Com. v. Diaz, C. ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
CYPRIAN DIAZ
Appellant No. 1132 EDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order March 11, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0704571-2003
BEFORE: BOWES AND MOULTON, JJ., AND STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 22, 2017
Cyprian Diaz appeals from the March 11, 2016 order denying him
PCRA relief in this 2003 case. The appeal concerns whether Appellant’s
request for relief was properly treated as a petition for relief under the
PCRA. We affirm.
After a bench trial, Appellant was found guilty of first degree homicide
and related offenses. The Commonwealth established that Appellant, while
an adult, shot and killed his former wife and her husband. Appellant
unsuccessfully pursued relief on direct appeal. Commonwealth v. Diaz,
927 A.2d 649 (Pa.Super. 2007) (unpublished memorandum). Appellant was
granted leave to file a Petition for Allowance of Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc, which
was ultimately denied by our Supreme Court on February 12, 2010.
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Commonwealth v. Diaz, 989 A.2d 914 (Pa. 2010). Appellant also pursued
PCRA relief, which was denied by the PCRA court and affirmed on appeal by
this Court. Commonwealth v. Diaz, 96 A.3d 1079 (Pa.Super. 2014). He
filed for discretionary review with our Supreme Court, which was denied on
May 15, 2014. Commonwealth v. Diaz, 63 EAL 2014 (Pa. 2014)
(unpublished in Atlantic Reporter).
On December 11, 2015, Appellant filed the instant petition, styled as a
request for habeas corpus relief. On February 8, 2016, the trial court
determined that the petition must be treated as a request for relief under
the PCRA, and, since Appellant failed to plead and prove an exception to the
one-year time bar, issued a notice of intent to dismiss informing him of
those procedural defects. On February 26, 2016, Appellant replied to the
notice, again averring that his request for relief was not cognizable under
the PCRA. The court thereafter denied the petition on March 11, 2016. This
appeal followed. Appellant raises the following claims for our review:
A. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing
Appellant's petition for writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Subjiciendum
where the verdict announced by the court of guilty on the first
degree murder offense was in error in that the court did not
have jurisdiction of the matter, where the criminal information
filed in this action w[as] fatally defective since i[t] failed to recite
all of the essential elements of the offense and failed to inform
Appellant of the precise charge he was required to defend
against at trial?
B. Whether Appellant is illegally confined based on the verdict
and sentence being vitiated and non-existent as a result of the
fatally defective criminal information and eliminates all questions
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of w[ai]ver, timeliness and due diligence as bars to the relief
sought?
Appellant’s brief at 3.
Our task is to determine if the court properly treated this petition as a
request for relief under the PCRA. This Court's “standard of review of the
denial of a PCRA petition is limited to examining whether the evidence of
record supports the court's determination and whether its decision is free of
legal error.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 121 A.3d 1049, 1052 (Pa.Super.
2015). Whether the present claim is cognizable under the PCRA is a matter
of law subject to de novo review, not an abuse of discretion as maintained
by Appellant. The following principles inform our determination of this legal
question.
It is well-settled that the PCRA is intended to be the sole means
of achieving post-conviction relief. Unless the PCRA could not
provide for a potential remedy, the PCRA statute subsumes the
writ of habeas corpus. Issues that are cognizable under the
PCRA must be raised in a timely PCRA petition and cannot be
raised in a habeas corpus petition. Phrased differently, a
defendant cannot escape the PCRA time-bar by titling his
petition or motion as a writ of habeas corpus.
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 465–66 (Pa.Super. 2013)
(citations and footnote omitted).
Herein, Appellant alleges that the claim raised is not cognizable under
the PCRA because he is illegally confined. He reaches this conclusion by
arguing that 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102, which provides the applicable sentences for
homicide, violates due process and is void for vagueness because it does not
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directly state that the punishment of life imprisonment is ineligible for
parole. 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(a)(1) (“[A] person who has been convicted of a
murder of the first degree . . . shall be sentenced to death or to a term of
life imprisonment”); 61 Pa.C.S. § 6137(a)(1) (“The board may . . . release
on parole any inmate . . . except an inmate condemned to death or serving
life imprisonment[.]”). Additionally, Appellant claims that the criminal
information simply charged him with homicide generally, and did not clearly
specify the various elements of first degree homicide. Appellant avers that
these defects violated his due process right to fair notice and as a result
divested the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. Hence, his conviction
was illegal, and, in turn, so is his confinement.
The court properly treated this request for relief as a PCRA petition.
Issues that may be brought under the PCRA must be brought under the
PCRA. The PCRA specifically states that a claim that “the conviction or
sentence resulted from . . . [a] proceeding in a tribunal without jurisdiction”
is cognizable. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(viii). Due process claims are
similarly cognizable under the PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(i).
Additionally, the salient facts necessary to forward that claim were clearly
known during the time period in which he was permitted to seek PCRA relief.
See Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 900 A.2d 407 (Pa.Super. 2006)
(rejecting untimely PCRA claim that trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction; the facts upon which the claim is predicated were known and
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thus the claim was not subject to any exception). Hence, while Appellant
has failed to plead and prove an exception to the time-bar, he could not
have done so in any event.
Additionally, while the PCRA court properly concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction to address the substance of his claim, we note that subject
matter jurisdiction simply requires “that the court be competent to hear the
case and that the defendant be provided with a ‘formal and specific
accusation of the crimes charged.’” Commonwealth v. Hatchin, 709 A.2d
405, 408 (Pa.Super. 1998) (quoting Commonwealth v. Little, 314 A.2d
270, 273 (Pa. 1974)). Both requirements were met. An information need
not specify a particular degree of murder. Commonwealth v. Chambers,
852 A.2d 1197 (Pa.Super. 2004). Assuming arguendo that a citizen must be
informed of parole eligibility as a matter of due process, the fact that parole
eligibility is codified elsewhere constitutes adequate notice. See
Commonwealth v. Bell, 645 A.2d 211 (Pa. 1994) (rejecting due process
claim that mandatory minimum statute is unconstitutionally vague because
it failed to expressly provide a maximum, as “one can be reasonably implied
when . . . read together” with other pertinent statutes).
Accordingly, the PCRA court properly concluded that the instant
petition is cognizable under the PCRA and that it lacked jurisdiction. Its
decision is free of legal error and we affirm.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/22/2017
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