Leckey, E. v. Presbyterian University ( 2015 )

J-A07011-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
EDWARD C. LECKEY, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
PRESBYTERIAN UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL,
AMY HARKE CURTIS AND ROBERT
WOLFORD,
Appellees No. 1038 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered June 2, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Civil Division at No(s): 13-4944
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and MUNDY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 23, 2015
Edward C. Leckey (Appellant) appeals from the order entered June 2,
2014, sustaining the preliminary objections of Presbyterian University
Hospital, Amy Harke Curtis, and Robert Wolford (collectively, Appellees) and
dismissing Appellant’s complaint for failure to state a cause of action. We
reverse and remand for further proceedings.
On August 2, 2011, Appellant sustained a head injury when he tripped
and fell outside his office.1 Appellant was taken to the emergency room at
Presbyterian University Hospital. Hospital personnel bandaged Appellant’s
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1
In light of the procedural posture of the case, this background is derived
solely from the averments in Appellant’s complaint.
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head and administered a CT scan, which showed no concussion. Following
this treatment, Appellant was dressed and ready to return to his office to
complete his workday.
At the direction of Amy Harke Curtis, security personnel at the
hospital, including Robert Wolford, physically restrained Appellant and
refused to permit Appellant to call a cab, thus preventing Appellant from
leaving the hospital premises. Thereafter, when Appellant’s wife arrived at
the hospital, Appellant was permitted to leave.
Appellant commenced this litigation in August 2013, filing a complaint
at the magisterial court. Following dismissal of his complaint, Appellant
appealed to the court of common pleas.
In December 2013, Appellees filed a notice of their intention to enter a
judgment of non pros on professional liability claims for failure to file a
certificate of merit. Thereafter, in January 2014, Appellant filed a motion to
determine the necessity of a certificate of merit. The trial court determined
that a certificate of merit was necessary, inferring from Appellant’s
complaint that Ms. Curtis made a professional decision that Appellant could
not leave the hospital. See Trial Court Memorandum and Order
(02/13/2014). In response, Appellant filed a certificate, asserting that
expert testimony was unnecessary.
In March 2014, Appellees filed preliminary objections, moving to strike
Appellant’s complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief may be
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granted. Following oral argument, in June 2014, the trial court sustained
the preliminary objections and dismissed appellant’s complaint with
prejudice. See Trial Court Memorandum and Order (06/02/2014).
Appellant timely appealed. The trial court did not direct compliance with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises the following issues:
1. Did the [c]ourt [b]elow properly determine that [Appellant]
was required to file a [c]ertificate of [m]erit to pursue this
action? …
2. Assuming the decision to prevent [Appellant] from leaving the
[h]ospital was made by a medical professional, did she have the
legal right to make the alleged medical judgment to detain
[Appellant] against his will? …
3. Did the [c]ourt [b]elow correctly describe the requirements
for a civil claim of false imprisonment? …
4. If, as the [c]ourt [b]elow found, unlawfulness was required
for a civil claim of false imprisonment, did [Appellant’s]
[c]omplaint allege an unlawful detention of [Appellant] by
alleging that the detention was effected by an assault upon
[Appelllant]?
Appellant’s Brief at 2.
Initially, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in its
determination that Appellant’s claim sounded in professional liability or
medical malpractice, thus triggering the requirement to file a certificate of
merit. According to Appellant, the basis of the court’s decision rests upon an
improper inference that Ms. Curtis is a medical professional. We are
constrained to agree.
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In order to determine whether an action is a professional
negligence claim as opposed to another theory of liability, this
Court must examine the averments made in the complaint. The
substance of the complaint rather than its form is the controlling
factor to determine whether the claim against a defendant
sounds in professional negligence or [another theory of liability].
Zokaites Contracting Inc. v. Trant Corp., 968 A.2d 1282, 1287 (Pa.
Super. 2009) (citations omitted). This inquiry raises a question of law for
which the standard of our review is de novo. Ditch v. Waynesboro Hosp.,
917 A.2d 317, 321 (Pa. Super. 2007).
“Medical malpractice is defined as the unwarranted departure from
generally accepted standards of medical practice resulting in injury to a
patient[.]” Id. Two characteristics distinguish a medical malpractice claim:
(1) medical malpractice occurs only within the course of a professional
relationship and (2) claims involve questions of medical judgment. Id. at
322.
