Com. v. Linnen, P. ( 2019 )


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  • J-S76005-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
    OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    PARRISH LINNEN,
    Appellant                 No. 1650 WDA 2017
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 17, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0013602-2013
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                   FILED FEBRUARY 6, 2019
    Appellant, Parrish Linnen, appeals from the judgment of sentence of an
    aggregate term of 25 to 50 years’ incarceration, imposed after he was
    convicted of two counts of criminal attempt to commit homicide, criminal
    conspiracy to commit homicide, and two counts of recklessly endangering
    another person. Appellant solely challenges the discretionary aspects of his
    sentence on appeal. After careful review, we affirm.
    We need not reiterate the trial court’s detailed summation of the facts
    and procedural history of this case. See Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 7/16/18,
    at 1-4. Instead, we only note that Appellant was convicted of the above-
    stated offenses and, on April 6, 2016, he was sentenced to the aggregate term
    
    mentioned supra
    . He filed a timely direct appeal, and this Court vacated his
    original sentence and remanded for resentencing. See Commonwealth v.
    J-S76005-18
    Linnen, 
    175 A.3d 358
    (Pa. Super. filed July 6, 2017) (unpublished
    memorandum) (concluding that Appellant should not have been sentenced for
    both the inchoate crimes of criminal attempt homicide and criminal conspiracy
    related to the attempted homicides).
    On remand, the trial court imposed a term of 15 to 30 years’
    incarceration for one of Appellant’s attempted homicide convictions, and a
    consecutive term of 10 to 20 years’ incarceration for the other.           Thus,
    Appellant received the same aggregate sentence of 25 to 50 years’
    incarceration that the court had originally imposed. Notably, Appellant did not
    file a post-sentence motion challenging his new sentence.
    Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and he also timely complied
    with the court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, preserving one
    issue for our review:
    a. The trial court abused its discretion in sentencing when it
    sentenced [Appellant] to consecutive terms of incarceration.
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 11/15/17, at 1. The trial court filed its Rule
    1925(a) opinion addressing this claim on July 16, 2018.
    Now, in his brief to this Court, Appellant states his issue as follows:
    1. The trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced
    Appellant to consecutive terms of incarceration resulting in a
    sentence of 25 — 50 years[’] incarceration[,] which is
    manifestly excessive.
    Appellant’s Brief at 5.
    Initially, Appellant failed to raise this claim in a post-sentence motion,
    and he does not point to where in the record of the resentencing hearing he
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    J-S76005-18
    preserved it for review. Consequently, it is waived. See Commonwealth v.
    Bromley, 
    862 A.2d 598
    , 603 (Pa. Super. 2004) (“It is well settled that an
    [a]ppellant’s challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence is waived
    if the [a]ppellant has not filed a post-sentence motion challenging the
    discretionary aspects with the sentencing court.”) (citations omitted).
    Additionally, while the issue Appellant sets forth in his “Statement of the
    Questions Involved” section of his appellate brief essentially mirrors that
    preserved in his Rule 1925(b) statement, his “Argument” section does not
    align with this claim. Specifically, rather than attacking the court’s imposition
    of consecutive sentences, “Appellant contends that the trial court committed
    reversible error when it focused solely on the nature of the offense and did
    not give any consideration to the rehabilitative needs of Appellant, his lack of
    criminal history, etc.”   Appellant’s Brief at 17.     At another point in his
    argument, Appellant maintains that the court failed to consider the mitigating
    factors of his “family … [or his] ability to contribute to society by maintaining
    full-time employment, purchasing a home and remaining in a committed
    relationship.” 
    Id. at 10.
    Appellant did not set forth these claims in his Rule
    1925(b) statement and, therefore, they were not addressed by the trial court
    in its opinion. Consequently, we would deem Appellant’s arguments waived
    on this basis, as well. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in
    the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this
    paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”).
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    J-S76005-18
    Finally, even if not waived, we would not review Appellant’s argument
    because the Commonwealth has objected to the inadequacy of his Pa.R.A.P.
    2119(f) statement. That statement reads, in its entirety and verbatim, as
    follows:
    Commonwealth v. Goggins, 
    748 A.2d 721
    (Pa. Super. [] 2000)
    requires that the Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) Statement for purposes of 42
    Pa.C.S. § 9781(b) must specify where the sentence falls in relation
    to the sentencing guidelines, what particular provision of the
    sentencing code the sentence violates, what fundamental norm
    the sentence violates, and the manner in which it violates that
    norm. Based on the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing
    Guideline Sentence Forms used in this matter, the ranges of
    sentences were as follows.
    Appellant’s Brief at 9.
    As the Commonwealth points out, Appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement
    “ends in what appears to be an incomplete thought.” Commonwealth’s Brief
    at 13. The Commonwealth argues that, “this statement is insufficient because
    [A]ppellant has not even alleged that the sentence imposed was improper, let
    alone how it violated any fundamental norm.”           
    Id. Accordingly, the
    Commonwealth insists that Appellant has waived his sentencing claim based
    on his failure to file a statement that complies, in any regard, with Rule
    2119(f). We are compelled to agree. See Commonwealth v. Kiesel, 
    854 A.2d 530
    , 533 (Pa. Super. 2004) (stating that “this Court is precluded from
    reviewing the merits of the claim and the appeal must be denied” where the
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    J-S76005-18
    appellee objects to the omission of a Rule 2119(f) statement) (citations
    omitted).1
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 2/6/2019
    ____________________________________________
    1 We note that, notwithstanding Appellant’s waiver of his sentencing claim on
    these various grounds, we would have affirmed his judgment of sentence
    based on the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Randal B. Todd of the
    Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. See TCO at 1-6.
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1650 WDA 2017

Filed Date: 2/6/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024