Com. v. Vargas, F. ( 2015 )

J-S38042-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
FRANKLIN VARGAS, :
:
Appellant : No. 190 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 14, 2012,
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County,
Criminal Division, at No. CP-09-CR-0001710-2012.
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BOWES and SHOGAN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED MAY 20, 2015
Appellant, Franklin Vargas, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County. We affirm.
The trial court summarized the factual history of this case as follows:
In December of 2010, the Thirty-Second Statewide
Investigating Grand Jury began hearing evidence concerning a
large scale heroin distribution ring operating in six counties
within the Commonwealth — Philadelphia, Chester, Delaware,
Montgomery, Perry and Bucks. The Grand Jury issued three
Presentments: Presentment No. 2, issued March 23, 2011,
Presentment No. 8, issued June 21, 2011 and Presentment No.
18, issued October 13, 2011. Those Presentments collectively
recommended the Attorney General arrest and prosecute 31
individuals, including [Appellant], identified as belonging to the
“Black Widow” heroin distribution ring, for violations of the
Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, 35 P.S. §
780-113(a), the Corrupt Organizations statute and other
offenses under the Crimes Code as a result of the widespread
dissemination of heroin stamped “Black Widow” in southeast
Pennsylvania.
J-S38042-14
Pedro Vega and Noel Vega distributed large quantities of
heroin throughout southeast Pennsylvania as members of the
“Black Widow” organization. Their supplier was Fausto Ezequiel
Valdez-Cordero, identified as the head of that organization.
[Appellant] acted as a “drug runner,” the person who
transported drugs and money between suppliers and purchasers,
for Fausto Ezequiel Valdez-Cordero. [Appellant] worked as a
“runner” for Valdez-Cordero for close to a two-month long period
in 2009. During that time, the Vega brothers were receiving
heroin deliveries two to three times per day. When their heroin
supply ran out, one of the Vega brothers would call Fausto
Ezequiel Valdez-Cordero. Fausto Ezequiel Valdez-Cordero would
then send [Appellant] to the Vega brothers with a new supply.
[Appellant] often met with other “Black Widow” members Jose
Matos or Jose Sanchez in order to resupply the Vega branch of
the distribution network. The heroin delivered by [Appellant]
was customarily supplied to the Vega brothers two “racks” at a
time; each rack would be wrapped in magazine paper with clear
tape and would be attached to one another. During this period
of time, [Appellant] utilized a white Toyota Corolla to complete
the deliveries. The Vegas either paid Fausto Ezequiel Valdez-
Cordero directly or gave the money to [Appellant] to deliver to
Fausto Ezequiel Valdez-Cordero, often confirming receipt of the
payment with Valdez-Cordero by telephone. The Vegas made a
profit of $3,000 to $6,000 per day.
After the summer of 2009, co-conspirator Saviel Mieses
Guzman replaced [Appellant] as the “runner” between Fausto
Ezequiel Valdez-Cordero and the Vega brothers and continued to
do so until his arrest in February of 2011. In mid-February of
2011, for approximately one week, [Appellant] again began
delivering heroin to the Vega brothers for Fausto Ezequiel
Valdez-Cordero. At that time, [Appellant] resided in a home that
was owned by Pedro Vega. [Appellant] utilized a black four-door
Chrysler with limousine tags to conduct this business. During
this period of time, the Vega brothers paid [Appellant] at the
time each supply of heroin was delivered. [Appellant’s]
participation in the drug deliveries was confirmed by police
surveillance. On February 23, 2011, law enforcement executed
a search warrant on [Appellant’s] residence[, 2424 N. Reese
Street in Philadelphia]. Inside the residence police found two
cellular phones and $7,660 in cash.
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Trial Court Opinion, 4/2/13, at 2-4 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
On May 23, 2012, Appellant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion seeking
to suppress the evidence found at 2424 N. Reese Street on the basis that
the search warrant was not supported by probable cause. The trial court
denied that motion.
