Com. v. Venable, R. ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
RAHMIR VENABLE, :
:
Appellant : No. 1069 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 19, 2013,
Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County,
Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0002534-2013
BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE and STABILE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED MAY 05, 2015
Appellant, Rahmir Venable (“Venable”), appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered on November 19, 2013 by the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County, Criminal Division, following his guilty plea to
aggravated assault,1 robbery,2 criminal conspiracy,3 use or possession of
electric or electronic incapacitation device,4 and use or possession of an
offensive weapon.5 For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and vacate
in part, Venable’s judgment of sentence.
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a).
2
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(i).
3
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(c).
4
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 908.1(a)(1).
5
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 908(a).
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This case stems from a heinous attack on Dr. Allison Walsh (“Dr.
Walsh”) in which Venable took part. The relevant facts that the
Commonwealth would have proven had this case gone to trial and to which
Venable pled guilty are as follows:
[O]n the morning of August 25th, 2012, at
approximately 5:45 in the morning[,] which was day
break[,] the complainant, [Dr. Walsh], was walking
to work at Jefferson Hospital. When she got to about
the area of 11th and Lombard Streets in the city and
county of Philadelphia, five males were walking
towards her. One looked at her and said, [g]ood
morning. She said good morning back as she looked
at him. He then -- that would be the codefendant,
Marquise Bullock [(“Bullock”)], grabbed her purse,
put a taser to her neck and shocked her.
At that point[,] she yelled for him to get off of her.
She struggled with him. He yelled, [g]et her.
Another codefendant, Sulan Jones [(“Jones”)],
grabbed her by the arm. Bullock then tries to tase
her again. She is able to break away but she runs
into [Jones]. Jones starts hitting her, punching her
with his fists on her right side. [Bullock] grabs her
arm, tases her again. She’s also kicked in her knee
and pushed to the ground.
At that point[,] while the males were walking
towards her, they slightly walk past her. These two
males were slightly ahead with another codefendant,
Anthony McKim. They come back and at that point
they come back and Dr. Walsh is on the ground face
up as all five of them punch and kick her repeatedly
about her body. She’s punched in the side of her
head. She’s kicked all over her body. She’s kicked
in her face which results in her having a broken
nose. She’s [tased] at least four times. First time
being on her neck. She’s tased on her inner arm.
She’s tased on the palm of her hand. She’s tased on
her forehead.
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They continuously try to get her purse from her.
While she struggles with them, they drag her on the
ground[,] pulling at her purse. Your Honor, to this
day she still has two scars, bad scars on her back
from being dragged on the ground. They do
eventually get her purse away from her and they all
run off together going northbound, I believe, on 11th
street.
Taken in her bag was her wallet with her
identification, credit cards and debit cards, her
physician’s license, $250 VISA gift card, her pagers
for Jefferson Hospital, her medications, her iPhone
and $40 of United States currency.
* * *
[Dr. Walsh’s] brother-in-law tried to track her iPhone
using an app. At that point[,] her iPhone was
originally labeled Allison’s iPhone. It came up as
Lamar’s iPhone. Then[,] through her Facebook
account, all of her friends were notified that an
Instagram account had been opened linked to her
Facebook. That name was under the name
Rahh_Bangga … . A picture of [Venable] popped up
with the account.
[Dr. Walsh] alerted the detectives. A picture -- a
screen shot of her phone was taken at that time and
[Venable] was put into a photo array. Dr. Walsh
identified him as one of the males that robbed her on
August 25th. She had stated that he kicked me
while I was on the ground. He was pulling on my
bag and kicking me.
* * *
[Dr. Walsh] did have a broken nose as I said as a
result of the incident. She did have to have surgery.
She has been -- the past year have been treated for
post[-]traumatic stress syndrome as a result of this
incident and she still suffers scars as a result.
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N.T., 10/7/13, at 10-14, 16.
On September 14, 2012, police arrested Venable. On October 7,
2013, Venable pled guilty to the above-referenced crimes. On November
19, 2013, the trial court sentenced Venable to five to ten years of
incarceration plus ten years of probation for each of the aggravated assault,
robbery, and use or possession of electric or electronic incapacitation device
charges, two to four years of incarceration plus six years of probation on the
criminal conspiracy charge, and no further penalty on the use or possession
of an offensive weapon charge. The trial court ordered these sentences to
run concurrently to one another for an aggregate period of five to ten years
of incarceration plus ten years of probation. The trial court further ordered
Venable to undergo random urinalysis, complete job and anger management
training, seek and maintain employment, and pay $2500 in restitution, plus
court costs and fees.
