Commonwealth v. Stahley ( 2018 )

J-A18016-18
2018 PA Super 346COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
TRISTAN STAHLEY :
:
Appellant : No. 3109 EDA 2017
Appeal from the PCRA Order August 28, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division
at No(s): CP-46-CR-0005026-2013
BEFORE: STABILE, J., STEVENS*, P.J.E., and STRASSBURGER**, J.
OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 19, 2018
Appellant, Tristan Stahley, appeals from the order entered in the Court
of Common Pleas of Montgomery County dismissing his petition filed under
the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 1941-1946. Herein, he
contends the PCRA court erroneously denied his ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claims and his legality of sentencing claim based on the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410(Pa. 2017) ("Batts II") (devising procedural safeguards to ensure proper
implementation of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) in the
consideration of life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders). We
affirm.
The PCRA court aptly provides a comprehensive recitation of relevant
facts and procedural history, as follows:
____________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
** Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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[Appellant’s stipulated non-jury trial] established that on May 25,
2013, Appellant murdered Julianne Siller, who was 17 years-old.
N.T. (trial), 9/29/14, at 13. Appellant was 16 years of age at the
time of the murder. Id.On the night of the incident, a dispatch came into the State Police
of a stabbing in Palmer Park. Id. The two responding troopers
went to Appellant’s house, where they saw Appellant and his
father on the ground fighting. Id. After separating the two,
Appellant [made] a statement that he stabbed his girlfriend
because she broke up with him and that he thought she would
hook up with other people. Id.The troopers took Appellant to Palmer Park and he directed them
to the trail where [ ] Ms. Siller was [lying]. Id. There was blood
on the trail and a trail of blood [leading] into the woods of the
park. Id. Appellant’s DNA was found at the scene. There was
DNA on the knife used to kill Ms. Siller. Id. at 13-14. The handle
of the knife contained Appellant’s DNA and on the blade was [DNA
belonging to] Ms. Siller. Id. at 14. In addition, one of the troopers
found blood in the bathroom at Palmer Park that was genetically
matched to Appellant. Id.
At the scene of the crime the troopers found Ms. Siller’s jean
jacket with a stab wound in it, a shirt that had blood on it, stab
wounds on Ms. Siller, and the murder weapon, 10 feet from Ms.
Siller’s body. Id.
Trooper Barry Bertolet took custody of Appellant at the scene
when Ms. Siller’s body was found. Id. Trooper Bertolet went
through the Miranda[1] warnings form with Appellant while in the
presence of his mother. Id. Appellant and his mother both signed
the form, indicating they understood all of his rights. Id.
Appellant gave the troopers a statement. During this statement
Appellant told the trooper that he was sober and that he
understood what was going on. Id. In the statement, Appellant
gave a rendition of the facts, wherein he said that he and Ms. Siller
were in a relationship, but they were on-again, off-again and that
she would always come back. Id. at 15. Additionally, he told the
troopers that they got into a fight that night about her going out
____________________________________________
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
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and that he stabbed her in the neck with the knife. Id. The
trooper asked Appellant, “When did you make the decision in your
mind?” [Appellant] replied, “About two seconds before I did it.”
Id.An autopsy was performed on Ms. Siller and the cause of death
was determined to be multiple stab and cutting wounds, and the
manner of death was homicide. Id. Ms. Siller suffered over 75
stab wounds to her body, including 27 to her head and neck and
45 to her torso and shoulders. Id.At the conclusion of trial, [the trial court] found Appellant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of murder in the first degree. Id. at
19.
On December 17, 2014, a sentencing hearing was held. After
considering the Miller v. Alabama, [567 U.S. 460 (2012)] factors
as codified in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1 and stating its reasons on the
record, including the finding of irreparable corruption, [the trial
court] imposed a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.
No appeal was filed.
On December 22, 2015, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition.
Counsel was appointed, and after multiple extensions of time,
PCRA counsel filed an Amended PCRA Petition on February 13,
2017.
A PCRA Hearing was conducted on July 25, 2017. Appellant’s trial
counsel, Timothy Barton, a seasoned defense attorney of 29
years, provided credible testimony as follows.
Attorney Barton’s involvement in this case began when he had
been privately retained by the Stahleys. Id. at 4. In his initial
meeting with the Stahley family, he discussed the scope and
nature of his representation and he also interviewed Mr. and Mrs.
Stahley regarding anything they might know about the incident.
N.T., (PCRA hearing), 7/25/17, at 5.
Both Mr. and Mrs. Stahley had been present the night that
Appellant was arrested. Id. Mrs. Stahley accompanied Appellant
to the police station and was present during the custodial
interrogation when Appellant, then a minor, gave a statement to
police. Id. at 5-6.
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Attorney Barton estimated that he met with Appellant over a
dozen times, “if not more.” Id. at 6. He met with him on a weekly
basis for a period of time at Montgomery County Correctional
Facility. Id. In addition, Attorney Barton testified that he met
with Appellant’s parents “[o]ften” and were in frequent contact,
although he was unable to estimate on how many occasions. Id.
at 6-7.
Since Appellant admitted to the murder in his statement to police,
Attorney Barton’s initial strategy was to focus on whether at the
time of the crime Appellant could have formed a specific intent to
kill and what degree of guilt it might be. Id. at 7.
Prior to trial, Attorney Barton in part prepared a decertification
motion, for which he retained two psychiatrists, Dr. John O’Brien
and Dr. Steven Samuel for the purpose of interviewing Appellant
to ascertain what defenses there might be at trial. Id. at 25-27.
In part, Attorney Barton wanted to use Dr. Samuel’s report to
show the [District Attorney] that there should be some sort of plea
negotiations. Id. at 27. In addition, he had several conversations
with the assigned Assistant District Attorney, Jeremy Lupo, who
had been assigned the case and with the then District Attorney,
Risa Ferman, about possible resolutions. Id. at 8. ADA Lupo
informally suggested that if Appellant were to plead guilty, the
Commonwealth would recommend a sentence of 40-80 years’
imprisonment. Id. at 28. Attorney Barton testified that Appellant
was not interested in that deal in large part because he believed
that in 40 years his mom and/or dad would be deceased. Id. That
was very important to Appellant, the hope that he would be able
to unify with his parents. Id.
Attorney Barton testified that in his conversations with Appellant,
they spoke about whether he actually formed the intent to kill. Id.
at 9. Attorney Barton also testified that Appellant had described
his state of mind the evening of the murder, telling him that he
intended to kill the victim. Id. at 32. Appellant told Attorney
Barton this at various meetings at the Montgomery County
Correctional Facility. Specifically, Appellant told Attorney Barton
that it was not his intent to kill Miss Siller when they were home
or left the home or went to the park, but at some point while at
the park he decided to kill her. Id.