Following a jury trial with co-defendant Darnell Ballard (“Ballard”),
Appellant was convicted of possession with intent to deliver a controlled
substance (“PWID”)-heroin, criminal conspiracy to deliver heroin, corrupt
organizations, and corrupt organizations-conspiracy. On December 14,
2012, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of incarceration of nine
to twenty-five years. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
[1.] Did the trial court err in granting the Commonwealth’s
motion for joinder at the start of trial?
[2.] Did the trial court erred [sic] in finding the affidavit of
probable cause established the requisite probable cause
necessary to search [Appellant’s] residence at 2424 North Reese
Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania?
[3.] Did the trial court err in [sic] when, during the trial, it
reversed its [sic] on a Motion in Limine ruling which precluded
the Commonwealth from introducing documentation which
identified [Appellant] as having various names?
Appellant’s Brief at 8.
Appellant first argues that the trial court’s joinder of the co-
defendants’ cases for trial was improper because the defenses were
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conflicting and the risk of jury confusion was great. Appellant’s Brief at 14.
Appellant asserts that separate conspiracies existed within the organization,
and the co-defendants were involved in separate conspiracies; thus,
Appellant argues that the co-defendants were not involved in the same
criminal activity. Id. at 16. Appellant also contends that the jury was not
able to separate the evidence because they were inundated with evidence
that supported the conclusion that “everyone was selling heroin.” Id. at 17.
Appellant maintains that he was prejudiced by being tried with co-defendant
Ballard1 because Ballard was the individual who ordered the supplies of
heroin, and that is the voice that the jury heard over and over again in the
courtroom. Id. at 17. Appellant asserts that because the evidence
established his mere presence during these deliveries, he was prejudiced by
being tried with the individual who consistently re-ordered the supplies of
heroin. Id.
We have stated the following regarding joinder:
Joinder and severance of separate indictments for trial is a
discretionary function of the trial court; consequently, the trial
court’s decision is subject to review for abuse of that discretion.
Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law, upon
facts and circumstances judicially before the court, after hearing
and due consideration. Consequently, an abuse of discretion
consists not merely of errors in judgment by the trial court, but
instead contemplates action unsupported by the evidence, at
1
We note that at times in his brief, Appellant incorrectly refers to his co-
defendant as “Bullard.” Appellant’s Brief at 15-17.
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odds with governing law, or arising from improper motives
personal to the judge.
Commonwealth v. Brookins, 10 A.3d 1251, 1255 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(internal citations and quotations omitted). Furthermore, Pa.R.Crim.P. 582
provides: “Defendants charged in separate indictments or informations may
be tried together if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or
transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an
offense or offenses.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 582(A)(2). Conversely, the rules permit
severance of charges of defendants already joined when it appears that a
defendant may be prejudiced by a joint trial. Pa.R.Crim.P. 583. Reading
these rules together, our Supreme Court established the following test for
severance matters:
Where the defendant moves to sever offenses not based on the
same act or transaction...the court must therefore determine:
[1] whether the evidence of each of the offenses would be
admissible in a separate trial for the other; [2] whether such
evidence is capable of separation by the jury so as to avoid
danger of confusion; and, if the answers to these inquiries are in
the affirmative, [3] whether the defendant will be unduly
prejudiced by the consolidation of offenses.
Commonwealth v. Collins, 703 A.2d 418, 422 (Pa. 1997). The prejudice
the defendant suffers due to the joinder must be greater than the general
prejudice any defendant suffers when the Commonwealth’s evidence links
him to a crime. Commonwealth v. Lauro, 819 A.2d 100, 107 (Pa. Super.
2003).
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The “prejudice” of which Rule [583] speaks is not simply
prejudice in the sense that appellant will be linked to the crimes
for which he is being prosecuted, for that sort of prejudice is
ostensibly the purpose of all Commonwealth evidence. The
prejudice of which Rule [583] speaks is, rather, that which would
occur if the evidence tended to convict [the] appellant only by
showing his propensity to commit crimes, or because the jury
was incapable of separating the evidence or could not avoid
cumulating the evidence. Additionally, the admission of relevant
evidence connecting a defendant to the crimes charged is a
natural consequence of a criminal trial, and it is not grounds for
severance by itself.
