army veteran who served
eight years as a military police officer. He was honorably
discharged in 2012. The VA provides him with a monthly
disability payment of $1,281 per month. [He] claims he
was discharged from the military with a 60% service
disability (PTSD) he suffered during his foreign
deployments and that as a result, he is not capable of
employment. He enrolled at Penn State in the fall of 2012
. . . . While at Penn State, his tuition has been paid
through the GI Bill. In addition, he has received a federal
Pell grant as well as a state educational grant which
cover[s] non-tuition expenses including living expenses.
He also receives a housing allowance through the GI Bill
which is conditioned upon his attendance at school. As of
the de novo hearing, [Father] was residing with his mother
and had minimal living expenses including no car payment.
Despite his disability and his claim at the de novo
hearing he is unable to work, [Father] was previously
employed for a few months in 2012 as a security guard
earning $12 per hour. That employment ended when he
was laid off following which he received unemployment
compensation between April 2012 through April 2013.
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[Father] has also worked in construction since his military
discharge. Nevertheless, [Father] claimed he cannot
attend school full-time and also work, and that his doctors
would confirm this, though he offered no medical or expert
evidence of his lack of employability. At the de novo
hearing, [Mother] asserted that at the most recent
Domestic Relations Section office conference, [Father] told
the conference officer that he chooses not to work since
any income he makes will be attributed to him (and
increase his support obligation). The domestic relations
Section Director confirmed that [Father] indeed told the
conference officer that if he is held to an earning capacity,
he will get a doctor’s letter stating he is disabled. [Father]
did not refute that he made such a statement.
Trial Ct. Op., 6/24/14, at 1-3 (references to record and footnote omitted).
On June 24, 2014 the court entered an order which provided, inter
alia, as follows:
(1) Effective, August 1, 2013 through November 12, 2013,
[Father] owes $2,346.59 per month allocated $1,989.51
for child support ($1304.49 basic child support, $665.21
child care, $19.81 extracurricular expenses) and $357.08
for spousal support.
(2) Effective November 13, 2013, the date of the parties’
divorce through January 13, 2014, the order is reduced to
child support only, of $1989.51 for child support.
(3) Effective January 14, 2014 to date, the order for child
support is $1,882.34 per month ($1,266.39 basic child
support, $597.87 child care, $18.08 extracurricular
expenses).
Order, 6/24/14.
This timely appeal followed. Father filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. The trial court filed a
responsive opinion.
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Father raises the following issues for our review:
A. Did the lower court abuse its discretion or commit an
error of law by assigning an earning capacity to [Father]
while also using educational grants as included income, in
addition to his V.A. disability income[?]
B. Did the lower court violate [Father’s] constitutional right
to equal protection under the law by treating him different
than other obligors similarly situated[?]
Father’s Brief at 7.
First, Father argues that the court erred in assigning an earning
capacity to him while also using educational grants and his disability income
to calculate his support obligation. Father asserts he cannot work full or
part-time because he is in college full-time and his disability prevents him
from working and attending college.1 Father’s Brief at 15. He avers: “It is
1
In support of his disability claim, Father refers to the reproduced record at
pages 52 to 57. Father’s Brief at 15 n.1. At the hearing, Appellee objected
to the introduction of Appellant’s medical record. N.T., 2/26/14, at 8.
Appellant does not indicate in the argument “a reference to the place in the
record where the matter referred to appears[.]” See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c).
Our review of the record does not reveal the medical report in the certified
record.
This Court has stated:
Pa.R.A.P. 1931(a)(1) provides that “the record on
appeal, including the transcript and exhibits necessary for
the determination of the appeal, shall be transmitted to
the appellate court within 60 days after the filing of the
notice of appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 1931(a)(1).
“It is black letter law in this jurisdiction that an
appellate court cannot consider anything which is not
part of the record in this case.” Any document which
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inconsistent, both conceptually and intellectually, to hold him to a full-time
earning capacity, and to use benefits he receives from the government that
allows him to attend college, when those benefits are conditioned upon him
attending school full time.” Id. at 15-16. Father claims the court erred in
including educational benefits and housing benefits under the GI Bill as
income. Id. at 19. He argues that educational grants should be considered
“public assistance” and excluded from income for purposes of support. Id.
at 22, 24.
