Commonwealth v. Leaner ( 2019 )


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  • J-S26039-18
    
    2019 Pa. Super. 9
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    ERIC L.L. LEANER                           :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 471 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 4, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-51-CR-0002556-2012
    BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
    OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                           FILED JANUARY 08, 2019
    Appellant, Eric L.L. Leaner, appeals nunc pro tunc from the April 4, 2014,
    judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia
    County following his conviction by a jury on the charges of second-degree
    murder, robbery, and possession of an instrument of crime.1             Appellant
    presents eleven issues, and after a careful review, we affirm.
    The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: Appellant was
    arrested in connection with the murder of sixty-one-year-old Thomas McNeil,
    and, represented by counsel, he proceeded to a jury trial. At trial, Wallace
    Tabron testified he assisted Mr. McNeil in moving furniture for Mr. McNeil’s
    aunt on September 14, 2009, and that evening, they stayed at the aunt’s new
    house. N.T., 11/19/13, at 75-76. The following morning, at approximately
    ____________________________________________
    1   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(b), 3701, and 907, respectively.
    ____________________________________
    * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S26039-18
    6:15 a.m., as they traveled to the local U-Haul to return the truck, Mr. McNeil
    waved at two young men who were standing at the intersection of 32 nd and
    York Streets. 
    Id. at 77.
    Mr. McNeil, who was driving the rental truck, pulled into a parking lot
    and exited the vehicle to speak to the two young men. 
    Id. at 78.
    Mr. Tabron
    remained inside of the vehicle and, after a while, he looked into the vehicle’s
    side mirror and observed Mr. McNeil lying on the ground with a man wearing
    a rust-colored hoodie or jacket “going through his pockets.” 
    Id. at 78-80.
    Mr. McNeil was on his back and not responding in any manner. 
    Id. at 79.
    Mr.
    Tabron exited the truck and picked up a crowbar, which he discovered near
    the truck. 
    Id. Mr. Tabron
    waved the crowbar at the young men, including
    the one going through Mr. McNeil’s pockets, so that they would leave the area.
    
    Id. One of
    the young men backed way, but the young man in the rust-
    colored hoodie/jacket started to approach Mr. Tabron.      
    Id. However, both
    young men fled when a marked police vehicle “came down the street.” 
    Id. The police
    vehicle “started chasing” the young men while Mr. Tabron remained
    with Mr. McNeil. 
    Id. Mr. Tabron
    testified that Mr. McNeil was semi-conscious and, after
    ambulance personnel removed him from the ground, Mr. Tabron saw Mr.
    McNeil’s wallet on the ground. 
    Id. at 84.
    Mr. McNeil’s identification and credit
    cards were still in the wallet; there was no cash in the wallet. 
    Id. Mr. Tabron
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    indicated he cooperated with the police investigation and gave a statement to
    the police on September 15, 2009, at 7:20 a.m.       
    Id. at 86.
      Mr. Tabron
    confirmed that he described the man going through Mr. McNeil’s pockets as
    “[a] [b]lack male, 30s, 5-6, around 180 pounds, beard, dark complexion, low-
    cut hair, wearing a two-tone rust-colored jacket.” 
    Id. Mr. Tabron
    testified Mr. McNeil died on January 17, 2010, and on
    January 18, 2010, at 6:30 p.m., he gave a second statement to the police.
    
    Id. at 87.
    In the second police statement, Mr. Tabron described the man who
    went through Mr. McNeil’s pockets as wearing “an orange hoodie[.]” 
    Id. at 89.
    Also, in the statement to the police, he indicated Mr. McNeil’s wallet was
    “underneath him and it was empty. And his credit cards were all on the ground
    underneath him.” 
    Id. Mr. Tabron
    confirmed that, on January 19, 2010, at 1:20 a.m., the police
    showed him a photo array and he chose Appellant’s photo as “the guy who
    didn’t run and came at me” when he picked up the crowbar. 
    Id. at 93.
    Mr.
    Tabron indicated that, at trial, he was unable to identify whether Appellant
    was involved with the crime because he was losing his eyesight. 
    Id. at 94.
    Nishea Wilkerson testified she was a dancer “for tips” at a squatter
    house on Patton Street, and she knew Appellant by the nickname “Black.” 
    Id. at 139-40.
    She indicated her brother and Appellant “hung out” together. 
    Id. at 142.
    Ms. Wilkerson gave the police a statement in which she indicated
    Appellant ran “stripper parties out of the house.” 
    Id. at 148.
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    At trial, Ms. Wilkerson confirmed she was “stripping” in the house on
    Patton Street during the night of September 14, 2009, into the morning of
    September 15, 2009, and Appellant was present in the house wearing an
    orange hoodie. 
    Id. at 149-52.
    At trial, Ms. Wilkerson indicated “a couple
    guys” were at the party wearing orange hoodies; however, she admitted that
    in her statement to the police, as well as at Appellant’s preliminary hearing,
    she testified Appellant was the only person wearing an orange hoodie at the
    party. 
    Id. at 153-55.
    Ms. Wilkerson testified that, when the party ended, she stayed in the
    house on Patton Street to sleep and, at around 6:15 a.m., she awoke to police
    officers pounding on the front door. 
    Id. at 156.
    Ms. Wilkerson confirmed the
    police took her to the police station for questioning on September 15, 2009,
    and in her statement she told the police that an orange hoodie, which the
    police seized from the living room, belonged to her brother. 
    Id. at 162.
    She
    testified at trial that she told the police the hoodie belonged to her brother, as
    opposed to Appellant, because her brother was a minor and she “thought he
    wouldn’t get in trouble about anything.” 
    Id. at 163.
    She further confirmed
    that in her second statement to the police, which she made on January 19,
    2010, she identified Appellant from a photo array and informed the police that
    he was wearing the orange hoodie on September 14-15, 2009. 
    Id. at 170.
    In the second statement, she admitted to the police that she had lied in her
    first statement as to the owner of the orange hoodie. 
    Id. at 171.
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    Police Officer Carlos Rodriguez testified he was responding to a radio
    call for an unrelated burglary in a marked cruiser on September 15, 2009,
    when, at 6:18 a.m., he observed three men standing on the corner in a vacant
    lot. N.T., 11/21/13, at 44-45. On direct examination, he testified as follows:
    Q. When you observed the three individuals, what did you see, if
    anything, happen?
    A. I see three individuals standing in a triangle type of way. I see
    the [victim], McNeil. He’s like in the tip. If you can picture a
    triangle, he’s at the top end. Then I see two black males on the
    two bottom end having a conversation. At first it was a glance
    that I seen. To me, the reason I noticed them because they fit
    the flash of a burglary that I was responding to at first.
    Q. And specifically, what do you see then among the triangle as it
    progresses?
    A. When I looked again to see the three individuals, I noticed an
    individual that was wearing an orange hoodie, dark-colored jeans
    strike the older gentleman, McNeil, in the head. And McNeil went
    down to the ground.
    Q. When you say you saw a guy in the orange hoodie strike the
    older gentleman in the head what, if anything, did you see him
    strike him in the head with?
    A. A crowbar.
    Q. Now as you sit here in the court today, do you see the man
    who had the orange hoodie who held that crowbar?
    A. Yes, the gentleman sitting right over there.
    [ADA]: Indicating [Appellant].
    Q. Now, at the time that you observed Mr. McNeil get hit in the
    head from where you are, did Mr. McNeil stay standing, or what
    did he do?
    A. He drops to the ground.
    Q. What’s the next thing that happens that you see after Mr.
    McNeil drops to the ground?
    A. I radioed in for more units. When I approached[,] when I
    started to approach the individuals and looked at them, actually.
    I seen a gentleman coming out of the truck who already had a
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    crowbar and was swishing away the two individuals, trying to keep
    them at bay while Mr. McNeil was laying on the ground.
    At that point, I radioed in for more units and I was trying to
    decide how I was going to approach them by car, whether the side
    or to the middle, because it’s two of them down there and only
    one of me. I decided to approach them head-on and jump on to
    the pavement. But by the time I reached them, [Appellant] and
    his colleague [saw] me—
    
    Id. at 45-47.
    Officer Rodriguez testified he made eye contact with Appellant, who was
    wearing an orange hoodie, and then Appellant and his apparent “friend” took
    off running. 
    Id. at 48.
    Officer Rodriguez indicated Appellant ran towards and
    then past his cruiser, coming within three feet of him. 
    Id. at 48-49.
    Officer Rodriguez put the police cruiser in reverse and began following
    Appellant; he testified he chose to follow Appellant, as opposed to the other
    man, since Appellant “is the one that struck the [victim] McNeil in the head
    with a crowbar.” 
    Id. at 49-50.
    Officer Rodriguez, while radioing for assistance
    and keeping Appellant in sight, followed Appellant to a house on Patton Street
    and observed Appellant run into the house. 
    Id. at 53.
    The officer stopped his
    vehicle in the middle of the street and tried to enter the house behind
    Appellant; however, the door had been locked. 
    Id. at 54.
    The officer started
    knocking on the door and a back-up officer arrived. 
    Id. After several
    minutes of knocking, Ms. Wilkerson looked out of a window
    located over the door and asked what the officer needed. 
    Id. at 54-55.
    He
    instructed her to open the door, and she complied. 
    Id. at 55.
    However, by
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    the time the police gained entry into the house, Appellant was no longer in
    the house, although his discarded orange hoodie was lying on the floor in the
    dining room. 
    Id. at 55-56.
    Officer Rodriguez specifically testified at trial that
    he recognized the orange hoodie as being the same hoodie that he saw
    Appellant wearing when he struck Mr. McNeil with the crowbar. 
    Id. at 56.
    The officer confirmed there was a back door to the subject house on Patton
    Street. 
    Id. Officer Rodriguez
    clarified he saw Appellant strike Mr. McNeil one time
    with the crowbar and Mr. McNeil immediately dropped to the ground. 
    Id. at 60.
    He also clarified that the crowbar, which he saw Mr. Tabron pick up, was
    the same crowbar, which had been in Appellant’s possession. 
    Id. He also
    specifically identified Appellant in court as the man he saw hit Mr. McNeil in
    the head with a crowbar. 
    Id. at 85.
    Detective Sekou Kinebrew testified he took a statement from Ms.
    Wilkerson on September 15, 2009, and she told him the orange hoodie
    belonged to her minor brother, James. 
    Id. at 144.
    Detective Harry Glenn testified he took a statement from Ms. Wilkerson
    on January 19, 2010. In this statement, Ms. Wilkerson admitted she lied to
    Detective Kinebrew when she told him the orange hoodie belonged to her
    brother, James. 
    Id. at 162.
    She admitted the orange hoodie belonged to
    “Black,” who Ms. Wilkerson knew “all [her] life.” 
    Id. She also
    confirmed to
    Detective Glenn that Appellant was known as “Black,” he was wearing the
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    orange hoodie at a party on the night of September 14, 2009, to the early
    morning of September 15, 2009, and no one else at the party was wearing an
    orange hoodie.   
    Id. at 161-63.
       Detective Glenn indicated Ms. Wilkerson
    identified Appellant from a photo array. 
    Id. at 164.
    The Commonwealth then introduced excerpts of preliminary hearing
    testimony given by Donta Wilkerson, who was unavailable, into evidence. At
    the preliminary hearing, Mr. Wilkerson denied knowing Appellant. 
    Id. at 183.
    He admitted that he was in the vacant lot and saw the beating of Mr. McNeil;
    however, he denied knowing who committed the crime since the person was
    wearing “a hoodie.” 
    Id. at 183-84.
    At this point at the preliminary hearing,
    as read to the jury at trial, the Commonwealth confronted Mr. Wilkerson with
    his police statement in which he admitted the following (verbatim):
    Me and Black were walking along Douglas and York Streets
    toward Patton Street when two males approached us in a U-Haul
    truck. The male in the passenger seat asked us if we had any
    hard. I replied no, but Black answered yes. And asked him how
    many do you need. The male asked if he could get six for 50.
    Black told him yeah and then told him to pull into a lot on Douglas
    and York.
    The male got out of the truck and came around to the
    passenger side of the truck. Black acted as if he were going to
    serve him but instead tried to snatch the money out of his hand.
    Black told the man give me the money, OG. The male attempted
    to fight Black off.
    But Black struck the old man in the head twice with his hand.
    The male fell backward on the concrete and hit his head very hard.
    The male in the truck got out and tried to help the man that was
    on the ground. The other male [] got out of the truck and reached
    for a crowbar that was on the ground.
    Black told the male, I wish you would pick up that crowbar.
    The cop came down Natrona Street the wrong way and attempted
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    to stop me and Black. I ran towards 32nd Street. Black ran towards
    Cumberland and Douglas Street.
    I ran into the alley on 32nd and Patton and hid there until
    everything was clear. When I came out the alleyway, I saw my
    friend. He was on his way to work, and asked him to drop me off
    at my grandmother’s house. Then he gave me an address. I
    stayed at my grandmother’s [house] until around 12:30 p.m.,
    then I went back outside to meet back up with Black. I asked
    Black why did he hit the old head like that.
    Black said that the old head tried to tee off on him. I told
    Black that the old head hit his head very hard on the ground.
    Black said yeah, but he was not trying to give that bread up. I
    told Black to tell me the next time he was going to do something
    like that.
    Black replied my fault. I ran into my sister Nishea and she
    told me that the cops had come around to the house on Patton
    Street. Nishea told me the cops were going to be coming back.
    So I told her that I was going to be getting down from there. I
    went to catch the train out to the Northeast.
    