Appellant’s complaint avers that he received medical treatment at the
hospital emergency room:
[T]he personnel bandaged [Appellant’s] forehead and
administered CT Scan of his head which showed no concussion.
Complaint at ¶ 3. However, there is no statement identifying who
performed or directed such treatment. Further, the complaint indicates that
the treatment was complete:
By approximately 7:30 p.m. [Appellant] was dressed and ready
to return to his office to complete the legal work on a brief he
was preparing.
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Complaint at ¶ 4. Thereafter, Appellant avers the following:
At the direction of Amy Harke Curtis[,] the alleged security
people at Presbyterian University Hospital and, in particular,
Robert Wolford refused to permit [Appellant] to call a cab to take
him downtown to return to his office or to leave the premises[;]
Wolford and three (3) goons physically restrained [Appellant]
from leaving the [h]ospital and in so doing falsely imprisoned
[Appellant.]
Complaint at ¶ 5.
Given these averments, it remains unclear whether Appellant had a
professional relationship with Ms. Curtis or whether, perhaps, Ms. Curtis was
the hospital security supervisor. Further, it remains unclear whether
Appellant’s detention raises questions of medical judgment. Ditch, 917
A.2d at 322. Thus, at this stage of the proceedings, we discern no basis on
which to conclude that Appellant’s claim sounds in professional liability or
medical malpractice. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s interlocutory
order entered February 13, 2014.2
In his third issue, Appellant contends that the trial court misconstrued
the requirements for a civil claim of false imprisonment. We agree.
A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer is properly
granted where the contested pleading is legally insufficient.
Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer require the
court to resolve the issues solely on the basis of the pleadings;
no testimony or other evidence outside of the complaint may be
considered to dispose of the legal issues presented by the
demurrer. All material facts set forth in the pleading and all
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2
We are aware of no precedent that would preclude Appellees from
revisiting this issue after pleadings are complete or following discovery.
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inferences reasonably deducible therefrom must be admitted as
true.
In determining whether the trial court properly sustained
preliminary objections, the appellate court must examine the
averments in the complaint, together with the documents and
exhibits attached thereto, in order to evaluate the sufficiency of
the facts averred. The impetus of our inquiry is to determine the
legal sufficiency of the complaint and whether the pleading
would permit recovery if ultimately proven. This Court will
reverse the trial court's decision regarding preliminary objections
only where there has been an error of law or abuse of discretion.
When sustaining the trial court's ruling will result in the denial of
claim or a dismissal of suit, preliminary objections will be
sustained only where the case i[s] free and clear of doubt.
Weiley v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 51 A.3d 202, 208 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(internal citations omitted; quotations marks omitted) (quoting Brosovic v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 841 A.2d 1071, 1073 (Pa. Super. 2004).
Appellant claims false imprisonment. “The elements of false
imprisonment are (1) the detention of another person, and (2) the
unlawfulness of such detention.” Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d
289, 293 (Pa. 1994). Although an unlawful detention may constitute
criminal behavior, it need not. Id. at 291 (considering whether a local
agency must indemnify a police officer for the payment of a judgment
entered in a civil, tort action for assault, battery, false imprisonment, and
emotional distress); see also 18 Pa.C.S. § 2903 (Official Comment – 1972)
(“It is not intended by this section [defining criminal false imprisonment] to
penalize every detention which might be the basis of a civil suit for false
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imprisonment.”). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has further clarified the
elements, citing favorably to the Restatement (2d) of Torts:
False imprisonment … entails liability to an actor if (a) he acts
intending to confine the other or a third person within
boundaries fixed by the actor, and (b) his act directly or
indirectly results in such a confinement of the other, and (c) the
other is conscious of the confinement or is harmed by it.
Gagliardi v. Lynn, 285 A.2d 109, 111 n.2 (Pa. 1971) (quotations marks
omitted).
In our view, Appellant’s complaint sets forth pleadings that would
permit recovery if ultimately proven. According to Appellant, Ms. Curtis
directed hospital security personnel to restrain Appellant physically and
without just cause, thus preventing him from leaving the hospital grounds.
Appellant avers further that he was harmed by such actions. See Complaint
¶¶ 6-7 (averring that Appellant lost 3.5 hours of work, billable at $200 per
hour).3 Accordingly, we also reverse the trial court’s order entered June 2,
2014, and remand for further proceedings.
Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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3
In light of our disposition, we do not reach Appellant’s second and fourth
questions presented. Also before the Court is Appellant’s motion to quash
Appellees’ Brief. Said motion is denied.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/23/2015
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