On November 27, 2013, Venable filed a timely post-sentence motion
challenging his sentence, which was denied by operation of law on March 28,
2014. On April 1, 2014, Venable filed a timely notice of appeal. On June 5,
2014, the trial court ordered Venable to file a concise statement of the
errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Rule 1925(b) of the Pennsylvania
Rules of Appellate Procedure. On June 26, 2014, Venable filed his timely
Rule 1925(b) statement.
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On appeal, Venable raises the following issues for our review and
determination:
1. Did not the sentencing court err in finding that
[Dr. Walsh] suffered serious bodily injury for
the purpose of applying elevated sentencing
guidelines for the offenses of Robbery and
Aggravated Assault in imposing its sentence
where [Dr. Walsh]’s injuries did not result in
permanent impairment, disfigurement, or
substantial risk of her death?
2. Did not the sentencing court err in relying
upon the deadly weapon used sentencing
enhancement in imposing sentence because a
Taser not a deadly weapon as considered by
the [g]uidelines and furthermore when
[Venable] never possessed the weapon?
3. Was not the sentence imposed manifestly
excessive, unreasonable, and an abuse of
discretion because the sentencing court failed
to consider the Sentencing Code, failed to
place the reasons for its sentence on the
record in open court, failed to consider the
needs of [Venable] and whether the sentence
was the least restrictive necessary to protect
the community and rehabilitate [Venable]?
Venable’s Brief at 3.
Each of the issues that Venable raises on appeal challenges the
discretionary aspects of his sentence. “The right to appellate review of the
discretionary aspects of a sentence is not absolute, and must be considered
a petition for permission to appeal.” Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91
A.3d 1247, 1265 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc), appeal denied, 104 A.3d 1
(Pa. 2014). “An appellant must satisfy a four-part test to invoke this Court’s
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jurisdiction when challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence.” Id.
We conduct this four-part test to determine whether,
(1) the appellant preserved the issue either by
raising it at the time of sentencing or in a post[-
]sentence motion; (2) the appellant filed a timely
notice of appeal; (3) the appellant set forth a concise
statement of reasons relied upon for the allowance of
his appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) the
appellant raises a substantial question for our
review.
Commonwealth v. Baker, 72 A.3d 652, 662 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation
omitted), appeal denied, 86 A.3d 231 (Pa. 2014). “A defendant presents a
substantial question when he sets forth a plausible argument that the
sentence violates a provision of the sentencing code or is contrary to the
fundamental norms of the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Dodge,
77 A.3d 1263, 1268 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quotations and citations omitted),
appeal denied, 91 A.3d 161 (Pa. 2014).
Here, Venable preserved his discretionary aspects of sentencing claims
by raising them in a post-sentence motion. See Post-Sentence Motion,
11/27/13, at 1-8. Venable also filed a timely notice of appeal. Furthermore,
Venable set forth a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for the
allowance of his appeal pursuant to Rule 2119(f) of the Pennsylvania Rules
of Appellate Procedure. See Venable’s Brief at 4-6.
Thus, we must determine whether Venable’s discretionary aspects of
sentencing claims raise substantial questions for our review. We begin with
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the first two issues Venable raises on appeal, as they are dispositive of the
entire case. First, Venable claims that the trial court misapplied the
Sentencing Guidelines by sentencing him in accordance with the finding that
Dr. Walsh suffered serious bodily injury. Id. at 10-13. A claim that the trial
court misapplied the Sentencing Guidelines raises a substantial question for
our review. Commonwealth v. Cook, 941 A.2d 7, 11 (Pa. Super. 2007).
Second, Venable contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it
applied the deadly weapon enhancement to his sentences for his aggravated
assault and robbery convictions. Venable’s Brief at 13-15. This Court has
“found on several occasions that the application of the deadly weapon
enhancement presents a substantial question.” Commonwealth v.
Rhoades, 8 A.3d 912, 916 (Pa. Super. 2010). Because Venable has
complied with the technical requirements for consideration of a challenge to
the discretionary aspects of a sentence for his first two issues, we will
consider these claims on their merits.
Our standard of review when considering discretionary aspects of
sentencing claims is as follows:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion
of the sentencing judge. Commonwealth v. Paul,
925 A.2d 825 (Pa. Super. 2007). The standard
employed when reviewing the discretionary aspects
of sentencing is very narrow. [Commonwealth v.