Attorney Barton stated that he had reviewed discovery, which
included a property receipt for a search that was executed at the
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Stahleys’ home. Id. at 9-10. In that property receipt was a
“nearly empty bottle of raspberry vodka.” Id. at 11.
Attorney Barton also reviewed various witness statement, and in
particular the statement of Todd Evans, a paramedic who treated
Appellant the evening of the murder, wherein Appellant told Mr.
Evans that he was under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 12.
Appellant had also told police in his statement that he had been
under the influence of alcohol. Id.
According to Attorney Barton, he had also received an expert
report from Dr. O’Brien which opined “It is my opinion that
[Appellant’s] records and the psychological testing performed by
Dr. Samuel reflect him to have been a troubled adolescent with a
combination of both psychiatric symptoms and characterological
difficulties which rendered him susceptible to the disinhibiting
effects of alcohol on the night of the offense.” Id. at 13, 15. The
report concluded “It is my opinion that as a result of his
psychiatric, psychological and characterological impairments, and
his degree of intoxication at the time of the offense, [Appellant]
was not able to premeditate, deliberate and formulate the intent
to kill Julianne Siller, notwithstanding his response to police
questioning about the timing of his ‘decision’ to kill Julianne Siller
at the time of the offense.” Id. at 17.
Attorney Barton had this report prior to the trial; however, he did
not call Dr. O’Brien to testify at the time of trial or at the
suppression hearing. Id. at 17-18. On cross-examination,
Attorney Barton explained that Dr. O’Brien had been privately
retained by the Stahley family for an opinion regarding Appellant’s
ability to form the specific intent to kill, in anticipation of him
testifying at a jury trial. Id. at 29.
At some point, Attorney Barton had concerns about Dr. O’Brien’s
opinion. Id. at 30. He elaborated that in speaking with Dr. O’Brien
after the Commonwealth had an expert examine Appellant and
prepare a report, and some of the statements Appellant made
after Dr. O’Brien’s report was prepared, that Dr. O’Brien’s opinion
was weakened, if not invalidated. Id. at 30. More specifically,
Attorney Barton had the expert report prepared by Dr. Barbara
Ziv, the expert retained by the Commonwealth to examine
Appellant. Id. at 31. He reviewed the report himself and with
Appellant at the prison. Id.
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At the PCRA hearing, Attorney Barton detailed the events on
September 29, 2014, the day of the scheduled trial, that occurred
causing Appellant’s decision to proceed with a stipulated bench
trial instead of a jury trial. That morning Attorney Barton was
prepared to proceed to a jury trial, and would have presented Dr.
O’Brien, Mrs. Stahley and possibly Appellant along with an
intoxication defense. Id. at 19, 21-22. Mrs. Stahley requested
that she speak to her son. Id. at 19. Both Mr. and Mrs. Stahley
were permitted to meet with Appellant in the robing room, where
there was a conversation mainly between Mrs. Stahley and
Appellant about whether he should proceed with a jury trial or
plead guilty. Id.
Mrs. Stahley and Attorney Barton had had many conversations
about the merits of the Commonwealth’s case, the defenses, and
the options. Id. Specifically, Attorney Barton explained the
defense of intoxication. Id. He explained that to present a
defense of diminished capacity by intoxication, [the intoxication]
had to be so overwhelming as to render him unable to process
what was going on. Id. at 20. Attorney Barton actually copied
the law on first and third degree murder and diminished capacity
and reviewed them with both Appellant and his mother. Id.
Attorney Barton also discussed Dr. O’Brien’s report with them. Id.
at 21.
Additionally, Attorney Barton testified that they discussed jury
trial, waiver of a jury trial, and what each entailed. Id. They
discussed “degree of guilt” hearings. Id. Attorney Barton
elaborated that whether to proceed to a stipulated non-jury trial
was an evolving conversation. He stated that the consideration
had been an ongoing conversation for weeks or months. As
Attorney Barton explained it, “it was all part of the fabric of our
conversations during probably the later parts of my
representations.” Id. at 33.
The Commonwealth asked trial counsel why . . . Appellant
proceed[ed] to a stipulated non-jury trial if Appellant elected to
plead guilty. Id. Attorney Barton recollected that [the trial court]
did not want to accept a guilty plea because that would allow
Appellant to at least attempt to file a motion to withdraw the guilty
plea within ten days and, therefore, a stipulated non-jury trial was
elected to go forward. Id. at 33-34. Attorney Baron fully advised
Appellant that it would be a stipulated non-jury trial instead of a
guilty plea. He also advised Appellant that it would be the
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functional equivalent of a guilty plea, but that he had to be
absolutely certain he wanted to proceed in that manner because
unlike a guilty plea, Appellant would not have the option to file a
motion to withdraw [a] guilty plea. Id. at 34.
It was Attorney Barton's opinion that the advantage to Appellant
in waiving a jury trial and essentially pleading guilty wold be that
the sentencing court would take this into consideration when
fashioning a sentence to impose, that Appellant showed some
remorse, took some accountability and spared the Siller's a
prolonged jury trial with graphic testimony and exhibits. Id. at
35. He believed these factors would be considered at the time of
sentencing. Id.
Regarding intoxication as an issue in this case, Attorney Barton
did file a suppression motion[.] [I]n part included therein was the
argument that the statements that Appellant gave to police were
not knowing and voluntary due to his level of intoxication. Id. at
35-36. There were several statements that Appellant made to
troopers who responded to the original scene, those made when
Appellant voluntarily accompanied the troopers to the park and
those he made during his custodial interrogation. Id. at 36. The
trooper asked some questions to elicit some response about his
condition, including his level of intoxication. Id. at 37. Mrs.
Stahley was present during this questioning and signed off on
each answer. Id.
There were audio/video recordings that cut against an intoxication
defense. Id. Specifically, there was a video directing the troopers
back to the park and you could hear Appellant in the audio being
conversational with the troopers, directing them through the park,
talking to them about certain things that happened. From
Attorney Barton's perspective, he believed this evidence, which to
him showed that Appellant did not seem intoxicated, would be well
below the standard required to suppress a statement due to
involuntary intoxication. Id. at 38. He also believed that this
evidence also undercut an intoxication defense at trial. Id.