    Id. at 187-89.
    In the statement to the police, Mr. Wilkerson admitted Appellant, also
    known as “Black,” was wearing an orange hoodie at the time of the incident.
    
    Id. at 192.
    He also clarified in the statement that “hard” refers to “crack” and
    Appellant took $60.00 from Mr. McNeil. 
    Id. at 192-93.
          Further, during the
    statement, Mr. Wilkerson positively identified Appellant from a photograph.
    
    Id. at 200.
    Detective James Pitts testified he interviewed Ms. Wilkerson’s brother,
    Donta, on January 19, 2010. He confirmed Mr. Wilkerson made a statement
    to the police as set forth supra. N.T., 11/22/13, at 14-24.
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    Detective Phillip Nordo confirmed he interviewed Mr. Tabron on January
    18, 2010. He indicated Mr. Tabron positively identified two men from a photo
    array.   Specifically, he identified Appellant as the person who took a step
    towards Mr. Tabron when he picked up the crowbar; he identified Donta
    Wilkerson as the man who backed away when Mr. Tabron picked up the
    crowbar. 
    Id. at 51-52.
    Jermaine Graham testified he is friends with Donta Wilkerson and
    Appellant, who lived on Patton Street. N.T., 11/20/13, at 37-38. Mr. Graham
    denied being present during the robbery of Mr. McNeil on September 15,
    2009; however, he admitted that in December of 2009 he was arrested for
    three other robberies. 
    Id. at 39-40.
    Mr. Graham testified that, on January 5, 2011, he was in the courthouse
    basement waiting to testify in an unrelated case when he saw Appellant. 
    Id. at 40.
    He testified as follows regarding a conversation he had with Appellant
    at that time:
    Q. Now when you saw [Appellant], did you happen to have any
    conversation with [Appellant]?
    A. Yes.
    ***
    Q. Now, as you talked with [Appellant] that morning, can you tell
    us what he said to you, like tell us what that conversation was.
    A. I mean, the conversation was about everything, but he wanted
    to know, he thought that they may have brought me down there
    to testify on him.
    Q. Now, at that time, you hadn’t been to Douglas and York Streets
    at the time of the incident, correct?
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    A. Right.
    Q. And what did he ask, other than whether you were there to
    testify against him, or like what else did he say about why he was
    here?
    A. He spoke on the situation. He said—
    Q. What did he say about the situation?
    A. He said he felt as though Donta didn’t have a right to be doing
    what he was doing, being though as he was involved.
    Q. Now, I got to ask you to break it down for me. You said Donta
    didn’t have a right to do what he was doing. What do you mean?
    A. As far as telling on him.
    Q. So when he’s talking to you, he’s saying he doesn’t think Donta
    should have told on him; is that correct?
    A. Right.
    Q. And why did he say Donta shouldn’t have told on him?
    A. Because Donta had something to do with it.
    Q. What did [Appellant] say happened?
    A. He said they was robbing him, and it was a scuffle. Donta was
    holding him. He told me he hit him in his head.
    Q. Who hit him in his head?
    A. [Appellant].
    Q. Who did he hit in the head?
    A. Whoever this person was.
    ***
    Q. And then did [Appellant] say what object, if any, he used to hit
    the man?
    A. A crowbar.
    Q. Did he indicate to you where he hit the man with the crowbar?
    A. In the head.
    Q. Did he say what happened after he hit the man in the head
    with the crowbar?
    A. He said he fell and he hit his head on the curb.
    Q. Did he say what happened to the man?
    A. After that?
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    Q. Yes.
    A. During that night?
    Q. What did he say happened to the man that he hit on the head
    with the crowbar?
    A. He said he died later on.
    Q. And, in fact, when he talked about Donta, did he say what role
    Donta was supposed to play?
    A. Donta was holding him.
    
    Id. at 40-42,
    45-46.
    Mr. Graham further testified that Appellant told him that his brother was
    supposed to kill Donta because Donta was talking about the crime. 
    Id. at 47-
    48.
    Detective James Pitts indicated that he located Donta Wilkerson, and he
    testified at Appellant’s preliminary hearing. 
    Id. at 119-20.
    Detective Pitts,
    as well as Detective Ron Aikin, testified that the police attempted to locate Mr.
    Wilkerson so that he could testify at Appellant’s trial; however, the police had
    not been able to find him. 
    Id. at 103-04,
    120-21.
    Gary Collins, M.D., the Deputy Chief Medical Examiner for Philadelphia,
    testified that his colleague, Dr. Blanchard, performed the post-mortem
    examination on the remains of Mr. McNeil, who died on January 17, 2010, at
    the Chapel Manor Nursing Home; however, Dr. Blanchard retired from the
    Medical Examiner’s Office. 
    Id. at 168-69.
        Dr. Collins noted that, pertaining
    to Mr. McNeil, he reviewed Dr. Blanchard’s autopsy report and photographs
    taken during the autopsy, as well as medical records from Temple Hospital,
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    Bryn Mawr, the Chapel Manor Nursing Home, and Aria Health. 
    Id. at 169-71.
    Based on the review of these items, he formed an independent opinion as to
    the cause and manner of Mr. McNeil’s death.       
    Id. at 171.
    Specifically, he
    opined Mr. McNeil’s cause of death was “complications of blunt head trauma”
    and the manner of death was “homicide.” 
    Id. at 173.
    In forming his opinion, Dr. Collins testified that, at Temple Hospital on
    September 15, 2009, Mr. McNeil “was diagnosed with having a subdural
    hematoma, which is an accumulation of blood on the surface of the brain
    beneath the skull, as well as skull fractures of the base of the skull and
    fractures of his nasal bones.” 
    Id. at 175-76.
    In order to treat his injury:
    [Surgeons] had to do a craniotomy to relieve the
    hematoma, the blood that was building up on his brain. So the
    skull is a fixed object and so is the brain.
    If you have accumulation of blood or any liquid that
    shouldn’t be there, it’s going to cause pressure on the brain which
    can cause death really quickly if you don’t relieve the pressure.
    So they had to do emergency surgery to relieve the pressure of
    the hematoma and during that state, had to go back a few more
    times to help relieve additional pressure caused by the initial
    surgery from the initial assault.
    