Marts, 889 A.2d 608, 613 (Pa. Super. 2005)]. We
may reverse only if the sentencing court abused its
discretion or committed an error of law. Id. “A
sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a
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manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an
abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error
in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish,
by reference to the record, that the sentencing court
ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or
ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable
decision.” Commonwealth v. Littlehales, 915
A.2d 662, 665 (Pa. Super. 2007). We must accord
the sentencing court’s decision great weight because
it was in the best position to review the defendant’s
character, defiance or indifference, and the overall
effect and nature of the crime. Marts, 889 A.2d at
613.
Cook, 941 A.2d at 11-12.
For his first issue, Venable claims that the trial court erred in applying
the sentencing guidelines by sentencing him in accordance with the trial
court’s determination that Dr. Walsh suffered serious bodily injury.
Venable’s Brief at 10-13. Venable argues that the injuries Dr. Walsh
suffered in this case were insufficient to support a finding that she sustained
serious bodily injury. Id.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
sentencing Venable in accordance with the finding that Dr. Walsh suffered
serious bodily injury. The certified record on appeal indicates that Venable
pled guilty to a crime that contained the element of serious bodily injury.
Specifically, the record reflects that in pleading guilty to robbery, Venable
pled guilty to section 3701(a)(1)(i) of the Crimes Code. See Docket,
7/2/14, at 5; Trial Disposition and Dismissal Form, 10/7/13, at 2. Section
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3701(a)(1)(i) reads as follows: “A person is guilty of robbery if, in the
course of committing a theft, he … inflicts serious bodily injury upon
another.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(i). Because Venable pled guilty to
inflicting serious bodily injury upon Dr. Walsh in the course of committing a
theft, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing him
accordingly.
For his second issue, Venable claims that the trial court abused its
discretion when it applied the deadly weapon enhancement to his sentences
for aggravated assault and robbery. Venable’s Brief at 13-15. First, Venable
argues that a taser is not a deadly weapon. Id. at 13-14. Second, Venable
contends that the trial court should not have applied the deadly weapon
enhancement to his aggravated assault and robbery sentences because he
never used the taser on Dr. Walsh or otherwise possessed it during the
attack. Id. at 14-15. This issue requires us to decide whether the taser
here constituted a deadly weapon. We have found no published opinions
discussing a taser within the context of the deadly weapon sentencing
enhancement.
A taser is a non-lethal electronic incapacitation device. See 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 908.1; Commonwealth v. Landis, 48 A.3d 432, 439 (Pa.
Super. 2012) (en banc). An electronic incapacitation device is “a portable
device which is designed or intended by the manufacturer to be used,
offensively or defensively, to temporarily immobilize or incapacitate persons
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by means of electric pulse or current.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 908.1(f); see also
Ickes v. Borough of Bedford, 807 F. Supp. 2d 306, 321-22 (W.D. Pa.
2011) (classifying a taser as an intermediate or medium quantum of force
that causes an individual to lose control of his or her muscles and does not
ordinarily cause death or serious bodily injury).
The trial court sentenced Venable according to the deadly weapon
used matrix of the Sentencing Guidelines. See 204 Pa. Code § 303.17(b);
N.T., 11/19/13, at 49. To determine whether the deadly weapon used
matrix should apply, the Sentencing Code provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
(2) When the court determines that the offender
used a deadly weapon during the commission of the
current conviction offense, the court shall consider
the DWE/Used Matrix (§ 303.17(b)). An offender
has used a deadly weapon if any of the following
were employed by the offender in a way that
threatened or injured another individual:
(i) Any firearm, (as defined in 42 Pa.C.S. §
9712) whether loaded or unloaded, or
(ii) Any dangerous weapon (as defined in
18 Pa.C.S. § 913), or
(iii) Any device, implement, or instrumentality
capable of producing death or serious bodily
injury.
204 Pa. Code § 303.10(a)(2).
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For our purposes, a taser is not a firearm as defined by 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9712,6 nor is it one of the dangerous weapons defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 913.7 See 204 Pa. Code § 303.10(a)(2)(i), (ii). Therefore, our analysis
will focus on determining the meaning and scope of the terms set forth in
section 303.10(a)(2)(iii). Under section 303.10(a)(2)(iii), a deadly weapon
is (1) “[a]ny device, implement, or instrumentality”; (2) that is “employed
by the offender in a way that threatened or injured another individual”; and
(3) is “capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.” 204 Pa. Code
§ 303.10(a)(2)(iii)
Applying section 303.10(a)(2)(iii), an en banc panel of this Court
explained:
6
A firearm is “[a]ny weapon, including a starter gun, which will or is
designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of
an explosive or the expansion of gas therein.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712(e). The
trial court did not find and the Commonwealth does not contend that a taser
falls within the definition of a firearm.