Next to testify on behalf of Appellant was Todd Evans, who was
employed by Skippack Emergency Medical Services as a
paramedic and responded to the scene at Palmer Park. Id. at 47-
48. Mr. Evans provided emergency help to Appellant for some
lacerations to his legs and an abrasion on his forehead. id. at
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48. While transporting Appellant to the hospital, Mr. Evans
observed that Appellant had different mood swings. Id. One
minute he would be calm and able to talk, but then he would break
down crying and sobbing uncontrollably and verbalizing
inappropriately. Id. Under questioning by PCRA counsel he said
that Appellant's behavior "possibly" indicated intoxication. Id. at
49. However, Mr. Evans was able to communicate with
Appellant. Id. at 50. He was able to ask Appellant questions, and
Appellant was able to provide some answers. Id. at 51. Mr. Evans
testified Appellant seemed emotionally upset. Additionally, Mr.
Evans stated that Appellant was able to walk on his own. Id. at
51.
Next to testify was Heather Stahley, Appellant's
mother. According to Mrs. Stahley, she relayed to Attorney
Barton that her son told her that he had been drinking and taken
Molly the night of the incident. Id. at 54. It was Mrs. Stahley's
testimony that Attorney Barton had advised her that voluntary
intoxication is not a defense to murder. Id.
Mrs. Stahley testified that on the morning of the scheduled trial,
Attorney Barton spoke to her about the possibility of pleading
open or a stipulated non-jury trial, explaining that Attorney Barton
suggested it because he believed it was the best chance to obtain
a more favorable sentence. Id. at 59. Mrs. Stahley relayed this
information to her son in the robing room. Id. [Concerning] the
degrees of murder, Attorney Barton had explained the difference
between first degree and third degree murder. Id. at 61. He had
also talked to Mrs. Stahley about calling Dr. O'Brien as a witness
at trial. Id. Additionally, Mrs. Stahley could only recall that
Attorney Barton had met with her son four or five times over the
course of his representation. Id. at 62.
Upon cross-examination, Mrs. Stahley recollected that in the
statement she gave to troopers the night of the murder she did
not tell the troopers that Appellant was intoxicated. Mrs. Stahley
was with her son on the day and night of the murder. According
to her statement to the troopers, at around 2:00 p.m., Appellant
went into her room wanting to go to Target where he bought a
video game. Id. at 64-65. Appellant knew that his mom was
upset about a fight she had with a friend, so he bought her favorite
drink from Starbucks to cheer her up. Id. at 65. After Target,
Mrs. Stahley and her son went to Rita's for water ice. Id. at 65-
66. The two of them went home afterwards and watched
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TV. Id. Appellant was still trying to cheer up his mom. Id. at
66. Mrs. Stahley admitted at the PCRA hearing that Appellant did
not appear intoxicated during the time they spent together. Id.
at 66.
At some point that evening, Appellant went upstairs to his
room. Later around 7:00 p.m., he asked his mom to take him to
Wawa. Id. at 67. Mrs. Stahley told the troopers in her statement
that Appellant did not appear intoxicated between the time they
got home from Rita's and went to Wawa. Id. at 68. After Wawa,
Appellant spent some time in the living room, and later went up
to his room again. Id. Around 8:20, Appellant went down and
asked his mom to use her phone to call Julianne two
times. Id. He then went up to his room with the phone. Id. Still,
Appellant did not appeal intoxicated. Id. at 69.
About 10 to 15 minutes later after Appellant [returned his
mother's phone to her], Ms. Siller came over her house. Id. Ms.
Siller said, "hi," and went upstairs. Id. Mrs. Stahley heard
bickering coming from upstairs and she went to check on
them. Id. She asked them if they were okay, and they said they
were fine. Id. at 69-70. Around 8:56 p.m., Mrs. Stahley spoke
to her husband on the phone. Id. at 70. Ms. Siller and Appellant
came downstairs around 9:01 p.m. Id. Mrs. Stahley saw them
briefly, and she did not see any signs of intoxication in her
son. Id.
Ms. Siller and Appellant went for a walk and sometime later
Appellant returned to his home and asked his mom to go for a
walk with him. id. Mrs. Stahley immediately knew that her son
was crying. Id. at 71. She also noticed some blood or dirt on his
legs, which Appellant explained away telling her he had
fallen. Id. Mrs. Stahley tried to persuade her son to sit down and
talk right there, but Appellant insisted they go for a walk. Id. at
71.
On their walk, Appellant told her that he and Ms. Siller broke up
and that he stabbed her. Id. at 72. Appellant said he did not
know yet whether he had killed her. Id. Appellant started crying
and pulled out a knife from his pocket and threatened to kill
himself. Id. at 73. Mrs. Stahley convinced her son to come back
to the house with her. Id. When she got there she went inside
and spoke to her husband. Id. Mr. Stahley came out to ask
Appellant what was going on. Id. He confessed to his father that
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he stabbed Ms. Siller and that she was on the trial. Id. At the
PCRA hearing, Mrs. Stahley stated that although Appellant was
upset and bawling she was still able to communicate with him. Id.
at 73-74.
Mrs. Stahley also testified that she had told police in her statement
that Appellant had been drinking and that she knew that because
her husband smelled alcohol on Appellant. Id. at 74-75. The
police officer asked her whether Appellant had been drinking
alcohol at the home prior to the event. Id. at 75-76. She
responded by saying, "Not that I'm aware of. I didn't see the
water bottle before they started wrestling. No. I mean, he was
fine all day. He seemed fine when they left." Id. at 76. At the
PCRA hearing, upon examination, Mrs. Stahley admitted that she
never told the police on the night of the murder that Appellant had
been drinking and took Molly, despite the officer's question
specifically inquiring as to whether Appellant had been drinking
that night. Id. at 76-77.
Next, the Commonwealth cross-examined Mrs. Stahley on the
formal statement that he son gave to police when police asked her
son whether he was under the influence of anything that might
impair his ability to understand. Id. at 77. Appellant denied this,
saying he understood what was going on. Id. The trooper
followed up asking Appellant whether he would consider himself
to be sober, buzzed or drunk to which Appellant answered,
"Sober." Mrs. Stahley initialed those answers and agreed with
Appellant. Id.
The third witness presented by PCRA counsel was Brian Stahley,
Appellant's father. On direct examination, Mr. Stahley testified
that the night of the incident his son was inebriated. Id. at 86-
87. He also testified that Attorney Barton told him that
intoxication is not a defense to murder in Pennsylvania. Id. at 87-
88. On cross-examination, Mr. Stahley admitted that he was not
with Appellant all day and would not have known when he started
drinking. Id. at 94.