Id. (quoting Collins, 703 A.2d at 423 (internal citations omitted, emphasis
in original)).
In addressing joinder of trials of co-defendants, our Supreme Court
has stated the following:
Where . . . the crimes charged against each defendant arise out
of the same facts and virtually all of the same evidence is
applicable to both defendants, this Court, as well as the United
States Supreme Court, have indicated a preference to encourage
joint trials to conserve resources, promote judicial economy, and
enhance fairness to the defendants:
It would impair both the efficiency and the fairness
of the criminal justice system to require ... that
prosecutors bring separate proceedings, presenting
the same evidence again and again, requiring victims
and witnesses to repeat the inconvenience (and
sometimes trauma) of testifying, and randomly
favoring the last tried defendants who have the
advantage of knowing the prosecution’s case
beforehand. Joint trials generally serve the interests
of justice by avoiding inconsistent verdicts and
enabling more accurate assessment of relative
culpability.
Given this preference, the burden is on defendants to “show a
real potential for prejudice rather than mere speculation.”
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“Separate trials of co-defendants should be granted only where
the defenses of each are antagonistic to the point where such
individual differences are irreconcilable and a joint trial would
result in prejudice.” Although antagonistic defenses are a factor
for a trial court to consider in determining whether to grant a
motion to sever, “the fact that defendants have conflicting
versions of what took place, or the extent to which they
participated in it, is a reason for rather than against a joint trial
because the truth may be more easily determined if all are tried
together.”
Commonwealth v. Rainey, 928 A.2d 215, 231-232 (Pa. 2007) (internal
citations omitted).
Furthermore, “joint trials are preferred where conspiracy is charged.”
Commonwealth v. Housman, 986 A.2d 822, 834 (Pa. 2009). The statute
defining conspiracy specifically addresses the issue of joinder as follows:
(d) Joinder and venue in conspiracy prosecutions.--
(1) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (2) of this
subsection, two or more persons charged with
criminal conspiracy may be prosecuted jointly if:
(i) they are charged with conspiring with
one another; or
(ii) the conspiracies alleged, whether
they have the same or different parties,
are so related that they constitute
different aspects of a scheme of
organized criminal conduct.
18 Pa.C.S. § 903(d)(1).
In the case sub judice, the trial court concluded that joinder was
appropriate and provided the following explanation:
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The testimony of two members of this conspiracy, Pedro
and Noel Vega, established that [Appellant] physically delivered
heroin to the Vegas and other members of the “Black Widow”
heroin distribution ring while acting as “runner” for the head of
the “Black Widow” organization, Fausto Ezequiel Valdez-Cordero,
on an on-going basis in 2009 and again in February of 2011.
The evidence established that co-defendant Darnell
Ballard, in conjunction with family member Victor Ballard,
participated in the purchase of “Black Widow” heroin from Fausto
Gabriel Valdez-Cordero, identified as the number two member in
the “Black Widow” hierarchy, which the Ballards then sold in
Bucks County.
[Appellant] and [Ballard] were charged with entering into a
conspiracy with the same group of individuals. The goal of that
conspiracy was the large scale distribution of “Black Widow”
heroin for profit. The crimes charged against each defendant
therefore arose from the same series of acts or transactions.
Specifically, proof of the crimes charged against each defendant
required introduction of the same evidence regarding the
existence and operation of the “Black Widow” heroin distribution
ring, an organization wherein individuals have defined roles,
each designed to effectuate the organization[’]s illegal business
activities. Proof of the existence and nature of that organization
required evidence of extensive electronic surveillance, the
testimony of organization members and physical evidence,
including large amounts of heroin, packing materials, ink stamps
and cash, seized as a result of the execution of multiple search
warrants. The conspiracies alleged were so related that they
constituted different aspects of the same “scheme or organized
criminal conduct” and therefore were appropriately joined under
the joinder provisions of the Rules of Criminal Procedure and the
Conspiracy statute.
