Com. v. Crater, Sr. D. ( 2017 )


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  • J   -S07021-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                         1   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    DANIEL EDWARD CRATER, SR.
    Appellant                        No. 1094 MDA 2016
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 5, 2013
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Perry County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-50-CR-0000495-2011
    CP-50-CR-0000500-2011
    CP-50-CR-0000501-2011
    BEFORE:     BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                                    FILED APRIL 06, 2017
    Daniel Edward Crater, Sr., appeals from the judgment of sentence,
    entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Perry County, following his
    conviction for two counts of sexual abuse of children.'              Upon review, we
    affirm.
    Three separate cases were opened against Crater involving allegations
    of child sexual abuse.      A   jury trial   in the case at docket number CR-501-
    2011 resulted in   a   guilty verdict for one count each of unlawful contact with
    a   minor,2 endangering the welfare of        a   child,3 corruption of minors,4 simple
    '   18 Pa.C.S. § 6312(b).
    2   18 Pa.C.S. § 6318(a).
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    assault,5 and harassment.6 In each of the cases at docket numbers CR-495-
    2011 and CR-501-2011, Crater entered         a   guilty plea to two counts of sexual
    abuse of children.
    Initially, Crater was sentenced to 12 to 24 months' incarceration for
    each of the four counts of sexual abuse of children, 12 to 24 months'
    incarceration for endangering the welfare of        a   child, and 16 to 60 months'
    incarceration for unlawful contact with      a   minor.   All sentences were to run
    consecutively to each other.      On December 13, 2013, Crater filed a motion
    to modify sentence, which was granted in part on March 10, 2014.                   The
    court reduced the sentence for unlawful contact with            a   minor to   1   to 9
    months' incarceration and the sentence for endangering the welfare of                 a
    child to   5   to 12 months' incarceration. The court denied Crater's request to
    run his sentences for sexual abuse of        a    child concurrently because there
    were four different victims. This appeal followed.'
    Crater raises the following issues for our review:
    (Footnote Continued)
    3   18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(a).
    4   18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a).
    5   18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a).
    6   18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)
    7 Crater's direct appeal rights were reinstated nunc pro tunc by the trial
    court after he filed a petition pursuant to the Post -Conviction Relief Act
    (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§9541-9546. See Order, 6/14/16
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    1. Didthe [h]onorable [s]entencing [c]ourt abuse its discretion
    by sentencing Mr. Crater to four (4) consecutive terms of 12-
    24 months of incarceration without considering mitigation,
    was said sentence manifestly unreasonable and excessive,
    and did the [c]ourt below not state a sufficient reason in
    support of imposition of consecutive sentences?
    2. Did the honorable sentencing court abuse its discretion by
    sentencing Mr. Crater to 1-9 months['] incarceration for the
    count of unlawful contact with a minor and a consecutive 5-12
    month term of incarceration for the count of endangering
    welfare of a child consecutive to one another, without
    considering mitigation, was said sentence manifestly
    unreasonable and excessive, and did the [c]ourt below not
    state a sufficient reason in support of imposition of
    consecutive sentences?
    Brief for Appellant, at 7.
    Although divided into two issues, Crater's appeal raises one claim:
    whether his sentence         is   excessive, particularly since he has been ordered to
    serve the sentence for each conviction consecutively.              This issue raises    a
    challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing and           is   not appealable as
    of right. Commonwealth v. Swope, 
    123 A.3d 333
    , 337 (Pa. Super. 2015).
    Rather, before we can address such            a   discretionary challenge, an appellant
    must satisfy     a   four-part test:
    (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
    Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
    preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
    sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720] ; (3) whether appellant's brief
    has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
    substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
    appropriate under the Sentencing Code.
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    Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 
    117 A.3d 763
    , 768                                  (Pa. Super. 2015) (en
    banc) (quoting Commonwealth v.                         Allen, 
    24 A.3d 1058
    , 1064          (Pa. Super.
    2011)).
    Instantly, Crater filed      a       post -sentence motion to modify his sentence
    raising his claim, followed by           a   timely notice of appeal to this Court. He has
    also included in his appellate brief                   a   concise statement of reasons relied
    upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of his
    sentence pursuant to Rule 2119(f). We must now determine whether Crater
    has raised a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
    appropriate under the Sentencing Code.                           In order to do so, an appellant
    must "advance       a   colorable argument that the sentencing court's actions
    were inconsistent with       a   specific provision of the Sentencing Code or violated
    a    fundamental norm of the sentencing process."                              Commonwealth v.
    Feucht, 
    955 A.2d 377
    , 383-84 (Pa. Super. 2008).
    Typically, "[a] court's exercise of discretion in imposing                        a   sentence
    concurrently or consecutively does not ordinarily raise                               a    substantial
    question."       Caldwell,       supra            at       769     (citing    Commonwealth               v.
    Mastromarino,       
    2 A.3d 581
    , 587 (Pa. Super. 2010)).                       However,      a   "critical
    distinction [exists] between         a       bald excessiveness claim based on imposition
    of consecutive sentences and an argument that articulates reasons why
    consecutive       sentences        in         a    particular        case     are     unreasonable."
    Commonwealth v. Dodge, 
    77 A.3d 1263
    , 1270                                      (Pa.   Super. 2013).
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    Indeed, the latter case "may raise    a   substantial question." 
    Id.
         (emphasis
    in   original).
    Here, however, Crater merely makes    a   bald claim that the court "failed
    to give appropriate weight to mitigating circumstances, such as Mr. Crater's
    lack of any criminal history, age, exemplary employment history, personal
    characteristics and life situation[.]" Brief for Appellant, at 15.     Crater does
    not articulate with any specificity in his Rule 2119(f) statement or elsewhere
    in his   brief what should have mitigated his sentence, nor does he state any
    fundamental norm that was violated during his sentencing process. Feucht,
    supra; Dodge, 
    supra.
            Accordingly, we find that Crater fails to raise       a
    substantial question necessitating our review of his sentence.8
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    8
    Even if Crater raised a substantial question, he would be entitled to no
    relief since, as the trial court notes, it reviewed a presentence investigation
    report. See Commonwealth v. Boyer, 
    856 A.2d 149
    , 154 (Pa. Super.
    2004) ("where the sentencing judge had the benefit of a presentence
    investigation report, it will be presumed that he or she was aware of the
    relevant information regarding the defendant's character and weighed those
    considerations along with mitigating statutory factors"). The court also
    provided its reasons on the record for sentencing Crater in the manner it did,
    which include, in particular, that two of Crater's victims are his children.
    See Trial Court Opinion, 9/7/16, at 4.
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    Judgment Entered.
    J    seph D. Seletyn,
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/6/2017
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