Finally at the PCRA hearing, Appellant testified. He testified that
on the night of the incident he had been drinking and took the
drug Molly. Id. at 98. Appellant stated that he had been drinking
since 4:00 or 5:00 in the afternoon and took Molly, a form of
Ecstasy, at about 7:00 p.m. Id. at 99. In relevant part, Appellant
stated that when he spoke to Attorney Barton he had informed
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him that he had been drinking and doing drugs the evening of the
murder. Id. at 102. Appellant related that Attorney Barton told
him that intoxication is not a defense to murder. Id. Appellant
also said that he only met with Attorney Barton five or six
times. Id. at 103.
Further, Appellant told [the PCRA court] that he wanted to go to
trial, and that he had told this to his attorney. Id. at
103. Appellant denied that Attorney Barton reviewed with him
how jury selection would work, what the Commonwealth had to
prove to find him guilty, that there are different degrees of
homicide in Pennsylvania and what third degree murder or
voluntary manslaughter means. Id. at 104-104. Appellant
further testified that Attorney Barton told him that the only
[possible way to avoid] a life sentence was to proceed with a
stipulated non-jury trial. Id. at 105. Moreover, Appellant denied
that Attorney Barton ever reviewed appellate options, despite
having competed and signed a post-sentence rights form. Id. at
106.
After the defense concluded its case, the Commonwealth called
Attorney Barton to testify as a rebuttal witness. Id. at 112. On
rebuttal, Attorney Barton categorically denied advising Appellant,
his mother or father that voluntary intoxication was not a defense
to murder. Id. at 113. Additionally, he denied telling Appellant,
his mother or his father that Appellant's only chance for a non-life
sentence was a guilty plea or a stipulated non-jury trial. Id. at
113-114.
On August 23, 2017, PCRA counsel and the Commonwealth
provided argument on the PCRA petition including the recent case
of Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) ("Batts
II"). Relief was denied on August 28, 2017.
Trial Court Opinion, 11/15/17, at 1-15.
On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for review:
I. DID THE PCRA COURT ERRONEOUSLY DENY
[APPELLANT’S INEFFECTIVENESS CLAIM, WHERE
TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO INTRODUCE READILY
AVAILABLE EVIDENCE, FROM BOTH LAY AND EXPERT
WITNESSES, WHICH WOULD HAVE ESTABLISHED
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[APPELLANT’S] INTOXICATION AT THE TIME OF THE
CRIME AND WHICH WOULD HAVE SUPPORTED A
DEFENSE OF VOLUNTARY-
INTOXICATION/DIMINISHED-CAPACITY?
II. DID THE PCRA COURT ERRONEOUSLY DENY
[APPELLANT’S] INEFFECTIVENESS CLAIM, WHERE
TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO INTRODUCE READILY
AVAILABLE EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD HAVE
ESTABLISHED [APPELLANT’S] INTOXICATION AT THE
TIME OF HIS POST-ARREST STATEMENT AND WHICH
WOULD HAVE PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR A
SUCCESSFUL MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE
STATEMENT?
III. DID THE PCRA COURT ERRONEOUSLY DISMISS
[APPELLANT’S] CHALLENGE TO THE LEGALITY OF HIS
SENTENCE UNDER BATTS II?
Appellant’s brief, at 5.
Initially, we recite our standard of review:
This Court's standard of review regarding an order denying a
petition under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA
court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal
error. Commonwealth v. Halley, 582 Pa. 164, 870 A.2d 795,
799 n. 2 (2005). The PCRA court's findings will not be disturbed
unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record.
Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Pa.Super. 2001).
Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 876, 879 (Pa.Super. 2007).
“To prevail on a claim alleging counsel's ineffectiveness, Appellant
must demonstrate (1) that the underlying claim is of arguable
merit; (2) that counsel's course of conduct was without a
reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client's interest; and
(3) that he was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness.”
Commonwealth v. Wallace, 724 A.2d 916, 921 (Pa. 1999),
citing Commonwealth v. Howard, 645 A.2d 1300, 1304 (Pa.
1994) (other citation omitted). In order to meet the prejudice
prong of the ineffectiveness standard, a defendant must show that
there is a “‘reasonable probability that but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
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been different.’” Commonwealth v. Kimball, 724 A.2d 326, 331
(Pa. 1999), quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). A “‘[r]easonable
probability’ is defined as ‘a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.’” [Kimball], 724 A.2d at 331, quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 811 A.2d 1057, 1060 (Pa.Super. 2002). Thus,
when it is clear that a petitioner has failed to meet the prejudice prong of an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the claim may be disposed of on that
basis alone, without a determination of whether the first two prongs have been
met. Commonwealth v. Baker, 880 A.2d 654, 656 (Pa.Super. 2005).
“We presume counsel is effective and place upon Appellant the burden
of proving otherwise. Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to pursue
a baseless or meritless claim.” Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 852 A.2d
323, 327 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citations omitted). If the record supports a post-
conviction court’s credibility determination, it is binding on the appellate court.
Commonwealth v. Dennis, 17 A.3d 297 (Pa. 2011).
In Appellant's first claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he contends
counsel ineffectively failed to present the testimony of his mother and Mr.
Evans, the ambulance driver, during the suppression hearing to establish his
intoxication at and around the time he provided his post-arrest statement to
police. Such testimony, he maintains, would have undermined the credibility
of the officers' claims that Appellant was not intoxicated when he gave his
statement.
Regarding a claim of trial counsel ineffective assistance for failure to call
witnesses, this Court has stated the following:
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In order to demonstrate counsel's ineffectiveness for failure to call
a witness, a petitioner must prove that “the witness existed, the
witness was ready and willing to testify, and the absence of the
witness' testimony prejudiced petitioner and denied him a fair
trial.” [Commonwealth v.] Johnson, 27 A.3d [244,] 247
[(Pa.Super. 2011)] (internal citation omitted). In particular, when
challenging trial counsel's failure to produce expert testimony,
“the defendant must articulate what evidence was available and
identify the witness who was willing to offer such evidence.”
Commonwealth v. Bryant, 855 A.2d 726, 745 (Pa. 2004)
(internal citation omitted).
Commonwealth v. Luster, 71 A.3d 1029, 1047 (Pa.Super. 2013).
Here, the notes of testimony from Appellant’s PCRA hearing belie his
claim that Mrs. Stahley and Mr. Evans would have advanced his defense that
he was intoxicated at the time he gave his statement to police. Specifically,
Appellant's mother testified that he did not appear intoxicated during his time
with her in the afternoon, and he seemed fine when he left the house with his
girlfriend. "[H]e was fine all day. He seemed fine when they left," she
testified. N.T. (PCRA) at 76-77.
As noted, Mrs. Stahley did testify Appellant was swaying when he
returned home after the incident. Proximate to the time Appellant gave his
statement to police, however, Mrs. Stahley told police that Appellant “knew
what was going on,” and she agreed with Appellant when he claimed to be
“sober” when police asked him to give a formal statement. N.T. at 76-77.