    Id. at 176.
    Dr. Collins testified surgeons inserted a drain to constantly remove fluid
    accumulating on Mr. McNeil’s brain, and he opined Mr. McNeil would have died
    soon after the beating had he not received immediate medical care. 
    Id. at 175,
    181.
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    Dr. Collins noted that after two months of care at Temple Hospital Mr.
    McNeil was discharged to the Chapel Manor Nursing Home. 
    Id. at 176-77.
    Following the September 15, 2009, assault, Mr. McNeil had neurological
    deficits such that he could not sit, move, or speak; he was on a feeding tube;
    he was incontinent of urine and feces; and he could not care for himself in any
    manner. 
    Id. at 177-78.
    He noted “[t]here was never any real improvement”
    in Mr. McNeil’s condition after the assault. 
    Id. at 182.
    Further, he testified
    that “with the lack of improvement, I can then correlate and say, well, there’s
    no intervening factor between this assault and him getting better and his
    death. So the initial event had to have played a significant role in his overall
    conditioning to end his [life] four months later.” 
    Id. Dr. Collins
    testified the
    head injury sustained by Mr. McNeil caused him to be “neurologically
    devastated where [he couldn’t] care for [himself]” and made him prone to
    infection, problems maintaining adequate nutrition, and a weakened immune
    system. 
    Id. at 183-84.
    He testified the records demonstrated that Mr. McNeil
    “wasted away,” meaning he lost weight and muscle, after the assault, and
    eventually, his heart stopped beating. 
    Id. at 187-88,
    211.
    Dr. Collins noted the medical records revealed that, prior to the beating,
    Mr. McNeil had high blood pressure and lymphoma, which is cancer of the
    white blood cells; however, Mr. McNeil was in “functional physical health” and
    able to care for himself in all respects prior to the assault. 
    Id. at 179.
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    At the conclusion of all testimony, the jury convicted Appellant of the
    offenses 
    indicated supra
    , and following a hearing, on April 4, 2014, the trial
    court sentenced Appellant to life in prison for second-degree murder; five
    years to ten years in prison for robbery; and two and one-half years to five
    years in prison for possession of an instrument of crime; the sentences to run
    concurrently. Appellant did not initially file a direct appeal; however, after his
    direct appeal rights were reinstated on January 29, 2016, via a timely filed
    PCRA2 petition, this counseled appeal followed on February 4, 2016. The trial
    court directed Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, Appellant
    timely complied, and the trial court filed a responsive Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)
    opinion.
    On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues, which we have set
    forth verbatim:
    1. Did the Trial Court err in denying the Appellant’s motion under
    Rule 600, and denying his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth
    Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,
    Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution?
    2. Was the evidence insufficient to support the verdict of Second
    Degree Murder, as the Commonwealth failed to establish
    causation?
    3. Did the trial court err in allowing the admission of an autopsy
    report, which is testimonial, without the testimony of the
    purported expert who prepared said report, and did the trial
    court err and abuse its discretion in allowing admission of the
    testimony of an expert who did not participate in the autopsy
    of the decedent or prepare the autopsy report, and in failing to
    consider alternate means to admit relevant evidence, including
    ____________________________________________
    2   Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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    J-S26039-18
    examining whether the expert who actually performed the
    autopsy was truly unavailable and whether it was possible to
    admit prior sworn testimony rather than having another expert
    who had no involvement in the autopsy give purported expert
    testimony, thus violating the Sixth Amendment of the United
    States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania
    Constitution? Further, was it error to deny the Appellant’s
    mistrial motion arising from this issue?
    4. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in denying the
    Appellant’s objection and allowing Dr. Gary Collins, who
    acknowledged that he does not treat living individuals and that
    his expertise is solely in pathology and directed toward
    deceased individuals, to offer an opinion as to a hypothetical
    involving a living person as to how long that person might have
    survived without placement in a nursing care facility?
    5. Did the trial court err in allowing the testimony and hearsay
    statements of Donta Wilkerson to be read into evidence,
    thereby violating the Appellant’s confrontation rights under the
    Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article
    I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution?
    6. Did the trial court err in allowing the Commonwealth to elicit
    testimony from a jailhouse informant about alleged threats to
    alleged co-conspirator Donta Wilkerson and in denying the
    Appellant’s mistrial motion, for the reasons argued at N.T.
    November 20, 2013, pp. 22-25, 35, 47-48?
    7. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in refusing to
    allow the [A]ppellant to cross-examine the detective who took
    Donta Wilkerson’s statement as to allegations by named
    individuals that he (Detective James Pitts) and his partner
    (Detective Ohmarr Jenkins) used coercive and abusive
    techniques to obtain witness and/or suspect statements,
    thereby tending to support Donta Wilkerson’s testimony that
    his statement was not accurate or voluntary, and did the trial
    court err and abuse its discretion further by denying the
    Appellant’s mistrial motion?
    8. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in denying the
    Appellant’s motion for mistrial; see November 22, 2013, pp.
    39-45?
    9. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in denying the
    Appellant’s motion to charge the jury as to Involuntary
    - 16 -
    J-S26039-18
    Manslaughter, as there was evidence of record that could
    reasonably support such a verdict?
    10. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in allowing
    another judge to preside over a portion of the Appellant’s trial
    and make important decisions therein, thus violating his right
    to have a single judge preside over the entirety of that trial;
    see N.T. November 25, 2015; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 601?
    11. Is the Appellant’s sentence illegal, as Robbery merges with
    Second Degree Murder for sentencing purposes? See N.T.
    April 4, 2013, pp. 12, 27.
    Appellant’s Brief at 5-6.
    In his first issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his
    motion to dismiss for the Commonwealth’s failure to bring the matter to trial
    in a speedy fashion as required by Rule 600 of the Pennsylvania Rules of
    Criminal Procedure.3 Specifically, Appellant contends the trial court erred in
    holding the delay attributed to the trial court’s crowded docket was
    “excludable time.” He also contends the Commonwealth was responsible for
    some of the defense’s requests for continuances such that the trial court erred
    in holding this delay was “excludable time.” Appellant’s Brief at 19.
    We review Appellant's Rule 600 argument according to the following
    principles:
    ____________________________________________
    3  To the extent Appellant avers a violation of his federal and state
    constitutional right to a speedy trial, this issue is waived. Although Appellant
    suggested in his pre-trial motion that there was a violation of his constitutional
    rights, he abandoned the claim during the hearing/argument before the trial
    court. N.T., 11/21/13, 5-14. See Commonwealth v. Colon, 
    87 A.3d 352
    (Pa.Super. 2014) (holding a constitutional claim of violation of speedy trial
    rights is separate from a Rule 600 issue).
    - 17 -
    J-S26039-18
    In evaluating Rule [600] issues, our standard of review of a
    trial court’s decision is whether the trial court abused its
    discretion. Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with
    law, upon facts and circumstances judicially before the court, after
    hearing and due consideration. An abuse of discretion is not
    merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the
    law is overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is
    manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice,
    bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion
    is abused.
    The proper scope of review is limited to the evidence on the
    record of the Rule [600] evidentiary hearing, and the findings of
    the [trial] court. An appellate court must view the facts in the
    light most favorable to the prevailing party.
    Additionally, when considering the trial court’s ruling, this
    Court is not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind Rule
    [600]. Rule [600] serves two equally important functions: (1) the
    protection of the accused’s speedy trial rights, and (2) the
    protection of society. In determining whether an accused’s right
    to a speedy trial has been violated, consideration must be given
    to society’s right to effective prosecution of criminal cases, both
    to restrain those guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating
    it. However, the administrative mandate of Rule [600] was not
    designed to insulate the criminally accused from good faith
    prosecution delayed through no fault of the Commonwealth.
    So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of the
    Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental speedy trial
    rights of an accused, Rule [600] must be construed in a manner
    consistent with society’s right to punish and deter crime. In
    considering [these] matters..., courts must carefully factor into
    the ultimate equation not only the prerogatives of the individual
    accused, but the collective right of the community to vigorous law
    enforcement as well.
    Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 
    74 A.3d 228
    , 234–35 (Pa.Super. 2013)
    (quotation omitted).
    Rule 600 provides in pertinent part: “Trial in a court case in which a
    written complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence within 365
    - 18 -
    J-S26039-18
    days from the date on which the complaint is filed.” Pa.R.Crim.P.
    600(A)(2)(a). The rule further states:
    (1) For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of delay at any stage
    of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the
    Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be
    included in the computation of the time within which trial must
    commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the
    computation.
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1).
    To summarize, the courts of this Commonwealth employ
    three steps…in determining whether Rule 600 requires dismissal
    of charges against a defendant. First, Rule 600(A) provides the
    mechanical run date. Second, we determine whether any
    excludable time exists pursuant to Rule 600(C). We add the
    amount of excludable time, if any, to the mechanical run date to
    arrive at an adjusted run date.
    If the trial takes place after the adjusted run date, we apply
    the due diligence analysis set forth in Rule 600([D]). As we have
    explained, Rule 600[] encompasses a wide variety of
    circumstances under which a period of delay was outside the
    control of the Commonwealth and not the result of the
    Commonwealth’s lack of diligence. Any such period of delay
    results in an extension of the run date. Addition of any Rule 600[]
    extensions to the adjusted run date produces the final Rule 600
    run date. If the Commonwealth does not bring the defendant to
    trial on or before the final run date, the trial court must dismiss
    the charges.
    Due diligence is a fact-specific concept that        must be
    determined on a case-by-case basis. Due diligence          does not
    require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but        rather a
    showing by the Commonwealth that a reasonable effort       has been
    put forth.
    
    Armstrong, 71 A.3d at 236
    (quotation marks and quotations omitted).
    Here, in rejecting Appellant’s Rule 600 claim, the trial court relevantly
    indicated the following:
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    J-S26039-18
    Pursuant to the record, [Appellant] was arrested on January
    21, 2010, and the criminal complaint was filed on January 22,
    2010. Accordingly, the mechanical run date was January 21,
    2011. The [trial] court calculated the excludable time as 1063
    days based on the following: January 27, 2010 to February 23,
    2010 (27 days attributable to the court), April 6, 2010 to June 9,
    2010 (64 days attributable to the court), October 13, 2010 to
    March 8, 2011 (146 days attributable to the defense), April 6,
    2011 to December 20, 2011 (258 days attributable to the
    defense), January 3, 2012 to February 28, 2012 (56 days
    attributable to the court), March 20, 2012 to April 11, 2012 (22
    days attributable to the defense), April 19, 2012 to November 29,
    2012 (224 days attributable to the defense), and February 25,
    2013 to November 18, 2013 (266 days ruled excludable by the
    scheduling court in giving the first and only trial date). Adding
    1063 days of excludable time to [the] mechanical run date
    produces an adjusted run date of December 19, 2013. Trial
    commenced on November 18, 2013, which was within the
    adjusted run date, and thus, [Appellant’s] assertion of a violation
    of Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 is without merit.
    Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/15/16, at 6.
    We find no abuse of discretion in this regard. See 
    Armstrong, supra
    .
    We specifically note that, with regard to the judicial delay in this case, it is
    well-settled that “judicial delay can support the grant of an extension of the
    Rule 600 run date.”     Commonwealth v. Trippett, 
    932 A.2d 188
    , 197
    (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). This is particularly true where, as here,
    there is no indication the trial court did not schedule the criminal proceedings
    at the earliest possible date consistent with the court’s business.    See 
    id. Further, to
    the extent Appellant suggests the Commonwealth may be held
    accountable for delay caused by the defense’s requests for continuance, our
    jurisprudence has held the opposite. See Commonwealth v. Watson, 140
    - 20 -
    J-S26039-18
    A.3d 696 (Pa.Super. 2016). Thus, we find Appellant is not entitled to relief
    on his first claim.
    In his second issue, Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to
    sustain his conviction for second-degree murder.4 Specifically, he avers the
    Commonwealth failed to prove he caused the death of Mr. McNeil as is required
    for criminal homicide. In this vein, Appellant highlights the following facts:
    (1) Mr. McNeil passed away 124 days after the incident, and (2) Mr. McNeil
    had pre-existing medical conditions, including cancer and coronary artery
    blockages.5 Appellant reasons that, when viewed in the light most favorable
    to the Commonwealth, “there were too many substantial intervening factors
    present to reach the conclusion that [Mr. McNeil’s] head wound, debilitating
    though it was, played a direct and substantial causative role in his death.”
    Appellant’s Brief at 30.
    Our standard of review is well-settled:
    The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of
    the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence
    admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the
    verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable
    the fact-finder to find every element of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above
    test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute
    ____________________________________________
    4 Appellant has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence as to his
    convictions for robbery and possession of an instrument of crime.
    5 Appellant also contends Mr. McNeil was a patient in several hospitals such
    that poor medical care could have been a substantial factor in causing his
    death. However, there was no evidence presented at trial in support of this
    speculative assertion. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief.
    - 21 -
    J-S26039-18
    our judgment for [that of] the fact-finder. In addition,
    we note that the facts and circumstances established
    by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
    possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
    defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder
    unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that
    as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn
    from      the    combined       circumstances.      The
    Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving
    every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
    by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.
    Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
    must be evaluated and all evidence actually received
    must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while
    passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
    weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all,
    part or none of the evidence.
    Commonwealth v. Graham, 
    81 A.3d 137
    , 142 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quotation
    marks and quotation omitted).
    The Crimes Code defines murder of the second degree as follows:
    (b) Murder of the second degree.—A criminal homicide
    constitutes murder of the second degree when it is committed
    while defendant was engaged as a principal or an accomplice in
    the perpetration of a felony.
    18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(b).
    Appellant’s claim of insufficiency is a challenge to causation.      To
    establish criminal causation, “the Commonwealth must prove that the
    defendant’s conduct was so directly and substantially linked to the actual
    result as to give rise to the imposition of criminal liability.” Commonwealth
    v. Long, 
    624 A.2d 200
    , 203–204 (Pa.Super. 1993) (citing Commonwealth
    v. Rementer, 
    598 A.2d 1300
    , 1304 (Pa.Super. 1991)) (citation omitted).
    - 22 -
    J-S26039-18
    In Rementer, we set forth a two-part test for determining
    criminal causation. First, the defendant’s conduct must be an
    antecedent, but for which the result in question would not have
    occurred. Rementer, [supra]; 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 303(a)(1). A
    victim’s death cannot be entirely attributable to other factors;
    rather, there must exist a “causal connection between the conduct
    and the result of conduct; and causal connection requires
    something more than mere coincidence as to time and place.”
    
