Com. v. Goodson, N. ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
NATHAN DEWAYNE GOODSON, :
:
Appellant : No. 487 MDA 2018
Appeal from the PCRA Order February 16, 2018
in the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0006103-2015
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED DECEMBER 12, 2018
Nathan Dewayne Goodson (“Goodson”) appeals from the Order denying
his first Petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act.1 We
affirm.
On March 2, 2016, Goodson pled guilty to failure to register as a sex
offender, as required under Pennsylvania’s Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (“SORNA”),2 in exchange for a sentence of three and one-half
to seven years in prison. Goodson filed no direct appeal from his judgment of
sentence.
On September 26, 2017, Goodson filed the within Petition, asserting
that pursuant to our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz,
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1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
2 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.41
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164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), retroactive application of SORNA to his conviction
violated the ex post facto clauses of the Pennsylvania and United States
Constitutions. After a hearing, the PCRA court dismissed Goodson’s Petition
as untimely filed. Goodson subsequently filed a timely Notice of Appeal,
followed by a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of matters
complained of on appeal.
Goodson presents the following claim for our review:
Whether Act 10 of 2018 can be applied against [] Goodson where
the applicable portion, Subchapter I, is punitive and therefore
cannot be imposed retroactively under the reasoning of [] Muniz,
leaving [Goodson] with no duty to register as a sex offender; and
whether, in the alternative, Subchapter I requires only a ten-year
period of registration[?]
Brief for Appellant at 4.
In reviewing an order denying PCRA relief, “we examine whether the
PCRA court’s determination is supported by the record and free of legal error.”
Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 114 A.3d 401, 409 (Pa. 2015) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
Before addressing Goodson’s claim, we first must ascertain whether
Goodson timely filed his PCRA Petition. “The PCRA’s timeliness requirements
are jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly construed; courts may not
address the merits of the issues raised in a petition if it is not timely filed.”
Commonwealth v. Leggett, 16 A.3d 1144, 1145 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation
omitted).
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Any PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date that the
defendant’s judgment of sentence becomes final. Id. at 1146. “A judgment
becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review
in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).
In the instant case, Goodson filed no direct appeal of his March 2, 2016
judgment of sentence. As a result, his sentence became final 30 days later,
on April 1, 2016. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Under the PCRA’s timeliness
provision, Goodson was required to file any petition for relief on or before
Monday, April 3, 2017.3 Goodson did not file the instant PCRA Petition until
September 26, 2017. Thus, Goodson’s PCRA Petition is facially untimely.
The PCRA’s jurisdictional time bar can be overcome only by satisfaction
of one of the three statutory exceptions codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Commonwealth v. Spotz, 171 A.3d 675, 678 (Pa.
2017). However, “[a]ny petition invoking an exception … shall be filed within
60 days of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545(b)(2). The PCRA petitioner bears the burden of proving the
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3See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (stating that “[w]henever the last day of any such
period shall fall on Saturday or Sunday, or on any day made a legal holiday
by the laws of this Commonwealth or of the United States, such day shall be
omitted from the computation.”).
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applicability of one of the exceptions. Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 65 A.3d
339, 346 (Pa. 2013).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court filed its decision in Muniz on July 19,
2017. Thus, Goodson was required to file his PCRA petition, based upon the
Supreme Court’s decision in Muniz, on or before Monday, September 17,
2017.4 Goodson filed the instant Petition on September 26, 2017.
Consequently, Goodson cannot invoke a timeliness exception based upon the
decision in Muniz. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).
Even if Goodson had filed his Petition within 60 days of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Muniz, he has failed to plead and prove the newly-
recognized constitutional right exception set forth at subsection (iii). As our
Supreme Court has explained, the exception set forth at subsection (iii) has
two requirements:
First, it provides that the right asserted is a constitutional right
that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
[the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] after the time provided in this
section. Second, it provides that the right “has been held” by
“that court” to apply retroactively. Thus, a petitioner must
prove that there is a “new” constitutional right and that the
right “has been held” by that court to apply retroactively.
The language “has been held” is in the past tense. These words
mean that the action has already occurred, i.e., “that court” has
already held the new constitutional right to be retroactive to cases
on collateral review. By employing the past tense in writing this
provision, the legislature clearly intended that the right was
already recognized at the time the petition was filed.
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4 The 60th day fell on Sunday, September 16, 2017. Therefore, Goodson was
required to file his Petition by Monday, September 17, 2017. See 1 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 1908.
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Spotz, 171 A.3d at 679 (citation omitted, emphasis added).
This Court has previously recognized that “Muniz created a substantive
rule that retroactively applies in the collateral context.” Commonwealth v.
Rivera-Figueroa, 174 A.3d 674, 678 (Pa. Super. 2017). However, because
Goodson’s PCRA Petition is facially untimely (unlike the timely filed first
petition at issue in Rivera-Figueroa), he must demonstrate that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that Muniz applies retroactively in
order to satisfy Section 9545(b)(1)(iii). See Commonwealth v. Murphy,
180 A.3d 402, 405-06 (Pa. Super. 2018) (recognizing that to invoke the
timeliness exception at subsection (iii), the petitioner must demonstrate that
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that Muniz applies retroactively).
To date, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not expressly held that Muniz
applies retroactively. Consequently, Goodson cannot rely on Muniz to meet
that timeliness exception.5 See id.Because Goodson failed to timely file his PCRA Petition, and because he
has not demonstrated an exception to the PCRA’s timeliness requirement, we
affirm the Order of the PCRA court.
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5 Should the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressly hold that Muniz applies
retroactively, Goodson may again petition for PCRA relief within 60 days of
that decision.
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Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/12/2018
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