Our review is governed by the following principles:
Our scope of review when considering an appeal from a
child support order is as follows:
When evaluating a support order, this Court may
only reverse the trial court’s determination where the
is not part of the official certified record is considered
to be nonexistent, which deficiency may not be
remedied by inclusion in the reproduced record. It is
the responsibility of the appellant to provide a
complete record to the appellate court on appeal,
including transcription of deposition testimony.
Brandon v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 34 A.3d 104, 106 n.1 (Pa. Super.
2011) (citations omitted).
We note our Supreme Court holds “that where the accuracy of a
pertinent document is undisputed, the Court could consider that document if
it was in the Reproduced Record, even though it was not in the record that
had been transmitted to the Court.” Pa.R.A.P. 1921 note (citing
Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 1139, 1145 n.4 (Pa. 2012)). In the
instant case, Appellee disputes the inclusion of these documents in the
reproduced record, therefore we will not consider them. See id.; Brandon,
34 A.3d at 106 n.1.
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order cannot be sustained on any valid ground. We
will not interfere with the broad discretion afforded
the trial court absent an abuse of the discretion or
insufficient evidence to sustain the support order.
An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of
judgment; if, in reaching a conclusion, the court
overrides or misapplies the law, or the judgment
exercised is shown by the record to be either
manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill will, discretion has been abused.
In addition, we note that the duty to support one’s
child is absolute, and the purpose of child support is
to promote the child’s best interests.
Morgan v. Morgan, 99 A.3d 554, 556-57 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
omitted).
“In Pennsylvania, child support awards are made in domestic relations
matters in accordance with specific statutory guidelines. . . . The guidelines
provide extremely detailed instructions for calculating spousal and child
support awards based on the obligor’s net income from all sources . . .
.” Commonwealth v. Hall, 80 A.3d 1204, 1216-17 (Pa. 2013) (emphasis
added).
Rule 1910.16-2(a) provides:
Generally, the amount of support to be awarded is
based upon the parties’ monthly net income.
(a) Monthly Gross Income. Monthly gross
income is ordinarily based upon at least a six-month
average of all of a party’s income. The term
“income” is defined by the support law, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
4302, and includes income from any source.
Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(a) (emphasis added).
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Section 4302 of the Domestic Relations Code defines income as
follows:
“Income.” Includes compensation for services, including,
but not limited to, wages, salaries, bonuses, fees,
compensation in kind, commissions and similar items;
income derived from business; gains derived from dealings
in property; interest; rents; royalties; dividends;
annuities; income from life insurance and endowment
contracts; all forms of retirement; pensions; income from
discharge of indebtedness; distributive share of
partnership gross income; income in respect of a
decedent; income from an interest in an estate or trust;
military retirement benefits; railroad employment
retirement benefits; social security benefits; temporary
and permanent disability benefits; workers’
compensation; unemployment compensation; other
entitlements to money or lump sum awards, without
regard to source, including lottery winnings; income tax
refunds; insurance compensation or settlements; awards
or verdicts; and any form of payment due to and
collectible by an individual regardless of source.
23 Pa.C.S. § 4302 (emphases added).
In Parker v. Parker, 484 A.2d 168 (Pa. Super. 1984), this Court held
service-connected disability VA benefits were a source of income for alimony
pendente lite purposes. Id. at 169, (cited with approval in Uveges v.
Uveges, 103 A.3d 825 (Pa. Super. 2014)). This Court has rejected the
argument that housing allowances from the military were not income
available for support:
Instantly, we find this Court’s decision in Alexander v.
