Com. v. McLoughlin, P. ( 2015 )

J. A34014/14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
PATRICK McLOUGHLIN, : No. 743 MDA 2014
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, April 1, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County
Criminal Division at No. CP-38-CR-0001088-2013
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
PATRICK McLOUGHLIN, : No. 969 MDA 2014
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, May 13, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County
Criminal Division at No. CP-38-CR-0001088-2013
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN AND STABILE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 20, 2015
Patrick McLoughlin appeals, pro se, from the judgment of sentence
imposed in the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County.
The facts, as aptly summarized by the trial court, are as follows:
DEFENDANT’s charges stem from an incident
that occurred overnight on Saturday, June 15, 2013
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in front of the residence located at 430 Locust Street
in Lebanon. Alane Steif (hereafter “STEIF”) is the
owner of the residence. Her boyfriend,
Lamont Stanley (hereafter “VICTIM”), was spending
the night at the residence while she was out of town.
(N.T. 6, 20). VICTIM’s vehicle -- a unique 2004
White Jaguar X-type -- was parked outside of the
residence overnight. (N.T. p. 6.) When VICTIM
returned to his car on Monday, June 17, he noticed
that someone had scratched the side of his vehicle
with a sharp object. (N.T. 6, 12).
As a result of prior vandalism, VICTIM and
STEIF installed two video cameras on the front of the
residence in January of 2013. (N.T. 14-15). The
video consists of two channels that correspond to the
two cameras in front of STEIF’s house. (N.T. 8).
The first channel shows two individuals “walking off”
past VICTIM’s vehicle on June 15, 2013 at
approximately 3:25 a.m. (N.T. 9). After they pass,
the vehicle shows scratches on its side caused by
“some sort of sharp object.” (N.T. 9). The second
channel shows a front view of the individuals
approaching the vehicle. (N.T. 8). The video is dark
and it is difficult to discern the facial characteristics
of the individuals in the video. However, the video
clearly depicts one of the men “keying” the victim’s
vehicle.
A Summary Hearing was held on April 1, 2014.
At the Hearing, VICTIM identified the two men as
DEFENDANT and his son, Alan McLoughlin. (N.T. 8).
VICTIM admitted that he had never actually met
DEFENDANT. (N.T. 10). However, he testified that
he was able to identify DEFENDANT because he had
seen DEFENDANT drive by him on numerous
occasions. (N.T. 11). More importantly,
DEFENDANT’s son, Alan McLoughlin, dated STEIF for
approximately six and a half years. (N.T. 11, 22).
VICTIM explained that STEIF had shown him pictures
of DEFENDANT in the past. (N.T. 11).
STEIF also identified DEFENDANT and his son
as the two individuals in the video. (N.T. 22, 26).
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She explained that she spent a significant amount of
time with DEFENDANT during her long relationship
with his son, Alan. (N.T. 22). She explained that
Alan lived with her at the 430 Locust Street
residence for a few years, and DEFENDANT visited
them several times a week. (N.T. 22).
STEIF testified that she was able to identify
DEFENDANT because he has a very distinct walk
resulting from various knee and toe injuries. (N.T.
23). From a side profile view, she could identify the
man in the video as DEFENDANT “from the nose, the
ears, the clothes that he wears, [and] the way he
rolled his shirt.” (N.T. 23-24). She explained that
he “has slightly larger ears,” (N.T. 25), and “he
always had a baseball cap on.” (N.T. 23-24). She
testified that the hat worn by the individual in the
video is consistent with the hat that DEFENDANT
frequently wore -- a black hat with the word
“Ireland” in green print. (N.T. 31, 44). She
proclaimed that she had “no doubt in [her] mind”
that DEFENDANT was the man in the surveillance
video. (N.T. 23-24). Similarly, she was able to
identify Alan because the second man in the video
moved “exactly the way Alan moves back and forth”
when he walks. (N.T. 26).