    Rementer, 598 A.2d at 1305
    , n.3 (quotation omitted). Second,
    the results of the defendant’s actions cannot be so extraordinarily
    remote or attenuated that it would be unfair to hold the defendant
    criminally responsible. 
    Rementer, 598 A.2d at 1305
    .
    As to the first part of the test, the defendant’s conduct need
    not be the only cause of the victim’s death in order to establish a
    causal connection. 
    Rementer, 598 A.2d at 1305
    . “Criminal
    responsibility may be properly assessed against an individual
    whose conduct was a direct and substantial factor in producing
    the death even though other factors combined with that conduct
    to achieve the result.” 
    Long, 624 A.2d at 203
    [.] The second part
    of the test is satisfied when the victim’s death is the natural or
    foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s actions. “Where the
    fatal result was an unnatural or obscure consequence of the
    defendant’s actions, justice would prevent us from allowing the
    result to have an impact upon a finding of the defendant’s guilt.”
    Commonwealth v. Nunn, 
    947 A.2d 756
    , 760 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citations
    and quotations omitted).
    In the case sub judice, there is no dispute Mr. McNeil suffered from
    medical problems prior to the assault, and his death occurred 124 days from
    the date of the assault. While Mr. McNeil’s prior medical problems were
    predominantly chronic, Dr. Collins’ testimony established that Mr. McNeil
    suffered skull fractures, fractures to his nasal bones, and a subdural
    hematoma (accumulation of blood on the surface of the brain beneath the
    skull) when he was hit with the crowbar.      Further, Dr. Collins specifically
    - 23 -
    J-S26039-18
    opined that Mr. McNeil’s cause of death was complications from this blunt head
    trauma. As the trial court aptly indicated in its opinion:
    The testimony of medical examiner Dr. Collins portrayed the
    gravity of the injuries that [Appellant] inflicted upon [Mr.] McNeil
    by striking him in the head with a crowbar, whereupon [Mr.]
    McNeil’s skull was essentially crushed. Dr. Collins described the
    irreparable damage caused to [Mr.] McNeil documenting the
    subdural hematoma, the fracture to the base of the s[k]ull, and
    the fracture to the nasal bone, and stated that such devastating
    injuries were consistent with the blunt force trauma caused by a
    hard metal object, such as a crowbar. Moreover, Dr. Collins
    testified that such injuries were consistent with [Mr. McNeil] being
    rendered unconscious upon impact and his testimony further
    explained the connection between the brain and the rest of the
    body and how brain injury affects other bodily systems.
    Specifically, he testified that [Mr.] McNeil’s head injury caused
    significant bodily deficits from which [Mr.] McNeil never recovered,
    including [Mr.] McNeil’s inability to sit, walk, or care for himself.
    This reduced bodily movement resulted in muscle atrophy
    throughout his body and Dr. Collins further explained that such
    lack of movement allows fluid to build up in the lungs, causing
    reduced levels of oxygen in the body, and ultimately causing other
    organs to suffer and leading to death.
    Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/15/16, at 8-9 (emphasis omitted).
    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
    as verdict winner, we conclude the evidence provides ample support for the
    jury’s conclusion that Appellant’s assault upon Mr. McNeil caused his death.
    Specifically, the evidence established a causal connection between Appellant’s
    conduct (hitting Mr. McNeil in the head with a crowbar) and the result of his
    conduct (the death of Mr. McNeil).      See 
    Nunn, supra
    .       Further, the fact
    medical intervention kept Mr. McNeil alive for 124 days after the assault does
    not suggest Appellant’s action were so extraordinarily remote or attenuated
    - 24 -
    J-S26039-18
    that it would be unfair to hold him criminally responsible for Mr. McNeil’s
    death, particularly since Mr. McNeil’s death was a natural or foreseeable
    consequence of Appellant striking him in the head with a crowbar. See 
    id. Thus, we
    find no merit to Appellant’s sufficiency claim.
    In his third issue, Appellant argues the admission of an autopsy report,
    which was prepared by Dr. Blanchard, a non-testifying witness, violated his
    rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. He further
    argues Dr. Collins’ expert opinions based on the autopsy report violated his
    confrontation rights since Dr. Collins did not perform the autopsy or prepare
    the report.     Whether Appellant’s confrontation rights were violated is a
    question of law; therefore, or standard of review is de novo, and our scope of
    review is plenary.       Commonwealth v. Brown, --- A.3d ---, 
    2018 WL 2452643
    , *5 (Pa. filed June 1, 2018) (citation omitted).6
    ____________________________________________
    6  In 
    Brown, supra
    , our Supreme Court recently considered whether an
    autopsy report—presented without accompanying testimony by the author—
    is testimonial in nature such that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
    confront the witnesses against him is violated by the admission of the autopsy
    report at trial. Noting that “Pennsylvania law requires the preparation of
    autopsy reports in all cases of sudden, violent and suspicious deaths, or deaths
    by other than natural causes, and in such cases, the autopsy and subsequent
    report are designed to determine whether the death occurred as a result of a
    criminal act[,]” 
    id. at *9,
    the Supreme Court concluded that “the primary
    purpose for preparation of an autopsy report under these circumstances is to
    establish or prove past events potentially relevant to a later criminal
    prosecution and that any person creating the report would reasonably believe
    it would be available for use at a later criminal trial.” 
    Id. Thus, the
    Supreme
    Court held that the autopsy report in Brown was testimonial in nature and,
    therefore, “the report could properly be introduced into evidence without [the
    - 25 -
    J-S26039-18
    Initially, with regard to the admission of the autopsy report, we conclude
    Appellant has waived his claim. For instance, during the direct examination
    of Dr. Collins, the Commonwealth, without objection, requested that the trial
    court mark the autopsy report for identification purposes, and it was marked
    C-40. N.T., 11/20/13, at 171. Further, at the close of the Commonwealth’s
    case-in-chief, the following relevant exchange occurred:
    [ADA]: Your Honor, with that, [the] Commonwealth would ask,
    first of all, for the exhibits to be entered into evidence which were
    marked and utilized throughout the trial.
    THE COURT: Those exhibits, those ones that have been marked
    and moved into evidence are now moved into evidence. They are
    in evidence.
    [Defense counsel], were there particular exhibits that were
    under objection? They were some that were just marked for
    identification, I think.
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, may we speak briefly at
    sidebar[?]
    THE COURT: You know what. All right. What we’re doing now is
    making sure the issue we have the number of exhibits that were
    actually utilized and which ones we’re saying are being allowed
    into evidence. We’ll come back and put those number for you.
    (Sidebar discussion off the record.)
    THE COURT: All right. [ADA], you may continue.
    ____________________________________________
    author’s] accompanying testimony only if [the author] was unavailable and
    [the defendant] had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him.” 
    Id. (quotation marks
    and quotation omitted). Since the defendant in Brown had no prior
    opportunity to cross-examine the author of the autopsy report, the Supreme
    Court held the admission of the autopsy report into evidence at trial was error.
    
    Id. However, the
    Supreme Court further found that the error was harmless
    since “the erroneously admitted autopsy report was merely cumulative of [a
    testifying expert forensic pathologist’s] independent opinion regarding the
    cause of death which was properly admissible.” 
    Id. at *10.
    - 26 -
    J-S26039-18
    [ADA]: Your Honor, continuing, the Commonwealth would ask to
    mark and enter into evidence the exhibits referenced throughout
    the trial, which, I believe go from Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1 to
    Commonwealth’s Exhibit, I believe it’s up to 51. And those that
    were relevantly marked and discussed.
    THE COURT: All right. Those are marked and they are moved in.
    And we will, I believe we’re going to show the jury some.
    [ADA]: Yes, Your Honor, following that, the Commonwealth
    would ask for publication that is actually handing to the jury,
    Commonwealth’s Exhibit C-1 through 15, the items that Officer
    Rodriguez actually drew on.
    THE COURT: So C-1 through C-15.             Just make sure [defense
    counsel] sees.
    [ADA]: Also 16.
    THE COURT: C-1 through 16 of what’s going to be shown to the
    jury.  So you are going to actually physically see these
    photographs. C-1 through 15, my staff will hand those around to
    you. Take the time you need to look through them.
    N.T., 11/22/13, at 60-62.
    As the record reveals, Appellant did not object to the admission of the
    autopsy report, and, thus, he has waived his claim of error.7 See Pa.R.A.P.
    302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised
    ____________________________________________
    7Appellant contends the trial court erred in its Rule 1925(a) opinion when it
    suggested that Appellant waived his challenge to the introduction of the
    autopsy report. See Appellant’s Brief 36 n.12. In support of his contention,
    he cites to pages 157-60 of the notes of trial testimony from November 20,
    2013. However, our review of the cited pages reveals that, while Appellant
    objected to Dr. Collins testifying instead of Dr. Blanchard, and specifically
    “ma[d]e a motion for mistrial allowing Dr. Collins to testify[,]” Appellant did
    not object to the introduction of the autopsy report. N.T., 11/20/13, at 157-
    60.
    - 27 -
    J-S26039-18
    for the first time on appeal.”); Commonwealth v. Rivera, 
    603 Pa. 340
    , 
    983 A.2d 1211
    , 1229 (2009) (holding lack of contemporaneous objection results
    in waiver of issue on appeal).8
    This does not end our inquiry, however, as Appellant has preserved his
    claim that the trial court violated his Confrontation Clause rights when it
    permitted Dr. Collins to offer expert opinions based on the autopsy report.
    Appellant argues that, in essence, the trial court permitted Dr. Collins to serve
    as an improper substitute for Dr. Blanchard, and, therefore, the trial court
    erred in denying his request for a mistrial.9
    The record reveals that Dr. Collins was accepted at trial as an expert
    forensic pathologist upon stipulation of the parties and following voir dire of
    his qualifications before the jury. The jury was informed that Dr. Collins, the
    Philadelphia Deputy Chief Medical Examiner, had performed approximately
    1500 autopsies, but he did not perform the autopsy of Mr. McNeil in the instant
    matter. N.T., 11/20/13, at 167. However, the jury was informed that Dr.
    ____________________________________________
    8 Even if not waived, as will be more thoroughly explained infra, to the extent
    the trial court erred in admitting the autopsy report, we conclude the error
    was harmless as it was merely cumulative of Dr. Collins’ independent opinion
    regarding the cause of death, which was properly admissible. See 
    Brown, supra
    .
    9Appellant properly raised an objection to Dr. Collins’ testimony in this regard
    at trial and made “a motion for mistrial allowing Dr. Collins to testify.” N.T.,
    11/20/13, at 157-59. The trial court overruled Appellant’s objection and
    denied the request for a mistrial. See 
    id. - 28
    -
    J-S26039-18
    Collins had reviewed the autopsy photographs of Mr. McNeil and the autopsy
    report prepared by Dr. Blanchard, as well as various hospital/medical records
    pertaining to Mr. McNeil.
    Based upon his review of these documents, the Commonwealth asked
    Dr. Collins to render his own opinion as to the cause and manner of Mr.
    McNeil’s death, and Dr. Collins testified that, in his opinion, the cause of Mr.
    McNeil’s death was “complications of blunt head trauma” and the manner of
    death was “homicide.” 
    Id. at 173.
    The Commonwealth argued at trial, as
    well as on appeal, that this testimony was admissible and did not violate the
    Confrontation Clause as Dr. Collins proffered his own independent expert
    conclusions regarding the cause and manner of death. The trial court agreed
    with the Commonwealth, and therefore, denied Appellant’s request for a
    mistrial. We find no error in this regard. See Commonwealth v. Jaynes,
    