Similarly, Mr. Evans indicated Appellant's emotional behavior after the
event "possibly" indicated intoxication. His testimony, however, also included
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his observations that Appellant communicated clearly during Mr. Evans’
interactions with him and was able to walk on his own.
Finally, the record shows Attorney Barton zealously cross-examined the
arresting officers and the interviewing trooper regarding their assertions that
Appellant was sober when he gave his statement. N.T. (Suppression) at 41,
55, 95-97.
Given the content of Mrs. Stahley's and Mr. Burns' respective PCRA
testimonies, we discern no prejudice from Attorney Barton's failure to call
them to testify at Appellant's suppression hearing, as they would not have
supported Appellant's theory of intoxication to the degree necessary to
preclude admission of his statement. Accordingly, this ineffectiveness claim
fails.
Next, Appellant contends Attorney Barton ineffectively failed to advise
his parents and him properly regarding the defense of voluntary intoxication.
Ordinarily, voluntary intoxication, or diminished capacity, is not a defense in
Pennsylvania. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 308. In cases of murder, however, a defendant
may offer evidence of intoxication if it is “relevant to reduce murder from a
higher degree to a lower degree of murder.” Id. “Thus, a defendant asserting
a diminished capacity defense admits responsibility for the underlying action,
but contests the degree of culpability based upon his inability to formulate the
requisite mental state.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 980 A.2d 510, 527
(Pa. 2009).
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According to Appellant and his parents, Attorney Barton asserted that
voluntary intoxication is not a defense to first-degree murder. It follows that
Attorney Barton never explained Pennsylvania decisional law holding that
voluntary intoxication can negate the element of specific intent to kill required
for a first-degree murder conviction, Appellant claims. For his part, Attorney
Barton denied the Stahleys’ claims in this regard.
The PCRA court determined Attorney Barton provided the credible
testimony on this contested point. The court opines:
Attorney Barton's credible testimony established that in his
conversations with [Appellant], they spoke about whether he
actually formed the intent to kill. Specifically, Attorney Barton
explained the defense of intoxication. He explained that to
present a defense of diminished capacity by intoxication, the
intoxication had to be so overwhelming as to render him unable
to process what was going on. Attorney Barton actually copied
the law on first and third degree murder and diminished capacity
and reviewed them with both [Appellant] and his
mother. Accordingly, Attorney Barton cannot be found to be
ineffective when he did, in fact, explain to [Appellant] and his
parents the defense of voluntary intoxication.
Trial Court Opinion, at 24. As noted above, credibility determinations are
within the sole province of the finder of fact, which in this case is the PCRA
court. As there appears nothing in the record giving cause to disturb the
court's findings of fact, Appellant's issue merits no relief.
Relatedly, Appellant also asserts Attorney Barton ineffectively
proceeded to a stipulated non-jury trial instead of introducing evidence of
Appellant's intoxication at the time of the crime. Evidence of his intoxication
included: Appellant's post-arrest statement that he had drunk a half-gallon of
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vodka at the time of the crime; the recovery of an empty vodka bottle from
his bedroom; the testimony of Mr. Evans that Appellant was crying
uncontrollably during his transport to the hospital; emergency room admission
records containing a diagnosis of "alcohol intoxication"; Mrs. Stahley's
testimony that Appellant was swaying when he returned from the park; Mr.
Stahley's testimony that Appellant smelled of alcohol when he returned home;
and the testimony of Dr. John O'Brien, a psychologist who concluded Appellant
was unable to formulate the intent to kill Julianne Siller due to a number of
factors including intoxication.
In response, the Commonwealth argues there was compelling evidence
demonstrating Appellant's specific intent to kill:
[Appellant] brought the victim to a secluded trail in a park, argued
with her, and decided to kill her. He stabbed her first in the neck
and then stabbed her over 75 more times. While he continued to
stab her, he dragged her by her arms and hair into a wooded
area. Hours later, he gave a detailed statement to police about
the killing, in which he admitted that he intended to kill the victim
and that he attempted to conceal her body. He also attempted to
clean himself up after the murder.
Appellee's brief, at 19.
Most problematic for Appellant is that the evidence he presents to
sustain his claim does not show he was “so intoxicated as to be overwhelmed
to the point of losing his faculties and sensibilities and unable to formulate a
specific intent to kill.” See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 47 A.3d 63, 92-93
(2012) (citing Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 25 A.3d 277 (Pa. 2011))
(citations omitted). In fact, the testimonies of those who saw Appellant
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shortly before and shortly after the murder in question indicate he ably
directed his actions and communicated his thoughts during all relevant times.
Though he was emotional that evening, he nevertheless demonstrated no
difficulty in leading investigators to the crime scene, describing to authorities
the events leading up to his killing of Ms. Siller, or confirming that he formed
the intent to kill just seconds before he stabbed her. Such evidence, therefore,
refutes Appellant’s claim that counsel’s failure to make a voluntary intoxication
presentation denied him a worthwhile guilt-phase defense. See Spotz, 47
A.3d at 94-95 (holding evidence of defendant’s directed, intentional, goal-
oriented activity at or near time of murder argues strongly against assertion
that diminished capacity would have been viable trial defense had counsel
only done further investigation).
In Appellant’s remaining claim, he contends that his 2014 discretionary
sentence of life without parole (“LWOP”) imposed in conformity with Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)2 has since been rendered illegal by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d
410 (Pa. 2017) (“Batts II”), which, Appellant maintains, applies retroactively
to his collateral appeal. We review legality of sentencing claims “pursuant to
____________________________________________
2 On June 25, 2012, the United States Supreme Court held in Miller v.
Alabama that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at
the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on ‘cruel
and unusual punishments.’” Id., 567 U.S. at 465.
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a de novo standard and plenary scope of review.” Batts II, 163 A.3d at 434-
36.
Initially, we note Appellant properly predicates his claim of an illegal
sentence on the argument that Batts II presents a new rule of law that is
retroactively applicable to his present PCRA claim. With respect to the
interplay between the legality of sentence and retroactivity claims,
jurisprudence of this Commonwealth has stated:
A new rule of law does not automatically render final, pre-existing
sentences illegal. A finding of illegality, concerning such
sentences, may be premised on such a rule only to the degree
that the new rule applies retrospectively. In other words, if the
rule simply does not pertain to a particular conviction or sentence,
it cannot operate to render that conviction or sentence illegal.