Prior to the June 15, 2013 incident, there was
some animosity between STEIF and DEFENDANT. At
some point prior to the incident, DEFENDANT filed a
civil action against STEIF for $20,000.00 worth of
renovations he made to the 430 Locust Street
property. (N.T. 14, 37). STEIF testified that she
was not aware of anyone else other than
DEFENDANT or his son Alan that would have a
motive to damage or destroy her property or the
property of her boyfriend. (N.T. 31).
DEFENDANT proclaimed his innocence
throughout the Hearing. He testified that he did not
recognize either of the men in the surveillance video,
and at the time of the vandalism, he was in his home
at 501 East Kline Avenue. (N.T. 38-39).
DEFENDANT explained that he is very sick, and
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suffers from leukemia, Archer’s Disease, and high
blood pressure. (N.T. 35). He explained that he
takes certain medication for his ailments that may
only be taken at night, and that he has not been
outside of his house at night after 9:00 p.m. for the
last year and a half. (N.T. 39). We note that
DEFENDANT’s residence is approximately one mile
from STEIF’s home. (N.T. 41). Further, there is a
bar located around the corner from STEIF’s
residence. (N.T. 43).
DEFENDANT was initially charged with
misdemeanor Criminal Mischief on June 24, 2013.
We conducted a bench trial on this charge on April 1,
2014. Following testimony, we determined that
DEFENDANT was in fact the culprit who damaged the
victim’s vehicle. However, because the
Commonwealth did not establish the monetary
extent of VICTIM’s damages, this Court found
DEFENDANT guilty of the summary offense of
Criminal Mischief. During sentencing, VICTIM
presented a claim for restitution in the amount of
$1,598.22. Since this value far exceeded the
statutory limit for the grading of Criminal Mischief as
a Summary Offense, we concluded that the
maximum amount to which VICTIM was entitled to
receive for the summary offense was the statutory
limit of $500.00. Immediately following trial, we
sentenced DEFENDANT to pay the costs of
prosecution, a fine of $100.00, and restitution in the
amount of $500.00. We advised the Commonwealth
that it could file a Motion for Modification of Sentence
within 10 days if it could provide case law supporting
its claim that VICTIM should be awarded $1,598.22
in restitution.
The Commonwealth filed their Motion for
Modification of Sentence on April 10, 2014, citing the
case of Commonwealth v. Wright, 722 A.2d 157(Pa. Superior Ct. 1998). We issued a Rule to Show
Cause upon DEFENDANT giving him an opportunity
to oppose the Commonwealth’s request for sentence
modification. DEFENDANT did not do so.
Accordingly, we granted the Commonwealth’s Motion
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on May 12, 2014 and awarded restitution to VICTIM
in the amount of $1,598.22. In the interim,
DEFENDANT appealed to the Superior Court on
April 30, 2014. DEFENDANT filed a pro se
Statement of Matters Complained Of on Appeal on
May 12, 2014, and he filed amended versions on
May 21, 2014 and May 28, 2014. We author this
Opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925 to address
DEFENDANT’s appeal and explain our reasons for
modifying DEFENDANT’s sentence.
Trial court opinion, 6/23/14 at 3-7.
On May 20, 2014, the trial court issued an order scheduling a Grazier1
hearing. On May 21, 2014, appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal from
the May 13, 2014 order. (Docket #27.) Appellant filed an “amended
concise statement of matters complained of on appeal,” and then on May 28,
2014, he filed a pro se “supplement to defendant’s amended concise
statement of matters complained of on appeal.” (Docket #29, 30.) On May
28, 2014, a Grazier hearing was held.
At the outset, we note that appellant’s appeal filed on April 30, 2014,
was premature. The Commonwealth had filed a motion for reconsideration,
which had not been disposed of by the trial court. Because the entry of the
order disposing of the Commonwealth’s motion to modify sentence then
becomes the triggering device for the defendant’s notice of appeal,
appellant’s April 30, 2014 notice of appeal from the April 1, 2014 judgment
of sentence was premature. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720, Comment. Additionally,
1
Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).
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appellant was acting pro se and without the knowledge of his counsel who
had not yet been granted permission to withdraw. Thus, we dismiss the
appeal filed at No. 743 MDA 2014.