The fact that [Appellant] and [Ballard] did not personally
know one [another] does not alter this analysis. “If a person
guilty of conspiracy...knows that a person with whom he
conspires to commit a crime has conspired with another person
or persons to commit the same crime, he is guilty of conspiring
with such other person or persons, to commit such crime
whether or not he knows their identity.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(b).
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Finally, [Appellant] has failed to demonstrate that he was
prejudiced by the joinder. He is, therefore, not entitled to relief.
Commonwealth v. Brown, supra.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/2/13, at 5-7.
We agree. Here, Appellant has failed to establish that severance was
necessary. First, the evidence presented regarding charges against both
defendants related to their roles in the “Black Widow” heroin ring, and as
such, evidence of the offenses would be admissible at trial for the other. 2
Second, evidence presented at trial detailed the role each co-defendant
played in the organization; thus, separation of the evidence by the jury was
possible and the likelihood of jury confusion was minimal. As to the third
element, Appellant has failed to establish that he suffered such prejudice as
to require a separate trial. Collins, 703 A.2d at 422. Additionally, the
parties’ individual defenses were not antagonistic of each other’s defenses,
and their claims that they participated in the distribution ring to varying
degrees is not a sufficient basis on which to sever. Rainey, at 231-232.
Furthermore, the evidence presented at trial established that both
defendants were involved in conspiracies “so related that they constitute
2
Evidence of other crimes is admissible to demonstrate: (1) motive; (2)
intent; (3) absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme, plan or
design embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each
other that proof of one tends to prove the others; or (5) the identity of the
person charged with the commission of the crime on trial. Collins, 703 A.2d
at 422-423. Additionally, evidence of other crimes may be admitted where
such evidence is part of the history of the case and forms part of the natural
development of the facts. Id.
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different aspects of a scheme of organized criminal conduct.” 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 903(d)(1)(ii). Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in joining the co-defendants’ cases for trial.
Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in denying the
motion to suppress and concluding that the affidavit provided the requisite
probable cause supporting the issuance of a search warrant for 2424 North
Reese Street. Appellant’s Brief at 14. Appellant asserts that because the
affidavit makes no mention of drugs coming from, or the proceeds going to
2424 North Reese Street, that there are no facts upon which a neutral
authority could conclude that contraband would be found at that residence.
Id. at 19.
We review the trial court’s decision according to the following
standard:
Our standard of review of a denial of suppression is
whether the record supports the trial court’s factual findings and
whether the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are free from
error. Our scope of review is limited; we may consider only the
evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence for the
defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of
the record as a whole. Where the record supports the findings of
the suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may
reverse only if the court erred in reaching its legal conclusions
based upon the facts.
Commonwealth v. McRae, 5 A.3d 425, 429 (Pa. Super. 2010).
In Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649 (Pa. 2010), our Supreme
Court addressed the requirements for a valid search warrant:
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Article I, Section 8 and the Fourth Amendment each
require that search warrants be supported by probable cause.
“The linch-pin that has been developed to determine whether it
is appropriate to issue a search warrant is the test of probable
cause.” Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 586 A.2d
887, 899 (1991) (quoting Commonwealth v. Miller, 513 Pa.
118, 518 A.2d 1187, 1191 (1986)). “Probable cause exists
where the facts and circumstances within the affiant’s knowledge
and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution
in the belief that a search should be conducted.”
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 448 Pa. 42, 292 A.2d 352, 357
(1972).
In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76
L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the United States Supreme Court
established the “totality of the circumstances” test for
determining whether a request for a search warrant under the
Fourth Amendment is supported by probable cause. In
Commonwealth v. Gray, 509 Pa. 476, 503 A.2d 921 (1986),
this Court adopted the totality of the circumstances test for
purposes of making and reviewing probable cause
determinations under Article I, Section 8. In describing this test,
we stated:
Pursuant to the “totality of the circumstances” test
set forth by the United States Supreme Court in
Gates, the task of an issuing authority is simply to
make a practical, common-sense decision whether,
given all of the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis
of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay
information, there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place.... It is the duty of a court reviewing
an issuing authority’s probable cause determination
to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis
for concluding that probable cause existed. In so
doing, the reviewing court must accord deference to
the issuing authority’s probable cause determination,
and must view the information offered to establish
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probable cause in a common-sense, non-technical
manner.