7
Section 913 defines dangerous weapons as:
A bomb, any explosive or incendiary device or
material when possessed with intent to use or to
provide such material to commit any offense, graded
as a misdemeanor of the third degree or higher,
grenade, blackjack, sandbag, metal knuckles,
dagger, knife (the blade of which is exposed in an
automatic way by switch, push-button, spring
mechanism or otherwise) or other implement for the
infliction of serious bodily injury which serves no
common lawful purpose.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 913(f).
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The Sentencing Guidelines do not define the terms
“device, implement, or instrumentality.” Only one of
those terms, “instrumentality,” has been defined by
our Court for purposes of the DWE. Our Court,
quoting Black’s Law Dictionary, determined an
instrumentality is a “thing used to achieve an end or
purpose.” Commonwealth v. Raybuck, 915 A.2d
125, 129 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary (8th ed. 2004)).
Without statutory or decisional authority defining the
terms defining the terms “device” or “implement,”
we thus turn to the dictionary meanings of these
words.
Merriam-Webster defines a “device” as “an object,
machine, or piece of equipment that has been made
for some special purpose.” Merriam-Webster,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/device
(last visited March 4, 2014). “Implement” is defined
as “an object used to do work.” Merriam-Webster,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/implem
ent (last visited March 4, 2014). These two
definitions appear to limit the scope of a deadly
weapon as something specifically designed to
achieve an end result, which in this case is to cause
death or serious bodily injury. However, the
Sentencing Commission’s use of the word “capable”
in the qualifying phrase “capable of producing death
or serious bodily injury” expands the scope of such
an interpretation.
“Capable” is defined as “able to do something[,]
having the qualities or abilities that are needed to do
something.” Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam
-webster.com/dictionary/capable (last visited March
4, 2014). Utilization of this word promotes the idea
that the device, implement, or instrumentality need
not originally be designed to produce death or
serious bodily injury. Instead, it may be utilized in a
different manner to achieve a more nefarious result.
From a review of these definitions, we discern that
collectively, a “device, implement, or
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instrumentality” is an object, whether simple or
complex, that is utilized in a fashion to produce
death or serious bodily injury, which need not be
consistent with the original purpose of the object.
Our case law supports such an interpretation by
stating that, for purposes of the DWE, “[i]tems not
normally classified as deadly weapons can become
so based upon their use under particular
circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Rhoades,
8 A.3d 912, 917 (Pa. Super. 2010) (intact glass
bottle qualified as a deadly weapon). We found
many examples in our cases: [Raybuck], 915 A.2d
125 [] (commercial mouse poison is an
“instrumentality” for purposes of the DWE);
Commonwealth v. Scullin, [] 607 A.2d 750 ([Pa.
Super.] 1992) (tire iron thrown at victim was a
deadly weapon); Commonwealth v. Cornish, []
589 A.2d 718, 721 ([Pa. Super.] 1991) (fireplace
poker used to strike victim constitutes a deadly
weapon); Commonwealth v. Brown, [] 587 A.2d
6, 7 ([Pa. Super.] 1991) (saw used to stab victim
was a deadly weapon); Commonwealth v.
Chapman, [] 528 A.2d 990 ([Pa. Super.] 1987)
(straightedge razor placed at the face of an
individual is a deadly weapon).
Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d at 1286-69 (emphasis in original).
Additionally, in deciding cases under section 303.10(a)(2), this Court
has applied the definition of serious bodily injury from section 2301 of the
Crimes Code. See Rhoades, 8 A.3d at 917 (citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301).
Section 2301 defines serious bodily injury as “[b]odily injury which creates a
substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement,
or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or
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organ.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301. With this framework in mind, we turn our
attention to the facts of this case.
Here, the certified record on appeal reveals the following regarding the
use of the taser. The assailants tased Dr. Walsh at least twice prior to her
falling to the ground. N.T., 10/7/13, at 11. The assailants continued to tase
Dr. Walsh after she fell to the ground. Id. In total, the assailants tased Dr.
Walsh at least four times – on her neck, on her forehead, on her inner arm,
and on her hand. Id. at 11-12. We now apply these facts to the three-part
framework set forth above.
First, a taser undoubtedly constitutes a device. A taser is a machine,
or piece of equipment, made for some special purpose, namely, the
temporary immobilization or incapacitation of persons. See 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 908.1(f); Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247 at 1268. Second, there is no doubt
that the assailants employed the taser here in a way that threatened Dr.
Walsh. See N.T., 10/7/13, at 11-12.