We now turn to the appeal properly filed from the May 13, 2014
amended judgment of sentence. Appellant presents the following issues for
our review:
1. Whether a poor quality, blurry surveillance
video of an unrecognizable person (who was,
in fact, not appellant) committing an act of
vandalism, along with other evidence
disproved by physical facts, is insufficient to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
appellant was guilty of criminal mischief[?]
2. Whether the verdict was against the weight of
the evidence where the surveillance video
purported to tie defendant to the crime, in fact,
showed someone else committing the
vandalism[?]
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion
and denied Appellant Due Process by basing its
finding of guilt on wrongly assumed facts that
were not introduced at trial[?]
4. Whether appellant was denied his
Constitutional right to a jury trial when he was
tried for a second-degree misdemeanor and
did not voluntarily or knowingly waive his right
to a jury trial pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 620[?]
5. Whether the Commonwealth attorney
committed gross prosecutorial misconduct and
overreaching when he intentionally denied
Appellant his Constitutional right to a jury trial
by dropping the misdemeanor charge, securing
a bench-trial based on the lesser, summary
charge, and then proceeding to try defendant
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on the supposedly-dropped misdemeanor
charge and whether retrying Appellant in that
situation would violate Double Jeopardy?
6. Whether the trial court erred by admitting and
considering as evidence a private surveillance
video that was not properly authenticated[?]
7. Whether the trial court imposed an illegal
sentence that was not supported by the
evidence[?]
8. Whether the trial court failed to adhere to
statutory sentencing requirements when it
resentenced Appellant without his knowledge
or presence[?]
9. Whether appellant’s trial counsel was
ineffective in the following respects:
a. Counsel did not interview or call
witnesses who could have testified
(1) that Appellant did not own a
hat or clothes like those worn by
the man in the video and (2) that
the man in the video was not
Appellant.
b. Counsel did not object to the
admissibility of the video, which
was not properly authenticated.
c. Counsel did not inform Appellant,
or object, when the Commonwealth
dropped the misdemeanor charge,
requested a bench trial, asserted
that Appellant no longer had a
right to a jury trial, and then tried
Appellant on the misdemeanor
charge.
d. Counsel did not inform the trial
court that Appellant requested a
jury trial or request that Appellant
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be colloquyed [sic]. He did not
even inform Appellant that he was
entitled to a jury trial since the trial
was on the misdemeanor charge.
e. Counsel failed to request that
Judge Charles recuse himself after
Appellant informed counsel that
Judge Charles was biased against
him, based on earlier experiences
with the Judge.
f. Counsel did not submit for the
Court’s consideration numerous
character letters in his possession.
g. Counsel did not challenge
Appellant’s conviction as against
the weight of the evidence even
though the video showed someone
other than Appellant committing
the crime.
h. Counsel did not notify Appellant
that the Commonwealth had filed a
notice to modify sentence, or that
the Court had granted a “Motion
for Rule to Show Cause” and
ordered counsel to respond to the
Commonwealth’s motion by May 5,
2014.
i. Counsel lied to Appellant,
representing that he would file an
answer to the Commonwealth’s
Motion to Modify, and then,
inexplicably, never filed one. With
no answer on Appellant’s behalf,
the Court granted the
Commonwealth’s Motion to Modify
Sentence in response to a
Commonwealth “Motion to Make
Rule Absolute.”
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j. Counsel failed to object to or
preserve the issues raised by
Appellant for the first time on
appeal.
Appellant’s brief at 6-10.
Appellant’s first two issues go to the weight of the evidence. We find
this challenge waived for failure to raise it before the trial court, a
mandatory requisite to preserve a weight of the evidence challenge for
appellate review. Pa.R.Crim.P. 607; Commonwealth v. McCall, 911 A.2d
992 (Pa.Super. 2006). The docket bears no notation showing that appellant
filed a post-sentence motion, and a review of the certified record discloses
no post-sentence motion filed by appellant raising a weight of the evidence
challenge. Furthermore, our review of the notes of testimony reveals that
no such motion was made orally after the verdict was rendered. Therefore,
this issue has been waived.