***
[Further,] a reviewing court [is] not to conduct a de
novo review of the issuing authority’s probable cause
determination, but [is] simply to determine whether
or not there is substantial evidence in the record
supporting the decision to issue the warrant.
Commonwealth v. Torres, 564 Pa. 86, 764 A.2d 532, 537–38,
540 (2001).
Id. at 655. “In determining whether a search warrant is supported by
probable cause, appellate review is confined to the four corners of the
affidavit.” Commonwealth v. Galvin, 985 A.2d 783, 796 (Pa. 2009).
A review of the affidavit in support of the warrant reflects the following
factors. The affidavit consists of four pages outlining various drug
transactions occurring during the week of February 15, 2011, and on,
specifically, February 23, 2011. Commonwealth’s Exhibit CS-2, probable
cause affidavit, 2/23/11, at 3-6 (unnumbered pages). The affidavit
references the ongoing narcotics investigation of a heroin distribution ring
conducted by Noel Vega, Pedro Vega, Jose Sanchez and Jose Morales. Id. at
3. The investigating agents had information that the Vega brothers were
distributing the heroin utilizing the services of Jose Sanchez. Id. The
agents were also advised that the supplier of the racks of heroin to Jose
Sanchez would be a Hispanic male operating a dark-colored Chrysler 300M
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bearing limousine registration, referred to as “Dominican Taxicabs.” Id.
Additionally, the affidavit included the following statement:
At approximately 11:59 A.M. [on February 23, 2011],
Agents observed Sanchez enter the passenger side of a dark
colored Chrysler 300M bearing a Pennsylvania Registration
number LM-26290 at the corner of 6th Street and Somerset
Street. Agents followed the Chrysler around the block and Jose
Sanchez exited the Chrysler at the corner of Fairhill Street and
Somerset Street. Agents observed Jose Sanchez walk back to
2800 N. 5th Street and enter the location using a key. Roving
surveillance followed the dark colored Chrysler to the 2400 block
of N. Reese Street and observed the operator, described as a
Hispanic male, late 20’s, approximately 5’9”, bushy dark hair
with a long goatee, wearing a multi colored shirt and blue jeans
exit the vehicle and enter 2424 N. Reese Street. Agent Riley
conducted a property assessment that revealed the registered
owner of the property located at 2424 N. Reese Street is Noel
Vega.
Id. at 4.
Based on the above averments, we conclude that given the totality of
circumstances, the affidavit clearly established “there [was] a fair probability
that contraband or evidence of a crime [would] be found in” 2424 N. Reese
Street. Jones, 988 A.2d at 655. As noted in the affidavit, Jose Sanchez
was suspected of distributing heroin. The agents had information that the
driver of a dark-colored Chrysler 300M, bearing limousine registration, would
be delivering heroin to Jose Sanchez. On February 23, 2011, using
surveillance, the agents observed Sanchez enter a dark-colored Chrysler
300M bearing limousine registration. After the driver left the company of
Jose Sanchez, he entered 2424 N. Reese Street. Upon investigation, it was
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discovered that 2424 N. Reese Street was registered to Noel Vega, a
suspected participant in the heroin distribution ring. Thus, we agree with
the trial court’s conclusion that the warrant was supported by probable
cause. The trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress.
In his final claim, Appellant argues that the trial court erred during trial
when it reversed its previous ruling on a motion in limine precluding
documentation identifying Appellant as having various names.3 Appellant’s
Brief at 8. Although not clearly argued, Appellant seems to be asserting that
the prosecutor’s questioning of Appellant regarding Appellant’s multiple
names was a violation of the trial court’s ruling. Id. at 20. Appellant
maintains that trial counsel did not “open the door.” Id. Although Appellant
cites to what he defines as a series of questions by trial counsel, he does not
provide a citation to the record wherein that exchange is memorialized or
explain the relevance of this testimony in his claim. Id. at 19-20.
