Com. v. Matula, M. ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
MONICA A. MATULA
Appellant No. 1297 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 13, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-54-CR-0001193-2013
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., WECHT, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED APRIL 29, 2015
Monica A. Matula appeals from her judgment of sentence, imposed in
the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County, after she was convicted by
a jury of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI).1 Upon careful review,
we affirm.
The trial court set forth the facts of this case as follows:
At about 1:00 a.m. on [May 25, 2013], Officer [Joseph] Krebs
[of the Tamaqua Police Department] saw a white Jeep Cherokee
vehicle – which he subsequently learned was being driven by
[Matula] – proceed east towards the intersection of Routes 209
and 309 in Tamaqua. The roadway had both a left turning lane
and a straight/right turning lane. The two lanes were marked on
the roadway.
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1
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1).
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The traffic light facing [Matula] was red. [Matula] stopped in the
straight/right turning lane and a second vehicle in the left
turning lane was moving towards the light. When the traffic light
turned green, Officer Krebs saw [Matula] abruptly cut into the
left turning lane into the path and in front of the other vehicle,
almost striking that vehicle. The operator of the second vehicle
slammed on its brakes to avoid a collision. [Matula] had
executed the maneuver and thereafter made the left turn
without utilizing any turn signal.
As a result of the inappropriate action by [Matula], Officer Krebs
began to follow her vehicle. [Matula] drove about a half block
on the one-way roadway she had entered and then stopped at
the side of the road with her vehicle about “halfway off the
roadway.” Officer Krebs, who had not previously activated the
siren or lights of his unmarked car, stopped behind [Matula’s]
vehicle. While he sat in the patrol car, Officer Krebs observed
that [Matula] had her vehicle in reverse, as the reverse lights
were activated the entire one to two minutes he was in his
vehicle.
After finishing radio communication about the stop, Officer Krebs
then approached [Matula] and asked for license, registration and
proof of insurance documents. [Matula] fumbled and dropped all
of her paperwork in her lap. Following what Officer Krebs
thought was “a long time,” [Matula] provided him a Pennsylvania
driver’s license. The officer noted [Matula] had very slurred
speech, glassy bloodshot eyes, and was emitting a strong odor
of alcoholic beverages about her facial area. [Matula] indicated
that she had had two drinks that evening, had an argument with
her boyfriend and was just out driving around. Officer Krebs
testified that he “had no indication” that she had been crying.
Officer Krebs asked [Matula] to exit her vehicle so he could
conduct standard field sobriety tests. When [Matula] exited her
vehicle, she kept her left hand on the vehicle while she walked
around it, until reaching the pavement. As Officer Krebs was
advising [Matula] how to perform the walk-and-turn test,
[Matula] swayed front to back and lost her balance.
After she lost her balance, [Matula] told Officer Krebs that she
had a foot injury. However, [Matula] said she could perform the
test. Officer Krebs believed [Matula] was wearing sandals and
he saw nothing “out of the ordinary” with her feet. After the
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officer explained the test again, [Matula] did nothing except look
straight ahead.
As [Matula] was uncooperative in performing the test, Officer
Krebs decide to take her into custody for suspicion of driving
under the influence. At first [Matula] pulled away from him and
then cried and begged that she not be arrested. After seating
her in her car, Officer Krebs began to read [Matula] the chemical
test warnings and consent form, known as the DL-26. [Matula]
cried, said she was probably over the legal limit and that she
just wanted to go home.
Officer Krebs read [Matula] the consent form twice and gave her
the opportunity to read it. After Officer Krebs asked [Matula] to
sign the form and to submit to the test, [Matula] said nothing
except to ask about her vehicle and say that she wanted to go
home. Because [Matula] did not respond to the officer’s request
that she submit to testing, she was transported to her home.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/18/14, at 1-4.
A criminal complaint was issued on May 28, 2013, charging Matula
with DUI, failing to employ the required position and method of turning
(summary offense) and failing to signal when turning (summary offense). A
jury trial was held on April 9, 2014, after which Matula was found guilty of
DUI. The trial court further found Matula guilty of both summary offenses.
On May 13, 2014, Matula was sentenced to 1 to 5 years in prison plus fines
and costs; her license was suspended for a period of 18 months and she was
ordered to obtain a mental health evaluation and any recommended
treatment.
Matula filed post-sentence motions, which were denied. This timely
appeal followed on July 25, 2014, in which Matula raises the following issue,
verbatim, for our review:
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A jury must find that a defendant had been properly warned of
the consequences of refusing chemical testing – in a DUI context
– in order to find that the defendant had refused to submit to
testing. Here, the Commonwealth elicited a legal conclusion
from a police officer on the parameters of his “obligation” to
advise. The officer responded that he “Just [has to] advise them
of their chemical test warnings.” Where refusal – and specific
consideration of the refusal element – was central to the
Commonwealth’s case – did the trial court err in overruling trial
counsel’s objection to such testimony?
Brief of Appellant, at 4.