    135 A.3d 606
    , 615 (Pa.Super. 2015) (setting forth standard of review for the
    denial of a motion for mistrial).
    In 
    Brown, supra
    , our Supreme Court was asked to determine whether
    an expert forensic pathologist, who had no role in the autopsy of the victim
    other than his review of the autopsy photographs and autopsy report prepared
    by a non-testifying witness, was permitted to testify that, in his opinion, “four
    gunshot wounds caused the victim’s death[.]” Brown, 
    2018 WL 2452643
    , at
    *10.   In holding the expert’s opinion was admissible, and there was no
    - 29 -
    J-S26039-18
    Confrontation Clause violation, our Supreme Court relevantly indicated the
    following:
    We recognize that in Bullcoming [v. New Mexico, 
    564 U.S. 647
    , 
    131 S. Ct. 2705
    (2011)], the High Court unquestionably
    held the right to confrontation is violated when the analyst who
    writes a report is not made available for cross-examination even
    if the report is wholly reliable. The testimony of a surrogate
    analyst is insufficient to vindicate the right to confrontation in such
    circumstances because cross-examination of the surrogate cannot
    expose any lapses or infirmities in the testing process or protocol
    employed by the analyst who authored the report. Significantly,
    for purposes of our present analysis, the Bullcoming Court noted
    no argument was presented in that case that the surrogate analyst
    had “any ‘independent opinion’ concerning Bullcoming’s BAC.”
    Here, [the expert forensic pathologist] testified his opinion four
    gunshot wounds caused the victim’s death was his own
    independent opinion.
    Additionally, unlike Bullcoming, this is not a case where a
    surrogate witness simply read a testimonial report authored by
    another into the record. In addition to the autopsy report, [the
    expert forensic pathologist] also examined autopsy photographs
    to support his own independent opinion as to the cause of death.
    Brown concedes the photographs were admissible evidence upon
    which [the expert forensic pathologist] could properly rely to
    inform his opinion. There is no Confrontation Clause concern over
    the opinions [the expert forensic pathologist] expressed based on
    his own review of the autopsy photographs because the photos
    were not testimonial statements of an unavailable witness. Thus,
    [the expert forensic pathologist], a medical examiner with many
    years’ experience, reached an independent opinion regarding the
    cause of death in part by examining data other than [the non-
    testifying witness’s] autopsy report.
    ***
    [W]e determine the factual scenario here differs from the
    factual scenario present in Bullcoming where the substitute
    analyst who testified at trial had no independent opinion regarding
    the defendant’s BAC. Here [the expert forensic pathologist]
    formed an independent conclusion and testified to that conclusion
    based on his own review of both the otherwise inadmissible facts
    and data contained in the report and the data provided by the
    autopsy photographs. Because [the expert forensic pathologist]
    - 30 -
    J-S26039-18
    properly formed an independent opinion, and was available to be
    cross-examined regarding the basis of that opinion, we conclude
    there was no Confrontation Clause violation with respect to his
    opinion regarding the cause of death.
    Brown, 
    2018 WL 2452643
    , at *10-12 (footnote and citations omitted).
    We conclude the factual scenario here is similar to that presented in
    Brown.     Specifically, in the case sub judice, Dr. Collins did not act as a
    surrogate witness simply reading a testimonial report authored by another
    into the record. Rather, he testified that based on his examination of the
    autopsy report, autopsy photographs, and hospital/medical records, it was his
    own independent opinion that the cause of Mr. McNeil’s death was
    “complications of blunt head trauma” and the manner of death was
    “homicide.” N.T., 11/20/13, at 171-73. The record reveals these were his
    own conclusions and he was not “merely parroting” Dr. Blanchard’s
    conclusions as set forth in the autopsy report. See 
    id. Further, Dr.
    Collins
    was available to be cross-examined regarding the basis of his opinions, and
    therefore, we conclude there was no Confrontation Clause violation with
    respect to his opinion regarding the cause and manner of Mr. McNeil’s death.
    See 
    Brown, supra
    .       Accordingly, we conclude Appellant is not entitled to
    relief on this claim.
    In his fourth issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred in permitting
    Dr. Collins to offer an opinion on re-direct examination regarding a
    hypothetical question posed by the Commonwealth related to whether Mr.
    McNeil would have died sooner had he not received full-time care in a nursing
    - 31 -
    J-S26039-18
    home. Appellant contends Dr. Collins’ expert opinion improperly exceeded the
    appropriate scope of his specialized knowledge on the subject under
    investigation in that he was an expert in pathology stemming from his work
    with deceased individuals as opposed to a medical doctor who treats living
    patients. Appellant’s Brief at 41.
    At trial, on the re-direct examination of Dr. Collins, the following
    relevant exchange occurred:
    [ADA]: Hypothetically, instead of releasing Mr. McNeil to a
    nursing home providing 100 percent care for him with feeding
    tubes with catheters with moving his body, there are things they
    had to do for him. If Temple Hospital put him out on the street
    that day, would he have been able to survive?
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I’m going to object, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: Can you give an opinion to that, Dr. Collins?
    THE WITNESS: Yes, I can, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: You may answer it.           And set forth reasons how
    you’re answering it.
    THE WITNESS: Let’s say he was sent home. He probably would
    not have survived as long. He would have probably developed
    depending, on how good his family was, may have developed bed
    sores, may have looked a lot more wasted. I wouldn’t have been
    surprised if he would have died a lot sooner.
    N.T., 11/20/13, at 224-25.
    Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence are within “the sound
    discretion of the trial court and its discretion will not be reversed absent a
    clear abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Thompson, 
    106 A.3d 742
    ,
    754 (Pa.Super. 2014). “Additionally, the trial court has discretion on the scope
    of re-direct examination.” Commonwealth v. Fransen, 
    42 A.3d 1100
    , 1117
    - 32 -
    J-S26039-18
    (Pa.Super. 2012) (en banc) (citation omitted).       “An expert may base an
    opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of
    or personally observed.” Pa.R.E. 703. Our courts have established that an
    expert may respond to a hypothetical with an opinion so long as the operative
    set of facts is eventually supported by competent evidence. Commonwealth
    v. Montalvo, 
    604 Pa. 386
    , 
    986 A.2d 84
    , 95 (2009). “The expert’s opinion is
    properly admissible to illuminate obscure and obtuse areas of knowledge. The
    hypothetical question should be employed to facilitate this end, focusing the
    witness’ expertise onto the narrow issue under consideration.”        Ranieli v.
    Mutual Life Ins. Co. of America, 
    413 A.2d 396
    , 398 (Pa.Super. 1979).
    Here, in explaining the reasons it permitted the hypothetical to be asked
    during the re-direct examination of Dr. Collins, the trial court indicated the
    following:
    At trial, Dr. Collins, as an expert in forensic pathology,
    testified that he had reviewed [Mr.] McNeil’s hospital and nursing
    home records and had formed his own opinion as to the manner
    and cause of [Mr.] McNeil’s death. In presenting the basis of his
    opinion that [Mr.] McNeil’s death was caused by complications of
    blunt force trauma, Dr. Collins gave testimony regarding [Mr.]
    McNeil’s brain contusion and the documented procedures
    performed to reduce fluid build-up in his brain that had resulted
    from a subdural hematoma.            His testimony explained the
    connection between the brain and the rest of the body and how
    brain injury affects other bodily systems. Specifically, he testified
    that [Mr.] McNeil’s head injury caused a significant bodily deficit,
    including [Mr.] McNeil’s inability to sit, walk, or care for himself.
    This reduced bodily movement resulted in muscle atrophy
    throughout his body and Dr. Collins further explained that such
    lack of movement allows fluid to build up in the lungs, causing
    reduced levels of oxygen in the body, and ultimately causing other
    organs to suffer and leading to death.
    - 33 -
    J-S26039-18
    In order to focus Dr. Collins’ expertise on the issue of
    determining the cause of [Mr.] McNeil’s death, the prosecutor
    presented the [] hypothetical [
    indicated supra
    ]….The hypothetical
    added no additional facts, but simply allowed the medical
    examiner to give an expert opinion as to how the extensive
    medical care sustained [Mr.] McNeil’s life beyond what it would
    have been without such care, given the serious injuries inflicted
    and the subsequent deterioration of his bodily function as
    documented in the medical records. As such, the hypothetical
    permitted Dr. Collins to properly focus his testimony on the bodily
    circumstances causing [Mr.] McNeil’s death without the life
    extending measures afforded by modern medicine and long term
    medical care.
    Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/15/16, at 20-21 (footnotes omitted). We find no
    abuse of discretion in this regard. 
    Thompson, supra
    .
    Further, we note that, during cross-examination, defense counsel asked
    Dr. Collins questions relating to whether the care Mr. McNeil received at the
    nursing home may have caused his ultimate demise. N.T., 11/20/13, 203-
    09. In this vein, defense counsel “opened the door” for the line of questioning
    contained in the hypothetical on re-direct examination. Accordingly, the trial
    court did not abuse its discretion in permitting re-direct on the issue in order
    to dispel defense counsel’s inferences. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 
    609 Pa. 605
    , 
    17 A.3d 873
    (2011) (holding if defense counsel opens the door to a
    line of questioning on cross-examination the trial court may permit the
    Commonwealth to continue the line of questioning on re-direct examination).
    In his fifth issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred in permitting
    the preliminary hearing testimony of Donta Wilkerson to be read into evidence
    at   Appellant’s   trial,   thus   violating    Appellant’s   confrontation   rights.
    - 34 -
    J-S26039-18
    Specifically, Appellant avers the Commonwealth failed to prove Mr. Wilkerson
    was unavailable for trial. He further contends that he did not have a full and
    fair opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Wilkerson at the preliminary hearing.
    As 
    indicated supra
    , whether Appellant’s confrontation rights were violated is
    a question of law, thus our standard of review is de novo and our scope of
    review is plenary. See 
    Brown, supra
    .
    “It is well-established…that the introduction of an unavailable witness’s
    prior recorded testimony from a preliminary hearing is admissible at trial and
    will not offend the right of confrontation, provided the defendant had counsel
    and a full opportunity to cross-examine that witness at the hearing.”
    Commonwealth v. McCrae, 
    574 Pa. 594
    , 
    832 A.2d 1026