Therefore, the sole question that remains is whether the taser, as the
assailants used it in this case, was “capable of producing death or serious
bodily injury.” See 204 Pa. Code § 303.10(a)(2)(iii). In Buterbaugh, our
Court defined “capable” as “able to do something” or “having the qualities or
abilities that are needed to do something,” namely, causing death or serious
bodily injury. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d at 1269. Under the Buterbaugh
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definition of “capable,” a device, implement, or instrumentality, can become
a deadly weapon based on its use under the circumstances. Id.
A prior case from this Court has held that a device, implement, or
instrumentality was capable of producing death or serious bodily because it
was designed to kill. In Raybuck, this Court held that mouse poison was a
deadly weapon when used on a person, no matter how much poison was
used, because it was by its very nature, toxic, dangerous and designed to
kill. Raybuck, 915 A.2d at 129. In other cases, this Court has held that
certain devices, implements, and instrumentalities, though not designed to
kill, were capable of producing death or serious bodily injury. See
Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d at 1269 (automobile); Rhoades, 8 A.3d at 917
(intact glass bottle); Scullin, 607 A.2d at 753 (tire iron); Cornish, 589 A.2d
at 721 (fireplace poker); Brown, 587 A.2d at 7 (saw). The evidence to
support those findings was readily apparent in those cases. In each of those
cases, the victims therein actually suffered death or serious bodily as a
direct consequence of the manner in which those devices, implements, and
instrumentalities were used. See id. For example, in Buterbaugh, this
Court held that an automobile was a deadly weapon where the appellant
intentionally struck and killed the victim while driving at the maximum rate
of acceleration. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d at 1268-69.
In contrast, a taser does not fit within either of these two categories of
cases. Unlike the poison in Raybuck, a taser is not designed to kill. As
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mentioned above, a taser does not ordinarily cause death or serious bodily
injury. A taser, rather, temporarily immobilizes or incapacitates persons by
means of an electric pulse or current. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 908.1(f). Thus, a
taser is designed to be a non-lethal device that uses an electric current to
incapacitate persons. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 908.1(f); Landis, 48 A.3d at 439.
Additionally, unlike Buterbaugh, Rhoades, Scullin, Cornish, and Brown,
there is no evidence here that Dr. Walsh died or suffered serious bodily
injury specifically from the taser, as the assailants employed it in this case.
See N.T., 10/7/13, at 10-16. Indeed, the facts to which Venable pled guilty
do not even indicate that Dr. Walsh suffered any injury due to the tasing.8
See id.
Moreover, there is no independent proof in the certified record on
appeal regarding a taser’s capability to produce death or serious bodily
injury as used here. There is no evidence of record that repeated shocks
from a taser are capable of producing death or serious bodily injury. The
record does not reflect what voltage the taser used in this case emitted. The
record likewise does not reflect whether that voltage, if inflicted repeatedly,
8
The trial court contends that Dr. Walsh experienced tachycardia and burn
marks following the tasing. Trial Court Opinion, 6/30/14, at 7. Tachycardia
refers to an abnormally rapid heart rate, greater than 100 beats per minute.
TABER’S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 2137 (20th ed. 2005). However, the
Commonwealth did not reference these injuries in the facts to which Venable
pled guilty. See N.T., 10/7/13, at 10-14, 16. Moreover, there is no
evidence of record that ties Dr. Walsh’s elevated heart rate following the
attack to the tasing. See id.
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is likely to create a substantial risk of death or cause serious, permanent
disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
member or organ. The record further does not reflect whether a taser, if
used upon the head, neck, arm, or hand, as it was in this case, is capable of
causing death or serious bodily injury. While not required, the
Commonwealth introduced no expert testimony or other evidence indicating
the level of injury caused by repeated tasing.
Therefore, there is no evidence, given the limited record before us, to
support the trial court’s decision to apply the deadly weapon enhancement in
this case because there is no evidence of record indicating that the
assailants’ use of the taser in this case was capable of producing death or
serious bodily injury. Accordingly, we must conclude, in the absence of any
evidence of whether a taser is capable of producing death or serious bodily
injury, that the trial court abused its discretion in applying the deadly
weapon enhancement to Venable’s aggravated assault and robbery
convictions.
Because we conclude that a taser was not a deadly weapon under the
facts and circumstances of this case, and that the trial court erred in
applying the deadly weapon enhancement to Venable’s aggravated assault
and robbery convictions, we must remand this case to the trial court for re-
sentencing. Accordingly, we need not consider the remaining argument of
Venable’s second issue or the entirety of his third issue.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed in part and vacated in part. Case
remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/5/2015
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