We begin by noting:
The standard of review employed when faced with a challenge to
the trial court’s decision as to whether or not to admit evidence
is well settled. Questions concerning the admissibility of
evidence lie within the sound discretion of the trial court, and a
reviewing court will not reverse the trial court’s decision absent a
clear abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is not merely an
error of judgment, but rather where the judgment is manifestly
unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record
shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill
will.
Commonwealth v. Young, 989 A.2d 920, 924 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal
citations omitted).
The following exchange between counsel for the Commonwealth and
Officer Krebs regarding form DL-262 comprises the testimony of which
Matula complains:
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2
Pennsylvania's “DL-26 form” is issued by the Pennsylvania Department of
Transportation and is titled “Chemical Testing Warnings and Report of
Refusal [to] Submit to Chemical Testing as Authorized by Section 1547 of
the Vehicle Code in Violation [of] Section 3802 (relating to driving under the
influence of Alcohol or Controlled Substance).” Commonwealth v. Barr,
79 A.3d 668, 669 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2013).
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Q: Okay. And with reference to the DL-26, your obligation
with reference to the DL-26 is to do what with that?
A: Just advise them of their chemical test warnings.
MR QUINN: Your Honor, I want to object to that and
move to strike that. His obligation, that’s a legal conclusion. His
obligation, what he’s supposed to do, that’s a matter of
interpretation by – by the Courts.
THE COURT: It – it’s overruled.
N.T. Trial, 4/9/14, at 83.
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
The DL-26 [f]orm provides the following information: (1) the
licensee is under arrest for DUI in violation of Section 3802(a) of
the Vehicle Code, 75 [Pa.C.S.A.] § 3802(a); (2) the officer is
requesting a chemical test of a particular type (blood, urine,
etc.); (3) it is the officer’s duty to inform the licensee that, if the
licensee refuses to submit to the chemical test, the licensee’s
operating privileges will be suspended for at least one year, that
if the licensee refuses and is convicted [of] or pleads guilty to
violating Section 3802(a) of the Vehicle Code (related to
impaired driving), the licensee is subject to more severe
penalties, the same as [if] he [were] convicted of driving with
the highest rate of alcohol; and (4) it is the officer’s duty to
inform the licensee that the licensee does not have the right to
speak with an attorney, or anyone else, before deciding whether
to submit and that any request to speak to an attorney or
anyone else after being provided the warnings or remaining
silent when asked to submit to chemical testing will constitute a
refusal, resulting in the suspension of the licensee’s operating
privileges and other enhanced criminal penalties if convicted of
impaired driving.
Id., quoting Sitoski v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Transp., 11 A.3d 12, 15
n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).
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Matula claims that the trial court erred by allowing Officer Krebs to
“render a legal conclusion on a critical element the jury had to decide.” Brief
of Appellant, at 11. Matula argues that, because a finding of refusal to
submit to chemical testing increases the penalty for DUI,3 pursuant to
Apprendi,4 the jury was required to find that (1) Matula was provided the
implied consent warnings and (2) she refused to submit to testing. Matula
asserts that Officer Krebs’ testimony regarding his obligations with reference
to form DL-26 was an opinion regarding a legal question that Officer Krebs
was unqualified to render. Matula is entitled to no relief.
Contrary to Matula’s assertion, Officer Krebs’ challenged testimony did
not address a “critical element the jury had to decide.” The jury was not
tasked with determining whether Officer Krebs had an obligation to advise
Matula of the warnings contained in the DL-26 form. Indeed, Officer Krebs’
“obligations” were irrelevant to the ultimate questions of fact to be decided
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3
This was Matula’s third DUI offense. Pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. §
3803(a)(2), a third offense is generally graded as a second-degree
misdemeanor carrying a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment. See
18 Pa.C.S.A § 106(b)(7). However, because Matula refused chemical
testing, section 3803(b)(4) provides that her offense be graded as a first-
degree misdemeanor, which carries a penalty of not more than five years in
prison. See 18 Pa.C.S.A § 106(b)(6). Moreover, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(c)(3)
subjects a third-time offender who refuses chemical testing to a mandatory
minimum sentence of one year’s imprisonment.
4
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that any fact that
increases penalty for crime beyond prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to jury, and proved beyond reasonable doubt).
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by the jury. Rather, the jury was charged with deciding, based upon the
evidence presented at trial, whether Officer Krebs did, in fact, provide
Matula with the implied consent warnings and whether Matula declined to
submit to chemical testing. See Commonwealth v. Xander, 14 A.3d 174
(Pa. Super. 2011) (refusal to submit to chemical testing necessarily requires
knowing refusal insofar as police must have provided arrestee with warnings
beforehand). Accordingly, even assuming, arguendo, that Officer Krebs’
testimony amounted to an improper legal opinion,5 the error was harmless.
See Commonwealth v. Holland, 543 A.2d 1068, 1072 (Pa. Super. 1988)
(opinions of lay witness on matter not in issue necessarily harmless in their
effect).
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/29/2015
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5
We note that form DL-26 itself states that “it is the officer’s duty” to inform
a motorist of the information contained on the form. See Barr, supra.
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