    , 1035 (2003).
    Under the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, a witness is deemed unavailable if
    attendance at trial cannot be procured through reasonable means. Pa.R.E.
    804(a)(5)(A).
    With regard to the “full opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the
    prior proceeding,” our Supreme Court has held that, “[w]hether prior
    testimony was given at trial or at any other proceeding where, as here,
    admission of that prior testimony is being sought as substantive evidence
    against the accused, we conclude that the standard to be applied is that of full
    and fair opportunity to cross-examine.” Commonwealth v. Bazemore, 
    531 Pa. 582
    , 
    614 A.2d 684
    , 687 (1992) (emphasis in original). Where a defendant
    asserts that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine the
    - 35 -
    J-S26039-18
    witness at the preliminary hearing, he must establish that he was deprived of
    “vital impeachment evidence” at or before the time of the preliminary hearing.
    Commonwealth v. Leak, 
    22 A.3d 1036
    , 1044-45 (Pa.Super. 2011). “The
    Commonwealth may not be deprived of its ability to present inculpatory
    evidence at trial merely because the defendant, despite having the
    opportunity to do so, did not cross-examine the witness at the preliminary
    hearing as extensively as he might have done at trial.” 
    Id. at 1045
    (quotation
    omitted).
    Here, in rejecting Appellant’s claim that his confrontation rights were
    violated by the introduction of Mr. Wilkerson’s preliminary hearing testimony,
    the trial court relevantly indicated the following:
    Detectives Akin and Pitts provided th[e] [trial] [c]ourt with
    testimony regarding the Commonwealth’s efforts to locate [Mr.]
    Wilkerson. Prior to the preliminary hearing, Detective Pitts went
    to [] S. Frazier Street—the only address he had for [Mr.]
    Wilkerson—and spoke with [Mr.] Wilkerson’s sister-Nishea
    Wilkerson, who said she had not seen him. The detective left his
    card with contact information at the address. Detective Pitts next
    called a woman he believed to be [Mr.] Wilkerson’s girlfriend, who
    told the detective that “she wasn’t dealing with [Mr. Wilkerson]”
    and did not have any information on his whereabouts. Detective
    Pitts called the phone number [Mr.] Wilkerson had provided, which
    did not work. The detective searched for addresses for other
    members of [Mr.] Wilkerson’s family and the only address that
    ever came back was the [] S. Frazier Street address. Despite
    these seemingly failed attempts, [Mr.] Wilkerson called Detective
    Pitts the morning of the preliminary hearing and told him he would
    be there and [Mr.] Wilkerson did appear for the hearing.
    In preparation for trial, Detective Aiken and Pitts went back
    to the [] S. Frazier Street address approximately a month and a
    half before trial and spoke with Nishea Wilkerson, who said she
    had not seen [her brother]. The detectives left a subpoena at the
    address for [Mr.] Wilkerson. The detectives returned to the house
    - 36 -
    J-S26039-18
    on November 18, 2013[,] and November 19, 2013[,] and, again,
    spoke with Nishea Wilkerson[,] who still had not seen [Mr.
    Wilkerson]. The detectives contacted the morgue and area
    hospitals and did custody checks in both Pennsylvania and New
    Jersey and did not find [Mr.] Wilkerson’s name. The detectives
    checked the DMV and the only address returned for [Mr.]
    Wilkerson was the [] S. Frazier Street address. The detectives
    checked the address provided by [Mr.] Wilkerson at the time of
    his interview with the Homicide Unit in 2009 and further checked
    the addresses contained within his criminal record[.] [A]gain, the
    only address returned for [Mr.] Wilkerson was the [] S. Frazier
    Street address. The detectives also checked the Clear database
    and received no additional address information.
    On November 20, 2013, upon th[e] [trial] [c]ourt’s request,
    detectives went out to recheck [] S. Frazier Street along with three
    other addresses of possible family members. Detective Centino
    provided th[e] [trial] [c]ourt with testimony on the results of the
    search. The detective stated that one address had a tenant who
    had been renting since 2011 and did not know [Mr.] Wilkerson;
    the second had no response at the door; and at the third address,
    which was the suspected address of [Mr.] Wilkerson’s
    grandmother per information in [Mr.] Wilkerson’s statement to
    police, detectives spoke with [Mr. Wilkerson’s] uncle who had not
    seen him since the summer and indicated that [Mr. Wilkerson] had
    never lived at that address. Additionally, detectives went to [Mr.]
    Wilkerson’s last place of employment, per information in [Mr.]
    Wilkerson’s statement to police. Upon arrival at the address,
    which was reported to be a crisis center, the detectives instead
    found a church. Further, Detective Centino confirmed that [Mr.]
    Wilkerson had not received any welfare benefits and that his
    driver’s license was most recently validated in August, just three
    months earlier, at the [] S. Frazier Street address. In evaluating
    the detectives’ collective testimony, th[e] [trial] [c]ourt found the
    measures taken by the Commonwealth to be a reasonable…effort
    to locate [Mr.] Wilkerson and taken in conjunction with [Mr.]
    Graham’s earlier testimony regarding the alleged threats to [Mr.]
    Wilkerson’s life, [which were made by Appellant], th[e] [trial]
    [c]ourt determined that [Mr.] Wilkerson was unavailable.
    Having found [Mr.] Wilkerson to be unavailable, th[e] [trial]
    [c]ourt next assessed whether [Appellant] had a full and fair
    opportunity to cross-examine [Mr.] Wilkerson at the preliminary
    hearing. [Appellant] had the opportunity to inquire as to what
    [Mr.] Wilkerson saw the night of the incident, the identity of the
    - 37 -
    J-S26039-18
    person involved in the incident, and the circumstances
    surrounding his statement to [the] police. Throughout the cross-
    examination, [Appellant] procured testimony that was
    inconsistent with the information provided in [Mr.] Wilkerson’s
    signed statement to police. Based upon the testimony from the
    preliminary hearing, [the trial court] found that [Appellant] was
    represented by counsel and had a full and fair opportunity to test
    [Mr.] Wilkerson’s credibility as a witness; thus, [the trial court]
    permitted [Mr.] Wilkerson’s preliminary hearing testimony to be
    read at trial.
    Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/15/16, at 13-16 (footnotes omitted).
    The record supports the trial court’s ruling, and we find no error.10 See
    Bazemore, supra; Pa.R.E. 804(a)(5)(A).
    In his sixth issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred in permitting
    a jailhouse informant, Jermaine Graham, to testify about alleged death threats
    Appellant made regarding Donta Wilkerson. Specifically, Appellant contends
    Mr. Graham’s testimony (that Appellant told him that Appellant’s brother was
    supposed to kill Donta because Donta was talking about the crime) constituted
    evidence of other bad acts. He alleges that, since the Commonwealth failed
    to provide reasonable notice of its intent to introduce Mr. Graham’s testimony,
    the trial court should have excluded the testimony under Pa.R.E. 404(b)(3).
    ____________________________________________
    10To the extent Appellant suggests he did not have a “full and fair opportunity”
    to cross-examine Donta Wilkerson at the preliminary hearing because the
    Commonwealth did not provide Appellant with Jermaine Graham’s police
    statement, which was given one month after the preliminary hearing, we note
    Mr. Graham’s statement implicated Appellant in the assault. Appellant has
    not explained how Mr. Graham’s statement constituted “vital impeachment
    evidence” or, in fact, how it would have assisted him at the preliminary
    hearing. Leak, supra.
    - 38 -
    J-S26039-18
    Further, Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for a
    mistrial based on Mr. Graham’s testimony as the evidence of prior bad acts
    was “absurdly prejudicial.” Appellant’s Brief at 51.
    We review a trial court's decision to admit or deny evidence for abuse
    of discretion or error of law.   Commonwealth v. Lopez, 
    57 A.3d 74
    , 81
    (Pa.Super. 2012). “Thus our standard of review is very narrow. To constitute
    reversible error, an evidentiary ruling must not only be erroneous, but also
    harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party.” 
    Id. Rule 404(b)
    of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence permits admission of
    prior bad acts evidence in certain circumstances. Rule 404(b)(3) requires the
    Commonwealth to provide the defense reasonable notice of its intent to
    introduce such evidence. Specifically, the Rule relevantly provides:
    In a criminal case the prosecutor must provide reasonable notice
    in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial
    notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such
    evidence the prosecutor intends to introduce at trial.
    Pa.R.E. 404(b)(3). “The purpose of this rule is to prevent unfair surprise, and
    to give the defendant reasonable time to prepare an objection to, or ready a
    rebuttal for, such evidence. However, there is no requirement that the ‘notice’
    must be formally given or be in writing in order for the evidence to be
    admissible.”   Commonwealth v. Lynch, 
    57 A.3d 120
    , 125–26 (Pa.Super.
    2012) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has held
    that sufficient notice exists where the prior bad acts evidence was discussed
    during a preliminary hearing or where the defense received the evidence in
    - 39 -
    J-S26039-18
    discovery. Commonwealth v. Stallworth, 
    566 Pa. 349
    , 
    781 A.2d 110
    , 118
    n.2 (2001).
    Here, during the trial, defense counsel indicated that the Commonwealth
    provided Mr. Graham’s statement to him on October 31, 2013, approximately
    three weeks prior to trial. N.T., 11/20/13, at 26. Defense counsel admitted
    that he reviewed Mr. Graham’s statement with Appellant prior to trial. 
    Id. at 26-28.
    Without evidence of unfair surprise, the trial court ruled the
    Commonwealth did not violate Pa.R.E. 404(b)(3)’s reasonable notice
    requirement. We find no abuse of discretion in this regard.11 
    Lopez, supra
    .
    With regard to Appellant’s claim that he was entitled to a mistrial
    because Mr. Graham’s testimony was unfairly prejudicial, we note:
    In criminal trials, declaration of a mistrial serves to eliminate the
    negative effect wrought upon a defendant when prejudicial
    elements are injected into the case or otherwise discovered at
    trial. By nullifying the tainted process of the former trial and
    allowing a new trial to convene, declaration of a mistrial serves
    not only the defendant’s interest but, equally important, the
    public’s interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments.
    Accordingly, the trial court is vested with discretion to grant a
    mistrial whenever the alleged prejudicial event may reasonably be
    said to deprive the defendant of a fair and impartial trial. In
    ____________________________________________
    11 At trial, Appellant contended the Commonwealth should be excluded from
    offering Mr. Graham’s testimony about Appellant’s alleged plot to have Donta
    Wilkerson killed. However, as it pertains to a violation of Rule 404(b)(3),
    defense counsel did not argue “unfair surprise.” Rather, he argued that, as a
    matter of law, in order to offer evidence of other bad acts, the Commonwealth
    was required to “file[] a motion under 404B under the Rules of Evidence which
    the Commonwealth [did not do] in this case.” N.T., 11/20/13, at 23. As
    