(Accord Welch v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 136
S.Ct. 1257, 1264, 194 L.Ed.2d 387 (2016) (alluding to the
“general bar on retroactivity” for new constitutional rules of a
procedural dimension); Montgomery, ––– U.S. at ––––, 136
S.Ct. at 730 (“[A] trial conducted under a procedure found to be
unconstitutional in a later case does not, as a general matter, have
the automatic consequence of invalidating a defendant's
conviction or sentence.”).
Commonwealth v. Washington, 142 A.3d 810, 814-815 (Pa. 2016).
“[N]ew constitutional procedural rules generally pertain to future cases
and matters that are pending on direct review at the time of the rule’s
announcement.” Id., at 815. Per Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)
(plurality) and its progeny, “[a] new rule applies retroactively in a collateral
proceeding only if (1) the rule is substantive or (2) the rule is a ‘watershed
rule of criminal procedure’ implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy
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of the criminal proceeding.” Commonwealth v. Ross, 140 A.3d 55, 59
(Pa.Super. 2016) (citation and quotation omitted).3
Batts II involved a juvenile defendant who had originally received a
mandatory LWOP sentence in 2007 for first-degree murder. While defendant
Batts’ direct appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court issued its
decision in Miller, invalidating mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles and
further indicating that discretionary LWOP sentences for juveniles should be a
rarity. In Commonwealth v. Batts, 66 A.3d 286 (2013), (“Batts I”), the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court directed that defendant Batts be resentenced in
light of Miller. Upon resentencing, however, Batts received a discretionary
____________________________________________
3On the topic of choosing a test to decide retroactivity issues, this Court has
said:
While state courts are free to adopt more liberal standards in
determining whether a decision is to be accorded full retroactivity,
our Supreme Court has utilized the Teague test in examining
retroactivity issues during state collateral review.
Commonwealth v. Bracey, 986 A.2d 128 (Pa. 2009);
Commonwealth v. Hughes, 865 A.2d 761 (Pa. 2004)
(discussing Teague and whether a new rule was a watershed
procedural rule); see also Commonwealth v. Cunningham,
622 Pa. 543, 81 A.3d 1, 8 (2013) (“This Court, however, generally
has looked to the Teague doctrine in determining retroactivity of
new federal constitutional rulings.”). In Cunningham, the Court
acknowledged that “this practice is subject to potential
refinement” and “is not necessarily a natural model for
retroactivity jurisprudence as applied at the state level.”
Cunningham, supra at 8. However, it ultimately applied the
Teague formulation.
Commonwealth v. Riggle, 119 A.3d 1058, 1065 (Pa.Super. 2015).
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LWOP sentence. This Court affirmed, and Batts appealed to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, which granted his petition for allowance of appeal.
In reversing Batts’ judgment of sentence and remanding, our Supreme
Court devised a procedural scheme by which to implement Miller.
Specifically, the scheme adopted a presumption against sentencing a juvenile
to life in prison without the possibility of parole, and it imposed a burden upon
the Commonwealth to prove a juvenile was incapable of rehabilitation beyond
a reasonable doubt.
Importantly, the central concepts of Miller informed the Batts II
procedures:
Under Miller and Montgomery [v. Louisiana, ––– U.S. ––––,
136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016)], a sentencing court has
no discretion to sentence a juvenile offender to life without parole
unless it finds that the defendant is one of the “rare” and
“uncommon” children possessing the above-stated
characteristics, permitting its imposition. Montgomery, 136
S.Ct. at 726, 734; Miller, 567 U.S. at 479, 132 S.Ct. 2455; see
Graham, 560 U.S. at 73, 130 S.Ct. 2011; Roper[ v. Simmons],
543 U.S. [551,] 572–73, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 [(2005)].
A sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for a
murder committed when the defendant was a juvenile is otherwise
disproportionate and unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment. Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 734, 735.
Thus, in the absence of the sentencing court reaching a
conclusion, supported by competent evidence, that the defendant
will forever be incorrigible, without any hope for rehabilitation, a
life-without-parole sentence imposed on a juvenile is illegal, as it
is beyond the court's power to impose. See [Commonwealth
v.] Vasquez, 744 A.2d [1280,] 1282 [(Pa. 2000)];
[Commonwealth v.] Shiffler, 879 A.2d [185] 189 [(Pa. 2005)];
In re M.W., 725 A.2d [729,] 731 [(Pa. 1999)].
Batts II, 163 A.3d at 435-36.
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Our Supreme Court went on to conclude, therefore, that “a faithful
application of the holding in Miller, as clarified in Montgomery, requires the
creation of a presumption against sentencing a juvenile offender to life in
prison without the possibility of parole.” Batts II, 163 A.3d at 452.
Supporting this conclusion were the following reflections on Miller:
[A]ny suggestion of placing the burden on the juvenile offender is
belied by the central premise of Roper, Graham, Miller and
Montgomery—that as a matter of law, juveniles are categorically
less culpable than adults. This central premise arises from “a
conclusion firmly based upon the generally known results of wide
human experience,” which is that the vast majority of adolescents
change as they age and, despite their involvement in illegal
activity, do not “develop entrenched patterns of problem
behavior.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 471, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (referring to
this conclusion as “common sense” and “what any parent knows”)
(citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70, 125 S.Ct. 1183); Watkins,
173 A. at 648. The Miller Court reiterated the High Court's
longstanding conclusion that the distinctive attributes of youth
generally preclude a finding that a juvenile will forever be
incorrigible, especially in light of the great difficulty even
professional psychologists have in making that determination
during a person's youth. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 472–73, 479–
80, 132 S.Ct. 2455.
Miller's holding, “that life without parole is an excessive sentence
for children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity,” is a
“substantive rule of constitutional law.” Montgomery, 136 S.Ct.
at 735. This, according to Montgomery, means that only “the
rarest of juvenile offenders” are eligible to receive a sentence of
life without the possibility of parole. Id.Only in “exceptional circumstances” will life without the possibility
of parole be a proportionate sentence for a juvenile.[ ] Id. at 736.
Thus, there can be no doubt that pursuant to established Supreme
Court precedent, the ultimate fact here (that an offender is
capable of rehabilitation and that the crime was the result of
transient immaturity) is connected to the basic fact (that the
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offender is under the age of eighteen). See Childs, 142 A.3d at
830.
The United States Supreme Court expressly left it to the States to
determine how the holding in Miller was to be implemented in
state court proceedings. Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 735.
Batts II, 163 A.3d at 452 (emphasis added).