To the extent that appellant presents a sufficiency of the evidence
claim, we find that no relief is due. There is sufficient evidence to sustain a
conviction when the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth
as verdict-winner, are sufficient to enable the fact-finder to conclude that
the Commonwealth established all of the elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Markman, 916 A.2d 586, 597 (Pa.
2007). The Commonwealth may sustain its burden “by means of wholly
circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 598. Further, we note that the entire trial
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record is evaluated and all evidence received against the defendant is
considered, being cognizant that the trier of fact is free to believe all, part,
or none of the evidence. Id.
A person commits criminal mischief when he “intentionally damages
real or personal property of another[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3304(a)(5). This
court has noted that pecuniary damage is not an element of Section 3304;
rather, it is a part of the grading of the offense. Hence, pecuniary loss need
not be shown where criminal mischief is charged as a summary offense.
Appellant argues that he was not the person involved in the
commission of the crime. The trial court, however, concluded he was guilty
of criminal mischief based on the surveillance video of the person damaging
the victim’s car. The court had an opportunity to witness appellant’s distinct
walk and compare his facial profile on the witness stand to the profile on the
video. Additionally, Steif identified appellant as the person in the
surveillance video. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, was sufficient to sustain appellant’s conviction for criminal
mischief beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant next argues that he was denied a constitutional right to a
trial by jury. However, there is no right to a trial by jury. See
Commonwealth v. McMullen, 961 A.2d 842 (Pa. 2008). “The right to a
jury trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article 1, Sections 6, 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution applies when a
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criminal defendant faces a sentence of imprisonment exceeding six months.”
Id. Appellant was charged with a summary offense, the maximum
punishment for which is 90 days’ incarceration. Therefore, we reject
appellant’s argument.
We likewise find no merit to appellant’s unfounded claim that the
district attorney committed gross prosecutorial misconduct when he
amended the charge from a misdemeanor to a summary charge.
Appellant’s sixth issue avers that the surveillance video should not
have been admitted into evidence as it was not properly authenticated. We
agree with the Commonwealth that this claim is waived for failure to object
to the video’s admission during trial. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); Commonwealth v.
Blassingale, 581 A.2d 183, 191 (Pa.Super. 1990).
In his seventh claim, appellant argues that the sentence imposed was
illegal and not supported by evidence. (Appellant’s brief at 59.) In the
context of criminal proceedings, an order of “restitution is not simply an
award of damages, but, rather, a sentence.” Commonwealth v. C.L., 963
A.2d 489, 494 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted). An appeal from an order
of restitution based upon a claim that a restitution order is unsupported by
the record challenges the legality, rather than the discretionary aspects, of
sentencing. Commonwealth v. Redman, 864 A.2d 566, 569 (Pa.Super.
2004), appeal denied, 875 A.2d 1074 (Pa. 2005). “[T]he determination as
to whether the trial court imposed an illegal sentence is a question of law;
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our standard of review in cases dealing with questions of law is plenary.”
Commonwealth v. Hughes, 986 A.2d 159, 160 (Pa.Super. 2009) (citation
omitted).
Both the Sentencing Code and Crimes Code contain provisions that
govern the imposition of restitution. The Sentencing Code provides that “the
court shall order the defendant to compensate the victim of his criminal
conduct for the damage or injury that he sustained.” 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9721(c). The statute governing restitution for injuries to person or
property, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106, provides that:
(a) General rule.--Upon conviction for any crime
wherein property has been stolen, converted or
otherwise unlawfully obtained, or its value
substantially decreased as a direct result of the
crime, or wherein the victim suffered personal
injury directly resulting from the crime, the
offender shall be sentenced to make restitution
in addition to the punishment prescribed
therefor.
....