Armstrong, [ ] 609 A.2d 183 ([Pa. Super.] 1992),
persuasive, despite [the f]ather’s attempts to distinguish
those facts from his situation. In Alexander, this Court
addressed a claim by the father, who was stationed in
Okinawa, Japan, that his housing and quarters allowances
did not constitute income for support calculation purposes:
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[R]elevant to our analysis is the fact that the
Pennsylvania Child Support Guidelines,
Pa.R.Civ.P.1910.16–1 et seq., are based on the
concept that the child should receive the same
proportion of parental income that he or she would
have received if the parents lived together. If
[the child] was living with [his father] or [his
father’s] new family, he would share in the benefit
from the allowances [his father] receives from the
Navy for housing and utilities. However, because
[the child] does not live with [his father] or [his
father’s family], he does not receive any benefits
from them. Accordingly, in keeping with the
guidelines, we must include in [the father’s]
income his [housing and quarters allowances].
Id. at 187.
Krankowski v. O'Neil, 928 A.2d 284, 286 (Pa. Super. 2007) (emphases
added).
In Spicer v. Com., Dept. of Public Welfare, 428 A.2d 1008 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1981),2 the petitioner appealed from an order of the Department of
Public Welfare (DPW) which affirmed the decision of the Bucks County Board
of Assistance (CBA) to discontinue her food stamps due to excess income.
Id. at 1008. The petitioner received the following: “a Basic Educational
Opportunity Grant (BEOG) for $544.00, . . ., and a grant from the
Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency (PHEAA) for $250.00.”
Id. at 1009. The Commonwealth Court found: “Since the Petitioner’s BEOG
and PHEAA grant were not specifically earmarked by the granting agencies
2
“Although decisions of the Commonwealth Court are not binding on this
Court, we may rely on them if we are persuaded by their reasoning.”
NASDAQ OMX PHLX, Inc. v. PennMont Sec., 52 A.3d 296, 308 n.7 (Pa.
Super. 2012) (citation omitted). Instantly, Father contends his educational
grants are akin to public assistance. Therefore, we look to the
Commonwealth Court for guidance. See id.
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and the grants were of a general nature, covering general living expenses as
well as tuition and fees, the entire grant excluding the tuition was
properly included as income for food stamp purposes.” Id. at 1011
(emphasis added).
As is provided in Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16–2(d)(1), generally
there is no change to the support obligation following a
voluntary reduction of income:
(1) Voluntary Reduction of Income. When either
party voluntarily assumes a lower paying job, quits a
job, leaves employment, changes occupations or
changes employment status to pursue an
education, or is fired for cause, there generally will be
no effect on the support obligation.
Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16–2(d)(1).
Smedley v. Lowman, 2 A.3d 1226, 1228 (Pa. Super. 2010) (emphasis
added).
Rule 1910.16–2(d)(4), addressing earning capacities, provides as
follows:
If the trier of fact determines that a party to a support
action has willfully failed to obtain or maintain
appropriate employment, the trier of fact may
impute to that party an income equal to the party’s
earning capacity. Age, education, training, health, work
experience, earnings history and child care responsibilities
are factors which shall be considered in determining
earning capacity. In order for an earning capacity to be
assessed, the trier of fact must state the reasons for the
assessment in writing or on the record. Generally, the
trier of fact should not impute an earning capacity that is
greater than the amount the party would earn from one
full-time position. Determination of what constitutes a
reasonable work regimen depends upon all relevant
circumstances including the choice of jobs available within
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a particular occupation, working hours, working conditions
and whether a party has exerted substantial good faith
efforts to find employment.
Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16–2(d)(4) (emphasis added).
This Court has stated: “[T]he voluntary choice to forego current
employment in order to further one’s education is an employment
decision that should be treated no differently than a decision to change jobs
and salary.” Kersey v. Jefferson, 791 A.2d 419, 423 (Pa. Super. 2002)
(emphasis added). “In determining a parent’s ability to provide support,
the focus is on earning capacity rather than on the parent’s actual earnings.”
Reinert v. Reinert, 926 A.2d 539, 542 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation
omitted).