    indicated supra
    , “there is no requirement that the ‘notice’ must be formally
    given or be in writing in order for the evidence to be admissible.” 
    Lynch, 57 A.3d at 125-26
    .
    - 40 -
    J-S26039-18
    making its determination, the court must discern whether
    misconduct or prejudicial error actually occurred, and if
    so,...assess the degree of any resulting prejudice. Our review of
    the resulting order is constrained to determining whether the
    court abused its discretion. Judicial discretion requires action in
    conformity with [the] law on facts and circumstances before the
    trial court after hearing and consideration. Consequently, the
    court abuses its discretion if, in resolving the issue for decision, it
    misapplies the law or exercises its discretion in a manner lacking
    reason.
    
    Jaynes, 135 A.3d at 615
    (quotations and citation omitted).
    The trial court’s decision to admit evidence is subject to review for an
    abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Dengler, 
    586 Pa. 54
    , 
    890 A.2d 372
    ,
    379 (2005). Here, as the trial court held, the bad acts evidence at issue was
    probative of Appellant’s consciousness of guilt.       Trial Court Opinion, filed
    12/15/16, at 10 (citing Commonwealth v. Flamer, 
    53 A.3d 82
    (Pa.Super.
    2012, and Commonwealth v. King, 
    689 A.2d 918
    (Pa.Super. 1997)).
    However, such evidence may be admitted “only if the probative value of the
    evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2).
    In balancing whether the probative value of the evidence outweighed its
    prejudicial effect, the trial court relevantly noted that, in addition to being
    probative of Appellant’s guilt, Mr. Graham’s testimony regarding Appellant’s
    desire to have Donta Wilkerson killed was illustrative of Mr. Wilkerson’s
    unavailability as a witness at trial. Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/15/16, at 11-
    12. Further, Mr. Graham’s testimony was not cumulative of other evidence
    presented at trial. See 
    id. Thus, the
    trial court held the probative value of
    the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. See 
    id. - 41
    -
    J-S26039-18
    We find no abuse of discretion in this regard. See 
    Dengler, supra
    . As
    our Supreme Court has held, “[t]he trial court is not required to sanitize the
    trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts from the jury’s consideration[.]”
    Commonwealth v. Hairston, 
    624 Pa. 143
    , 
    84 A.3d 657
    , 666 (2014)
    (quotation marks and quotation omitted). Although evidence of Appellant’s
    plan to have Donta Wilkerson killed may have been prejudicial, it was not
    unduly so. See 
    id. As the
    comment to Rule 403 instructs, “‘[u]nfair prejudice’
    means a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis or to divert the
    jury’s attention away from its duty of weighing the evidence impartially.”
    Pa.R.E. 403 cmt.   “As with motive, the Commonwealth must be given the
    opportunity to show the strength of the defendant’s consciousness of guilt
    through all admissible evidence. The highly probative nature of this evidence
    clearly outweighs any undue prejudice arising from its admission.” 
    Flamer, 53 A.3d at 88
    . Thus, since the bad acts evidence at issue was introduced for
    a legitimate purpose, and was not so prejudicial that it likely diverted the
    jury’s attention away from its duty of weighing the evidence impartially, we
    conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s
    motion for a mistrial. See 
    Jaynes, supra
    .
    In his seventh issue, Appellant contends the trial court abused its
    discretion in limiting his cross-examination of Detectives James Pitts, to whom
    Donta Wilkerson gave his pre-trial police statement. Specifically, Appellant
    contends the trial court erred in preventing him from cross-examining the
    - 42 -
    J-S26039-18
    detective with a Philadelphia Enquirer news article, which reported allegations
    made against the detective, as well as his partner, Detective Jenkins,
    pertaining to the use of coercive and abusive techniques to obtain witness
    statements. We find this issue to be waived.
    Here, at trial, the trial court sua sponte brought up the issue regarding
    the newspaper article. Specifically, the trial court indicated that it wanted to
    make defense counsel aware of the newspaper article so that he would have
    an opportunity to determine whether it should be used for cross-examination
    purposes. N.T., 11/20/13, at 149. Defense counsel indicated that he had
    heard about and “skimmed” the article. 
    Id. at 150.
    Defense counsel indicated
    that, if Mr. Wilkerson’s preliminary hearing notes were read into evidence,
    “Detective Pitts on the stand…may raise [issues] with regard to objections
    against Detective Pitts.” 
    Id. at 155.
    The trial court indicated that it would
    give the defense an opportunity to develop a position on the issue but that at
    that point it just wanted to bring the article to everyone’s attention. 
    Id. In response,
    the prosecutor noted that, “given the serious nature of what the
    Court is raising as a possible thing for the defense to raise,” she needed to
    speak to her supervisor. 
    Id. The trial
    court indicated that it was not ruling
    on anything but was giving the parties time to determine their positions. 
    Id. at 156.
    - 43 -
    J-S26039-18
    Later that same day, near the conclusion of the proceedings, defense
    counsel indicated that, as it pertained to possible cross-examination of
    Detectives Pitts and Jenkins, should they decide to testify:
    I don’t know if there is any kind of Internal Affairs
    investigation going on, headquarters investigation going on,
    ethics accountability investigation going on.     These would
    probably be issues that might have to be investigated before
    Detective Pitts or Detective Jenkins can be cross-examined. I
    don’t know what the Commonwealth’s position---
    
    Id. at 243-44.
    The trial court noted that the court had no further information, and
    defense counsel asked for time to “wrap [his] head around it.” 
    Id. at 244.
    Defense counsel thanked the trial court for its “indulgence.” 
    Id. at 246.
    In
    response, the prosecutor noted that her position was that the newspaper
    article was not an appropriate area of cross-examination as it was based on
    speculation and unsubstantiated allegations. 
    Id. at 247.
    In response, defense
    counsel indicated the newspaper article was “only one part of the inquiry[,]”
    and the other inquiry is whether there are formal investigations pending
    against the detectives. 
    Id. at 248.
          The trial court noted that the court did
    not “believe you would be able to cross-examine those detectives with what
    other people said they did or didn’t do. So if that’s all it is, well, it’s just other
    people who are unhappy with how they were treated by those detectives
    during a homicide investigation.” 
    Id. at 250.
    In any event, the trial court
    indicated that defense counsel could investigate the matter and, if an in
    camera hearing was need, the trial court would hold one. 
    Id. at 250-51.
    - 44 -
    J-S26039-18
    The next day, the trial court asked the prosecutor and defense counsel
    if they had an “opportunity to flesh out [any] objection” regarding Detectives
    Pitts and Jenkins.   N.T., 11/21/13, at 15.      Defense counsel indicated he
    “checked around” and the detectives had no open federal lawsuits pending
    against them, although there were “numerous Internal Affairs complaints that
    have been made against Detective Pitts.”         
    Id. at 16.
       Defense counsel
    indicated “I don’t know if this Court wants to bring this case to a halt so that
    a subpoena can be issued to Internal Affairs to allow for that information to
    be reviewed in camera.” 
    Id. The trial
    court agreed to an in camera hearing
    to determine whether it was “just a newspaper report.” 
    Id. at 34-35.
    At the conclusion of the in camera hearing, the trial court indicated that
    the newspaper article contained nothing more than an attorney’s beliefs about
    a case involving his client, as well as “reports of people being contacted and
    unhappy about things[.]”     
    Id. at 35.
       The trial court noted there was no
    information that “would create proper impeachment for either Detective Pitts
    or Detective Jenkins[.]”   
    Id. at 36.
        The trial court indicated it would not
    “continue the case so that we can determine whether there’s any validity
    because of something in the newspaper because it’s a fishing expedition.” 
    Id. at 36.
    The trial court indicated that, based on the newspaper article itself,
    “there certainly isn’t enough to allow any kind of cross-examination or
    impeachment of the detectives based on the newspaper article.” 
    Id. In response,
    defense counsel indicated the following:
    - 45 -
    J-S26039-18
    With all due respect, I have to disagree with the Court about
    the fishing expedition, the IAD file. The information that I have is
    that allegations of misconduct have been made against Detective
    Pitts. I have not seen any of those complaints nor have any of
    those complaints have [sic] been made by any specific individual
    that I am aware of.
    I have been advised by [an attorney] the IAD complaints
    were made against Detective Pitts. He is aware of complaints
    against him. So I don’t think it’s a fishing expedition.
    I understand the Court’s position that you don’t want to stop
    a jury trial in progress for IAD files to be produced, but I think this
    is more than a fishing expedition, under the circumstances.
    I respectfully submit the Court is going to allow Detective
    Pitts to testify. I can certainly agree with the Court. Questioning
    someone about a newspaper article which can certainly contain
    anything and may be based upon complete speculation or
    conjecture or can’t be pursued because the person who is getting
    the report to write the article is probably not proper. I think there
    may be more here. The defense is going to be deprived of an
    opportunity to investigate that, pursue those avenues.
    
    Id. at 38-39.
    Based on the aforementioned, we conclude that, although defense
    counsel sought additional time to pursue whether there was any merit to the
    allegations in the newspaper article, which the trial court denied, defense
    counsel agreed with the trial court that it would be improper to cross-examine
    Detective Pitts based on an unsubstantiated newspaper report of “complete
    speculation or conjecture[.]” 
    Id. at 39.
    Thus, to the extent defense counsel
    now complains the trial court should have permitted him to cross-examine
    Detective Pitts with regard to the newspaper article, without corroborating
    information, we find the issue to be waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues
    not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time
    - 46 -
    J-S26039-18
    on appeal.”); 
    Rivera, supra
    (holding lack of contemporaneous objection
    results in waiver of issue on appeal).
    In any event, even if not waived, we note that the scope of cross-
    examination is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and will not be
    reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Commonwealth v. Hitcho, 
    633 Pa. 51
    , 
    123 A.3d 731
    , 769 (2015). When a trial court determines the scope
    of cross-examination, it may consider whether the matter is collateral, the
    cross-examination would be likely to confuse or mislead the jury, and the
    cross-examination would waste time. Commonwealth v. Brinton, 
    418 A.2d 734
    , 736 (Pa.Super. 1980). Here, the trial court suggested that the use of an
    unsubstantiated, speculative newspaper article for impeachment purposes
    would confuse or mislead the jury.       In this regard, we find no abuse of
    discretion. See 
    Hitcho, supra
    .
    In his eighth issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying
    his motion for a mistrial with regard to testimony offered by Detective Phillip
    Nordo during direct examination.     Specifically, Appellant contends the trial
    court erred in permitting Detective Nordo to testify that Jarrett Washington,
    who did not testify, provided information to the police, which then led the
    police to put together a photo array, which included Appellant’s photo, from
    which Mr. Tabron identified Appellant. Appellant contends Detective Nordo’s
    testimony presented “hearsay testimony through a back door.” Appellant’s
    Brief at 57.
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    J-S26039-18
    “Hearsay is an out of court statement offered to prove the truth of the
    matter asserted.” Commonwealth v. Manivannan, 
    2018 WL 2076100
    , *5
    (Pa.Super. filed 5/4/18) (citation omitted). Pa.R.E. 801 defines “statement”
    as “a person’s oral assertion, written assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the
    person intended it as an assertion.” Pa.R.E. 801(a).
    The following portion of Detective Nordo’s direct examination is
    relevant:
    Q. Detective Nordo, on January 18 of 2010, at 10:45 p.m., did
    you have occasion to speak to a man named Jarrett Washington,
    in this case named Street?
    A. Yes
    Q. Now, subsequent to that, were two photo arrays prepared?
    Yes.
    ***
    Q. Now, Detective, taking a look at, beginning with
    Commonwealth’s Exhibit C-21, one of the photo arrays you have
    in front of you?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And can you tell us on what date and what time that photo
    array was prepared based on the stamping in the bottom right-
    hand corner?
    A. It’s stamped 1/18/2010 at 11:42 p.m.
    Q. Yes. Turning to Commonwealth’s Exhibit C-22, can you tell us
    on what date and time that was prepared?
    A. Stamp appears 1/18/2010 11:55 p.m.
    Q. Now following the preparation of those two photo arrays, did
    you have occasion then to speak with Mr. Tabron again?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Specifically, what time did you speak to Mr. Tabron again?
    A. It was early morning hours. As a matter of fact it’s recorded
    here, 1:20 a.m.
    - 48 -
    J-S26039-18
    Q. As you showed those photo arrays that were marked as C-21
    and C-22 as you showed the photo array, did you ask Mr. Tabron
    questions about the photo arrays?
    A. Yes.
    ***
    Q. And as you showed Mr. Tabron this photo array, did you record
    down what you asked him and what his response was?
    A. It was recorded, yes.
    ***
    Q. And specifically what did he say in his statement?
    A. I wanted to do my best to read this writing, this handwriting
    here from the detective. Yes, that’s the guy who did run and come
    at me. Then it has here, “The witness positively identified Eric,”
    the defendant.
    N.T., 11/22/13, at 48-50.12
    In rejecting Appellant’s claim, the trial court indicated the following:
    Based upon th[e] [trial court’s] instructions to both the
    witness and the district attorney, the questioning of Detective
    Nordo was extremely tailored and did not go beyond the scope of
    the detective merely indicating that he had spoken with [Mr.]
    Washington. The direct examination of the detective was void of
    any inquiry as to the content of the interaction with [Mr.]
    Washington and, as such, the detective’s testimony was free of
    any hearsay statements. The testimony was properly permitted
    to explain the course of the detective’s investigation, which
    culminated in the preparation of photo arrays that were shown to
    the eyewitness, Wallace Tabron, who positively identified
    [Appellant]. Accordingly, the introduction of such testimony did
    not deprive [Appellant] of a fair and impartial trial[, thus the trial
    court] properly denied [Appellant’s] motion for a mistrial.
    ____________________________________________
    12 In anticipation of Detective Nordo’s testimony, Appellant lodged an
    objection and requested a mistrial. N.T. 11/22/13, at 39-45.
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    J-S26039-18
    Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/15/16, at 23-24.     We find no abuse of discretion
    in this regard. See 
    Jaynes, supra
    . Specifically, as the trial court determined,
    Detective Nordo did not testify as to any “oral assertion, written assertion, or
    nonverbal conduct” of Jarrett Washington. Pa.R.E. 801.
    In his ninth issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his
    request to charge the jury on involuntary manslaughter since there was
    evidence of record that could reasonably support such a verdict. 13         In this
    vein, Appellants points to Donta Wilkerson’s police statement.
    “[O]ur standard of review when considering the denial of jury
    instructions is one of deference—an appellate court will reverse a court’s
    decision only when it abused its discretion or committed an error of law.”
    Commonwealth v. Yale, 
    150 A.3d 979
    , 983 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citation
    omitted). An “[involuntary] manslaughter charge shall be given only when
    requested, where the offense has been made an issue in the case, and the
    trial evidence reasonably would support such a verdict.” Commonwealth v.
    Patton, 
    936 A.2d 1170
    , 1177 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). “A person
    is guilty of involuntary manslaughter when as a direct result of the doing of
    an unlawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner...he causes the death
    ____________________________________________
    13   Appellant preserved this claim in the trial court. N.T., 11/22/13, at 65-84.
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    J-S26039-18
    of another person.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2504(a). 14 Where the evidence does not
    support the inference that the death was the result of reckless or grossly
    negligent behavior attributable to Appellant, an involuntary manslaughter
    instruction is unwarranted. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 
    511 Pa. 343
    , 
    513 A.2d 1371
    , 1377–78 (1986).
    Here, contrary to Appellant’s assertion, Donta Wilkerson’s police
    statement does not support the contention that Mr. McNeil’s death was a result
    of Appellant’s grossly negligent or reckless actions. Instead, viewing Donta
    Wilkerson’s statement in the light most favorable to Appellant, Donta informed
    the police that Appellant “acted as if” he was going to engage in a drug deal;
    however, instead, Appellant “tried to snatch the money out of [Mr. McNeil’s]
    hand.” N.T., 11/21/13, at 187-89. Donta indicated that Appellant told Mr.
    McNeil to “give me the money” and, when he would not do so, Appellant struck
    the “old man in the head twice with his hand[,]” resulting in Mr. McNeil hitting
    his head hard on the concrete. Donta further indicated that, after the incident,
    Appellant told him he hit the victim because “he was not trying to give that
    ____________________________________________
    14 In context of the Crimes Code, “reckless” conduct is the conscious disregard
    of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element of the offense
    will result from the conduct. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(3). A person acts
    negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should
    be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element
    exists or will result from his conduct. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(4).
    - 51 -
    J-S26039-18
    bread up.” 
    Id. Donta confirmed
    Appellant took money from Mr. McNeil. 
    Id. at 192-93.
    We agree with the trial court that Donta Wilkerson’s statement, even
    when viewed in the light most favorable to Appellant, reveals that Appellant
    robbed the victim and, during the robbery, he struck the unarmed victim twice
    in the face, resulting in the victim falling and hitting his head on the concrete.
    Such evidence does not support the inference that Mr. McNeil’s death was the
    result of reckless or grossly negligent behavior attributable to Appellant, and
    thus the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s request for an involuntary
    manslaughter instruction.15 See Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    490 Pa. 187
    ,
    