The Court further held the Commonwealth could rebut the presumption
against the imposition of LWOP punishment with proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that the juvenile falls under the exception to the general rule deeming
juvenile offenders rehabilitable. Id. at 453. On this point, again, the Court
drew upon the Miller decision:
The United States Supreme Court has clearly and unambiguously
instructed that the decision that an offender is one of the rare and
uncommon juveniles who may constitutionally receive a sentence
of life without the possibility of parole must be made with near
certainty. The sentencer must determine that the offender is and
“forever will be a danger to society,” a finding that the High Court
found to be in direct conflict with a child's inherent capacity to
change. Miller, 567 U.S. at 472, 132 S.Ct. 2455. To protect
youthful offenders from erroneous decisions that foreclose their
ability to ever be released from prison, the Supreme Court
therefore held that a sentence of life without parole is
disproportionate and illegal for a juvenile offender unless that
defendant “exhibits such irretrievable depravity that rehabilitation
is impossible.” Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 733 (citing Miller,
567 U.S. at 479–80, 132 S.Ct. 2455) (emphasis added).
Pursuant to our consideration of the attendant due process
concerns and the definitive language used by the Supreme Court,
we conclude that to overcome the presumption against the
imposition of a sentence of life without parole for a juvenile
offender, the Commonwealth must prove that the juvenile is
constitutionally eligible for the sentence beyond a reasonable
doubt. In an effort to satisfy this burden, the Commonwealth may
present evidence relating to the factors announced in Miller and
the factors appearing in section 1102.1(d).
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Batts II, 163 A.3d at 454–55 (emphasis added).
At the time Batts II was decided, Appellant’s judgment of sentence was
final, and his present collateral appeal was pending. Under the general rule
of retroactivity cited supra, therefore, the new constitutional procedural rule
announced in Batts II would not apply to Appellant’s matter. Acknowledging
this fact, Appellant argues Batts II qualifies as an exception to the general
rule, as it announced either a substantive rule or, in the alternative, a
“watershed rule of criminal procedure” implicating the fundamental fairness
and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.” Ross, 140 A.3d at 59.
Differentiating substantive from procedural rules, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has explained:
[S]ubstantive rules are those that decriminalize conduct or
prohibit punishment against a class of persons. See
Montgomery, ––– U.S. at ––––, 136 S.Ct. at 729–30.
Concomitantly, the Supreme Court has made clear that “rules that
regulate only the manner of determining the defendant's
culpability are procedural.” Id. at ––––, 136 S.Ct. at 730 (quoting
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 2523,
159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004)) (emphasis in original).
As to watershed rules, to date, the Supreme Court of the United
States has discerned only one, arising out of the sweeping
changes to the criminal justice system brought about by the
conferral of the right to counsel upon indigent defendants charged
with felonies in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct.
792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). See Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406,
417, 124 S.Ct. 2504, 2513–14, 159 L.Ed.2d 494 (2004).
Washington, 142 A.3d at 813.
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Specifically, Appellant offers alternative arguments for retroactive
application of Batts II to his collateral appeal, asserting Batts II announced
either a substantive rule of constitutional law or a watershed procedural rule:
[Appellant] was never placed in the class of individuals eligible to
receive life without parole. After [his] sentence was final, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Batts II, corrected the prevailing
jurisprudence in the state and adopted due process protections to
ensure unconstitutional sentences were not imposed. The Court
established that life without parole imposed in the absence of key
due process protections was an illegal sentence beyond the state’s
authority to impose, creating a substantive rule that must be
applied on collateral review [pursuant to Teague].
...
Alternatively, . . . [e]ven if Batts II is deemed procedural, it
satisfies Teague’s second exception as a “watershed rule[ ] of
criminal procedure” [so as to require retroactive application]. . . .
[Batts II] requir[es] a sentencing court to presume the attendant
characteristics of youth and how they counsel against a life
without parole sentence[, as is] necessary to avoid an
unacceptable risk that the facts of the case will overpower the
inherent mitigation of youth. . . . The presumption also
constitutes a “bedrock procedural element” as it ensures the court
conducts its analysis from the proper starting point, favoring
parole-eligibility, and the presumption shifts the burden to the
Commonwealth. “[A]ny suggestion of placing the burden on the
juvenile offender is belied by the central premise of Roper,
Graham, Miller, and Montgomery—that as a matter of law,
juveniles are categorically less culpable than adults.”
Further, Batts II affirms the need for the Commonwealth to prove
irreparable corruption [of the juvenile] beyond a reasonable
doubt. . . . The Court selected the highest burden of proof due to
its assessment that the “risk of an erroneous decision against the
offender would result in the irrevocable loss of that liberty for the
rest of his or her life,” which outweighed the minimal risk of a
parole-eligible sentence[, with parole likely to be denied if the
juvenile later proved to be incapable of rehabilitation after all]. . .
. Requiring a sentencer to shift from weighing various factors to
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the Commonwealth having to prove irreparable corruption beyond
a reasonable doubt creates a fundamentally different hearing.
...
[In the case sub judice,] [t]he lack of a presumption, failing to
assign the burden of proof to the Commonwealth, and the absence
of a beyond the reasonable doubt standard left the sentencing
court in a position of merely weighing various factors against one
another rather than answering Miller’s central question: whether
the juvenile is capable of rehabilitation.
Appellant’s brief at 26, 33, 34-35, 36.
The Commonwealth counters that Batts II expressed neither a
substantive new rule nor a watershed rule of criminal procedure implicating
the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding. Instead,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Batts II identified that it was merely
imposing new “procedural safeguards . . . required to ensure that life-without-
parole sentences are meted out only to ‘the rarest of juvenile offenders’ whose
crimes reflect ‘permanent incorrigibility,’ ‘irreparable corruption’ and
‘irretrievable depravity,’ as required by Miller and Montgomery.” Batts II,
at 416. As the procedures simply advanced the Miller concepts of juvenile
sentencing, the Commonwealth submits, they affected only the manner in
which the court determined sentence, and do not amount to a substantive
rule.
Nor do the Batts II procedures reach “watershed status,” argues the
Commonwealth. This is hardly surprising, the Commonwealth continues, as
the United States Supreme Court has effectively limited the class of cases
establishing watershed rules to a class of one—Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
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U.S. 335 (1963) (requiring the appointment of counsel to indigent defendants
charged with felonies). See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 417-18
(2007) (“in the years since Teague, we have rejected every claim that a new
rule satisfied the requirements for watershed status”) (collecting cases).
Further undercutting Appellant’s claim that Batts II announces a
watershed procedural rule, the Commonwealth posits, is that Miller and
Montgomery anticipated states would create procedural rules to implement
Miller’s new substantive rule. It insists this is all the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court did in its Batts II decision, as the Superior Court has since recognized.