Appellant has failed to sufficiently develop this claim or cite to relevant
legal authority in support of it. Our rules of appellate procedure require an
appellant to support his or her argument with pertinent analysis, including
citation to and discussion of relevant authority and facts of record. Pa.R.A.P.
2119. This Court will not become counsel for an appellant and develop
arguments on an appellant’s behalf, Commonwealth v. Gould, 912 A.2d
3Appellant fails to identify the referenced trial court ruling or provide a
citation to the record wherein this ruling is reflected.
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869, 873 (Pa. Super. 2006), and waiver of an issue results when an
appellant fails to properly develop an issue or cite to legal authority to
support his contention in his appellate brief. Commonwealth v. Williams,
959 A.2d 1252, 1258 (Pa. Super. 2008). Additionally, it is not this Court’s
responsibility to comb through the record seeking the factual underpinnings
of a claim. Commonwealth v. Samuel, 102 A.3d 1001, 1005 (Pa. Super.
2014). When deficiencies in a brief hinder our ability to conduct meaningful
appellate review, we may dismiss the appeal entirely or find certain issues to
be waived. Id.; Pa.R.A.P. 2101. Because Appellant’s failure to properly
develop this issue hinders our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review,
we find this issue waived.
Even if we were to ignore the defects and attempt to address this
issue, however, we would conclude that it lacks merit. The trial court
provided the following analysis on this issue:
The Defendant next contends that [the trial] court erred in
allowing the Commonwealth to question the Defendant about
false identification found in the Defendant’s residence. The
Defendant further claims that the Commonwealth’s questioning
of the Defendant regarding his aliases went beyond what the
court had ruled admissible. On direct examination the
Defendant introduced employee identification cards and his
temporary certificate to operate a limousine. While explaining
the different names on those photo identifications, ie. Franklin
Pichardo, Franklin Vargas and Franklin Pichardo Vargas, the
Defendant testified that he “only [had] one name.” N.T. 6/5/12,
p. 128. Based upon this testimony, the Commonwealth sought
to introduce an official Pennsylvania identification card and
official drivers licenses issued to the Defendant in the name of
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Marciel Perez Delgado. The court ruled that the Defendant
opened the door to his use of an alias for purposes of
impeachment but ruled that the identification cards themselves
could not be used unless the Defendant denied that he used an
alias and a false date of birth on cross-examination. N.T.
6/5/12, p. 186. When asked on cross-examination if he used
the name Marciel Perez Delgado, the Defendant said that he did
and volunteered that he needed false identification in order to
purchase merchandise from a grocery store. He also
volunteered that he obtained a fake birth certificate to procure a
fake license. N.T. 6/5/12, p. 180. The court ruled that the
Defendant opened the door to the inquiry regarding the fake
identification cards. N.T. 6/5/12, pp. 180, 183-184.
The scope of cross-examination is within the discretion of
the trial court and the court’s decision will not be reversed
absent an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Britton, 380
A.2d 807, 810 (Pa.Super.1977) (citations omitted). In this case,
the Defendant clearly opened the door to his use of an alias by
volunteering to the jury that, “I only have one name.” He again
opened the door to the questioning regarding the multiple pieces
of false identification found in a wallet seized from his residence
when he volunteered information about obtaining false
identification, since those false documents were inconsistent with
the Defendant’s explanation for why they were needed.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/2/13, at 12-13 (footnotes omitted).
To the extent that the trial court has been able to surmise Appellant’s
argument, we conclude that its determination is supported by the evidence
of record and relevant legal authority. Thus, even if we were to address this
issue, we would conclude that the trial court did not err in permitting the
Commonwealth’s questioning of Appellant regarding his various names.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/20/2015
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