Susquehanna Bank v. Bleacher, B. ( 2015 )

J-A08033-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
SUSQUEHANNA BANK, F/K/A FARMERS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
FIRST BANK, : PENNSYLVANIA
:
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
BONNY BLEACHER, :
: No. 1338 MDA 2014
Appellant
Appeal from the Order Entered July 8, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of York County,
Civil Division, at No(s): 2014-SU-605-86
BEFORE: SHOGAN, WECHT, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED MAY 06, 2015
Bonny Bleacher (Bleacher) appeals from the July 8, 2014 order which
granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Susquehanna
Bank (the Bank), f/k/a Farmers First Bank, in this action for revival of a lien
of judgment. We affirm.
The underlying facts are not in dispute. In September 2003, the Bank
obtained a deficiency judgment of $7,424.50 against Bleacher based upon a
car loan it had made to her. The judgment was transferred to the Court of
Common Pleas of York County and revived in September 2009. The Bank
filed a second writ of revival in February 2014. Bleacher filed an answer
raising a statute of limitations defense. The parties filed cross-motions for
judgment on the pleadings. On July 8, 2014, the trial court entered an order
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A08033-15
denying Bleacher’s motion and granting the Bank’s motion. Bleacher timely
filed a notice of appeal to this Court.
Bleacher states two questions for our consideration:
I. Did the [trial] court err in entering judgment on a writ of
revival where the writ of revival was filed more than five years
after the initial revival, in violation of the statute of limitations?
II. Did the [trial] court err in holding that a judgment may be
revived after the five year period expires but merely loses its
priority, in direct contravention of the statute of limitations?
Bleacher’s Brief at 3 (suggested answers and unnecessary capitalization
omitted).
We consider Bleacher’s interrelated questions mindful of the following
standard of review.
Appellate review of an order granting a motion for
judgment on the pleadings is plenary. The appellate court will
apply the same standard employed by the trial court. A trial
court must confine its consideration to the pleadings and
relevant documents. The court must accept as true all well
pleaded statements of fact, admissions, and any documents
properly attached to the pleadings presented by the party
against whom the motion is filed, considering only those facts
which were specifically admitted.
We will affirm the grant of such a motion only when the
moving party’s right to succeed is certain and the case is so free
from doubt that the trial would clearly be a fruitless exercise.
Cubler v. TruMark Financial Credit Union, 83 A.3d 235, 239 (Pa. Super.
2013) (quoting Coleman v. Duane Morris, LLP, 58 A.3d 833, 836 (Pa.
Super. 2012)).
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“Any judgment or other order of a court of common pleas for the
payment of money shall be a lien upon real property….” 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 4303(a). The judgment “continues as a lien against real property for five
years and then expires unless revived.” Mid-State Bank and Trust Co. v.
Globalnet Intern., Inc., 710 A.2d 1187, 1190 (Pa. Super. 1998).
Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5526(1), an “action for revival of a judgment
lien on real property” is one which “must be commenced within five years.”
Bleacher’s argument is that the plain language of this statute precludes
revival of a judgment when, as in the instant case, the action is not filed
within five years. Bleacher’s Brief at 8-9.
Bleacher ignores precedent which states the opposite: “The judgment
lien may nonetheless be revived after the five-year statute of limitations
period for revival, however its priority against intervening liens, if any, is
lost.” Shearer v. Naftzinger, 747 A.2d 859, 860 n.1 (Pa. 2000) (noting
that the statute of limitations was no impediment to revival where seven
years passed between writs). See also Mid-State Bank, 710 A.2d at 1190(“Although a judgment may be revived after the five year period, its priority
against intervening liens is lost.”). Bleacher’s attempts to distinguish these
cases are unpersuasive.
We also find no merit in her second claim: that the legislature, by
amending the statute of limitations in 2006 without altering the language
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regarding revival of judgments, indicated its “intent to continue the
requirement that liens be revived within five years in order to constitute a
lien against real property.” Bleacher’s Brief at 11. To the contrary, the
legislature’s failure to modify the language of the statute in the face of the
Mid-State Bank and Shearer decisions, if anything, indicates its
agreement with the Courts’ construction. See, e.g., Birth Center v. St.
Paul Companies, Inc., 787 A.2d 376, 387 (Pa. 2001) (“In enacting a
statute, the legislature is presumed to have been familiar with the law, as it
then existed and the judicial decisions construing it.” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)).
Finally, “[o]ur Courts have recognized that the only cognizable
defenses in a proceeding to revive a judgment lien are that the judgment
does not exist, has been paid or has been discharged.” Shipley Fuels
Marketing, LLC v. Medrow, 37 A.3d 1215, 1218 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The statute of limitations is
not one of those defenses. Rather, as our Supreme Court explained long
ago:
While it is true that a judgment, as far as defendant is
concerned, continues beyond the five year limitation (although
its lien does not, unless revived within that period), yet if
plaintiff deems it advisable to revive his judgment against
defendant, he may do so, and the fact that the judgment is or is
not a lien against any real property is not a legal defense to such
revival.
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Cusano v. Rubolino, 39 A.2d 906, 908 (Pa. 1944) (citations omitted). See
also Shearer, 747 A.2d at 861 (Zappala, J., concurring) (“A money
judgment acts as a lien against real property, but only for five years. The
lien must be continued (or revived) to maintain (or obtain a new) place of
priority. However, properly speaking, it is the lien that is revived, not the
judgment. There is no outer time limit to executing against real property
to satisfy a judgment, but the proceeds of such a sale must be distributed
according to the priority of liens.” (emphasis in original)).
Accordingly, the trial court properly determined that that the Bank had
the right to revive its lien after more than five years, but lost its prior
priority status.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/6/2015
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