    415 A.2d 403
    (1980) (holding the appellant was not entitled to an involuntary
    manslaughter instruction where there was no evidence that the killing resulted
    from an accident or negligence; but rather, all evidence reasonably pointed to
    the appellant striking the victim in the head with a pipe during a robbery).
    In his tenth issue, citing to Pa.R.Crim.P. 601(C),16 Appellant contends
    the trial court erred in permitting another judge to preside over a portion of
    Appellant’s trial, thus requiring a new trial. We find this issue to be waived.
    ____________________________________________
    15Appellant does not point to any other evidence in support of his claim that
    he was entitled to an involuntary manslaughter instruction.
    16 Pa.R.Crim.P. 601(C) provides that “[t]he judge who is present from the time
    the trial commences shall be considered the trial judge and shall be present,
    except in extraordinary circumstances, until a verdict is recorded or the jury
    is discharged.”
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    J-S26039-18
    The record reveals that the Honorable Linda Carpenter presided over
    Appellant’s trial; however, during jury deliberations, Judge Carpenter “became
    extremely ill,” and thus, the Honorable Barbara McDermott presided when the
    court reconvened to give a supplemental jury instruction17 and accept the
    jury’s verdict. See Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/15/16, at 27. Appellant does
    not point to any objection that he lodged with regard to Judge McDermott
    sitting for Judge Carpenter, and our review of the record does not reveal such
    an objection. Thus, Appellant has waived his claim of error on appeal.18 See
    Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot
    be raised for the first time on appeal.”); 
    Rivera, supra
    (holding lack of
    contemporaneous objection results in waiver).
    In his final issue, Appellant presents a legality of sentencing claim.
    Specifically, Appellant contends that his sentence is illegal since his robbery
    conviction merges with his second-degree murder conviction for sentencing
    purposes.
    ____________________________________________
    17 The record reveals that Judge McDermott consulted with Judge Carpenter
    via the telephone with regard to the supplemental jury instruction. N.T.,
    11/25/13, at 3-16.
    18 Notably, Appellant has developed no appellate argument disputing that
    Judge Carpenter’s illness constituted “extraordinary circumstances” as
    provided for in Pa.R.Crim.P. 601(C).
    - 53 -
    J-S26039-18
    “A claim that crimes should have merged for sentencing purposes raises
    a challenge to the legality of the sentence. Therefore, our standard of review
    is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Quintua,
    
    56 A.3d 399
    , 400 (Pa.Super. 2013). “A challenge to the legality of the
    sentence may be raised as a matter of right, is non-waivable, and may be
    entertained so long as the reviewing court has jurisdiction.” Commonwealth
    v. Robinson, 
    931 A.2d 15
    , 19–20 (Pa.Super. 2007) (en banc).
    Whether offenses merge at sentencing implicates Section 9765 of the
    Sentencing Code, which provides:
    § 9765. Merger of sentences
    No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the crimes
    arise from a single criminal act and all of the statutory elements
    of one offense are included in the statutory elements of the other
    offense. Where crimes merge for sentencing purposes, the court
    may sentence the defendant only on the higher graded offense.
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9765.        In light of our Supreme Court’s decision in
    Commonwealth v. Tarver, 
    493 Pa. 320
    , 
    426 A.2d 569
    (1981), a sentencing
    court has no authority to impose a sentence for felony murder as well as a
    sentence for the predicate offense. In other words, a predicate felony and
    second-degree murder ipso facto (1) arise from a single criminal act, and (2)
    all of the elements of the predicate felony are included within the elements of
    second-degree murder. See Commonwealth v. Adams, 
    39 A.3d 310
    , 325
    (Pa.Super. 2012), affirmed, 
    104 A.3d 511
    (Pa. 2014).
    - 54 -
    J-S26039-18
    Here, Appellant contends that his robbery of Mr. McNeil was the
    predicate felony for his second-degree murder conviction, and thus, the two
    convictions merged for sentencing purposes. The trial court concluded that
    Appellant committed two separate robberies (one when he took money from
    Mr. McNeil’s hand during the struggle and one when he took money from Mr.
    McNeil’s wallet after rifling through Mr. McNeil’s pockets).   See Trial Court
    Opinion, filed 12/15/16, at 29. Thus, the trial court reasoned that, while one
    of the robberies was a predicate offense for second-degree murder, the other
    robbery did not arise from a single criminal act such that it did not merge for
    sentencing purposes. See 
    id. We agree
    with the trial court that the record supports the conclusion
    that Appellant’s crimes did not arise from a single criminal act. He committed
    two distinct robberies: one that was the predicate offense for second-degree
    murder and a second robbery that occurred as Mr. McNeil lay on the ground
    in a semi-conscious state. In this regard, we note, as stated in an Opinion
    authored by P.J.E. Bender:
    When considering whether there is a single criminal act or multiple
    criminal acts, the question is not whether there was a break in the
    chain of criminal activity. Th[e] issue is whether the actor
    commits multiple criminal acts beyond that which is necessary to
    establish the bare elements of the additional crime, [and if so,]
    then the actor will be guilty of multiple crimes which do not merge
    for sentencing purposes.
    Commonwealth v. Pettersen, 
    49 A.3d 903
    , 912 (Pa.Super. 2012)
    (quotations and quotation marks omitted).
    - 55 -
    J-S26039-18
    In Pettersen, the trial court sentenced the appellant to, inter alia,
    consecutive terms of imprisonment on three counts of aggravated assault
    after he broke into the victim’s residence, struck her in the head with a
    hammer, stabbed her ten times and placed a bag over her head and attempted
    to suffocate her. 
    Id. at 906–07.
    This Court rejected the appellant’s argument
    that the aggravated assault charges merged for sentencing purposes.
    Specifically, we held:
    Although the time between the separate acts was relatively short,
    the three assaults were committed with different weapons and
    caused distinct injuries to different parts of the victim’s body.
    When [the] [a]ppellant struck the victim in the back of the head
    with a hammer, he committed an aggravated assault. When [the]
    [a]ppellant stabbed the victim multiple times in the chest and
    back, he committed at least one aggravated assault. And [the]
    [a]ppellant committed an aggravated assault when he attempted
    to suffocate the victim by placing a plastic bag over her head.
    [The] [a]ppellant is not entitled to a volume discount for these
    crimes simply because he managed to accomplish all the acts
    within a relatively short period of time.
    
    Id. at 912.
    Similarly, in the case sub judice, Appellant committed two separate
    robberies. Specifically, he committed the first robbery, which was a predicate
    offense of his second-degree murder conviction, when he grabbed money from
    the victim’s hand while threatening and striking the victim with a crowbar.
    Further, after the victim fell to the ground and lay in a semi-conscious state,
    Appellant went through his pockets, removed his wallet, and emptied it of its
    - 56 -
    J-S26039-18
    contents. As the trial court notes, the fact that Appellant committed his two
    robberies within a relatively short period did not require merger.19   See 
    id. For all
    of the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
    Affirmed.
    P.J.E. BENDER joins the Opinion.
    Judge Bowes files a Concurring Opinion.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 1/8/19
    ____________________________________________
    19 Here, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with one count of robbery.
    However, our Supreme Court has held that “[w]here a murder is alleged to
    have been committed in the perpetration of a felony, there is no requirement
    that the defendant actually be charged with the underlying felony.”
    Commonwealth v. Giles, 
    500 Pa. 413
    , 
    456 A.2d 1356
    , 1359 (1983).
    Accordingly, the trial court reasoned that the Commonwealth did not charge
    Appellant with the first robbery, which was the predicate offense for second-
    degree murder; however, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with the
    second robbery, which occurred while the victim lay semi-conscious on the
    ground.
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