Appellee’s brief at 28 (citing Commonwealth v. Foust, 180 A.3d 416, 429
(Pa.Super. 2018) (“After deciding the merits of Batts’ appeal, our Supreme
Court ‘exercise[d its] constitutional power of judicial administration to devise
a procedure for the implementation of the Miller and Montgomery decisions
in Pennsylvania.’”) (quoting Batts II).
Appellant first submits that Batts II expresses a substantive rule, as he
claims it forbids imposition of a LWOP sentence upon a defined class of
individuals, namely, those whom the Commonwealth cannot prove beyond a
reasonable doubt are incapable of rehabilitation. In other words, he says
Batts II protects a class of individuals from a discretionary LWOP sentence
beyond the Commonwealth's authority. Appellant's brief at 29. We disagree.
It was Miller, not Batts II, that announced the relevant substantive
rule requiring retroactive application when it held sentencing a juvenile to life
without parole is excessive for all but "the rare juvenile offender whose crime
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reflects irreparable corruption[.]" Id., at 479-480. See also Montgomery,
136 S.Ct.. at 734 (recognizing Miller issued a new substantive rule requiring
retroactive application to collateral appeals). Indeed, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court specifically announced it was providing with its Batts
II decision a procedural overlay to Miller in order to advance implementation
of Miller. As such, Batts II did not represent an extension of Miller by
defining an additional class of juvenile offenders capable of rehabilitation and,
thus, insulated from LWOP sentencing. Instead, it only developed procedures,
rooted in Miller’s principal considerations of juvenile sentencing, that would
optimize accurate identification of rehabilitable juveniles coming under
Miller’s protection.
This conclusion aligns with the precept in Schriro and its progeny that
whether a new rule is substantive or procedural is largely driven by a
consideration of the function of the rule at issue, we discern that the new rule
in Batts II may fairly be said to regulate only the procedures for determining
a juvenile offender’s capacity for rehabilitation. As such, the rule is
procedural, not substantive. See Welch, 136 S.Ct. at 1265-66. For these
reasons, we conclude Batts II announced no substantive rule qualifying for
retroactive application to cases pending on collateral review.
Alternatively, Appellant argues, Batts II created a "watershed rule of
criminal procedure requiring retroactive application." Appellant's brief at 33
(emphasis omitted). "Even if Batts II is deemed procedural, it satisfies
Teague's second exception as a "watershed rule[ ] of criminal procedure[,]"
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Appellant posits, because the change is "necessary to prevent an
impermissibly large risk" of inaccuracy in a criminal proceeding and also
"alter[s] our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to
the fairness of a proceeding." Appellant's brief at 33 (acknowledging standard
expressed in Whorton, 549 U.S. at 418 (internal quotations omitted)).
Appellant also claims that "[t]he requirements under Batts II upend juvenile
homicide sentencing hearings, recognizing the distinct nature of life without
parole and protecting against such a sentence for a certain class of
youth." Appellant's brief at 34.
We discern no "impermissibly large risk" of inaccuracy in LWOP
proceedings when Miller repeatedly emphasized how rare it is for a juvenile's
crime to reflect incorrigibility and admonished that a LWOP sentence should
be an uncommon occurrence. 4 Clearly, the aim of the Batts II procedural
____________________________________________
4To our earlier discussion of such references in Miller, we add the following
principled insights from the seminal decision that served as a template for the
Batts II procedural scheme:
“[G]iven all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision
about children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for
change, we think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles
to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon. That is
especially so because of the great difficulty we noted in Roper and
Graham of distinguishing at this early age between “the juvenile
offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient
immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 573, 125 S.Ct. 1183;
Graham, 560 U.S. at 68, 130 S.Ct., at 2026-2027. Although we
do not foreclose a sentencer’s ability to make that judgment in
homicide cases, we require it to take into account how children
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scheme is to reduce misapplications of Miller in juvenile sentencing, and its
specific requirements regarding presumptions and burdens are well-designed
toward that end.
Yet, precedent teaches that “the chance of a more accurate outcome
under the new procedure normally does not justify the cost of vacating a
conviction whose only flaw is that its procedures ‘conformed to then-existing
constitutional standards.’” Teague, supra, at 310. In this regard, Miller’s
standards, embracing as they did a clear repudiation of not only mandatory
LWOP sentencing schemes but also the notion of commonplace discretionary
LWOP sentences, did much to clarify how sentencing courts should view
evidence of a juvenile’s capacity to rehabilitate. While Batts II provides a
delineation of procedures that aid in this evidentiary review, we stop short of
____________________________________________
are different, and how those differences counsel against
irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Miller, at
479-480.
“‘[o]nly a relatively small proportion of adolescents’ who engage
in illegal activity ‘develop entrenched patterns of problem
behavior.’” Miller at 471 (at 570) (citation omitted).
“We reasoned that those findings—of transient rashness,
proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences—both
lessened a child’s ‘moral culpability’ and enhanced the prospect
that, as the years go by and neurological development occurs, his
‘deficiencies will be reformed’” Miller, at 570 (citation omitted).
Incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth. Life without the
possibility of parole forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.
It is “at odds with a child’s capacity for change.” Miller, at 473
(citation omitted).
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declaring it to have altered our understanding of Miller’s bedrock elements
informing a fair proceeding.
Indeed, in Batts II, our Pennsylvania Supreme Court distilled Miller’s
essential observations—appropriate occasions for LWOP sentences will be
uncommon; it will be the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption; and fundamental differences between children and
adults counsel against LWOP sentences for juveniles—into a procedural
scheme requiring sentencing courts to presume juveniles can rehabilitate and
placing upon the Commonwealth the burden to prove otherwise beyond a
reasonable doubt. To be sure, our Supreme Court acknowledged Miller’s
pivotal role in the formulation of the Batts II presumption and burden of proof
assignment where it noted “any suggestion of placing the burden on the
juvenile offender is belied by the central premise of Roper, Graham, Miller,
and Montgomery. . . .” Batts II, 163 A.3d at 452.
Such a scheme, therefore, represents the manifestation of Miller’s clear
charge for mitigated sentencing with the opportunity for parole in the vast
majority of juvenile cases.
Rather than including Batts II among the ranks of Gideon—the only
decision recognized by the United States Supreme Court as issuing a
watershed procedural rule—we understand Batts II as announcing a new rule
that nevertheless rests largely on the Miller precedent. As such, Batts II
provides a most salient directive regulating the manner in which sentencing
courts are to implement Miller’s governing considerations.
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We, therefore, decline to find Batts II established a watershed
procedural rule necessitating retroactive application to collateral proceedings.
Accordingly, Appellant’s final challenge fails.
Order affirmed.
Judge Stabile has joined the Opinion.
Judge Strassburger files a Concurring/Dissenting Opinion.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/19/18
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