Father claims the court erred in assigning an earning capacity to him
and including his educational and housing benefits under the GI Bill as
income. He avers he is unable to work because of his disability. He
contends his benefits under the GI Bill should be considered “public
assistance” and excluded from income for purposes of support.
In the case sub judice, the trial court opined:
[Father’s] decision here to forego full time earnings in
order to attend college was clearly voluntary and
subordinated the immediate financial needs of his children
to his career aspirations. Inasmuch as [Father] has
willfully failed to obtain or maintain appropriate
employment, this court may attribute to him an income
equal to his earning capacity to help support his three
children.
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In deciding upon his earning capacity, this court takes
into consideration the totality of [Father’s] circumstances,
including his age (28), health, work experience, earnings
history and child care responsibilities. Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-
2(d)(4). With regard to [Father’s] health, he failed to
provide any medical or expert evidence that he is unable
to obtain and maintain employment. While he cited the
VA’s finding of a 60% disability, he failed to provide any
evidence connecting that finding to his employability. The
record otherwise revealed he has maintained employment
since the VA’s finding: following his discharge from the
military he has been employed full-time as a security
guard until he was laid off and has also worked in
construction, the latter occurring while he was enrolled in
college. The record additionally supports [Mother’s]
argument that [Father] refrains from obtaining
employment because any income he earnings will be
attributed to him for support.
* * *
Furthermore, the record presented before this court
revealed that the grant monies [Father] receives are
available to cover his personal living expenses and thus
reflect the true nature and extent of his financial
resources. As noted, his tuition is completely covered by
the GI Bill.[3] In addition, he receives a housing allowance
for the months he is considered in school, an allowance
which appears to be a windfall to [Father] inasmuch as he
lives with his mother.[4]
3
We note the trial court did not include the tuition as part of Father’s net
available income for child support.
4
The trial court noted that although Father’s lack of living expenses could
warrant an upward deviation for his support obligation, the record was
insufficient on the issue. Trial Ct. Op. at 13 n.10. At the hearing, the
following exchange took place regarding Father’s living expenses:
[Counsel for Mother]: I will just say in closing [Father]
lives with his mother and doesn’t have a car payment. He
has no expenses. . . .
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* * *
[Father], while not working and having minimal living
expenses, receives a yearly $5,645 federal Pell grant,
$3,700 state educational grant, $10,179 housing allowance
and $15,372 VA benefits, a total net of $34,896, or $2,908
per month. From this he is ordered to pay $1,304.49 basic
child support for his three children [of] $1,266.39 under
the current order.
Trial Ct. Op. at 7-8, 11, 13 (citation to the record omitted).
We discern no abuse of discretion. See Morgan, 99 A.3d at 556-57.
The court calculated Father’s support obligation based upon his monthly net
income pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(a)(2). Father’s disability benefits
are income for child support. See Parker, 484 A.2d at 169. The court
properly considered Father’s housing allowance. See Krankowski, 928
A.2d at 286. The court did not abuse its discretion in considering Father’s
Pell grant. See Spicer, 428 A.2d at 1011. Father voluntarily reduced his
income by changing his employment status and choosing to pursue his
education. See Smedley, 2 A.3d at 1228. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in imputing an earning capacity to Father. See Pa.R.C.P.
1910.16-2(d)(4); Kersey, 791 A.2d at 423.
[Counsel for Father]: Do you know why he lives with his
mother?
The Court: Would that be your testimony?
[Father]: Yes, Your Honor.
N.T., 2/26/14, at 29.
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Given our resolution of Appellant’s first issue, we find the trial court
did not treat him differently than other obligors similarly situated in violation
of his constitutional right to equal protection under the law. “[A] parent’s
duty to support his minor children is absolute, and the purpose of child
support is to promote the children’s best interests. The court has no legal
authority to eliminate an obligor's support obligation, where the
obligor can reasonably provide for some of the children's needs.” Silver v.
Pinskey, 981 A.2d 284, 296 (Pa. Super. 2009) (emphases added). The trial
court found Appellant was obligated to support his three minor children.
See id.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the order is affirmed.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/21/2015
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