Com. v. Talley, Q. ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
QUINTEZ TALLEY,
Appellant No. 28 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 21, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003711-2009
BEFORE: BOWES, JENKINS, and PLATT,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MAY 07, 2015
Quintez Talley appeals from the judgment of sentence of three to six
years imprisonment that the trial court imposed after a jury convicted
Appellant of arson, risking a catastrophe, institutional vandalism, reckless
endangerment, and failure to prevent a catastrophe. Appellant contends
that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for failure to
prevent a catastrophe. The Commonwealth and this Court agree with that
position. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction for failure to prevent a
catastrophe and sentence imposed thereon. As this decision does not affect
the sentence imposed, we do not order a new sentencing proceeding.
The trial court provided a summary of the evidence presented against
Appellant:
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Through the testimony of four correctional officers and a
fire department captain the Commonwealth established that on
October 23, 2008, shortly before 7:00 p.m., while a prisoner in
the Philadelphia Detention Center, [Appellant] began yelling and
screaming obscenities and threats, apparently in resentment for
the fact that a scheduled visit he was supposed to have had
been cancelled. He then started flooding his cell block by
clogging the toilet in his cell and running the water. When the
guards shut off the water from outside the cell he threatened to
burn the place down and then set fire to various flammable
items in his cell using a light fixture which he apparently had
pulled from the wall and broke in order to do so. As a result of
the fire and smoke that were emanating from his cell, three
other inmates in the cell block began complaining about being
affected and had to be evacuated and given medical attention for
slight smoke inhalation. When the guards opened the cell the
defendant refused orders to cease what he was doing and get
down on the floor and was subdued with pepper spray and
removed from his cell while some of the guards extinguished the
fire. While no one actually saw him set anything on fire, since
the cell door was solid as opposed to bars, he was the only one
in the cell. The fire department captain who had arrived after
the fire was extinguished and conducted an investigation
testified that the light fixture was the apparent ignition source.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/2/14, at 2-3. Three inmates were taken to a medical
facility to determine if they suffered from smoke inhalation, but they did not
require treatment. The fire did not spread beyond Appellant’s cell and
consisted of a paper fire. There was no structural damage caused to the
cell.
After Appellant was convicted of the above-described crimes, the case
proceeded to sentencing. On November 21, 2013, Appellant received a
sentence of three to six years imprisonment on the arson conviction, and
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concurrent sentences on all his remaining crimes. In this ensuing appeal,
Appellant raises one issue: “Was the evidence in support of the charge for
Failure to Prevent a Catastrophe, 18 Pa.C.S.A. Sec. 3303(2), insufficient to
support Defendant’s conviction because no catastrophe occurred?”
Appellant’s brief at 4.
The elements of failure to prevent a catastrophe are set forth in 18
Pa.C.S. § 3303, which provides in relevant part:
A person who knowingly or recklessly fails to take reasonable
measures to prevent or mitigate a catastrophe, when he can do
so without substantial risk to himself, commits a misdemeanor of
the second degree if:
....
(2) he did or assented to the act causing or
threatening the catastrophe.
18 Pa.C.S. § 3303.
As our Supreme Court has observed, the offense of failing to prevent a
catastrophe is markedly different from the crime of risking a catastrophe.
“[A] person can be guilty of risking a catastrophe even where no catastrophe
occurs, while a person can be guilty of failure to prevent a catastrophe only
where the catastrophe actually occurs[.]” Commonwealth v. Karetny, 880
A.2d 505, 522 (Pa. 2005). Our High Court also noted that the term
“‘catastrophe’ is intended to be synonymous with ‘widespread injury or
damage.’” Id. at 514 (citation omitted).
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Herein, the evidence fails to sustain a finding that Appellant actually
caused widespread injury or damage when he lit the fire in his cell. His cell
was undamaged, and no one was injured. While Appellant undoubtedly
risked causing such injury or damage by his actions, the small trash fire was
extinguished by the prison guards before any property damage or physical
injuries occurred. Hence, we concur, as does the Commonwealth, that,
since no catastrophe occurred herein, Appellant’s conviction under 18
Pa.C.S. § 3303 is infirm.
Appellant received a two-year probationary term on this crime that
was concurrent with the three-to-six year jail term imposed upon the arson
offense. Thus, our decision herein has no effect on the sentencing scheme,
and we do not need to order a new sentencing proceeding.
Commonwealth v. Thur, 906 A.2d 552, 569 (Pa.Super. 2006) (citations
omitted) (“If our disposition upsets the overall sentencing scheme of the trial
court, we must remand so that the court can restructure its sentence plan.
By contrast, if our decision does not alter the overall scheme, there is no
need for a remand.”).
The conviction for failure to prevent a catastrophe under 18 Pa.C.S. §
3303 is reversed and the judgment of sentence of two year’s probation
imposed thereon is vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/7/2015
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