(2) At the time of sentencing the court
shall specify the amount and
method of restitution. In
determining the amount and
method of restitution, the court:
(i) Shall consider the extent
of injury suffered by the
victim, the victim’s
request for restitution as
presented to the district
attorney in accordance
with paragraph (4) and
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such other matters as it
deems appropriate.
....
(4) (i) It shall be the
responsibility of the
district attorneys of the
respective counties to
make a recommendation
to the court at or prior to
the time of sentencing as
to the amount of
restitution to be ordered.
This recommendation
shall be based upon
information solicited by
the district attorney and
received from the victim.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106.
When fashioning an order of restitution, the lower
court must ensure that the record contains the
factual basis for the appropriate amount of
restitution. Commonwealth v. Pleger, 934 A.2d
715, 720 (Pa.Super.2007). The dollar value of the
injury suffered by the victim as a result of the crime
assists the court in calculating the appropriate
amount of restitution. Id. The amount of the
restitution award may not be excessive or
speculative. Commonwealth v. Rush, 909 A.2d
805, 810 (Pa.Super.2006), reargument denied.
Commonwealth v. Atanasio, 997 A.2d 1181, 1183 (Pa.Super. 2010).
According to appellant, the trial court ordered him to pay $1,598.22
based on an “unsigned repair estimate the victim provided to the
prosecution.” (Appellant’s brief at 60.) Appellant argues there was no
evidence as to the extent of the June 15th damage to the vehicle, and he
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points out that the victim acknowledged this was not the first time the
vehicle was vandalized; thus, appellant claims there was no representation
that this estimate provided only covered damage done to the vehicle on
June 15th. (Id. at 60-63.)
We disagree. It is clear from the sentencing hearing transcripts that
the court’s sentence of restitution was not speculative and finds support in
the record. The figure was obtained by the testimony of the victim, and
despite appellant’s claim to the contrary, we glean nothing speculative about
the trial court’s calculation. Appellant fails to proffer any authority which
would preclude the trial court from relying solely on the victim’s calculation
of loss where, as in the case before us, the trial court deemed such
testimony credible. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err
in the imposition of restitution.
Finally, appellant raises numerous issues regarding the ineffective
assistance of trial counsel.2 However, appellant did not preserve for
purposes of Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
by raising the claims in the court below. Thus, these issues have been
waived.
2
We find that appellant’s claim concerning whether the trial court violated
Pa.R.Crim.P. 602 when it modified the restitution amount without his
knowledge or an opportunity to be heard is belied by the record. It is also
actually raised as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; in support of
this issue, appellant avers his attorney did not inform him of the matter and
“lied” to him. (Appellant’s brief at 64-65.)
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Furthermore, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are generally
deferred to collateral review proceedings, with the exception of certain
circumstances not present in the instant case. See Commonwealth v.
Arrington, 86 A.3d 831 (Pa. 2014). To be eligible for such relief under the
Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), a petitioner must be currently serving a
sentence of imprisonment, probation, or parole. 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9543(a)(1)(i). As appellant is appealing a summary conviction, for which
he was sentenced to pay restitution, we find that he is not eligible for relief
under the PCRA. In Commonwealth v. Straub, 936 A.2d 1081 (Pa.Super.
2007), appeal denied, 963 A.2d 470 (Pa. 2009), we held that a defendant
convicted of a summary offense and not incarcerated or placed on probation
is not entitled to litigate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct
appeal even though he may not be eligible for PCRA relief. Id. at 1083. The
Straub court stated that:
In light of [Commonwealth v. O’Berg, 880 A.2d
597 (Pa. 2005)] majority’s express disapproval of
the jurisprudential “short sentence” exception to
[Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa.
2002)] and particularly in light of Justice Castille’s
cogent, thoughtful and well-reasoned concurring
opinion in O’Berg, we conclude that, in the case at
bar, Appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel may not be reviewed on direct appeal before
this Court.
Id. at 1083-1084. Consequently, the law does not provide appellant with an
avenue to pursue his ineffective assistance of summary trial counsel claims.
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See Commonwealth v. Reigel, 75 A.2d 1284, 1288-1289 (Pa.Super.
2013).
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/20/2015
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